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T H E O R Y: 
 
1 
1. Introduction 
Governments are in charge of administrating the well-being of a society. In 
respect to environmental problems it will be shown, that governmental 
interference is needed. “Wealth” of societies is stated by [Wicke et al 1991] to 
consist of  
• material goods (e.g. the production of a refrigerator at some expense 
of natural environmental decay by the emissions etc. caused) and  
• non-material goods (e.g. better air quality at some expense of 
renouncement of material consumer goods).1 
Both categories contribute to the needs of individuals and increase their utility.2 
The welfare of a society as a whole is (following the individualist postulate) the 
sum of all utilities of the individuals within a society. 
Individuals have their preferences at different level of endowments (of material 
and non-material goods). Governments are in charge to restore the social 
optimum for all inhabitants of a country between these two conflicting goals of 
societies3 
• on the one hand creation of wealth of a certain community by 
establishing an environment prosperous for economic activities (driven 
by the individuals the strive for profit-maximization), and 
• on the other protecting natural environment from deterioration since it 
is again a factor for influencing societal wealth in economic (e.g. 
influencing yields in agriculture) but also private sense (e.g. bike-
riding-tour in sound nature). Moreover protecting the environment can 
involve using capital, labour, etc., which are therefore not available to 
other purposes.4 
Pollution per se is being perceived as something bad, but also follows from 
production of necessities. Hence it can be argued, that pollution imposes both 
benefits and costs. [Krugman et al 2008] explain that the answer to the social 
optimal quantity of pollution is located where the marginal cost of pollution (being 
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3 [Wicke et al 1991], p. 6 et seq. 
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“the additional cost imposed on society as a whole by an additional unit of 
pollution”) equals the marginal benefit of pollution.5 
The fact that environmental protection is a pure public good, leads to insufficient 
allocation. This makes governmental interference in the market necessary to 
ensure the allocation of the social optimum (constituting an environmental state, 
that it will harm the public). Preventing environmental degradation competes with 
the establishment of an atmosphere wherein businesses can prosper in order to 
generate enough jobs for inhabitants. Governments are yet again financially 
dependent on taxes paid. Since most countries create their state-income by levies 
on income, return and added value, the function of reallocation of course is 
essential in respect to social equity. At the same time the state of the natural 
environment impacts on economies (most of all in the agricultural sector): 
climate change causing extreme weather conditions like heavy snowfalls, storm, 
acid rain, floods, hail can affect yields e.g. in farming, but also damage goods 
(cars), affect the electricity-supply, cause delivery problems etc. 
The chart of [Munich Re] “presents the economic losses and insured losses, 
adjusted to present values. The trend curves verify the increase in catastrophe 
losses since 1950” and serves as verification that human impacts on the 
environment have a boomerang effect heavily affecting economic losses: 
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Figure 1: Economic losses and insured losses – Absolute values and long-term 
trends (2004); Source: [Munich Re 2004], p.15 
 
Every government has their own regulation schemes to overcome and impede 
certain environmentally challenging behaviours, being formed by the influence of 
different interest groups. Associations of the economy and environmental 
protection lobbies are indirect social actors of environmental protection trying to 
influence decision-making processes of national governments and international 
organisations (by forming together in umbrella organisations).6 For the long run it 
is important to restore to the use of environmental economics measures to put 
economies on sustainable paths with balanced measures to sustain Pareto 
optimality. 
1.1. Research Questions 
In order to reach the Research Objective the following specific research questions 
have been formed: 
• Why are environmental issues causing market failures and is 
governmental interference the solution to the problem? 
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• Which normative and non-normative instruments are there for 
governments to steer the economy towards the social optimum of 
environmental protection graded by the respective grade of market-
interference of these instruments? 
• How does the ruling economic power of business evolve and which 
possibilities to counteract governmental regulations open up for 
businesses? 
The stress field of governments and businesses shall be analysed by firstly listing 
the range of options governments have in terms of regulating instruments to 
achieve environmental protection, by the order of increasing governmental 
interference. Secondly, anticipated counter pressure opportunities of businesses 
are plotted, respectively listed by the rising grade of “severity” of their 
implications. This paper should therefore meet the interest of students or any 
other persons involved with the questions of how interactions between economy 
and environmental policy occur. 
1.2. Definition of the Terms 
1.2.1. Environment 
[Wicke et al 1991] states that the “environment” in its widest sense is “the whole 
of factors designating existence” therefore including the sociological, spatial and 
biological (ecological) concerns of environment, and the “conditions of air, water, 
soil, fauna and flora” in the narrowest sense.7 The definition of the term 
“environment” is crucial for understanding content and fields of application of 
environmental law, because it implies specific consequences on the radius of 
action and definition of norms. 
1.2.2. Environmental Issues 
According to [Wicke et al 1991] Sources for environmental problems derive from 
development factors (population and economy growth, ongoing tendencies of 
urbanization, technical changes), socio-economic factors (public good-
problems, existing externalities, environmental damaging behaviour of 
individuals) and system-related factors (economic system, policy).  
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Environmental issues are mainly covered by the following concerns many of them 
fuelling each other: 
• Climate change (covering the implications of global warming and 
dimming; efforts on the mitigation of greenhouse gases that are 
causing climatic changes, as e.g. through the Kyoto Protocol) and 
Ozone depletion  
• Energy usage concerns (reduction of societal consumption of fossil 
fuels; switching to alternative (low-carbon), renewable energy and 
efficient use of energy, but also threats arising from nuclear power 
usage, and residual radioactive waste). 
• Conservation necessities for threatened species extinctions 
(preservation of species or whole ecosystems from extinction e.g. 
through whaling; hence, protection of biodiversity and establishment of 
nature reserves also in order to counteract habitat destruction and 
fragmentation) 
• Air, water, soil and noise pollution (e.g. oil spills, acid rain) by the use 
of toxins (Chlorofluorocarbons, Dioxin, heavy metals, herbicides, 
pesticides), (toxic) waste reduction and recycling and the exploitation 
of scarce natural resources (overfishing, logging, mining) 
• Environmental impacts of huge building projects (e.g. dams), 
genetically engineered food, overpopulation, urban sprawl and 
intensive farming (e.g. monocultures, overgrazing).  
In the following the term environmental degradation shall be used covering all of 
these negative impacts on environment throughout the paper.  
1.2.3. Environmental Policy 
Environmental policies try to tackle the problems mentioned above by 
implementing strategies that are directed towards balancing quantities (of 
material and immaterial goods) by either 
• Direct measures on environmental degrading goods or actions (on 
pollution itself) reflecting true social costs, or regulating their 
quantities by law by emission taxes etc., or  
• Indirect measures where the source of the environmental degradation 
is not traceable and only the original activities or goods that yield 
certain pollution can be targeted (as for example traffic congestions 
caused by too many cars on the road) mostly regulating quantities by 
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taxes and production permits on these indirect sources of origin (e.g. 
by product charges). 
Generally it should be aimed at approaching the sources of environmental 
degradation directly, because it gives incentives to pollution abatement.8  
Environmental policy making can be considered to be a collective argumentative 
process to reach sustainability, weighing up social benefits and costs and setting 
certain priorities, monitoring the condition of nature to draw conclusions from it, 
and finding arguments for and against different positions.9 
1.2.4. Environmentalism 
Environmentalism is the support of or involvement with the environmental 
movement by individuals. Nowadays it is a social movement, which seeks to 
influence the political process by lobbying, education, activism and setting an 
example in order to protect natural resources and ecosystems.  
2. Historical Review and Present 
2.1. Development of Multinational Companies and 
Trade Regulation  
After the Second World War circumstances such as rising labour costs in 
developed countries, increasing consumer demand for novelties, improved 
transportation possibilities, new communication facilities and the economies of 
scale (inter alia) triggered the expansion and the building of transnational 
corporations.10 By the early 1970s, multinational enterprises already attracted 
considerable public concern: the argument being that expansion focused primarily 
on the exploitation of natural and human resources in third-world-countries. 
These arising ethical issues also included environmental impacts. Due to the fact 
that multinationals are key players in the world economy (some with yearly 
revenues in the size of the GNP of whole countries), these companies dispose 
over a great economic and hence also political power, which can easily lead to 
reaping benefits for the company and its proprietors. The perception that these 
companies operate in a vacuum between ineffective national laws and non-
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9 [Bøgelund 2006], p. 79 
10 Information of the subsequent paragraph is mainly based on the information taken 
from [Fowler 1995] 
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existent or unenforceable international laws has heightened concerns about the 
current reach and effectiveness of environmental regulation.11 [Fowler 1995] 
stating that "[w]ith the exception of a handful of nation-states, multinationals are 
alone in possessing the size, technology, and economic reach necessary to 
influence human affairs on a global basis."  
Clearly, multinationals aim for liberalized trade in the global economy. Also the 
developments in trade regulation are generally perceived to contribute to 
environmental degradation with the liberalization of international trade by 
increasing pressure on natural resources12 and increased flow of goods. According 
to [Sampson 2002], former Director of the Trade and Environment Division of the 
WTO, “numerous quantitative studies that have explored the link between growth 
and environmental degradation have been far from convincing”. The explanation 
he gives is that not free trade itself causes for environmental damage but 
“inappropriate production and consumption patterns and the failure to implement 
environment-management programs to deal with the negative implications of 
growth”. As a fact, trade regulations and agreements are the main determining 
factors for how natural resources are used and major decisions on trade policy 
are taken on the level of the WTO. The committee of the WTO notes that actions 
taken to protect the environment and the impact they are having on trade can 
play an important role in some environmental agreements, particularly when 
trade is a direct cause of the environmental problems. But it also points out that 
trade restrictions are not the only actions that can be taken, and they are not 
necessarily the most effective, because alternatives include helping countries 
acquire environmentally-friendly technology, giving them financial assistance, 
providing training, etc. A further consideration brought up by [Sampson 2002] is 
that removed trade restrictions can result in more environmental conservation 
activities because of the reduced use of scarce natural resources in better 
functioning markets through enhanced competition. Undoubtedly this is a possible 
causal coherence, but unfortunately IMHO seems to be rather wishful thinking 
than a general fact at present. 
                                          
11 [Fowler 1995] 
12 [Nissen 1997] 
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2.1.1. The Development of the WTO and Environmental 
Concerns 
After the Second World War 15 countries began negotiations trying to correct the 
legacy of protectionist measures remaining from the early 1930s. 23 founding 
members eventually signed 1947 a package of trade rules and tariff concessions 
affecting about one fifth of the world’s total trade13. The multilateral trading 
system started to evolve in the 1960s, when a series of multilateral negotiations 
took place known as “trade rounds”, bringing about further development of 
international trade liberalization, held under GATT’s auspices. 
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the successful reduction of tariffs were followed by 
a series of economic recessions driving governments to devise other forms of 
protection for sectors facing increased foreign competition (establishing bilateral 
market-sharing arrangements with competitors and embarking on a subsidies 
race) trying to countervail high rates of unemployment and factory closures. The 
GATT had been found wanting14 and the General Agreement from 1940 lagged 
behind the changes that beginning globalisation had brought about: world trade 
had become far more complex and important, international investment had 
expanded and the GATT’s institutional structure and its dispute settlement system 
needed refurbishment and extension to a multilateral system. 
From 1986 to 1994 negotiations of the “Uruguay Round” (constituting the most 
extensive of all eighth GATT rounds) marked a major step in the recognition of 
the relationship between trade and the environment and the need to 
achieve a balance15, but failed to clarify the relationship between multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs), therefore not solving the potential conflicts 
that could arise through possible restrictions of trade (in order to achieve 
environmental goals). Further decisions on how to incorporate these agreements 
were “desperately”16 needed in order to support the environmental objectives of 
MEA, without endangering indiscrimination. 1994 the Committee on Trade and 
the Environment (TEC) was established to include and analyse environmental and 
sustainable development issues. 
                                          
13 USD 10 billion, stated by the WTO 
14 It is stated that e.g. in agriculture loopholes in the multilateral system were heavily 
exploited, and efforts liberalizing agricultural trade had little success. 
15 [Nissen 1997] 
16 [Nissen 1997] 
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During the Uruguay Round the original GATT articles were reviewed, leading to 
the establishment of the WTO 1995, being a supranational organisation and 
constituting a single institutional framework encompassing the GATT with all 
agreements and arrangements concluded under its auspices (including the results 
of the Uruguay Round). In the preamble of the Agreement establishing the WTO it 
is stated that “[members’] relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour 
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living [etc.] and 
expanding […] trade […], while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s 
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, 
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the 
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and 
concerns at different levels of economic development”17, but there is no specific 
agreement dealing with the environment. 
The WTO and its agreements expanded its competencies (in addition to the trade 
in goods already regulated under GATT) to trade in services and agriculture and 
to include the trade of intellectual property. It modernized its dispute settlement 
system and implemented a monitoring tool called “Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism” (DSU – Dispute settlement understanding18) to regularly review 
national trade policies and practices of GATT members.  
After the Marrakesh Agreement in 1994 commitments were incorporated into the 
Doha Development Agenda 200119. Further negotiations should clarify the 
situation of WTO members being party to environmental agreements and the 
possible fields of conflict of specific trade obligations (and measures taken) 
arising through the participation in multilateral environmental agreements with 
WTO rules20. The TEC analyses the relationship between trade liberalization 
(including the Uruguay Round commitments) and the protection of the 
environment and is especially involved in the exploration of relevant 
environmental issues and the identification of WTO rules that need to be clarified. 
An example brought up by the WTO is that the impact of fishery subsidies 
provided by governments was studied aiming for improvement of WTO rules 
applying to fishery subsidies. Since subsidies can be environmentally damaging if 
                                          
17 [WTO 01]; [WTO 02] 
18 [WTO 03], Article 1 in Annex 2 
19 [WTO 04] 
20 [WTO 05] stating that “[so] far, no action affecting trade and taken under an 
international environmental agreement has been challenged in the GATT-WTO system.” Status: 
2007 
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leading to too many fishermen chasing too few fish, this is of course a very good 
example.  
There are about 200 multilateral environmental agreements outside the WTO 
dealing with various environmental issues currently in force. According to the 
WTO approximately 20 of these include provisions that could affect trade by 
banning trade of certain products, or allowing countries to restrict trade in certain 
circumstances as e.g. the Basel Convention (trade and transportation of 
hazardous waste across international borders), etc. 
2.1.2. Possible Areas of Conflict of Trade and Environment 
Examples of provisions in the WTO agreements dealing with environmental 
issues21: 
• Measures serving environmental objective are recognized as legitimate 
under paragraph (g) of Article XX [i.e. 20] of the GATT 1994.  
• GATT Article 14 and Article 20 exempt various policies affecting trade 
in goods and services for protecting human, animal or plant life or 
health from normal GATS disciplines under certain conditions (but also 
provides certain criteria such as non-discrimination) 
• Technical Barriers to Trade (i.e. product and industrial standards), and 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (animal and plant health and 
hygiene) explicitly recognize environmental objectives. 
• Intellectual property regulations allow governments the refusal of 
issuing patents that threaten human, animal or plant life or health, or 
risk serious damage to the environment (TRIPS Article 27). 
• Agricultural environmental programs are exempt from cuts in subsidies 
• Up to 20% subsidies of firms’ costs for adapting to new environmental 
laws are allowed 
• Negotiations on the reduction or elimination of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to environmental goods and services. 
 
The Principle of Extraterritoriality forbids forcing another MS into the 
implementation of environmental standards or regulations of domestic law, 
because possible protectionist abuses (disguised restriction on international 
trade): imports could be banned merely because of different environmental, 
                                          
21 following paragraph is mainly based on information retrieved from [WTO 06] 
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health and social policies. An example is the “tuna-dolphin”-dispute 1991: the 
U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act set dolphin protection standards not only for 
the domestic fishing fleet, but also for all fishing boats harvesting yellow-fin tuna, 
banning imports not proving their compliance with U.S. standards. The WTO 
recommends using the provisions of an international environmental agreement 
rather than forcing other countries into changing their environmental policies. But 
also the “Product” Versus “Process” Principle tackles the problem that occurs 
if trade rules permit action to be taken against the method used to produce goods 
(rather than the quality of the goods themselves) as happened in the mentioned 
case above. A possible measure would be to apply regulations on the quality or 
content of a product imported, which can be achieved by eco-labelling 
requirements. The role of the TEC is to examine whether existing WTO rules 
stand in the way of eco-labelling policies, and to judge whether labelling 
describing “the way” a good is produced (rather than the product itself) complies 
with the rules of the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement. It is IMHO to be 
hoped, that the WTO will not interfere in this concern: consumer welfare is also 
created by spending on the well-being of others (because of the declining 
marginal utility of income, i.e. explaining donations). “Fair trade” labelled goods 
are about buying the fact that the coffee-grower has access to medical care and 
receives a just share of the margin, being issues on “how” the good was 
produced, but not about the quality of the good itself and a possible case of these 
considerations of interference with WTO rules. Another principle is the Non-
Discrimination: WTO Members are free to adopt their own policies aimed at 
protecting the environment, but respect the rights of other Members. The case 
“United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products” has 
shown the difficulties occurring in their implementation that has to be overcome 
by MS agreeing on amendments or waiving the rules (by decisions). The 
Transparency-Principle requires WTO members to provide as much information 
as possible about adopted environmental policies or actions they may take (if 
these are judged to have a significant impact on trade) by notifying the WTO, 
again causing IMHO an administrative burden to many environmental policy 
instruments. Also in the case of a domestic prohibition of goods countries are 
required to inform on environmental or public health dangers concerning 
dangerous chemicals. Since international agreements exist (e.g. the Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and their Disposal) the WTO “plays a complementary role” at best. It still is to be 
judged as dangerous IMHO, that an institution is capable to decide whether a 
restriction of exports of certain hazardous or toxic products is allowed to be 
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undertaken, which is not taking over the responsibility for possible impacts on 
human health (evidence may still be lacking), opposing the implementation of the 
precautionary principle. Regarding Intellectual property and services, the TEC 
notes that clauses in the agreements on services and intellectual property allow 
governments to give priority to their domestic environmental policies and it might 
even be argued that the agreements could help facilitate countries to obtain 
environmentally-sound technology and products. Also WTO Dispute settlement 
procedures rule to be the only possible forum for settling disputes if they arise 
due to actions taken by a country participating an environmental agreement 
outside the WTO and not all parties concerned are members of according 
environmental agreement. 
2.1.3. Future Outlook 
Assessing environmental problems of liberalization and making provisions to solve 
them should be a national task (maybe assisted by NGOs, especially in 
developing countries, as suggested by [Sampson 2002]) and should not be 
shifted into the realms of the WTO, which could be considered to only be an 
additional expansion of its competencies of non-trade matters. Moreover the 
issue has to be viewed critically in the light that the WTO is not a democratic 
institution responsible for public concerns but lacking transparent decision 
processes (also not offering NGO’s the chance to participate). According to 
[Sampson 2002] “the WTO does not want to become an environmental policy-
making or enforcement body - nor should it become one.” On international level, 
unfortunately, environmental law has not (yet) managed to install a comparable 
counterbalance by the implementation of powerful agreements in respect to the 
WTO, providing mechanisms for settlement of disputes being subject to 
enforceable compensation. This gap will have to be filled to enable the tackling of 
environmental issues at international level. 
2.2. Development of Environmental Movement 
The laissez-faire politics in Europe were characterised by an economic doctrine 
opposing governmental interference in economic affairs (economic 
interventionism and taxation) beyond the minimum necessary for the 
maintenance of security, peace and property rights and resulting in a usually 
deliberate abstention from direction or interference especially with individual 
freedom of choice and action for a system of free enterprise to operate according 
to its own economic laws, believing that private initiative and production are best 
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to roam freely.22 This doctrine also embodied free trade and that a state ought 
not to interfere with protectionist measures (such as tariffs) in order to block or 
limit trade between countries, forming a purely economical liberal market view, 
believing that the market would dispense with inefficiencies in a more deliberate 
and quick manner than any legislating body could. The basic idea is that less 
government interference in private economic decisions (such as pricing, 
production, consumption and distribution of goods and services) results in a more 
efficient economy. Economist Adam Smith posed his invisible hand-theory: since 
the only way to produce income would be through voluntary exchange, and thus 
the only way to earn money would be to produce what others wanted, he 
believed it was the free market guiding people to act in the public interest by 
following their own self-interest. In the 19th century some European countries 
followed this doctrine, resulting in free trade treaties being signed. However, at 
the end of the century these countries found themselves taking up economic 
protectionism again: after several industrial accidents and other (more insidious) 
cases of environmental catastrophes, as for example the destruction of the Rhine 
(by the pharmaceutical industry giant Sandoz), had shown the damage that could 
be caused by purely profit-driven (environmentally blind) performance. The first 
treaties concerning international waters in Europe were signed. However, these 
treaties had not yet an implication on the quality of water per se, but more on 
laying down founding rules for fishery and shipping usage, especially concerning 
the bilateral contracts.23 Environmental protection activities on an international 
basis began already in the beginning of the 1940s by interstate instances of 
arbitration. Massive industrial expansion before and after the World Wars also 
sparked unbridled industrialisation and urbanisation, mining, logging, air 
pollution, etc. but still only a small number of people tried to raise awareness of 
environmental destruction. At that time the oceans and rivers were considered 
unlimited in size, holding fish forever (as it has been the credo in the GDR until 
the big North See fish depletion and breakdown of fishery). Rachel Carson's book 
“Silent Spring” published in 1962, not only led to the ban of DDT in American 
agriculture, but also catalysed environmentalism on an international level raising 
new public awareness to environmental issues and impacts on human health. 
In Europe environmental protection as a topic of international discussion has only 
come up in 1968, when the Council of Europe released a policy statement on the 
                                          
22 The French term “laissez faire”, is short for “laissez faire, laissez aller, laissez passer” 
meaning “let do, let go, let pass” (people as they choose) Source: [Merriam-Webster] 
23 [Lang 1989], p. 14 
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control of air pollution.24 European interest grew sharply during the environmental 
movements of the late 1960s25 and experienced a great push when the Club of 
Rome published its famous study “The Limits to Growth” in 197226. Also local TV-
shows such as Bernhard Grzimek’s “Ein Platz für Tiere” (in Austria and Germany) 
and a number of events as for example an incident of extreme air pollution in the 
Ruhr area and oil spills, lead to the building of environmental agencies and 
pressure groups that were formed during the 70s and 80s. 
2.2.1. Creation of International Environmental Institutions 
The environment was no longer perceived to be a free good (available in 
unlimited quantities), but being subject to scarcity and that the different functions 
how it serves the public (“public consumption good, providing natural resources 
and receptacle of waste” 27) are competing with each other (as discussed above). 
But particularly the issues of global public goods (e.g. air or water quality) are not 
restricted to certain international (or regional) levels and their institutional 
powers.28 Also the existence of international trade law and MNEs clearly 
necessitate matching organisations. Some international organisations and bodies 
having been established to protect the environment are stated in the following. 
Additionally to these international organisations the governments of all developed 
countries today have government departments or agencies devoted to monitoring 
and protecting the environment. Furthermore numerous international 
environmental agreements (made to protect the environment in different ways) 
exist. 
2.2.1.1. UNCHE, UNEP, Brundtland Report, UNCED, Agenda 21 
United Nations (UN) specialized agencies and other bodies within the UN system 
began to devote attention to the issue of climate change, notably the UN 
Environment Programme (UNEP), which was established to promote 
environmental practices based on the principles laid down in the Declarations of 
the UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), 1972 in Stockholm. 
Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration includes the famous statement of “Man 
has the fundamental right to freedom, equality, and adequate conditions of life, in 
an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he 
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27 [Siebert 1995], p. XIII 
28 See [Teegen 2003], p. 271 
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bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present 
and future generations.”29 It was then, when many industrialized countries 
created their own national agencies to address the question of environmental 
protection. The UNEP is responsible for the development of the international 
environmental law addressing issues such as the loss of bio-diversity, climate 
change or desertification etc.30. 1983, the UN General Assembly created the UN 
World Commission on Environment and Development, with Dr. Brundtland as 
chairperson, who in the 1987 Brundtland Report first coined the term 
“sustainable development” being "[m]eeting the needs of the present 
generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
needs […]"31. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) was held 1992 in Rio de Janeiro producing the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development laying down principles linking economic 
development to environmental protection in order to create sustainability. The 
declaration required global partnership involving governments, people and key 
sectors of society. In addition to the Rio Declaration, the governments attending 
UNCED also agreed an international action plan called Agenda 21, laying down 
foundations for the promotion of sustainable development in terms of social, 
economic and environmental progress.32 
2.2.1.2. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
In October 1988 the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the UNEP 
established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in Toronto. 
The UN-general assembly named the problem of the climate change for the first 
time. In 1990 the first IPCC report was published and the UN-general assembly 
entered into negotiations on United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and arranged the Inter-state Negotiation Committee (INC). 
2.2.1.3. Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) 
The CEC is an international organisation created by Canada, Mexico and the U.S. 
under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and 
was established to address regional environmental concerns, to help prevent 
potential trade and environmental conflicts, and to promote the effective 
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enforcement of environmental law. The Agreement complements the 
environmental provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
2.2.1.4. European Environment Agency (EEA) 
The agency of the European Union is an independent body established by EEC 
Regulation 1210/1990 (on the establishment of the European Environment 
Agency and the European environment information and observation network) and 
became operational in 1994. In cooperation with the European Environment 
Information and Observation Network (EIONET), it shall gather and disseminate 
comparable environmental data and is therefore devoted to establishing a 
monitoring network and to protect and improve the environment in accordance 
with the provisions of the Treaty and Community environment action programs, 
with a view to establishing sustainable development within the Community. Its 
role is purely advisory but tries to accelerate the adoption of new measures and 
assesses the impact of decisions already adopted. Its tasks are set to provide 
comparable information for enhanced measurability at evaluating the 
implementation of the measures and to ensure that the public is properly 
informed on the state of the environment.33 
2.2.1.5. International NGOs and “Soft Law” 
International “soft law” is a category of norms, which lacks the compulsory 
character of traditional law systems, but is respected by the political consensus of 
nations and therefore has certain expectations concerning its implementation. 
This soft-law is mostly created by international organisations of governmental 
experts under many different terms/names: declarations, principles, guidelines, 
etc. However, nations having voted for adoption can only be expected to behave 
in accordance to the determined principles based on the principle of equity and 
good faith, because there is no central enforcement authority enforcing these 
legal systems. These agreements, therefore, depend to a very high degree on the 
good-will of nations and their governments. 
But international public goods (global warming concerns, clean air) offer nations 
to act as free riders34, just as economic actors do (initially causing the market 
failure because of high transaction costs involved with public goods): [Teegen 
2003] argues that national governments will rather be driven by their perceptions 
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of their specific nation’s interests35. [Andersson 1991] e.g. argues that 
“governments may respond to political pressure rather than maximize social 
welfare” stating that “[b]ecause pollution tends to hurt large unorganised groups, 
future generations, and those who are uninformed, there is likely to be a 
‘government failure’ resulting in too little protection of the environment.” 
Moreover, the problem is that government failure of one country can affect the 
level of environmental protection of others. Anderson’s findings suggest that 
“government failure is a major cause of environmental mismanagement” 
therefore even calling for an international institution to compensate for these 
failures.36 
Due to the supranational venue of global exchanges, national governments are 
unable to respond to these problems37. While markets knowingly fail to account 
for the externalities, the set-up of the current institutional structures also lead to 
institutional failure because of high transaction costs associated with the Pareto-
allocation of public goods. 
Being a consequence of the lack of formal international institutions [Teegen 2003] 
addresses international NGOs to be ‘‘third sector’’ entities bridging the gap of 
public and private interests on a global scale: these informal institutions are 
contributing significant change of the context “within which governments and 
MNEs interact”.38  
Environmental policy making, considered to be a collective argumentative process 
weighing up social benefits and costs, setting certain priorities, monitoring (of 
facts), drawing conclusions, finding arguments for and against different positions 
has to be influenced by the supranational paradigm of environmental concerns 
(enabling the view over the rim of the national tea-cup). On this subject 
[Bøgelund 2007] e.g. states that “key to this process is to make sure that diverse 
groups of actors are engaged in the assessment process, particularly those voices 
that are commonly unheard have a place at the table”39, which are most likely to 
associate via NGOs, representing bundled public interests. 
Environmental NGOs are private organisations involved in lobbying, advocacy, or 
conservation efforts and include international organisations (i.e. Bird Life 
                                          
35 [Teegen 2003], p. 271 
36 [Andersson 1991] 
37 [Teegen 2003], p. 271 
38 [Teegen 2003], p. 271 et seq. 
39 [Bøgelund 2006], p. 79 
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International)40 and national organisations in many countries (i.e. the 
“Transitforum Austria Tyrol”). Their core duties are the supervision of action of 
environmentally damaging companies, not only regarding the surveillance of the 
actual impact but also on their behaviour transcending future goals, and watch 
the lobbying on the European level closely. Through the (monetary or active) 
support of their members and possibility of building alliances they use their 
bargaining power to pursue their goals.  
But whereas regulated industry groups have a very high level of homogeneity of 
their wills and overcoming the free rider problem by obligatory membership fees, 
this is different to the aggregation of environmental interests: on a national and 
international level these become more heterogenic regarding the preferences of 
the individuals which priorities to set in environmental policy, how to tackle these 
and moreover struggle with the free rider effect. The crucial point is whether the 
economies of scale of joint operation outweigh these problems. [Revesz et al 
2007] suggest another important issue namely that the “large number of citizen 
breathers41, each with a relatively small stake in the outcome of a particular 
standard-setting proceeding, will be overwhelmed in the political process by 
concentrated industrial interests with a large stake in the outcome.”42 
NGOs are found to play a role in scientific boundary-work and the construction of 
expertise and the distribution of knowledge in a society by [Eden et al 2006] and 
[Hammar] states that “environmental institutions are one efficient means to 
loosen informational and political constraints in environmental policy, and, hence, 
that investment in environmental institutions is justified.” 
As nowadays the environmental discussion is held on a wide base and the 
protection of air, water, soil and noise abatement, waste prevention and disposal, 
energy saving and conservation are becoming a serious issue of public concern 
environmental institutions are (in the absence of a international institution) found 
to shape environmental awareness that can influence governmental reaction. 
                                          
40 just to name a few more: The Center for International Environmental Law, Earth 
Charter Organization, Environmental Investigation Agency, Environmental Law Association 
Worldwide, EthicalNetwork.org (Global Online community of environmentalists), Foundation for 
Environmental Education, Friends of the Earth, Green Cross International, Greenpeace, iNSnet, 
The Nature Conservancy, World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Worldwatch 
Institute, World Wildlife Fund, etc. 
41 In the example of clean air regulation 
42 [Revesz et al 2007], p. 61 
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2.2.2. General Conditions for Environmental Movements 
Tilly43 examined the development of environmental movement in the long run in 
Great Britain and gathered that the “sit-in” as a form of violent-free sitting-
protest-action had been used earlier but in the 1960s developed to be a standard 
protest form. 44 His Framing-theorem45 tries to take in many dimensions to 
explain under which conditions environmental groups build and how mobilization 
of people to fight for environmental improvement can be successful. Since the 
aim of social movements will always be the broadcasting of scandals and failures 
in order to overcome this lack, the problem itself, which is dealt with, takes an 
important role. Every social movement is triggered by the lack of something and 
by the hope, that this ‘need’ will be met in future, because authorities respond to 
the mismanagement. The response of the public to a topic is substantial. 
Influencing factors of success are: 
1) Freedom of the press: only in a system of free press (independent from 
government) decisions on what shall be printed will be unbiased.  
2) Social interest potential: Medias quote stories that interest. Logically seen, the 
larger the group of potentially interested people, the more resources the media 
can afford to invest in these topics.  
3) The effect on people: issues that affect people do not necessarily interest 
them. Since natural ecosystems surround us everywhere, there is a good 
chance that people find themselves affected, but in our modern world of 
supermarkets, cars, electronics and air-conditioned offices, many people are 
no longer “attached” to their relationship with nature. 
4) Personal ambition/ motivation: people must seek to solve ecological problems, 
focusing on the natural surroundings and must in any case care for the state of 
their natural surroundings, and see the direct link to their own level of well-
being.46. This also requires a certain level of education and the ability to see 
through the consequences of their individual actions. 
It ought to be mentioned at this point that the Coasian Theorem proposes a 
mechanism by which potential beneficiaries of a public good band together and 
                                          
43 In [Roose 2003]: Tilly, Charles 1978: From Mobilization to Revolution, New York u.a.: 
McGraw-Hill Publishing Company. 
44 [Roose 2003], p. 52 
45 [Roose 2003], p. 47 
46 [Roose 2003], p. 48-51 
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pool their resources based on their willingness to contribute to the creation of a 
public good. Coase argued that if the transaction costs between potential 
beneficiaries of a public good are sufficiently low, and it is therefore easy for 
beneficiaries to find each other and pool their money, then an adequate level of 
production for the public good could occur, even under competitive free market 
conditions. At the time when Coase developed this theorem in the 1960s he 
might not have anticipated the impact of the internet on the possibility to band 
together, which is now available for institutions like WWF, Greenpeace, etc. 
2.2.3. The Role of Law for Environmental Protection 
As shown in above sections, economic power has over time developed and 
enhanced its legal mechanisms to enforce its interest. Environmental law had to 
grow to protect nature respectively. 
Bearing in mind the market failures already discussed, environmental protection 
laws play an important role as a counterbalance to organised interests of 
economical power.47 To overcome human tendencies to maximize only their 
present individual profit, environmental law protects the environment for future 
generations, not yet having a voice to declare their interests and no lobby to 
defend their rights. Environmental politics, environmental law and environmental 
aid therefore need open public discussion to bundle and assert diffuse interests of 
the environment in contrast to the organized interests of economy. 
[Mercuro et al 1994] conclude that alterations in (environmental) law have “direct 
impact upon economic performance including environmental quality” and offer 
following line of reasoning: changes in law or working rules  lead to changes in 
the incentive structures  lead to changes in institutional behaviour  lead to 
changes in economic performance  lead to changes in natural resources and 
environmental quality.48 
Subject matter of environmental law is to be understood as “environmental 
protection law” which is suggested by [Epiney 2005]49 to be a more precise term. 
Further she argues that the open formulation of Art. 174 TEC seems to indicate a 
rather wide (maybe too unclear) environmental understanding which is of 
particular importance, because the definition of the term “environment” must be 
                                          
47 [Krämer 2002], p. 3-25 
48 [Mercuro et al 1994], p. 84 
49 [Epiney 2005], p. 3 et seq. 
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determined in a way, which enables realization of the laid down aims of the 
framework of common environmental politics. But interestingly the judiciary of 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities fails to deliver a definition of 
the term ‘environment’ and of the term ‘environmental protection’, which it refers 
to in its decisions.50 [Krämer 2002] states that in spite of all the guidelines and 
regulations, programs and plans, ceremonial statements, charters and 
conventions, the condition of the environment, is worsening. According to 
[Krämer 2002] the European Court is the least of all to blame, because on the 
whole the interpretation of rules for the protection of the environment is 
environmentally friendly and innovatively reinforced and environmental protection 
is a European Interest, but there is no group strong enough to conserve theses 
interests and assert them.51 
Tackling environmental problems is made more complicated by the increasing 
technical aspect not only of understanding the causes of numerous means of 
environmental pollution but also of approaching their effective avoidance or 
reduction, which again depend on an extremely high degree of developments in 
technology and technical engineering. 
Constitutional law cannot interfere to deal with technicalities, but it constitutes a 
framework paving the way for the incorporation of effective environmental 
protection law into “simple legislation”. TEC regulations include guidelines and 
principles for the development of the Common Environmental Law, and can be 
seen to define the general aim and scope of the material environmental law of 
MS. 
Both the Community and the MS are “responsible” for the protection of the 
environment, therefore competent. The Community’s and the MS’ legal system 
exist in parallel, with Community law being independent of individual state law, 
constituting a self-contained and developing legal system.52 
2.3. Birth of Environmental Legislation in Europe 
At its founding the EU had no environmental policy or laws53 and only began to 
address environmental concerns from 196854 on. Since then Common 
                                          
50 As per 2005, Source: [Epiney 2005], p. 4 
51 [Krämer 2002], p. 3 et seq. 
52 [Krämer 2002], p. 26 et seq. 
53 [Jordan 1999] 
54 [Lang 1989], p. 14 
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Environmental Law has increased the development of environmental protection 
by growing an infrastructure for conservation and the enhancement of importance 
in the agendas not only on the level of the European Community, but also of the 
member states (where pre-existing environmental policies have undergone a 
progressive change through their involvement in EU environmental 
policymaking).55 
According to [Krämer 2002] awareness of environmental problems, the existence 
of only one coherent environment and the need to restore and improve its quality 
has reached the member states of the European Union. Further it is stated that 
“practically all member states of the European Union give room to a minimum of 
50% [and higher] of common environmental law in their entire national 
environmental law”, also claiming that “a common conviction exists believing in 
the importance to work out, to ratify, to put into force and to develop common 
law for the care of environment.”56 
The treaties (constituting “primary legislation” comparable to constitutional law at 
national level) “lay down the fundamental features of the Union, in particular the 
responsibilities of the various actors in the decision-making process, the 
legislative procedures, under the Community system and the powers conferred on 
them”.57  
When the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC)58 was 
amended in 1987, the EEC started taking up tasks of environmental protection 
measures, along with increased responsibility in social and regional policies, since 
it was no longer a purely economic community (renamed by the Maastricht treaty 
to “European Community”). In 1993 the Community decided to aim for a high 
(however not the highest-possible!) protection level (Art.174 Abs. 2) based on 
the precautionary principle and preventive actions (polluter-pays-principle). Since 
1997 the principle of sustainable development is one of the EC’s main objectives 
and stipulates that environmental protection requirements must be integrated 
into the definition and implementation of other areas of Community policies.59 
Simultaneously this evolution can be observed in secondary community-law: in 
1979 the member states had still been strictly against a European law for nature 
                                          
55 [Jordan 1999] 
56 [Krämer 2002], p. 25 et seq. (translated by the author) 
57 [EU 04] 
58 which came into force in January 1958 
59 Art. 6 TEC 
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conservation (79/409 for the conservation of wild bird life), but in 1987 the EC-
contract was changed to embed the possibility of finding Community solutions. In 
1988 the court claimed that the conservation of bird wild life was a common 
European responsibility. Between 1988 and 2000 the destruction and depletion of 
the ozone layer led to a step-by-step ban of several ozone-destroying 
substances.60 In 1976 an industrial accident in Seveso caused the community to 
work out a common provision for the avoidance of major industrial accidents61, 
which had not been accepted before. The Europeanization of the market of the 
automotive industry and for products in general led to rules for end-of-life-
vehicles62 and for packing waste63. In these fields the progressive economic 
integration of Europe necessitated the elaboration of common environmental 
regulations, based on Art. 174 TEC. 
2.4. Current Legislation Of European Environmental 
Law  
European environmental law can neither be isolated from national legal systems 
nor can it be independent of general matters of the Community law. That is, 
because on the one hand, Community Law and National Law are correlated with 
each other, so that numerous mutual influences can be observed. On the other 
hand, the common environmental law is per se a part of the Community Law, so 
that its characteristics and specific features have to be taken into consideration, 
as they are playing an increasing role in the context of the growing importance of 
environmental law and political issues and their implications and challenges of 
international significance. 174 (1) TEC defines the bottom line of goals to reach 
within Common environmental policy and reinforce a statement of objectives of 
the EU environmental policy which are preserving, protecting and improving the 
quality of the environment, protecting human health, prudent and rational use of 
natural resources and promoting measures at international level to deal with 
regional and world wide environmental problems. 174 (2) TEC lists the applicable 
methods for the achievement of these objectives, laying down the guiding 
principles upon which environmental action must be based, being requirements 
regarding the content of Common environmental policy. [Epiney 2005] judges 
                                          
60 EC 2037/2000 
61 Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 (Seveso II) 
62 Directive 2000/53/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 
2000 on end-of-life vehicles, in: Official Journal L 269 of 21.10.2000,p. 34 
63 Council Directive 94/62/EC of 15 December 1994 on packaging and packaging waste, 
in: Official Journal Nr. L 365, p. 10 
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this as “remarkable” compared to other Common policies where objectives are 
also outlined, but not the way to achieve them.64 The “acquis” comprises 
approximately 300 legal instruments, mostly in the form of directives, covering 
environmental protection, polluting and other activities, production processes, 
procedures and procedural rights as well as products. Apart from laws that deal 
with cross-cutting issues (environmental impact assessments, access to 
information on the environment, combating climate change), quality and related 
emissions standards are set for air, waste management, water, nature protection, 
industrial pollution control, chemicals and genetically modified organisms, noise 
and nuclear safety and radiation. 
2.4.1. European Community Environmental Action Principles  
High-Level-Of-Protection Principle 
According to Art. 95(3) TEC the Commission must consider a high-protection-
level in their proposals (Art. 95(1) TEC) in the field of environmental protection 
(taking account of regional variations across the Community), just as the Council 
and Parliament must do. From the horizontal clause (Art. 6 TEC) and Art. 174 (2) 
sentence 1 TEC, it can be gathered that all environmentally relevant legal acts of 
the Community have to base their decisions starting from a high level of 
environmental protection However “high level of protection” does not mean 
“highest level” of protection, so that political and economic aspects can be taken 
into account. Further [Epiney 2005] assumes that the term “high level of 
protection” does not have an absolute but relative character, so that the 
definition of it has to take into consideration the circumstances of a certain 
region.65 
Precautionary Principle And Prevention-Rather-Than-Remediation-Principle 
Art 174 Abs. 2 Sentence 2 TEC says that the Community policy on the 
environment “shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principle 
that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a 
priority be rectified at source and the polluter should pay.” The preventive 
action principle concerns the defence of danger with (proven) relatively high 
likelihood. The precautionary principle can be seen to integrate preventive 
anticipation: it allows taking appropriate prevention-measures for even “only” 
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potential endangerment. This way intervention is possible before scientific proof is 
available on the grounds that a delay in the action will cause damage to nature 
and society although causality has not yet been proven indisputably.66 The 
precautionary principle can therefore be seen to lower the “inhibition threshold of 
intervention”. Considering the complicated interdependencies of environmental 
issues, the uncertain conditions of certain environmental problems and the 
persistence of insufficient knowledge (despite ongoing scientific research), this is 
an important step towards risk management. An example for an unrecognised 
environmental hazard is the use of CFCs that started in the 1940s: 30 years later 
scientists predicted that emissions of CFCs could lead to ozone depletion in the 
stratosphere. But the ozone hole over the Antarctic needed to be proved (1985) 
to bring about an environmental treaty (Montreal Protocol, 1987) eventually 
resulting in the ban of CFCs.67 One therefore has to include the requirement that 
protective measures can be developed before specific environmental hazards are 
evident, so that necessary measures for avoidance and abatement of potential 
hazards can be taken without having to wait for scientific ascertainment or 
realization of a certain possible threat. 
Proximity Principle 
This principle implies that environmental pollution should be dealt with at the 
nearest possible source (geographically seen) and at the earliest possible point in 
time.68 It parallels the precautionary and preventive action principle, since these 
also aim at the early control of environmental pollution. While the precautionary 
principle restores information under which conditions an environmental policy 
measure is to be taken, the point-of-source-principle implies when and where the 
measures are to be taken. 
Polluter Pays Principle 
The general idea behind this principle69 is that the polluter should bear the costs 
not only for the production, but should also forced to internalise the external 
effects (environmental costs), paying for the costs of avoidance, abatement or 
repair, reflecting “true costs” of certain polluting activities. In combination with 
the precautionary principle the polluter should be encouraged to abate, and 
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67 [UN Global Compact 02], p. 52 
68 Art. 174 Abs 2, sentence 2 TEC: […] environmental damage should as a priority be 
rectified at source […] 
69 Article 174 (2), sentence 2 TEC 
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should not only pay for the repair of existing environmental pollution but also for 
the costs of its avoidance. The idea of this principle is generally acknowledged but 
when implemented, several unsolved problems arise on the issues of causality, 
calculation, and percentage of cost-burden (etc.). 
Integration Principle 
The Integration Principle allows for the fact that environmental policy has cross-
sectional character: “[e]nvironmental protection requirements must be integrated 
into the definition and implementation of the community policies and activities 
referred to in Article 3 TEC, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable 
development”70. 
Environmental policy cannot be seen isolated and can only be successful if 
environmental concerns are integrated in all coherent policies (for example as 
infrastructure, agricultural and energy policies). This principle therefore implies to 
concede co-existence of the demands of the different policies (including 
environmental policy), without assigning a position of pre-eminence to any policy. 
2.4.2. Competences (Distribution of Power) in the EC 
How is the distribution of power organized in the European Community and who 
is responsible for the enforcement of environmental issues? The European Union 
has no “all-embracing competence” for ecological questions that concern the 
Community. According to [Krämer 2002] this follows from the Articles 3, 5 and 
174 TEC, dealing with the “Environmental Community Policy”, not drawing a 
sharp line between the environmental political competences. As MS have the 
decisive task of implementing Common Environmental Law on a national level 
they certainly play a crucial role. 
Primary and secondary Common law seem to provide a framework for the 
national governments, which can (within certain limits) considerably widen the 
scope, when adjusting legal texts to their necessities. Unfortunately, the 
framework’s limits are blurred and the control of compliance is not feasible to the 
extent needed, therefore MS have a wide range of possibilities to deviate from 
principles set by the EU in their day-to-day business.  
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27 
Although the Commission can open an infringement procedure according to 
Article 226 TEC If a MS is suspected to not applying Common law correctly, this 
comprises a 3 stage-procedure with an average duration of up to 4-571 years. 
IMHO this speaks for itself and the Commission cannot be seen as having 
sufficient capacities to enforce written law. 
3. Economic Reasons for Governmental 
Interference 
In this chapter it shall be discussed, why governments are actually interfering in 
the economy with respect to environmental issues. That governmental 
interference might well be needed in matters of reducing poverty by monetary 
redistribution (social equity) or safeguarding individuals and societal groups will 
not be the focus of this paper, although the environmental status cannot be seen 
completely detached, and there are major contributions to “environmental 
justice” already e.g. in the U.S.72. Generally governmental intervention will be 
justified, if the benefits for society outweigh societal costs. 
3.1. Market Failures 
The market mechanism based on prices and sales to adjust to the “optimal” level 
of resource allocation (cleared markets) may fail to provide the socially optimal 
combination of output, because of certain market imperfections of this 
mechanism, because supply and demand do not always lead to Pareto optimal 
points on the production possibilities curve. Following the definition of [Winston 
2006] market failure occurs, “when it is possible to make one person better off 
without making someone else worse off, thus indicating some degree of 
inefficiency”, hence not obtaining “Pareto optimality”.  
Yet again [Sagoff 1994] has been found to heavily criticize certain dogmas of the 
invisible hand doctrine, pleading on abandoning them, such as the proposition of 
neoclassical economics that “markets may fail to allocate resources efficiently, 
that is, to those willing to pay the most for them”.73 As a consequence he sees 
the interest in institutional context of production rising and turning towards 
empiricism - a postulation that can only endorsed by the author.  
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72 [Rutledge et al 2002] 
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In the following the main sources of market failure shall be explained.  
3.1.1. Public Good “Environment” 
Natural environment providing us with the supply of fresh water and clean air is 
understood to be a public “good”. In economics, a “good” is something that 
increases utility or satisfies a want. Further a public good is a good that is hard or 
even impossible to produce for private profit, because the market fails to account 
for its large beneficial externalities. Natural environment is not produced but 
given (even regenerating and increasing, e.g. harvest), but is deteriorated at the 
expense of production of environmentally impacting goods. 
A "pure" public good possesses the following properties:74 
• Joint-supply: a provided good is available to the public at no extra cost 
e.g. if water quality of the Danube is raised because of more stringent 
regulation on sewage treatment, everyone who wants to benefit the 
improvement, can: consumption of one individual does not reduce the 
amount left for others (in comparison to e.g. food, that once eaten is 
not available anymore to others) 
• Non-excludability: it is not possible to exclude a person selectively 
from the consumption of natural environment by prices as in private 
markets (in comparison to e.g. theatre, only consumed by those 
paying for the tickets). Over-fishing problems result from the 
impossible control (and charging) of the seas. 
Markets can only provide private goods (excludable and rivalrous) efficiently 
tending to under-produce public goods and over-produce private goods. Why, is 
explained in the following: 
3.1.1.1. Free-Rider-Problem 
The free rider problem constitutes an answer to why the free markets do not 
produce the social optimum of the public good “environmental protection”. 
The insufficient provision of the good “healthy environment” emerges from the 
existence of incentives for individuals not revealing their real (full) willingness-to-
pay as a consequence of the joint-supply characteristic of public goods: the 
production of public goods results in distributed benefits - nobody can be 
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excluded from the good once provided. Thus, it is possible for the individual to 
receive the benefit without contribution (at no extra cost) and is the resulting 
economic behaviour of a purely rational, gain-seeking individual (homo 
economicus) trying to minimize (own) costs to maximize (own) profits. The result 
is that private markets will provide suboptimal solutions. “If no one reveals what 
they are willing to pay, private producers cannot make a profit”. Companies 
underlying the concept of profit-orientation would not voluntarily exert any extra 
effort, unless e.g. subsidies are provided by the government or regulation urges 
companies to “produce” environmental protection: free-riders are waiting for 
someone else to pay, trying to reap the benefits free of charge. 
It has to be remarked, that there is also the phenomenon of non-individualistic 
behaviour: which incentives drive a company to overcomply with regulation whilst 
others tend to be environmental laggards? To some degree an explanation may 
partly be subscribed to the anticipation of additional tightening of regulations but 
all companies are faced with the fact that legislation is getting tighter, not looser. 
[Gunningham et al 2003] have tried to deliver explanations for these “variations 
in environmental performance” over time by an international examination of 
compliance-behaviour of 14 pulp and paper manufacturing mills, delivering 
complex reasons for the phenomenon of why some companies, but not others, 
tend to overcomply. One of their findings is that the “expectation of periodic 
tightening of regulatory standards has been responsible for beyond-compliance 
investments taken in anticipation of those governmental requirements”75. 
3.1.1.2. Tragedy of the Open Access (Problems of Overuse) 
However, the public good “healthy environment” has become a scarce resource76 
and is limited to certain areas. Considerably clean air is not available in all parts 
of the world and therefore IMHO environment is to be addressed as a public good, 
with different regional endowments. E.g. fish stocks in the open seas are rival in 
consumption (but fishing trawlers cannot be excluded from catching fish) and 
therefore belong to the group of common resources. 
Environmental protection problems that are related to free and easy access to 
resources77 (because of missing or ignored property rights) appear to be a 
consequence of individuals maximizing their profits by behaving as rational, 
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individual enterprisers. [Siebert 1995] gathers that the environment serves as 
“public consumption good, as a provider of natural resources, and as a receptacle 
of waste”78 - all of these functions competing with each other. Misallocation 
results from scarce resources being available at no cost. Therefore the use of the 
scarce resource “environment” requires a price. In the absence of private 
property rights, no self-orientated individual has an incentive to restrict the own 
environmental damaging behaviour leading to overproduction of pollution by 
missing incentives for e.g. purifying sewage before being released into rivers.79 
The impossibility to install property rights to environmental goods such as “air” 
the phenomenon must in these cases be prevented by governmental interference, 
for example by installing coercive laws (that will result in fines for transgressors) 
or using taxes to adjust a price to environmental degradation. 
3.1.2. Environmental Externalities 
Market activities that create side effects affecting uninvolved (third party) 
individuals by imposing costs on (but also providing benefits for) them without 
taking these into account include “externalities” (either positive or negative). 
Interdependencies exist between the utility functions (or production functions) of 
individuals80: consumer goods sold to both the producer’s and the consumer’s 
advantage (increasing wealth) can include the negative externalities of air 
pollution reducing the public good “clean air” for dwellers near the company. If 
the ones benefiting from pollution are not equal to those suffering under the costs 
of pollution they have no incentive to take these costs into account, leading to 
external costs borne by others (unless this asymmetry is being offset by 
governmental intervention (for example by enforcing compensation payments). 
As a prerequisite the impact has to be relevant to the individual’s utility function 
and affect them, because when individuals don’t care about external effect, 
although persistent, there is no external cost. Brent defines a potentially relevant 
externality to exist if “the activity actually performed generates any desire on the 
part of the affected party, A, to modify the behaviour of the party empowered to 
take action, B, through trade, persuasion, compromise, agreement, convention, 
collective action, etc.”81  
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Environmental pollution is mainly produced by the economy at extraction-, 
production-, logistics-, packaging-processes (etc.) and the residual waste after 
consumption. If the physical impacts on nature (e.g. emissions to air, noise, acid 
rain) interact with humans causing “expression of distaste, unpleasantness, 
distress, concern, anxiety”82 an uncompensated loss of human welfare can arise: 
external costs (or negative externalities). Examples for human welfare loss in 
literature are “health damage, morbidity and mortality increases, less pleasurable 
recreation experiences”83.  
3.1.2.1. Private vs. Social Costs 
In 1920 Pigou distinguished between private costs (direct costs of activity borne 
by consumer/producer) and full social costs on society as a whole (being the full 
costs of an activity including externalities), showing that pollution produces 
external costs making social costs the sum of private and external costs, and that 
firms therefore overproduce polluting goods. (Free) market revenues exclude 
consumer surplus (as shown in the next chapter) resulting in over- and 
underproduction in private market activity.84  
Only the measurement of external benefits and costs enables governments to 
correct coherent market-failures moving to market equilibrium by installing 
measures to adjust (shadow-) prices to negative external effects, so that they 
have to be internalised by the economy and by providing subsidies for positive 
externalities, taking into account monetary benefits for excluded factors.85  
The market equilibrium can only be reached if external costs and benefits are 
integrated, but yet governmental interference is not always needed under the 
conditions holding for the Coase theorem.86 
The Coase theorem87 suggests overcoming externality problems by introducing 
property rights and holds under the conditions of a small number of concerned 
negotiation partners to obtain a socially efficient outcome. This is not the case 
with many environmental problems (e.g. the problem of climate change as a 
result of carbon emissions) and the existence of too many bargaining parties and 
asymmetric information would not restore a solution in a reasonable period at 
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reasonable costs (because of transaction costs and delayed agreements). For the 
situations when the Coase theorem preconditions do not apply Pigou 
recommended tax (subsidy) instruments to internalising the externality according 
to the shadow price of the externality, constituting an increase of marginal costs 
(benefits). The social net benefit of such a tax is obvious, but it can also result in 
a segment of consumers being worse off.88 
a) Production Decision Failures 
As discussed above externalities impose costs on society in the absence of 
governmental regulation because producers do not take them into account: 
markets will under-produce goods that yield external benefits and over-produce 
goods that generate external costs. Seeing the problem from the macroeconomic 
view supply is beneficial for industries up to the quantity where their marginal 
costs equal marginal benefits (under perfect competition). But only internal 
(private) costs are taken into account and production will be continued neglecting 
environmental degradation (external costs) by further using environmental 
polluting production techniques or inputs (at lower individual costs, than more 
advanced cleaner technology) as long as it results to be more profitable: private 
companies do not concert their actions to maximize social welfare, but (tend to) 
only maximize their individual maximization of welfare. This is why industrial 
supply is not reflecting “the true costs to society of production of the good”89, 
resulting in an oversupply (and excessive consummation of goods due to prices 
which are too low as shown down below) than the quantity socially desirable, if 
the market is left to itself. To restore the social optimum, the industry supply 
curve must be corrected to include marginal social cost of goods and activities, 
meaning that it needs to be corrected to include the marginal costs of (negative) 
externalities. 
b) Consumption Decision Failures 
Wanting to maximize their own satisfaction the consumption decisions of 
individuals may also fail to consider the interdependence of their consumption 
patterns impacting the well-being of others. This is because market demand only 
takes the anticipated private benefits weighed up against the purchase price in 
account. But when external costs are involved, market demand augments social 
demand (or vice versa for external benefits). To install sustainability of demand, 
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full social costs and benefits must be reflected by additionally including accrued 
externalities. 
3.1.2.2. Consumer Surplus 
Measuring the Willingness to Pay (WTP) of individuals for certain goods allows one 
to measure whether there is an excess over the price paid to the WTP. This 
difference between the price actually paid and the price reflecting the real 
individual valuation is called Consumer Surplus (CS). One of the main reasons 
why (also perfectly competitive) markets fail to restore large projects is because 
they “fail to measure the full social benefits”90 with the CS seen to be of growing 
importance respective to the size of the project. This is because benefits are 
involved that “occur away from the margin where market prices operate” and 
result in market failures by causing under-production “even for small, marginal 
levels of private market activity”.91 It is further stated that the “inclusion of the 
consumer surplus is therefore a crucial difference between private and public 
decision-making”92. But there are difficulties entailed with the unbiased 
measurement of the CS, which can be seen to be correlating with the free rider-
problem. 
3.1.3. Asymmetric Information 
To detect situations in which the individuals suffer a utility decrease by the 
actions of another (hence, discovering an existent external cost) the individuals 
need information about the externality, its impacts on his utility function to start 
negotiations with the party causing the external effects. Let us consider an 
example of a pulp mill and the neighbouring dwellers. Monitoring air quality, 
water quality, etc. (ignoring the costs here) only delivers data. A transformation 
process of human intelligence has to turn “raw data” into information (or even 
knowledge) serving as the base for negotiation. In our example the dwellers 
would need to know, what level of air contamination of which chemical 
substances would cause which problems to their health (and what it would cost in 
respect to health care treatment and losses of life value). It cannot be assumed, 
that paper mills only build sites to individuals being experts in chemistry, 
physician, etc. Whereas “knowledge” requires that the right conclusions are 
drawn out of monitoring (sticking with the example) air and water quality it is 
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impossible to expect the average inhabitant to interfere with these subject 
matters. Of course these services could also be achieved by private companies, 
not only by governments, but the free-rider effect would presumably bias the 
covering of costs. 
The author therefore agrees with [Esty 2004] stating that information gaps and 
uncertainties lie at the heart of many persistent pollution and natural resource 
management problems. But further argumentation that new information 
technologies have the potential to fill these gaps (expanding options available for 
addressing environmental challenges) is only partly shared. As stated before, all 
other classical economic theory inputs (Labour, Capital, Land) will always be 
subject to scarcity, but searching the internet for information regarding a topic, it 
is common to have so many “hits”, that processing “all” or at least the greatest 
share of information available will take virtually “forever”. Special fields of 
business administration such as “Business Intelligence” deal with the problem of 
e.g. extracting relevant information for a business from all sources available, but 
struggles with problems of data inconsistency and unstructured formats making 
the automated processing of data difficult. 
Although the accumulation of information in today’s modern world is expanding 
with enormous velocity and new media (such as the internet) enable distribution 
the problem discussed above is still persisting for societies as a whole. 
Information can be perceived as an asset, which requires correct management to 
counteract challenges such as the decaying character of data, “unprecedented 
growth” of data volumes and the simultaneous increase in data extraction 
requirements to obtain decision bases, mutually fuelling each other if it not 
managed adequately. 
[Cerf 2007] even displays the critical dilemma of the exponentially rising (digital) 
data as a data-avalanche (having to be accumulated, indexed and stored) 
warning it could bury us (if not managed). With these arguments the author 
wants to make clear, that although information (or to be exact: data) might even 
exist, it cannot be expected of the individual to react in the appropriate way in 
respect to human limitation. 
A crucial requirement to the new communication technology is the more contents 
and context related structuring of data in the Internet. The classification of 
sources according to academic, credible, first-hand sources and ontologies (e.g. 
Taxonomies, Thesauri, Topic Maps) are only in their infancy and the fast, bundled 
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retrieval of validated data (not requiring the engagement in troublesome search) 
still needs development. 
If these preconditions will be fulfilled sometime ahead in future it will be “easier 
to identify harms, track pollution flows and resource consumption, and measure 
the resulting impacts”, not only as Esty suggests making “possible a new 
structure of institutional responses to environmental problems”93, but also making 
available to individuals impeding and hindering governmental failures - of course 
given that the other requirements are fulfilled: individuals who are motivated, 
concerned, have the capacity to involve (more details in chapter 2.2.2.). 
3.1.4. Assymetric Market Power 
Since this paper is on “economic power” (interacting with environmental law) the 
author would like to discuss this term in more detail: 
[Boulding 1990] states that the concept of power involves many disciplines, i.e. 
political science, philosophy, physical sciences, social sciences.94 The central 
question has to be to what extent and by which means one can get what one 
wants and how other people can be used in order to achieve above.95 In [Clegg 
1989] it is stated that power has historically been interpreted in terms of the 
ability of achieving goals.96 In the analysis of power intentions are a driving force, 
i.e. what is intended to happen and the reasons people might have for their 
behaviour.97  
[Boulding 1990] classifies the different types of power to be threat power (being 
of destructive character; Boulding calls this “the stick”), economic power (being 
of constructive character; Boulding calls this “the carrot”) and integrative power 
(“the hug”). Boulding claims that it is integrative power (and not threat power as 
one might assume) that is “the most dominant and significant form of power”, 
because without legitimacy (based upon integrative power) threats would be 
“naked”.98 
Power can be used to destroy, produce/create, exchange, and integrate (by 
building relationships). But power is subject to boundaries: first of all there is an 
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“ultimate power boundary” (limited to the actions within the realms of the 
naturally possible for a certain individual in a certain period, widely differing 
between e.g. the President of the U.S. and a child), but it is further limited by 
other boundaries such as the “taboo boundary” (resulting in refraining activities 
that would be possible per se, but are judged to be a taboo) and further the 
boundaries of preference settings.99 
Power is not the characteristic of a person - it is not possessed without relational 
conditions. A single individual cannot wield any power. Power can only result from 
relationships. As a precondition to use power over another person there must be 
the means of enforcing power, being punishment (or reward) and dependence.100 
But [Clegg 1989] argues that “[h]owever, reified power will rarely if ever occur 
entirely without resistance”101 because there is a (close) relationship between 
power and resistance.102 [Clegg 1989] further argues that those captured by the 
sovereignty of power may be unable to free themselves from this capture, i.e. the 
suppressed not being able to leave the state of dependence easily. The lack of 
ability to actually recognize their free will might result in non-decision making and 
therefore their negation of power.103 Wielding power does not only comprise 
getting things done (e.g. another individual behaving in a way it would not have 
acted otherwise), but also preventing certain actions (e.g. by hindering 
individuals to act according to their personal preferences).104 The phenomenon of 
power could be interpreted as a degree of possible influence in relation to the 
possible countervailing resistance.105 
For further clarification it should be considered that wielding power is a 
behavioural structure derived from our social background, formed by the 
acceptance of institutionalised compliance to behavioural rules of society in every 
day life: [Radlingmaier 1989] argues that the legitimisation of power happens 
through a majority, i.e. many countries no longer believe in the monarchichal 
system, which gives power to the ruler “by divine right”, thus paving the way for 
democracy.106 
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Individuals behave and act according to their own framework of values. However, 
according to [Radlingmaier 1989] a phenomenon occurs where individuals hold 
too much power: the focus shifts onto holding and increasing this power by using 
(any) appropriate instruments, despite existing moral values, making individuals 
acting morally amorphous and therefore power becoming an end in itself.107 The 
reason for the abuse of power can therefore be seen as achieving an 
improvement in respect to personal advantages, but also in extending their 
personal power level (using power to increase power). Instruments of law that 
install better control and communication mechanisms (e.g. the availability of 
decision bases open to the public for better transparency) and direct voting as a 
principle of democracy are to be seen as instruments devoted to avoid such 
abuses.108 
Personal character, property and organisations are sources of power and can be 
observed to be interdependent (to a certain degree): strong personalities tend to 
gain power through their status in an organisation, enabling them to increase 
property. Organisations need dominating personalities as managers, who have 
rhetoric talent combined with the means of persuasion and repression in order to 
subordinate others both to their personal as well as their organisations’ 
objectives. In developed countries property might not give power as it has done 
in the past and the practice to buy political will is declining (at least in developed 
countries). However, the importance of financial means cannot be 
underestimated, because it enables trade-offs. Interactions between individuals 
(e.g. managers and government spokesmen) influence their view on bilateral 
power. Particularly the holder of power relies on voluntary subordination out of a 
matter of habit or self-benefit without having to enforce subordination.109 
Organisations can be defined as social entities pursuing certain economic aims 
and having a formal structure, which ensures that the activities of its members 
are targeted to reach these goals. According to [Clegg 1989] the organisation can 
be seen to be an arena of decision and action: the result of the discourse between 
different people responsible for different disciplines.110 This includes that 
employees have to serve the interests of the company, which, in case of collision, 
results in the individual no longer being orientated by his personal values, but 
subordinates these under the organisational aims, leading to actions (within their 
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work) actually contravening their personal values.111 [Clegg 1989] calls for the 
field of theory of organisation to give explanations how organisational structures 
produce disciplined obedience, arguing that the depiction of authoritative 
structures (organisation charts) is a flawed approach because they “rarely if ever 
conform” with reality (especially in very complex organisations).112 
Market power is not only the ability to alter the market price of goods or services 
but also to influence regulatory circumstances. Especially if power is wielded in 
unequal relationships (where one is weaker to oppose) markets can fail. 
3.2. Governmental Intervention 
Market failures cause the need for governmental intervention. Because free 
markets show allocation problems causing the public good “healthy environment” 
to be restored below the level of the social optimum, governments need to 
impose mechanisms to restore it. To tackle problems of international scope 
governments even have to work together to reduce e.g. environmental problems 
such as river pollution, acid rain, etc.113 Governmental intervention (in 
environmental issues) aims for adjusting socially optimal levels of production and 
consumption by internalising externalities, correcting demand and supply (e.g. 
provision of goods that the market does not supply or subsidizing/regulating the 
provision), but also picking up problems of (perceived) inequalities or 
inefficiencies. According to [Jaffe et al 2005] there are four strategies for 
governments to changing individual behaviour: informing, facilitating the change 
and giving incentives (making the change attractive), or enforcing the change (by 
imposing penalties). Whereas [Jaffe et al 2005] conclude, that information and 
facilitation are the strategy choice with "motivated" people, regulation is the 
alternative to pick with “strongly desired, discrete, detectable goals achievable in 
few ways”. This is because monitoring is needed to ward off companies 
orientating at (wrong) market incentives (because of market failures). 
Overregulation can cause not only adverse outputs, but also reactions of 
resistance and rising costs of environmental protection. [Jaffe et al 2005] find 
that incentives are “the most reliable, efficient strategies, especially if the change 
is continuous, detectable, and achievable in many ways”.114 How governments 
can intervene in the market and exactly which conditions these measures are 
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perceived to have in regard to environmental protection will be discussed 
intensively later on in this paper. 
Conflicting Goals of Economic Players and Governments 
The production of goods is not an aim by itself, but is driven by the aim to create 
income. Given that income is the difference between cost and price, companies 
clearly try to maximize profit by keeping costs down. If governmental action 
diminishes profits (by e.g. imposing a tax on used resources to safeguard public 
health), interests conflict, since the reduction of hazards is not borne by the 
general public (although the benefits are distributed to all), but only affects the 
regulated and the individuals amongst which these profits should have been 
distributed. The larger the missing share of profit, the larger the opposition can 
be assumed to be (and possibilities opening up for firms will be displayed further 
down in this paper). 
But “profit maximisation” is not an explicit goal. All economic entities are faced 
with a plurality of aims (a system of set goals, not a single aim): apart from the 
financial targets (particularly profit, turnover, return on investment) there are 
targets regarding performance (aim to achieve a certain temporary, quantitative, 
qualitative provision of goods (or services) on a market), but also technical, 
social, ecological targets. Usually formal targets dominate private businesses and 
factual targets prevail in public administration. This can also be seen from the 
viewpoint of financial targets being crucial to the survival of private organisations 
(e.g. liquidity) but also monitored e.g. investors expecting a high rate of return 
on investment, which is not so for public administration also striving for cost-
effectiveness, but in case of non-achievement does not discontinue a 
service/duty.  
Whereas companies’ aims are determined by secondary stakeholders115 taking 
indirect influence and primary stakeholders116 governmental goals are influenced 
by the perceived will of the respective share of public which they are recruiting 
their votes from, but economic power yet can bias the “perceived will” of the 
public and gain more importance. The greater the economic power, the higher the 
wealth the company creates in the country, the more policy might miss to create 
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the social optimum, by firms using their economic power to attain their “private 
interests”, which may (substantially) diverge from “public interests”.117 [Shaffer 
1995] states that there is an “unavoidable interdependence of business and 
government in modern society.” Because society depends on “the business sector 
for attaining macroeconomic goals such as growth in employment and national 
income, firms play a legitimate role in the public policy process by advocating 
policies deemed desirable with regard to business operation and competitive 
position.”118 Firms play a role in the development of governmental policies 
because they are the implementers of national economic strategies.119 
4. Governmental Instruments of Power 
As outlined earlier, market distortions exist and governments need to avoid 
market failures by measures directed towards reflecting real costs (full social 
costs), that if imposed entirely on the polluter result in high incentives to take 
actions that cost less than the additional pollution costs now bared. If it is left up 
to the polluter to consider how these costs can be saved within the company, the 
flexibility leads to more options that can be considered, minimizing pollution 
control costs. The idea is transferable from companies to entire sectors: flexibility 
described above adds up across companies, enabling to focus not only on the 
possible actions within one company but across the whole sector to choose the 
sources with lowest costs. Governments are thus able to give effective incentives 
to companies enforcing the (social) optimal levels of pollution (set) and generally 
there are two regulatory approaches for central modification of economies to 
ensure that environmental protection is allocated at the social optimum: the 
classical command-and-control- (CAC) mechanisms (performance standards, 
production technologies) and the market-based incentives approach.120  
Command-and-control-mechanisms: with CAC being mechanisms with a high 
grade of interference on how the economy has to control pollution of course the 
flexibility of companies to adjust to these full costs effectively is lost, traded off 
against a high risk-reduction and control on governmental side: direct regulation 
is traditionally used to control abstractions from, and emissions to the 
environment and offer a great variety of possibilities for governments to reach 
their goals through direct environmental relevant regulations on the 
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environmental behaviour patterns of producers and other subjects with an impact 
on the environment. Seen in the context of the polluter-pays-principle these 
environmental policy instruments shall aim for polluters tackling their 
environmental damage and arising external costs. As it is generally the case with 
direct regulation, governmental aims can be obtained to a very high degree 
through the high level of interference by the state, but at the same time can be 
seen to be the general disadvantage of instruments that mandate the reduction 
paths, because governments need to interfere in expert fields of knowledge: not 
only that the competence from companies how their environmental impact could 
be reduced efficiently is ignored and information regarding these issues has yet to 
be obtained by governments (by employing expert staff and gathering 
information), but also the variations of possible abatements are not considered 
leading to excessive costs for economies. Still the U.K. Environmental Agency 
states that these kinds of measures will remain a fundamental part of a legal 
framework and will continue to have an important role especially for point of 
source emissions, until other solutions can be implied.121 
In certain situations other regulatory measures can be used, often in 
combinations, to deliver some of the same outcomes as direct regulation with 
greater flexibility, thus stimulating innovation and providing more cost-effective 
solutions. More market-based instruments for environmental policy and 
natural resource management are environmentally related taxes, fees and 
charges, environmentally motivated subsidies, tradeable permits systems, 
deposit-refund systems.  
Applying the right approach is essential to achieving environmental objectives 
efficiently and effectively.  
Modern regulation needs to be outcome-focused and risk based, clearly 
communicated to those regulated and delivered in a consistent manner.122 The 
range of environmental instruments available has expanded as environmental 
policy has developed and also requires the provision of a number of economic, 
technical or fiscal instruments. 
Ever since environmental policies began to achieve a certain importance, analysts 
have been trying to rank alternatives, by comparing their cost-effectiveness. At 
the same time policy makers are striving to determine the distributional impacts 
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of policy costs leading to an additional important classification regarding their 
political feasibility (e.g. the distortion of policy instruments costs on certain 
industry branches) playing a major role in the process of instrument choice. 
Distributional impacts can be considered across industries (but also demographic 
groups) and can according to [Bovenberg et al 2007] “be especially important, 
since industry groups often constitute a powerful political force”123, further stating 
that “to the extent that industrial stakeholders wield significant political power, 
designing policies that achieve environmental goals while avoiding serious 
adverse impacts on key industries can enhance political feasibility.”124 [Bovenberg 
et al 2007] shows that instrument choice under the precondition of cost 
compensation to affected industries can “significantly alter the cost ranking”, 
dependent on the degree of abatement: a rather small or medium degree of 
required abatement “can make the emissions tax more costly than command-
and-control policies” (although emissions taxes are considered to be generally 
more cost-effective under circumstances where no cost compensation is 
required). Yet again, if abatement requirements are extensive “the emissions tax 
regains its status as the most cost-effective instrument”125. 
Based on [Turner et al 1994] the selection of environmental policy instruments is 
suggested to consider following criteria: 
• Overall economic efficiency 
• Information requirements (the less accurate information is required, 
the better) 
• Administrative costs (the less complex and technical the lower the risk 
of failure or limited effectiveness) 
• Equity (just distribution) 
• Dependability (avoiding uncertainties) 
• Adaptability (capability to adapt to changes) 
• Dynamic incentive (encouraging continuous environmental 
improvement) 
• Risk reduction (of environmental risks) 
• Political acceptability (not radical, but subject to shared views) 
• Economic resistance level (economic counteraction) 
•  
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When adopting fiscal environmental instruments MS must also ensure their 
implementation is compatible with the provisions of the TEC (most of all Art. 174 
TEC: “MS must establish the need for a levy to solve environmental problems.”), 
minding their Community obligations (and other obligations towards third 
countries covered by WTO rules). 
Further it is stated at this point by the author, that a general precondition is 
assumed while discussing the instruments in the following paper: evaluating the 
instruments it is also assumed that they are effectively monitored and enforced 
by appropriate measures. According to [Lee 2008] decreased firm-specific 
regulatory intensity in Korea has not been a result of missing or less stringent 
norms, but of the decrease of monitoring and enforcement (because of political 
instability). 
In the following subchapters environmental policy instruments will be displayed in 
a descending order, starting with the instruments characterized by the highest 
governmental interference to the measures including less interference. 
4.1. Environmental Standards 
The concept behind command-and-control is that regulated companies are 
prescribed what kind of efforts in pollution control they have to undertake. 
Environmental obligations regulating pollution can be binding requirements 
(specifying requirements for future actions to be taken) or prohibitions 
(impeding certain present actions) with a very strong, governmental interference 
level, because of the direct influence on economic behaviour and is a fiscal-
neutral (but not cost-neutral) policy instrument.126. Under certain circumstances 
these measure are indeed necessary e.g. to impede further use of a hazardous 
substance by a ban. Despite the importance of this policy option regarding the 
regulation of hazardous substances and the success in environmental protection 
that has been reached by European standards since the 1980s127 it is not 
regarded to be an efficient instrument dealing with environmental degradation 
abatement: the drawbacks are inflexibility and the complete overruling of 
economic constraints by not taking into account the abatement costs of 
companies, not reducing environmental degradation at minimum cost.128 Further 
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the “blind” mandating of a solution to an environmental problem can prohibit 
other, more efficient possibilities. Therefore economic efficiency is low because 
the individual companies’ MC of abatement are not considered, imposing unequal 
burdens for companies (because of different MC), lagging behind ongoing 
technical changes without restoring incentives for overcompliance. In respect to 
administrative costs there is the advantage of clear goals, but efficiency 
depending on information requirements may be an important tool and an 
appropriate measure in critical situations (were e.g. bans are needed). But on the 
whole firms’ room to manoeuvre are curbed, entailing a high economic resistance 
level. 
4.1.1. Regulating Emissions 
Emission Control Norms constitute threshold values of pollution, mostly by setting 
emission-limits of certain pollutants to air/water/soil by a whole plant, but also by 
reduction-obligations for a quantified rate/amount of a certain emitted pollutant 
generally allowing regulated companies some degree of flexibility in how to 
respond to meeting set goals. An example would be the European Volatile Organic 
Compound Regulation, setting threshold values for solvent emissions of paint-
using plants. 
Product Norms (considering emissions) are threshold values determined for the 
emission of specific pollutants, which are not to be exceeded in the production of 
a certain product (and the emissions associated with its production). Additionally 
products can be bound to provide specific characteristics (e.g. catalyst) in order 
to reduce emission quantities and the usage of a product can be limited to certain 
requirements or to certain times of day and places (as, for example, a night 
driving ban for heavy goods vehicles). Another type of product norms could be 
labelling-duties of hazardous and polluting substances, which have to carry 
warnings and instructions of how to handle the product. 129 
4.1.2 Regulating Production Processes 
These norms interfere with the businesses’ value adding process by prescribing 
how (or how not) they should do what they do and costs can result to be higher 
than external costs (damage) caused by the polluter130 and therefore will not be 
highly appreciated by economic response. Nevertheless it can in special cases be 
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a needed measure (as shown), were the economic losses of regulated companies 
are still outweighed by the limitation of resulting harmful effects, that would 
otherwise lead to higher societal costs (social cost optimality). 
Input-regulations are applied on the production process, so that the producer can 
be urged to switch from e.g. the use of certain specified raw materials with a high 
level of environmental damage, determining maximum concentrations of 
pollutants in the production process or regulating a total ban of certain 
substances, as for example the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) in the production 
of refrigerators, because the substance is (now) known to be a major contributor 
to ozone depletion. 
Process norms regulate how and which technology is to be used in facilities and 
regulate their applied technology in terms of elimination, reduction or application 
of a certain production process. This is how industries can be pushed to apply 
methods that are environmentally friendly (or judged to be so by the 
government). As an example industries, whose production processes are 
accompanied by a high level of heat, will be regulated to reuse this energy. 
Benchmarking helps to evaluate and classify the performance, giving feedback for 
environmental leaders and sorting out the “laggards”. 
4.1.3 Regulating the Production 
The production quantities of certain products that are subject to high emissions 
can be limited to certain amounts in a certain time period or area (in a 
geographical sense), and can in the worst case result in a production-stop of a 
certain product if required reductions in emissions cannot be met. A ban for 
settlement can be necessary to apply in certain areas such as natural parks or 
water reserves, but can also be a tool to avoid over-industrialization of certain 
regions, with immissions needing to be limited. The IPPC for example is a 
European guideline calling on the substantive concentration on the operation and 
permit of environmental relevant industrial plants (can be seen as the 
implementation of the precautionary principle) which investigates on (expected) 
environmental consequences of a project, based on an integrative concept.131 
Lessons learned from these evaluations can lead to not permitting ecologically 
incompatible construction-plans. 
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4.2. Environmental Levies 
The term ‘levy’ can be used to cover both taxes and, fees and charges132 and is 
considered (according to OECD definition) to be an environmental levy, if the 
taxable base of the levy has a negative effect on the environment. “Taxes 
designed to reduce external costs are known as Pigouvian taxes.”133 Private 
marginal costs of pollution are forced to include the cause of external effects and 
therefore alter the supply of the polluting producer encouraging lower 
environmental degradation. Fiscal law (as part of public law) is particularly 
suitable to play a significant role134 for environmental protection not only by 
installing a price to the use of environment (by market incentives to internalise 
external costs), but also to allocate financial resources that can serve 
environmental protection aims or be used to decrease other taxes which are 
perceived as distorting the economy. It can be assumed that opportunities of 
pollution (covered by regulation) control will be efficient, since firms will exploit 
all perceived cost saving opportunities, because of their flexibility to adapt 
(especially with a view to developing technologies available in future), therefore 
showing a great incentive effect135. This follows from the different levels of 
marginal benefits from environmental degradation. Only where the benefits are 
higher than the tax imposed on the environmental damaging action or substance 
it will be of further economic benefit to sustain these production processes.  
If the financial function is dominating it can be seen as a way of implementing the 
Polluter Pays Principle. Generally these measures cover all compulsory payments 
to government levied on tax-bases deemed to be of particular environmental 
relevance. The revenues can accrue directly to the government budget or can be 
“earmarked” to serve particular purposes.136  
As a further enforcement incentive measures can also only be applied above a 
certain level (imposed by the government), with the effect, that these costs are 
then related to revenues related to non-compliance.137 Tax differentiation serves 
a similar approach by ascertaining certain types of decreasing levies with 
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environmental impact. An example would be the Austrian levy on the purchase 
price of cars depending on the emissions138. 
Economic efficiency could therefore be very high, but likewise is the information 
requirement, to find the optimal level of the tax (but e.g. price elasticity, market 
behaviour may be difficult to judge ex-ante). Environmental Levies enjoy a rather 
easy implementation (embedded in existing tax systems)139, being flexible and 
even applicable to mobile pollution sources (e.g. trucks).140 
Taxes can be ‘unrequited’ (benefits provided to taxpayers may not be in 
proportion to amounts paid), whereas fees and charges are ‘requited’ payments 
to the government (levied more or less in proportion to services provided; e.g. 
the amount of wastes collected and treated). 
However, the level at which environmental taxes and charges are fixed is a 
crucial factor, because only an appropriate adjustment ensures having necessary 
effects on the market. As it can be learned from [Turner et al 1994] at least in 
the past these instruments were “tended to be fixed at too low a rate to achieve 
the environmental objectives the administrators had in mind”141. Further potential 
environmental effects of a tax, determined by the tax impacts on the producer 
and consumer prices in question, have to be seen in conjunction with the relevant 
price elasticity. These insecurities can result in too little environmental protection, 
because the tax is set too low. The opposite case with taxes being set to high will 
be well opposed by companies (and their interest representations) delivering an 
explanation for the finding stated by [Turner et al 1994] above. 
It can be observed in literature that the implementation of variable environmental 
tax systems is judged very difficult if not impossible. Although the author 
recognizes that the opinion stated here cannot be undermined by practical 
experience, but the insights gathered into the Austrian Income Tax system 
generate another view to the problem: income tax law is a very complex system 
that allows for a multitude of refining paragraphs, exemptions, and special cases. 
The economy as well as the public have accepted the need tax advisers to find 
their most beneficial way to react to these rules. If in environmental law likewise 
it were aimed for the building up of a similar legal construction of imposed 
environmental levies, IMHO could very well be an appropriate measure to deal 
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with the complexity in tackling environmental issues and is perceived by the 
author to be a necessary future aim to proceed to and it could well be imagined 
that in future there will be environmental tax advisers, helping to find possible 
reduction possibilities of environmental degradation in order to comply better with 
law and generate savings on imposed taxes. 
Product charges: related to environmentally damaging products produced, 
consumed or discarded. Product charges can for example be directed towards 
pesticides, gasoline, lubricant oil, non-returnable beverage containers (etc.) and 
install an incentive effect to reduce the use of environmentally harmful products 
switching to less damaging substitutes. Considering the demand for gasoline (an 
example of low price elasticity) the effectiveness of the measure can be “seriously 
inhibited”142. Further it is not the adequate instrument for products that are 
hazardous to health, needing to be banned completely. 
Deposit Refund Systems: help avoiding pollution by potentially harmful 
substances, but also enable expert reuse or recycling of environmentally 
impacting products if return to collection point can be achieved: by installing an 
'deposit rate' (extra fee paid at purchasing a good) and a 'refund rate' (amount of 
fee returned) serves as an incentive for handing back concerned products after 
use (the rates not necessarily having to be the same), rewarding environmentally 
appropriate behaviour. The success of the measure depends on careful calculation 
of rates and observation of return percentages in the system, further there are 
high set-up costs and requires a large amount of cooperation between producers, 
retailers and users. Examples are the collection scheme for mainly arranged in 
the scope of waste management such as scrapped tires, batteries, etc. 
Emission charges: are charged on pollutant emissions into air, water, soil, but 
also noise. Since it can be flexibly related to the level and severity of pollution it 
can be seen to be a very flexible system with a high potential of incentive effect, 
where monitoring is practicable. The efficiency of this instrument is not only 
limited by technological and technical boundaries but can also only cover a certain 
amount of pollutants to be feasible. 
Examples for Fees and Charges that are implemented in Austria as 
environmental instruments according to the OECD database are for example the 
Charges on batteries, Charge for tree protection (in Vienna, 100% earmarked for 
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the planting of new trees), Fee on hunting and fishing, Fee on municipal waste 
collection/treatment, Fee on water use, Fees for the import and export of animals 
and plants, Toll for alpine roads, the Vignette (for the use of highways) and 
wastewater charges.143 
Examples for Taxes in Austria are the Austrian Energy Tax (16.835%) being a 
form of indirect earmarking, as the Austrian Provinces and the Communities get 
11.835% and 5% respectively of the revenues transferred linked to promoting 
measures protecting the environment and energy-saving.144 Also with the 
Austrian Mineral oil tax (4.88%) a form of indirect earmarking of the revenues 
can be observed: revenues are transferred to the Provinces (independent of their 
tax share) to promote public local passenger transport. 
4.3. Contingent Liabilities 
Another environmental instrument adjusting the legal framework to provide 
better protection of the environment are more stringent environmental liabilities 
and the introduction of compulsory environmental liability insurances. 
Environmental liability is holding polluters liable145 for the environmental damage 
caused and should encourage socially efficient levels of prevention as firms faced 
with potential liabilities seek to minimize the total costs associated with their 
liabilities e.g. with proper waste disposal and waste avoidance.  
Also compulsory environmental liability insurances install incentives for 
environmental sustainability: public or private proprietors involved in higher risk 
by the nature of their production processes, properties of the products sold or 
stored (or other economic actions) will be facing higher insurance costs, 
dependent on the level of environmental damage risks.  
Advantages  
Obligatory environmental liability insurance have the advantage of being a 
permanent payment (continuously incorporated into economic management 
strategies), but also help enforcing the polluter-pays-principle in the case of 
existing damage and due payment, without existential problems arising for 
companies. 
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145 The principle according to which the polluter pays when environmental damage 
occurs, is already set out in the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
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Also in respect to the high technicality and complexity of potentially harmful 
substances environmental contingent liability can be judged to be a tool that 
manages to internalise the risks by the agitators, avoiding governmental 
interference (saving immense resource-intensive administrative costs, e.g. 
evaluation, passing, enacting and controlling regulation)146 and is, according to 
[Wicke et al 1991], to be seen as the “broadest (regarding all areas of 
environmental burden) and the most comprehensive pivotal point, to increase 
self-interest in environmental protection”. 
The measures therefore are market-based incentive assigning cost to 
environmental risk, which is now influencing management decision aiming to 
minimize environmental risks in terms of keeping insurance fees down. Also 
indirect environmental damage shall be avoided or (given the case) repaired, 
relating to the precautionary principle and the measure is seen to be compatible 
with the personal responsibility principle dominating free market: companies on 
their behalf will have to consider how to hold the input of environmental 
burdening material down, increase re-usage, limit the production of 
environmental damaging goods). Also on European level it is concluded147 that a 
Community environmental liability scheme establishing a Common framework for 
liability would be the needed step forward. 
The Directive 2004/35/EC distinguishes between two complementary 
situations148: 
1) Dangerous or potentially dangerous occupational activities149: the operator 
may be held responsible even if he is not at fault. Regulated under this first 
scheme are mainly agricultural or industrial activities requiring a license under 
the Directive on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC)150, activities 
which discharge heavy metals into water or the air, installations producing 
dangerous chemical substances, waste management activities etc.151 
2) All other occupational activities: applying to all other occupational activities, 
but only where there is damage, or imminent threat of damage. In this case, the 
operator will be held liable only if he is at fault or negligent. 
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Problems: 
But still Directive 2004/35/EC only applies where it is possible to establish a 
causal link between the damage and the activity in question.152 Because of 
complex interdependencies of environmental problems more stringent elements 
of an offence of legal liability have to be designed, as for example  
• Shifting the burden of proof to the accused party (because of 
causality153 problems) with a possible solution lying in legal action as 
[Wicke et al 1991] states, that by enabling legal action instituted by an 
institution it could effect in rising economic risks through the 
eventuality of damage claims. 
• Also with a view to threat of conviction and sentence environmentally 
damaging behaviour of individuals, as observed with fiscal 
delinquencies, could lead to deterrent personal risk-taking of 
responsible executives for environmental delinquencies. 
Further the efficiency achieved by the means of liability strongly depends on the 
court systems, but also on the properties of the externalities at stake. 
4.4. Tradeable Permits (Allowances) 
Environmental allowances are an environmental policy instrument dealing with 
“rights on polluting”, which can be seen as an approach of assigning 
proprietorship to the public good “clean environment”, privatising its use to the 
politically negotiated level that environment is capable to absorb the permitted 
environmental damaging actions.154 Environmental permits entitle the holder to 
the usage of environmental media by rendering a proprietor-related right (in the 
certified quota) to them. Since these “permissions to pollute” are needed in the 
adequate amount (at the rate of pollutants discarded through the production of a 
certain good) by companies, creating an environmental pollution-rights exchange 
market allowing environmental polluters to trade. These allowances can be either 
sold by the state (generating public income), allocated gratis to all pollutants or 
according to a certain criteria. 
Tradeable allowances are a means whereby markets can be created by a small 
degree of governmental intervention to obtain a fixed (politically agreed) 
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environmental standard (e.g. a certain level of emission), by generating a market 
price for certain environmental degradations (such as pollutants emission or 
nuisance-action). Attaching a price this ‘factor’ has to be accounted for and in 
terms of lean production can be implemented in managerial decisions on cost-
cutting and therefore not only in reducing emissions per se but also triggering the 
(invention and) application of cleaner (because cheaper) production methods 
limiting environmental damage. If the demanded amount of allowances exceeds 
the amount offered by the state (limited by the maximum tolerable pollutant 
emission) the price of allowances goes up. Therefore tradeable emission permits 
can be seen to reduce pollution where it is the cheapest and can be rated to be 
economically efficient. 
Examples are of course the licensing for certain heavy polluting companies, but 
also for motorboats on rivers or lakes, or for (coastal) fishing. To mention an 
interesting example put up in [Krugman et al 2008] on the licensing of lobster-
fishing: in Australia setting lobster traps requires a license costing about 21.000€. 
With the fishermen being sceptical at first, they are now stated to be enthusiastic 
about this system, because unlike in other regions of the world their lobster 
catches have not only increased in quantity but also in quality (bigger lobsters). 
Maybe this example shows, that industry resistance is equivalent to possibility to 
perceive chances of increasing private interests by regulation. 
Examples and Characteristics of Trading Schemes 
The concept of tradeable allowances has already been put into practice in the EU 
in the context of environmental policy (Montreal Protocol, packaging waste 
recovery note (and export note) system), the Common agricultural policy (dairy 
quotas, tradeable development rights for land preservation, nutrient emission 
rights for farmers) and the fishery policy (tradeable fishery (catch) quotas). In 
the EU Emission Trading Scheme for CO2 or other greenhouse gas emissions 
trading schemes a system was established whereby companies are allocated with 
allowances for their greenhouse gas emissions according to the overall 
environmental ambitions of their government.155 If companies face a cost for e.g. 
each tonne of carbon they emit, carbon emissions have to be treated as a cost in 
their investment decisions (these former externalities are now internalised) and 
different options available for reducing this economic impact will be explored 
(including switching to less carbon-intensive forms of generation).  
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The main characteristics (according to the [OECD]) of the tradeable permit 
systems used in environmental policy are listed below. These types of permits 
system can be distinguished:  
A ‘quota system’ establishes a quantified ceiling or floor assigned to each 
participant for a given period. There are different types of quotas systems 
referring to the situation of the initial allocation. The allocation of allowances is a 
difficult, but crucial decision: sectors and companies to be involved have to be 
determined. Regarding synergy with other policies, it has to be clarified how 
technical regulation, taxation and environmental agreements are respectively 
substitutes for or complementary to the trading instruments. There are following 
types (that can be also be used in a mixed strategy): (1) Auctioning - quotas are 
sold to the highest bidders, (2) Unconditional grandfathering - quotas are 
distributed for free according to some criteria (e.g. historic production or historic 
emissions), without any particular conditions attached (3) Conditional 
grandfathering - certain conditions are placed on freely distributed quotas, e.g. 
that production within a given region/factory has to be maintained (e.g. Belgium: 
nutrient emission right for farmers). 
In a ‘credits system’, a baseline development has been agreed before the start of 
the period. The participant is credited with any over-achievement at the end of 
the period, and is allowed to trade the credits. In the UK’s “GHG Emissions 
Trading Scheme” for example permits for GHG emission under the cap are traded 
and credits are given for emission reduction against baseline under the “Climate 
Change Levy Agreements”. With averaging, the authority sets average limit 
values for a range of similar products manufactured by firms in the same 
industry.  
‘Transferable usage rights’ (e.g. Belgium: nutrient emission right for farmers) 
involve licensing the use of natural resources that previously were freely 
available, or whose ownership was shared. But there are also other possibilities.  
Trading, Banking, Borrowing, Bubbles and Interzone-trading can be allowed or 
restricted and specifications of what and who is allowed to trade are needed. The 
administrative costs and possibilities of types of monitoring the system are of 
interest but very hard to obtain (no entries found in [OECD]). To give an example 
the Belgian quota system trading tons of CO2 emission allowances uses a 
monitoring protocol in environmental permit consistent with EU monitoring and 
reporting guidelines. Some systems foresee sanctions for non-compliance: excess 
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taxes per ton for emissions exceeding the quotas (e.g. Denmark, Belgium 
40€/ton CO2), fines in case of misreporting of companies or emitting more than 
allowed (example in farming: more animals are kept than allowed), others again 
have no sanctions involved. Sometimes explicit links between a tradeable permit 
system and other instruments used in environmental policy exist (e.g. voluntary 
agreements) or foresee special arrangements regarding linkage of instruments 
(e.g. in the U.K. GHG Emissions Trading Scheme participants of the Climate 
Change Agreements receive an 80% discount on the climate change levy). 
[Petsonk 1999] states that “the emissions trading structure of the Kyoto Protocol 
deploys a rule-based system of "free trade" in emissions allowances to benefit the 
environment” with at the same time suggesting that environmental and economic 
benefits can be maximized if governments “refrain from raising non-tariff barriers 
to trade in emission allowances, and avoid imposing quantitative restrictions on, 
or arbitrarily discriminating against, such trade” to be compatible with their 
responsibilities under the multilateral trading system (WTO). 
Advantages 
Companies are faced with the decisions on whether to sell allowances and install 
pollution abatement (that is cheaper than the selling price; creating revenues), to 
outsource, or to buy additional allowances. Firms will however choose to minimize 
their individual costs, at the same time restoring general efficiency and leaving 
the market to organize itself being a scheme that allows a degree of flexibility 
without disadvantage to the environment. Furthermore the development of new 
technologies is encouraged and does not build market entry barriers: any 
company capable of holding producing at a competitive level can enter the 
market. Administrative costs for governments are low because they only have to 
set the goal (e.g. maximum value of emissions of a certain substance) and 
control compliance. (Forced) switching costs that arise with the sudden coming 
into force of top-down-regulations is countervailed. Only a framework is restored, 
but leaving economic responsibility and the freedom of choice with the economy.  
Disadvantages 
It is difficult for governments to determine the social optimum pollution quantity, 
needed to calculate the quantity of permits to be issued. It will again be subject 
to pressure of concerned companies to influence governments to issue too many 
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permits156, resulting in too small environmental impact, not attaining the 
optimum level of pollution. Further there is a risk in suboptimal concentration of 
pollutants, which can still exceed certain hazardous levels and must be either only 
applied regionally or combined with another regulation measure.  
Another problem arising is the risk taken by companies in assigning the correct 
value to the “emission grant”, that is tradeable. This combines knowing how high 
demand will be and where the marginal costs lie for the industry, to anticipate 
how the price (determined by buying or selling decisions) will develop. As it has 
been shown from the experiences with the EU Scheme this year, the lack of 
experience of companies with this value, and obviously an oversupply of 
allowances has resulted in a break down of the market price. The environmental 
allowance trading requires expertise and has yet to develop and institutionalise. 
The risk is therefore seen to be shifted on to the economy. Missing experiences 
with such new instruments may lead to increasing resistance of companies 
following risk-averse strategies.  
As with other measures vast problems on the control of compliance exist157 and 
are expected to increase with the complexity of the measure. 
4.5. Subsidies 
A subsidy can be considered as a "negative tax," and could theoretically be as 
efficient as pollution taxes, although in literature it is stated that it is “almost 
never observed.”158 However, a government may subsidize production of a public 
good (internalising positive externalities) in the private sector, resulting in some 
form of a competitive market (unlike with governmental provision). But also 
subsidies can result in governmental failure: deciding which companies exactly to 
subsidize for which action and in which quantity is crucial and important to make 
this costly instrument efficient. Besides, subsidized companies have incentives to 
be less efficient (relying on the state funding). Further the subsidy granted to 
certain companies distorts the market for other companies that may even provide 
environmentally superior substitutes, driving these out of the market. 
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Subsidies can refer to many different types of policies, such as a subsidy for 
technological change (e.g. catalysts), to the production of a (public) good, or can 
take the form of a direct payment to polluters for reducing emissions (per unit of 
reduction relative to a baseline). This last measure mentioned could be biased by 
companies trying to increase the baseline, resulting in inefficiencies: only “when 
the baseline is exogenous to the firm and there is no deadweight loss to taxation, 
a subsidy achieves the cost-effective pollution outcomes for a given set of 
firms”159. Further the measure gives incentives to companies to stay or even 
enter the field and may lead to an overall increase of pollution by the industry.160 
Subsidies for activities respecting environment and contribution to the reduction 
of environmental pollution can be granted voluntarily. These can either be given 
out deliberately or be involved into a sort of open contest with the “best” entry 
being redeemed with a financial “award”. E.g. in Netherlands the purchase of 
ecological areas by private conservation organisations can be subsidized. 
Advantages: 
Depending on what is meant to be achieved, conditions can be applied regarding 
who and which projects should be subsidized, giving the state the possibility of 
selectively boosting the economy with targeted projects, since the state can lay 
down all the rules, without needing to oppose economic resistance. 
Subsidies can also be used in areas with a potential for non-individualism: for 
instance, a state may subsidize devices to reduce air pollution and appeal to 
citizens to cover the remaining costs. Environmental policy subsidies can be used 
to increase energy-efficiency for professional activities (e.g. supporting applied or 
industrial research), investments support (e.g. adoption of modern (ecologically 
concerned) equipment or production methods), but also financial aid for 
compensating income losses.  
Disadvantages: 
The potential for cronyism (for example, an alliance between political insiders 
and the businesses receiving subsidies) can be limited with secret bidding for the 
subsidies or the application for subsidies following clear general principles. 
Depending on the nature of a public good and a related subsidy, principal agent 
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problems can arise between the citizens and the government or between the 
government and the subsidized producers; this effect and counter-measures 
taken to address it can diminish the benefits of the subsidy.  
The need to avoid “perverse subsidies”: Operations have to be scrutinised in 
order to exclude those projects which promote different forms of “perverse 
subsidies” as they can be found to support the replacement of state owned 
monopolies by private or public-private ones e.g. in the energy sector. The fast-
paced liberalisation of the energy market in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern 
European countries leads to lowering restrictions by governments to attract 
private investors161, sometimes transferring benefits to potential investors that go 
far beyond normal market incentives such as long-term contracts for the buy-out 
of energy at fixed prices, budget funding for research and impact analyses, 
agreements for future privatisation on special conditions, lower pricing of already 
existing state-owned energy assets. “Patching” activities (keeping “dirty parts” 
such as environmental liabilities for nuclear accidents) have to be viewed 
critically. Some even being of the opinion that all such subsidies – open or hidden 
– distort a future free market on the energy sector and predetermine a number of 
problems for the consumers and taxpayers. “Perverse subsidies” could maintain a 
high ratio of fossil fuel and nuclear-based energy, thus effectively blocking the 
growth of cleaner and safer forms of energy production. 
Further the mentioned above disadvantages of market distortions can occur: e.g. 
other environmentally effective products (substitutes) may face sales problems 
because of the competition of artificially low (because subsidized) prices. Further 
the crowding out effect is implied.  
Different forms of environmentally related subsidies exist, which are explained in 
the following: 
4.5.1. Grants  
Grants are financial supports (also in form of a compensation for financial losses) 
on investments with a positive environmental impact up to a certain percentage 
of total eligible investment costs linked to conditions concerning the project (e.g. 
feasibility study, organic production techniques in agricultural projects, types of 
trees planted in afforestation programmes) and can be graded relating to the size 
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of the company concerned. A practical example of supporting environmentally 
sustainable investment costs are Wallonia’s “subsidies to increase energy-
efficiency for professional activities” granting 50 to 70% of expenditures to small 
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and up to 50% of expenditures to large 
enterprise. Grants for forestry management beneficial to the environment 
(afforestation, endangered species conservation) can take the form of 
compensation payment amounting up to income losses or increased maintenance 
costs compared to customary forestry practices. In Wallonia a reward of 200€/ha 
is granted for leaving fields to natural meadows.162 
4.5.2. Soft Loan, Subsidized Loan 
This is a form of support of financing eligible projects via special state-provided 
loans for business entities (companies, state enterprises, co-operatives, 
entrepreneurs) providing soft loans from state-owned banks or interest rate 
subsidies for loans taken from commercial banks. These funds may subsidize up 
to 100 percent of the loan interest for a certain period, mostly capped by a 
maximum amount of interest subsidy or limited by a certain percentage of total 
investment costs to be covered (e.g. 50%). Form of support (soft loan or 
subsidized loan), amount of subsidy (in case of a subsidized loan) and the 
projects eligible for financing (selected on environmental and technical criteria) 
depends on priorities set for the environmental performance of the project. There 
are also different options on the financing period and repayment periods (also 
regarding grace periods) and systems used: the Czech Republic has installed an 
“Energy Performance Contracting” with the loan being paid back on the basis of 
realized energy-savings. The program is operated by special firms, allows 
preparation of an energy saving project without ex-ante spending of investors’ 
money and focuses on environmental audit, proposal of measures, control and 
training.163 In the Netherlands, to bring up another example, the “Loan for green 
projects” offers an interest rate 1.5% below the market rate financed by income 
tax exemption on dividends from Green Funds. But also interest rates with an 
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average rate of 2 (or even higher164) percentage points below the market rate are 
to be found.165 
Other forms can also be grants combined with a loan: in the event of this 
combined support, the grant or a part of it may be substituted by an additional 
soft loan (applying to certain conditions). In the Czech Republic the State 
Environmental Fund is entitled to change the required percentage of proportion 
and financial volume of grant and loan within the framework of conditions for a 
given programme of support.  
4.5.3. Loan Guarantee 
Security loans that are guaranteed by the State can be given in a few cases with 
high risk: e.g. loans for pollution control investments (e.g. in the Netherlands 
security loans for land decontamination for small and medium enterprises with 
90% security and max. 908,000€ are granted.) 
4.5.4. Allowances 
Allowances can be made to constitute and favour ecological ‘good behaviour’. 
Considering the use of for environmentally friendly vehicles, allowances could be 
made by not charging road fees (or vehicle registration fees) for cars completely 
driven by alternative fuels (and reducing costs partly for cars with hybrid energy 
consumption). 
4.5.5. Accelerated Depreciation 
An example of a fiscal possibility concerning the subsidization of ecologically 
focused investments is the accelerated depreciation, which is of course only 
available to companies committed to accounting. In Finland these are available 
for investments regarding air and water pollution abatement and cover up to 25% 
annually. 
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4.5.6. Tax Exemption 
The range of possible measures where taxes actually imposed by other laws can 
be exempted by environmental law reach from income tax (e.g. income tax 
exemption of forestry owners in Netherlands), corporate tax, value added tax and 
excise duty exemptions (e.g. Lithuania exempts fuels obtained from biological 
raw materials from excise duty: motor fuels and gas oils mixtures with bio-fuels 
are taxed at a reduced rate, proportional to the share of biological raw materials 
in the product, zero tax is applied to bio-fuels). 
4.5.7. EC Financial Instruments 
LIFE program: To guarantee the operation of the internal market the Community 
has introduced a Common financial instrument called LIFE program166 which aims 
to contribute to the development, implementation and updating of Community 
environmental policy legislation. The integration of environmental issues into 
other policies should be facilitated and sustainable development achieved (by co-
financing).167 Projects financed by LIFE must meet general criteria (contributing to 
its objectives, feasibility and technically and financially sound partners). LIFE 
consists of three thematic components (LIFE-Nature, LIFE-Environment and LIFE-
Third countries). The distribution of financial resources is as follows: 47% of the 
total budget for LIFE-Nature, 47% for LIFE-Environment, and 6% for LIFE-Third 
countries. 95% of the budget is granted to projects and 5% to accompanying 
measures.168 
Cohesion Funds: Art. 161 (2) TEC calls for the support of economically weaker MS 
in the realization of Community activities. 
4.6. Environmental Agreements 
How can the state act apart from legislation? General non-binding actions of the 
EC are Recommendations, Opinions, Communications of the Commission (Green 
or White Papers), Environmental Policy Action Programmes of the EC and 
Environmental Agreements (covenants). Legally non-binding communication often 
prepares legislatory measures and provides the basis for future law-development 
and can reflect the political orientation of European legislators from which 
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conclusions can be drawn on order to predict future trends in Common legislation. 
As a result these proceedings can have a certain steering effect on the economy 
adjusting to recommendations (anticipating future changes in law). 
Environmental agreements are environmental co-operation solutions by which 
governments can implement their environmental concerns either by bilateral 
(binding) contracts or non-binding arrangements with certain pollutants. Target 
groups are either industrial sectors or associations, but also establishing 
environmentally concerned associations. 
The objective of environmental agreements is to improve environmental 
performance of companies and implement sustainable production methods by 
encouraging voluntary commitments and agreements.169 The aim of such 
agreements is often to prosecute deliberate obligations of the industry and 
economy respectively on certain environmental political objective targets, so that 
they obligate themselves to a certain “good conduct” being rewarded by the 
“getting around” of legally binding licensing requirements and orders.170 
Binding bilateral contracts with industry sectors lay down environmental 
objectives to be achieved, and a time-plan to be met for achieving these, 
sometimes an agreement on certain measures achieving this goal, occasionally 
financial incentives monitoring methods and regulations for non-compliance 
(penalties). 
Furthermore the Communication171 lists six criteria, which should be met (inter 
alia) as the base of evaluation of the success of environmental agreements. 
1) The evaluation of the agreements should take account of the cost-benefit 
ratio and only used if a saving on administrative costs can be achieved 
(administrative costs should not be higher than those of other instruments 
available). 
2) Regarding the signatories to environmental agreements it is suggested that 
these should represent the majority of the involved economic sector and should 
be responsible and organised. 
                                          
169 [EU 09]: In accordance with the sixth Action Programme for the environment 
170 [Epiney 2005], p. 28 
171 COM(2002) 412: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 17 July 
2002 on Environmental Agreements at Community Level within the Framework of the Action Plan 
on the "Simplification and Improvement of the Regulatory Environment  
62 
3) The objectives of the agreements must be clearly stated, by unambiguous 
formulations. Reliable indicators to measure the extent to which objectives have 
been achieved must be installed. For agreement covering long period, 
intermediate objectives must be specified.  
4) Agreements, relevant reports and accounts should be accessible to the public 
on the Internet with the possibility for interested parties of the public making 
comments. 
5) Environmental agreements should include a monitoring and reporting system 
for achieving the objectives. 
6) And elements of sustainable development and consumer protection matters 
need to be incorporated in agreements. 
Potentials and Advantages 
There are three different potentials for development of environmental 
agreements:  
• Agreements initiated by stakeholders in fields where there is no drafted 
legislation. 
• Agreements adopted by stakeholders in response to the Commission's 
stated intention to draft legislation. 
• Agreements ensuing from an authority’s initiative. 
The advantages of such agreements are that effective and tailor-made solutions 
lead to fast (or at least faster) achievement of environmental objectives and 
enable economic and social operators to be more dynamic because of 
simplification. Regulatory systems can be improved by ensuring a high level of 
legal certainty. Additionally these instruments can be seen as requiring a 
proactive approach from industries, allocating responsibility to the economy.172 
Moreover this instrument can doubtlessly be judged to offer the highest flexibility 
to both regulator and regulated. Flexibility, without resulting in administrative 
overload can be seen to be a pivotal success factor for environmental economic 
instruments. This is also pointed out by [Gunningham et al 2003] finding that 
“when regulators are more flexible in enforcing prescriptive rules, many firms 
have been willing to devise and invest in non-required methods of responding to 
regulatory values.” Partly this is for efficacy reasons (firms know best themselves 
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where they can save costs) and partly it is found to be beneficial to “develop 
cooperative and mutually trusting relationships with regulatory officials”.173 
In the Communication of the Commission form 2002174 the commission starts to 
concretise the perspectives of environmental agreements on Community level and 
lists sectors relevant for agreements in which the Union is currently striving for 
environmental agreements naming specific fields such as product regulations, 
waste management and climate policy (climate change). The agreements should 
present a real added value with regard to the level of protection of the 
environment.  
Limitations 
[Petts 2000] states that it is an emerging point of agreement that environmental 
policy efficacy and implementation efficiency are most likely to be achieved by an 
appropriate balance between command-and-control and self-regulation methods. 
In a survey on SMEs in England and Wales the paper explored attitudes on the 
importance of compliance with, and the effectiveness of, regulation. Compliance 
with regulation is viewed as morally right however, the effectiveness of regulation 
is questioned (whether all regulation is relevant to environmental protection) and 
there is a strong demand for consistent regulation to ensure a 'level playing field'. 
[Petts 2000] has found that the majority of SMEs are not taking any, or only 
minimal, steps to self-regulate - although seen as an opportunity because of the 
perceived weakness of reactive regulation.175 
4.6.1. Self-Regulation  
Self-regulation concerns agreements, which are made among the social partners, 
economic operators, NGOs or associations in order to regulate and organize their 
activities. On Community level the parties themselves generally take these 
initiatives. The Commission can encourage and recognize them. The contractors 
thereby agree to decrease a certain environmental degrading action or oblige 
themselves to a certain environmentally friendly measure. 
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4.6.2. Co-Regulation  
Co-regulation concerns agreements concluded in the framework of a Community 
legislative instrument falling back on agreements on the basis of Common 
secondary law. The details for implementation are set out in the agreements. In 
general, it is the Commission that takes the initiative for such agreements, 
proposing that the legislature make use of them. 
Communication in the negotiation process between the Commission and the 
polluters that are “under pressure” to install “self-regulations” are not published, 
therefore it is hard to take insight in the process and which instruments of power 
were used on both sides forming the outcome of these negotiations resulting in 
recommendations from the Commission directed at the Associations.176 
From the example of the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA) 
being an economic interest group representing thirteen European car, truck and 
bus manufacturers at EU level, obligating “itself” 1998 to lower CO2-emmissions 
of new vehicles to 140g/km after 2008, and the largely concordant formal 
obligations of the Japanese Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA)177 and 
the Korean Associations (KAMA) it can be gathered, that industries will only 
obligate themselves to restrictions, that are perceived to be necessary anyway. 
4.7. Other Instruments  
4.7.1. Governmental Public Relations 
The absence of a European point of view, European discussion and European 
media focussing on the “general interest” does not promote the quantity and 
quality of European environmental law, orientations in environmental politics, nor 
enhancement of the environmental aid.178  
Governments should maximize the use of other opportunities and legal authorities 
to address environmental issues and expand public involvement. The public 
(including businesses, academia and community organisations) should be 
informed timely about environmental issues, participation in environmental 
decisions facilitated (e.g. improving community access to data) and responds 
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evaluated, because an active, informed citizenry is critical to the success of 
environmental initiatives. Only individuals being aware of their personal 
environmental impact can behave eco-efficiently and can use purchasing and 
investment powers in a sustable way. Universities play a vital role as they are 
more insulated to political bias of environmental concerns and could be a credible 
and trusted source of scientific advice to the public.179 
4.7.2. Information Disclosure 
Public disclosure of environmental performance data (e.g. carbon disclosure) can 
play a role overcoming information asymmetries, and aid market decision-
making. It can increase economic risk for firms involved in the production of 
environmental damaging goods (or undertaking environmental damaging 
behaviour), because it can lead to image loss, decreasing customer satisfaction 
and hence, profit losses. Instruments proliferating information provision programs 
are e.g. U.S. Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) or the declaration of the emission 
values of CO2 of cars. 
4.7.3. Environmental Labelling 
Governments can additionally trigger non-binding environmentally friendly 
behaviour of companies by setting a “clear, explicit, and specific terminology” 
framework for the “eco-labels”, enhance the reliability of eco-labels by requiring 
the producers to reveal information on standardized factors and by reducing 
existing labels serving as a transparency advantage to the consumer. Intensive 
communication to the public on the meaning of accepted labels being compliant 
with the frameworks should lead to higher public consumer choice.180 
4.7.4. Industry Partnerships 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of the U.S. has started voluntary 
industry-government-partnerships with all branches of industries. These 
partnerships are built in many different industry sectors to promote improved 
environmental performance with reduced regulatory burden. Theses voluntary 
collaborations between U.S. EPA and businesses are e.g. programs to encourage 
companies to develop long-term comprehensive climate change strategies and 
set GHG emissions reduction goals, but also compliance and assistance programs 
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with business Initiatives and compliance assistance information and programs 
designed to help businesses incorporate environmental considerations into the 
design and redesign of products, processes, and technical and management 
systems. 181 
4.7.5. Awards 
Public opinion surveys show that Europeans are more worried about the 
environment. This reflects growing awareness among Europeans of environmental 
problems and increased commitment to protecting the planet’s vital resources. 
Seven out of ten Europeans believe that environmental protection and fighting 
pollution represent "an immediate and urgent problem".182 Our health and quality 
of life and that of our children are dependent upon the state of the environment, 
and are therefore a general concern. The environment is not just a matter for 
experts. It may be a complex and varied subject, but every shareholder, whether 
representing industry, public authorities, citizens, or NGOs, must be fully involved 
and committed to the cause.183 
European Business Awards for the Environment 
The Awards (presented every two years in four categories) are awarded by the 
European Commission aiming to recognize and reward outstanding corporate 
contributions to sustainable development of European companies, which set an 
example by successfully bringing together innovation, economic viability and 
environmental concerns. Reflecting growing business interest in contributing to 
environmental sustainability, the competition of 2006 attracted a record of 139 
entries from 23 countries.184 This is the highest number of entries submitted in 
the 19 years history of the European Business Award for the Environment and is 
an indication of businesses’ growing interest in taking care of the environment.185 
Global 500 Forum Laureate Roll of Honour 
The UNEP established the Global 500 Laureate Roll of Honour186 to recognize the 
environmental achievements of individuals and organisations around the world. 
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Toyota Motor Corporation for example has won this award 1999187 for developing 
and introducing Prius to the market, the world's first passenger vehicle in 
production powered by ’hybrid power train system’, which offers twice the fuel 
efficiency compared with conventional vehicles and cuts emissions of certain 
pollutants to about one tenth. Another winner was e.g. Fuji Xerox Australia188 in 
2000 for solving a significant environmental problem in the area of forest 
management: responding to poor sales of existing 100% recycled papers (which 
the market deemed to be of poor quality, expensive and unreliable) the company 
developed (after extensive research) recycled copy paper to precise specifications 
for use in digital equipment. 
5. Government Failures 
However governments, just as the free market, do not necessarily produce 
optima. With “government failure” the systemic problem is addressed preventing 
governments from efficiently reacting on market failures by working out unbiased 
solutions. Failures occur because, just as with market failures illustrated before, 
governmental institutions and their decisions are determined by the same 
individuals: “political decisions are not handed down from on high by omniscient 
beings who cannot err”189. Why should the behaviour of individuals in the market 
differ from those in political processes? [Turner et al 1994] even shows “that 
governments are very often themselves the cause of environmental degradation” 
(unfortunately) being “often not better than the free market”. Powers are not 
necessarily used to provide “healthy environment” in the socially optimal 
quantity. Also [Langford 1999] reports on a “growing literature on failed 
states”190. [Winston 2006] explains that governments can fail “because markets 
are performing adequately or public policy does not correct a market failure 
efficiently”, further stating that government intervention may even exacerbate a 
problem or entail (unintended) negative results and may result in “considerably 
greater” costs than the original market failure it was thought to encounter. 
“Dysfunction [of the effectiveness of democratic politics] is predicted because 
democratic institutions produce elements of irresponsibility and ignorance.”191 
This is, because failures distorting markets (described above) can likewise happen 
to afflict governments, even burdened with additional aberrances (e.g. [Kashani 
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2005] confirmed inefficiencies of the state intervention in the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf activities). 
Generally speaking governmental interventions in markets that do not correct 
market failure, or even reduce the efficiency of allocation of good or resources 
(making society as a whole worse off, than without governmental intervention) 
are addressed as government failures.  
“In short, government failures may be generated by non-Coasian legislative 
institutions, poor selection of policy makers, socially costly rent seeking, and 
intertemporal investment, policy, and political linkages.” 192 
Observations of the principal–agent theory can help to explain failures as it 
describes combinations of parties where there is a principal delegating work to 
one or more agents to perform it, as for example in relation to civil servants 
within a ministry.193 Since governments are structured hierarchically the 
development and execution of policies involve ministers delegating the 
preparation of detailed programs to lower level bureaucrats. But conflicting goals 
and asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent combined 
with the problem of control and assessment these constellations can cause agent 
opportunism: “bureaucrats may pay attention to their budgets and personal 
career advancement instead of the public services they are supposed to 
provide.”194 The information asymmetry problem may even lead to moral hazard 
problems. Overcoming the asymmetry of information problem costs of monitoring 
and valuation must be faced, but there are further solutions proposed by the 
agency theory according to [Ouyang 2006], namely selecting the right agents, 
using various forms of monitoring (such as third party control), and adopting 
various negative and positive sanctions.195 Especially in policy processes involving 
high technology the information asymmetry problem is more severe, because of 
special technological expertise and know-how and may be subject to accelerated 
change and uncertainty (even hard to keep pace with for specialists) conceding 
significant leeway and power to agents (e.g. bureaucrats). To understand what 
makes states capable of efficient policy execution [Ouyang 2006] claims that “we 
must study the bureaucrats in order to understand the state’s capacity and its 
role completely”, because the “government leaders need to be able to control 
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their powerful bureaucrats when the bureaucrats are autonomous from the 
society”196. 
Public Choice Theory tries to explain the political processes by economic 
analysis of the “political decision making, including theories of the state, voting 
rules and voter behaviour, apathy, party politics, log rolling, bureaucratic choice, 
policy analysis and regulation”197 and is based on the rational self-interest (‘utility 
maximisers’) assumption of all decision makers, introducing doubt about 
governments' (politicians') incentives to always act for the social good.198  
Classical welfare theory suggests that all policy-decisions should be made with a 
view to the greatest utility available to the maximum number of individuals. This 
process of public policy making clearly involves trade offs. Public Choice Theory 
responds to observations that governments are not always only benevolently 
regulating markets for the good of citizens, but are also found to accommodate 
private interests, diverting resources to certain groups at the expense of citizens 
at large.199 Besley is said to “point out the main trouble with the traditional 
welfare-economics approach when applied to policy making, i.e., the impossibility 
of providing a means of aggregating individual utility to form a societal measure 
of well-being”.200 
Sources of government failures according to Besley are “ignorance, private 
influence such as corruption and rent seeking, and the quality of leadership”201 
and the author will stick to this classification in the following, although it must be 
remarked, that there is no sharp separation possible since the human phenomena 
described in the following all interact with and fuel each other. 
5.1. Information Failures 
Information failures derive from asymmetric information situations between 
producers and consumers, which has been shown to lead to market failures, but 
also between the producers and governments leading to governmental failure. 
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[Hillier 1994] describes the problem to be the following: “managers of the 
regulated companies know more about their companies than do the regulators”202 
and therefore recommends taking this into consideration when designing 
regulatory policy. Regulators may only have insight into external factors, having 
no knowledge about the production function (the exact cost functions of the 
regulated). As the tackling of environmental problems is very knowledge 
intensive and the measurement of externalities (also for positive) assessing their 
true worth is not an easy task, many instruments for governmental interference 
into environmental problems cause high administration costs (the government 
may have to hire information carriers at high wages in the fields of special 
expertise of highly technical industries). It is therefore important to consider the 
information structure between economic actors. Asymmetric information 
structures are set out in that there is more (complete) information on the one 
side than on the other (incomplete information).203  
This is also a major distinctive feature from “uncertainty”, where it is assumed, 
that uncertainty is the same to all market participants (simply for the fact, that 
science has not advanced to figuring out facts).204 
These two terms used in economics but also game theory need to be 
distinguished in more detail:  
Imperfect information – is when there is uncertainty about the actual 
behaviour of economic actors or if the evolution of circumstances is not known at 
decision making (no instantaneous update as soon as new information is 
available).205 Imperfect information comprises the lack of knowing all prices 
(costs), values (benefits), long-term-effects and externalities and can therefore 
result in inefficient allocation by governments. Perfect information would only be 
possible at zero costs of information. It is therefore also for governments not a 
realistic status, because the gathering of sufficient information is no easier for the 
regulator than for the individual.  
Incomplete information – is when the economic actors do not know all 
elements defining the rules of the process itself (e.g. how many actors taking 
part).206 This lack of information can lead to unforeseen consequences. 
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There is the general assumption in economic theory that individuals prefer levels 
of better information to inferior levels if there are no transaction costs. Therefore 
models tend to display the optimal level of information to be only stemmed by the 
costs of information: costs of searching, transmitting, acquisition (depending on 
the information technology) of information and then the costs of transformation 
(of information into knowledge) also influenced by the a priori knowledge. Clearly 
hereby time plays a crucial role, with increasing value, the more educated 
individuals need to occupy.207 
But this general view of theory is opposed by practical findings of human nature 
taken from psychology regarding the assumption that new information is always 
used to reconsider viewpoints – the theory of “Cognitive Dissonance” suggests 
following findings, that have been shown by experiments: it suggests that people 
have preferences over their beliefs about the state of the world (just as they have 
preferences over the real state of the world), they can control their own beliefs 
(by selecting “credible” information sources and choosing sources that are likely 
to conform with their “desired” beliefs) and further tend to stay with chosen 
beliefs.208  
Also there is the constraint of Rational Ignorance that describes actual 
"rational" behaviour, if the cost described above involved with the gathering of 
sufficient information and learning (on a certain issue in order to make an 
informed decision) is judged to outweigh the expected potential benefit. Spending 
time and money on informing oneself can therefore be set aside due to 
considering it as irrational and not all the information necessary to make an 
informed decision on issues will be retrieved. The problem of rational ignorance 
yet again can be a variant of the public goods problem. This is because time 
spent gathering information by governments could be worthwhile if better 
decisions could be conveyed to the public as a whole. 
[Turner et al 2000] have found that policy intervention failures (along with the 
public good and externality problems) “due to a lack of consistency among 
government policies in different areas (economics, environment, nature 
protection, physical planning, etc.)” have led to the loss (and threatening) of 
wetlands all over the world. The group of scientists traced back the reasons of (all 
(!) the facets of the wetlands-extinction-problem) to information failures: 
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complexity and ‘invisibility’ of spatial relationships in the ecosystem. As a solution 
integrated research (combining social and natural sciences) are recommended to 
partly solve this failure by achieving the required consistency across various 
policy fields.209 
Another problem can simply be the idled perception of action-requirement caused 
by either lack of knowledge on action-requirement (incomplete knowledge, 
different to information!) concerning a certain existing environmental problem. As 
perceiving environmental problems is often linked to high information demand (or 
better: knowledge of certain interaction has to be understood), they often are not 
avoided ex ante, but only at their occurrence. It for example needed a severe 
fish-die-off until the quality of rivers diminished in such an obvious way that 
governments began to monitor and draft regulation.  
However, provision failures can occur even although an environmental problem is 
obvious, if there is insufficient public demand of action (causing minor priority of 
the issue) resulting in ignorance by politicians until a certain level of public 
demand gives a reason to act (being worth the effort by taking credit for tackling 
the problem). This can also be seen from the point that politicians are influenced 
by lobby groups and can only resist the pressure, if there is enough public 
opposition justifying reluctance.  
5.2. Individualism 
Governments may not always pursue a clear objective to reach this social 
optimum because of discrepancies on approaches (how to tackle problems) and 
internal power struggling (democratic lock-up) between political parties (being a 
political playing field for personal interests of politicians and not public interests), 
resulting in a weakened, antagonistic position to resist lobbying and counteract 
market failures. [Shaffer 1995] brings up the paradigm of “interest group 
pluralism” theorizing “that the public policy process attempts to reach 
compromise between the competing goals of a multitude of interest groups” and 
states that this democratic process is doubted (by political scientists) to function 
effectively.210 When governments are subject to influence from organized groups, 
they become tools through which benefits are channelled towards the interest of 
these groups. 
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Further the nature of environmental polices interacting and correlating heavily 
with other political resorts, as for example the building of streets by the 
infrastructure authority, entails the problem that aims are often not harmonized 
and work against each other.  
Additionally governments might not be as benign, as it could be hoped for. This 
can range from the complete lack of will or a weak incentive to serve the 
community (a factor closely linked to the existence of free elections), to the 
selective representation of interests of certain favoured societal groups, meaning 
the governments “may well not act to protect the environment, especially if they 
think, that environmental protection will impose costs on members of powerful 
pressure groups.”211 “Even in democratic countries governments may to have to 
please a certain pressure group rather than the community as a whole.”212  
Further, lacking diligence, because other preconditions are not fulfilled e.g. 
citizens monitoring the government's activities, voters taking the time to study 
issues prior to voting, experts generating socially beneficial policy ideas, which 
are implemented in the correct situations and ways, etc.213 - many of these 
preconditions, however, being public goods themselves. By the logic of public 
goods theory, these preconditions will not be sufficiently provided on the market, 
so some of the necessary preconditions for government to provide public goods 
will not be met.  
5.2.1. Rent-Seeking 
Rent seeking occurs where decisions are manipulated to be made in favour of 
certain individuals or interest groups (being either regulators, bureaucrats or 
regulated) leading to resource allocation profitable for the rent seeker at the 
expense of others. Rent seekers try to draw (uncompensated) advantages (rents) 
from regulation (processes) and law, manipulating the impact of regulations, 
rather than creating profit by economic actions (production, trade): legislators try 
to ensure re-election, bureaucrats try to increase their influence and budget (to 
promote own interest), the regulated try to increase subsidization to obtain 
and/or reduce competition. 
                                          
211 [Turner et al 1994], p. 80 
212 [Turner et al 1994], p. 80 
213 [Insua et al 2007] 
74 
The impact of rent seeking can be considerable, if "buying" a favourable 
regulatory environment is cheaper than more efficient production: resources are 
spent on lobbying that is unrelated to contributions to social wealth or well-being. 
An example of rent seeking would be lobbying for economic regulation of tariff 
protection by the agricultural lobby. 
5.2.2. Regulatory Capture 
Rent seeking, information failures (above all rational ignorance), which have been 
described above, are the main mechanisms, which allow Regulatory Capture to 
happen. Regulatory Capture is an economic phenomenon, following the 
observation of collusion between firms and the government agencies that are 
actually assigned to regulate them, especially when there is asymmetric 
information between the regulator and the regulated.  
[Laffont et al 1991] explain that “[t]he “capture” or “interest group” theory 
emphasizes the role of interest groups in the formation of public policy” and state 
that it strikes roots back to the view of Marx (inter alia) that big businesses 
control institutions. [Laffont et al 1991] also cite Stigler, who noted, that the 
“regulatory process can be captured by small business industries as well […]”214. 
The phenomenon of “regulatory capture” is about the capture of regulators by the 
regulated and encompasses active but also passive behaviour by responsible 
authorities resulting in protection of illegal, unethical, immoral or anti-public 
interest practices that respective authorities are actually charged with to 
regulate.215 The to be regulated industry gets so many “friendly votes” from the 
regulators, that their utilities are the driving factor and these industries actually 
control regulation: the regulator becomes dominated by the interests of the 
industry that it is supposed to monitor. 
[McMahon 2002] claims that “there is no bastion of morality or courage or 
vigilance or statesmanship or ethics that seems immune from the threat of 
‘capture’’”216 and concludes that the phenomenon is not fully visible (not even for 
courts). Further [McMahon 2002] provides a classification of certain levels of 
capture:  
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1. Regulatory Capture may start with the regulator allowing a certain group 
or individual that should be regulated “to breach the law, ethic, good 
practice rule, moral principal or public interest duty that the regulator is 
responsible for upholding.” 
2. The next level involves the regulator assisting “the regulated to avoid the 
regulatory consequences after the fact.” 
3. At the “deepest level of development, the ‘capture’ is so complete that the 
regulator may assist the regulated to defeat the regulatory regime before 
the fact.”217 
Two main causes of Regulatory Capture named in literature can either result 
from subordination of an entire regulatory system to the regulated industry (a so-
called “systemic capture”), but also from undue influencing (through personnel 
exchange, identification with values through frequent contact, direct corruption, 
etc.).218 Hence, designing regulation “needs to take account of regulatory 
capture”, which is recommended by Mc Mahon to be achieved best by “[m]arket-
based instruments and independent regulatory bodies tend to reduce the scope 
for capture.”219 
[Laffont et al 1991] puts forward an interesting claim, that contrasting 
“conventional wisdom of interest-group politics, an interest group may be hurt by 
its own power”.220 
5.2.3. Logrolling 
Logrolling is about trading votes by legislative members due to a specific purpose, 
or even buying/selling votes and can involve not only individuals, but also whole 
interest groups or parties.221 The implicit bargain is the expectation of cooperation 
regarding decisions on resource allocation in return for support in other decisions, 
resulting in actual power not being exercised (otherwise there will be retaliation). 
In order to reach the two main goals of politicians (re-election and passing certain 
policies222) logrolling can be used to increase the chance of passing bills.  
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In his paper [de Carvalho 2006] showed, that “the lack of a stable government 
coalition resulted in costs to society that were not anticipated by the 
government”.223  
The government used logrolling (a trade of votes) to “guarantee the number of 
votes necessary to approve the amendments”, creating “a vicious system in 
which representatives would only vote with the government if they had benefits in 
return”.224 A basic remedy for logrolling is requiring supermajorities. 
5.2.4. Pork Barrel Politics 
The term (smoked pork was in earlier times transported in barrels) derives from 
the U.S. where politicians would enrich their voters by government spending to 
their advantage, but burdened on all tax payers. 
This deficiency of policy processes therefore contributes significantly to 
government failures, because of limiting economic efficiency, wasting resources 
and reducing welfare impacts. A reason for pork barrel spending may well be the 
“electoral pressure”: politicians striving for re-election need to pass ‘popular’ 
policies to capture votes. 
5.3. Deficient Quality of Leadership 
[Lodge 2002] finds that “[r]egulatory reform is often seen as a road paved by 
good intentions”, nevertheless it can lead to “policy hell”, as [Lodge 2002] calls it. 
Hence, it is not enough to have good intentions, because there is another possible 
source of government failure: the intellectual capacity of the decision maker itself 
in charge for developing and implementing a policy. If the basic quality of 
leadership, competency, is missing, policy makers can cause government failures. 
But competency does not prevent the politician from committing government 
failure “by implementing projects harmful to society by following personal 
preferences”225 (as shown above). It can therefore be seen as an additional 
prerequisite for a functioning regulatory system. The qualities of regulators may 
not only encompass technical, bureaucratic and other specialist knowledge, but 
also the cooperation ability: [Peterson et al 2003] claims, that the real regulatory 
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failure of the Californian Electricity Crisis has been “that FERC226 and state 
policymakers were unable to work together to resolve the crisis.” 
Mismanagement, miscalculation or other errors can cause a regulation failure 
that occurs, when regulation designed to avoid (also only potential) market 
failures, results in decreased economic welfare e.g. because administrative costs 
outweigh the benefits of regulation.  
Likewise [Jaffe et al 2005] argue that “the rate and direction of technological 
advance is influenced by market and regulatory incentives, and can be cost-
effectively harnessed through the use of economic-incentive based policy” but 
warn that “[I]n the presence of weak or nonexistent environmental policies, 
investments in the development and diffusion of new environmentally beneficial 
technologies are very likely to be less than would be socially desirable.”227 
Environmental policy therefore needs strong advocates that are not easily 
misled by the discussed governmental failures to overcome the present status of 
regulations being subject to the toxic mix of public hysteria, rent-seeking of 
lobbyists, and power-seeking by bureaucrats. 
In this respect the author wants to make the following statement: ‘‘environmental 
policy is the prisoner of all other policies of social and economic affairs, to which 
higher priority is given’’.228 
5.4. Consequences of Government Failures 
[Winston 2006] claims that “[g]overnment failure may result in missed 
opportunities, wasted resources, and waning public support”. 
5.4.1. Welfare Impacts 
Due to absence of adequate information and/or information aggregation problems 
in the political process, government decisions may ignore to measure valuations 
of individuals regarding public goods accurately, but also may fail to distribute 
these fairly (according to certain welfare criteria). 
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Rent seeking, logrolling, pork barrel spending activities may have different 
welfare effects depending on the situation for the whole society before and after 
these decisions, such as the erosion of consumer surplus but also producer 
surplus. 
5.4.2. Market Distortion 
Implementation of instruments without profound knowledge of market 
mechanisms can distort the market (e.g. setting taxes the elasticity of demand 
must be known accurately): agricultural subsidies, fuel taxes can lead to 
suboptimal allocation of goods and services (if applied in the wrong amount). 
Further markets are e.g. distorted by the effect of “crowding out” resulting from 
extended governmental spending (e.g. to finance subsidies) causing the rise of 
interest rates, putting pressure on private sector investment. “As policy makers 
misread economic theory, they produce results worse than those they are 
attempting to correct. Thus, these distorting effects are equally as bad, or worse 
than, the market failure regulators hoped to ameliorate.”229 Also Regulatory Risk 
(being the risk faced by firms due to regulatory changes) is distorting markets. 
5.4.3. Short Termism 
[Pineau 2007] establishes a policy analysis framework that allows the evaluation 
of the likeliness that the implemented policies are sustainable and gathers 
“policies based on a flawed analysis are unlikely to produce outcomes that are 
sustainable in the long run.”230 
Besley’s model is also stated to reveal that the “government's inability to commit 
to a policy ahead of time can reduce welfare” and that “re-election prospects 
shape political incentives and lead to the choice of inefficient policies”. 
Hence there are indicators that the orientation at election cycles (short time 
horizons of a couple of years only) lead to the putting on hold of complex long-
term issues. 
5.4.4. Unintended Consequences 
Wrong decisions can lead to disincentive effects, misallocation of resources (again 
lowering social welfare). As a consequence of incomplete information regulators’ 
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actions might entail consequences that they have not intended, but still occur, 
because of the adaptation mechanisms of the market (mostly resulting out of 
substitutional behaviour). 
5.5. Possibilities to Avoid Governmental Failures 
Therefore, even if government interferes, an adequate provision of public goods is 
not guaranteed to be reached. Moreover for the reason that finding solutions are 
not open to private actors countering government failure offers more limited 
options (compared to market failures). In [Mason 2008] Ann Florini gives a 
definition of governance transparency: “the degree to which information is 
available to outsiders that enables them to have informed voice in decisions 
and/or to assess the decisions made by insiders”231. It is argued that 
transparency as a moral and political imperative is clear to states having 
developed right-to-know legislation, however noting that some developing 
countries “have been more ambitious than the older Western democracies in the 
scope of their information access entitlements”232. 
[Kathuria 2007] outlines that due to the limitations of formal regulations that 
have been recognized combating pollution in developing countries “there is a 
growing interest in the potential of informal regulations to achieve environmental 
goals”233. Perceiving chances for “informal channels” or local press to influence 
local pollution in India, the study shows that the press can function as an informal 
agent of pollution control. However there is not immediate effect, but only if there 
is sustained234 interest about pollution and suggests that “lobbying efforts 
through the media by environmental activists and NGOs may be quite effective in 
influencing industry behaviour”235. 
Also Mildred Warner is stated to recognize the extensive failures that characterize 
markets and governmental interference, yet stating that governments play “a 
market structuring role in building competition, managing monopoly and reducing 
transaction costs of contracting”236. This governmental role is addressed as 
necessary and desirable by her because it holds out both efficiency and planning 
benefits, but she is stated to call “for the inclusion of civic groups in the design 
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and delivery of public services”237 because she is convinced that “public 
engagement can help mitigate government and market failures and foster 
solutions to difficult public problems that are both efficient and socially 
optimal.”238 
6. Instruments of Power of the Economy 
[Grey et al 1993] have analysed the impact of regulation on the economy, by 
examining the interrelation of productivity growth and environmental regulation 
on three manufacturing industries in the time interval 1979-1985 by calculating 
both labour productivity and total factor productivity over time and relating these 
values to the pollution abatement expenditures, comparing the changes of growth 
rates to pollution abatements costs (weighed by other factors as compliance 
status, pollution level etc.). The results show that “[p]lants with higher 
compliance costs have significantly lower productivity levels and slower 
productivity growth rates than less regulated plants”239. The study reveals a total 
factor productivity reduction by a 3 to 4 fold of a compliance costs increase.240  
From this starting point it is clear that firms’ individualistic behaviour will try to 
oppose and manipulate the magnitude of “burden” shifted onto its economic 
stance. Responses of firms to environmental regulation include strategic 
adaptation but also attempts to influence policy-makers.241 To reflect on how far 
companies can push their interests [Gunningham et al 2003] draw up the theory 
of companies acting within the realms of a so-called “license to operate” (due to 
their research work on corporate environmental behaviour of paper mills) 
consisting not only of a  
• Regulatory license (e.g. land use permits, process standards), but also 
of an  
• Economic license (e.g. creating return on investment and profit 
growth, liquidity constraints) and a  
• Social license (e.g. meeting demands of social actors, such as 
neighbours, environmentally concerned NGO’s, functioning as part of 
the social system242). 
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These aspects of the “license to operate” interact and can leverage each other: 
companies that are not taking over responsibility for their social license (pushing 
it too far) risk future increasing stringency of the regulatory license as they 
provoke environmentalists to engage in lobbying at governmental level or might 
call for a consumer boycott influencing the economic license. On the whole the 
economic license can be seen to operate “as a brake on beyond-compliance 
investments and expenditures”243 with governmental interference determining 
companies’ profitability by certain grades (according to the situation and the 
instrument used). According to the severity of interfering with a company’s 
(estimated) capabilities to achieve profits, the following instruments can be 
installed to improve the economic situation. 
6.1. Using Public Relations 
Businesses can choose to face environmental issues in their interaction and 
communication with their customers (according to the degree of public interest). 
As it is stated that “social license pressures have intensified”244 especially 
industries producing consumer goods will have to evidence more and more the 
ecological friendliness of their production methods and the resulting product for 
sale. Revealing environmentally related information may be enforced (e.g. CO2 
emissions of cars), but can also result from a foresighted strategy of responding 
to a customer having further needs and expectations on top of merely focusing on 
factors such as price, look, etc. Some businesses and business organisations have 
recognized the importance of the implementation of the environmental “view” and 
support their state’s environmental initiatives.  
The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) for example is a multidimensional evaluation 
system (from the domain of Business Intelligence) concerning several views on 
the situation of the business apart from the financial view245, deploying a holistic 
view on the business opportunities that can be amplified depending on the 
individual business e.g. customer and employee perspective, process-perspective, 
development/potentials perspective and ecological perspective: in [BMFVIT] it is 
shown that the Austrian Federal Forests246 use such an expanded (in respect to 
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the classical) BSC to encompass further strategic control components building up 
consistency in all company domains.  
 
Figure 2: Sustainability Balance Score Card; Source [BMFVIT], p. 20 
 
“Regulative leaders” have significant opportunities to improve their social license 
by moving beyond meeting minimum environmental requirements and 
responding directly to community concerns. Maybe firms (environmental) PR can 
be seen as some kind of preventative measure, a possibilities of companies to 
react to and manage their individual business environment by paying attention to 
the social license of a company. 
Public Relations include the active communication transporting information across 
available media (internet, newspaper, hotline etc.) on environmental concerns 
such as for example by the regular issuing of environmental reports observed by 
a number of companies, especially in the heavy polluting sectors, such as 
chemicals (company BASF), petrol (company BP)) but also the engagement in the 
European Environmental Management and Auditing Scheme (EMAS) and ISO-
certifications (ISO 14001 certified environmental management system) 
constituting possible responses to the stakeholders’ demands. As e.g. a social 
health reform was planned in 2008 in Austria limiting certain rights of medical 
doctors an advertising campaign was started opposing the arguments drawn up 
by the state and directly communicating with their direct stakeholder, the 
patients, as an act of political resistance. It could be considered that similar 
action can be taken by other economic players concerning environmental 
regulation, in cases of governmental failure. 
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However, businesses can convert additional costs into added value and additional 
selling propositions (even bearing the possibility of gaining a comparative 
corporate advantage) by creating a consumer surplus through environmentally 
sensible behaviour. But of course this economic process of “rent-seeking” can 
also aim at gaining competitive advantages “by influencing legislative and 
regulatory processes rather than through competition in product markets”247 
seeking to obtain advantages by resistance or opposition to regulatory processes. 
6.2. Lobbying, (Il)legal Platforms, Cartels, Unions  
While the main response on firm level is adaptation248, attempts to influence the 
development of environmental policies can be undertaken by bundled interest 
groups, seeking to protect and advance their interests by lobbying or building 
coalitions that try to influence political developments. Thus efforts are typically 
targeted at governmental authorities: interest groups can either lobby directly 
e.g. national governments or indirectly e.g. members of the European Council 
working groups. If lobbying performed on behalf of organisations includes making 
contributions, the borderline to corruption is blurred, especially if politicians then 
appear to be acting upon the lobbied interests. Lobbying in the EC came up in the 
late 1970s, but at that time only a few lobbyists were involved in the system and 
likewise only a few business associations upheld representative offices. But the 
more legislative power was bundled in Brussels the more companies started to 
open offices in order to be nearer to the source of change needing to be provided 
with updated information, but also trying to influence the process actively and 
effectively. The more complex EU legislation evolved and the mightier the EC 
grew the more important and attractive lobbying has turned out to be for all 
different kinds of stakeholders. Currently around 15,000 lobbyists249 (consultants, 
lawyers, associations, corporations, NGOs, international organisations, trade 
federations etc.) are stated to be in Brussels. More than 2,600 special interest 
groups (the number growing) have a permanent office in Brussels, displaying the 
importance of lobbying work and the tendency of efforts to directly influence the 
political agenda at European level. The EC and several European governments are 
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claimed by the WTO to have worked closely together with business lobbies such 
as the European Services Forum.250  
The outcome of lobbying can be seen according to following example stated by 
[Lee 2008]: “In Korea, it is highly probable that the contribution of environmental 
regulations to productivity growth varies across industries depending upon the 
degree of market power; industries with more market power have less regulatory 
impact.”251 
Not in an environmental area, but still exploring the political economy of the 
regulatory process [Duso 2002] has empirically investigated the U.S. mobile 
telecommunication market in the 80ies and revealed that businesses could 
influence the choice of the regulatory system by lobbying, resulting in regulation 
moving towards the set goals, however not very significantly. [Duso 2002] found 
that some companies plied such a successful lobbying, that markets were not 
regulated where it would have been most efficient. [Duso 2002] furthermore finds 
that the smaller the companies’ opportunities for collusive behaviour on the 
market (enabling the aiming for coordinated goals) are the higher lobbying efforts 
will be. 
[Duso 2002] states that “[r]egulation, like many other policy decisions, results 
out of a complex process that is shaped by political as well as economic forces. 
Therefore, regulatory decisions must be endogenized when studying their impact 
on the market outcome.” It can be assumed that environmental regulation faces 
the same problems. 
Economic Chambers 
Federal Economic Chambers are (in best case) democratically self-governing 
bodies that are financially independent to governmental authorities by the grade 
of funding by its members.252 Economic Chambers act as coordinated 
representatives of the interests of business and balance sector and size-related 
interests. Since these institutions bundle the interests of entire business 
communities they play a role as an intermediary (also building central contact 
platforms for companies) coordinating and representing economic interests at 
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national and international level (offering information on law issues, organizing 
industry-wide advertising and market research, collective bargaining, training and 
consulting). Membership can be compulsory (as e.g. in Austria) and governments 
can be obliged to involve the relevant economic chamber in decision-making and 
administrative procedures, i.e the Austrian government is obliged to consult the 
Austrian Economic Chamber on legislative projects and important regulations.253 
Trade Organisations 
Trade organisations support and promote businesses involved with international 
trade by consulting and guiding enterprises worldwide helping companies to find 
suitable foreign business partners and strengthen existing business connections, 
improving the ability to compete in the global marketplace. In Austria e.g. this 
service is provided by a specialised department at national level (“Austrian 
Trade”) and by offices in new high-potential markets.254 
Professional Associations 
Professional Associations (or Industrial Unions) can cover all kinds of different 
sectors throughout the industrial landscape of a country (producing, processing, 
servicing industry) and help bundling interests. Membership, normally on a 
voluntary basis, opens up the access to a lobby group upholding relations with 
politicians and opinion leaders, maintaining a network of contacts to permanently 
represent the interests of its members on national but also international levels.  
6.3. Threat and Intimidation 
Threats can reach from the outsourcing of company-parts or even moving the 
whole company to a country with a laxer environmental law, to the threat of 
loosing working places, liquidity problems leading to a possible bankruptcy of the 
company. Further multinational companies can “think loudly” about their 
requirements or constraints regarding a possible FDI in the planning phase of new 
facilities or regarding the considerations of closing a site. 
The evaluation of these threats can be seen in their possible consequence for a 
society, so as the moving of a company causes loss of income to certain societal 
groups, but also results in income tax losses for the respective government. 
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Whereas the macroeconomic impact of e.g. a huge pharmaceutical company 
shutting down can clearly be estimated in terms of high-class working places lost, 
decreased income tax flows and even possible unemployment insurance 
payments, loss of the economic status of the region, etc. are obvious and can be 
calculated on a rather short notice; with environmental impacts on the other hand 
the costs are hidden and can be subject to information which is very hard to 
obtain (as for example the willingness to pay, which is often biased) on a huge 
scope (the society). Clearly it is sometimes tempting to make concessions 
regarding intangibles, rather than letting a good chance to create material wealth 
slip away. 
6.4. Choice of Location 
As the strongest instrument of power of last resort the moving of (existing) 
locations and the decision against a certain location can be the adequate strategy 
respond of firms in regard to un-negotiable environmental stringency.  
Constraints Of Free Choice Of Location  
There are limitations to the possibility of moving whole production sites:  
• Firms engaged in certain activities bound to a local extraction of a good 
(mining, fruit growing),  
• Service companies clearly must be based at the customer (tires can be 
produced somewhere else, but the can only be sold and mounted at 
the customers site).  
• Further perishable goods (e.g. bread) tend to be produced near the 
customer (depending on whether the profit margin allows for the costs 
of long distance transport further influenced by weight, size and 
durability of products).  
• Heavy industries with a high quota of fixed installations and 
equipment, such as the company VOEST Alpine will find it rather 
difficult to move on short notice. But how long will VOEST Alpine stay 
under conditions far more stringent than in other countries? 
 
However, there are some constraints onto the solemn choice of location according 
to low levels of environmental protection. Today’s economic map of the world is 
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dominated by what [Porter 1998]255calls clusters256 defined as unusual 
accumulation of competitive success (regarding a specific field of economic value-
adding) in a location (national, regional, state and even metropolitan economy), 
especially in more economically advanced nations. These clusters are not unique, 
but highly typical, promoting both competition and cooperation: according to 
Porter the enduring competitive advantages in a global economy lie increasingly 
in local knowledge, relationships, motivation, that distant rivals cannot match. 
Clusters increase productivity of companies based in the area, driving the 
direction and pace of innovation (important to sustain future productivity growth) 
and stimulates the formation of new businesses257. A cluster allows each member 
to benefit as if it had a greater scale258 or as if it had joined with others formally, 
without requiring it to sacrifice its flexibility, with the linkages among the 
members leading to better results. Summarizing the choice of location can be 
influenced by considerations on the allocation of competitive clusters. However 
there are many other business environment factors, such as supplier structure, 
market and price development, legal issues (tax law, legal security, social law) 
that determine the choice of location of companies.259 Also internal business 
analysis (e.g. on the necessity of skilled labour bound to the original location) can 
also play a role hindering free moving of location. Seen from the imposed costs 
that have to be faced on moving, there are transaction costs (finding/choosing 
location with less stringent environmental regulation, negotiation with employees 
made the proposition to be “exported”, changes in suppliers and logistics), 
transportation costs (equipment) and risks (lack of knowledge on the foreign 
market, knowledge loss by employees not willing to emigrate, uncertainty on the 
period of the environmental law advantage). Generally moving will only be 
dominant strategy if costs for moving are perceived to be smaller than the 
environmental regulation costs imposed on a firm. 
If the same standards apply in all MS of the EC, a company would have to move 
completely outside the European territory. IMHO it is a sticking point to move on 
with the closing of ranks of European countries (forming a great part of 
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industrialized countries), because promoting environmental law development on 
supranational level diminishes avoidance-opportunities for companies. 
7. Results and Conclusion 
As [Revesz et al 2007] put it: “Of course, no particular form of government 
intervention, no individual policy instrument — whether market-based or 
conventional — and no specific level of government is appropriate for all 
environmental problems. Which instrument or level of government is best in any 
given situation depends upon a variety of characteristics of the environmental 
problem, and the social, political, and economic context in which it is being 
regulated.”260 
The role of governments is to integrate the consideration of risks and impacts on 
the environment in the set of managerial decision-making-processes. The most 
diligent way however is not to take over this decision-making-process for those 
assigned with the tasks in the businesses, because the law-maker is rather not 
capable of competing with all the different scientific capacities working for 
industries in the economy, but carefully lead these institutions onto a sustainable 
path. Administrative, managerial and technical competence capacities should not 
be overruled by (unskilled) top-down-regulation not considering all impacts, as 
can the specialists (both technical and managerial) in the respective industries, 
which of course for their part may be reluctant to provide or bias this information.  
Besides the problems caused by this information asymmetry, environmental 
policy is also restricted by the fact, that the national labyrinth of incentives and 
constraints aiming for certain purposes of either social, economic or political kind 
include many initiatives that are not based on the idea of sustainability 
(subsidizing the building of streets, watering systems, forest-clearing licences261 
or even the use of pesticides262). To extinguish the incentives actually destroying 
the environment therefore is to be assumed an integral part of sustainability and 
is why governments have to set their clear aims in environmental protection and 
then take the necessary steps, withstanding displayed counter-pressures of the 
regulated economic players and resisting discussed governmental failures (e.g. 
regulatory capture). The author can therefore only agree with [Bøgelund 2007] 
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stating that “we need more research into the institutional setting of the policy-
making process”263 to succeed in the challenge of making environmental concerns 
matter in those policy processes, which at the moment “fail to take environmental 
concerns into account in a proper way”. [Bøgelund 2007] even argues that 
“government alone cannot provide the basis for making informed decisions about 
environment and development” because they “tend to let other more traditional 
and narrow economic concerns dominate decision-making”264, and is why the 
work of NGOs is crucial to the forthcomings of environmental law. 
Environmental policy has to become smarter to ensure environmental protection 
balances conflicting demands efficiently and effectively through the appropriate 
use of risk-based approaches, greater standardization and associated charging 
mechanisms, environmental taxes, trading schemes, negotiated or voluntary 
agreements, advice and education programs, environmental management 
systems.265 Furthermore it is crucial to not only produce environmental legislation 
but also actually effectively implement it, e.g. by introducing incentives (for 
ecological behaviour) or certain factors of deterrence (to avert environmental 
polluting activities) for economic actors. 
As outlined in the paper social optimum of the environmental state is where 
marginal cost of environmental degradation equals the marginal benefit of 
pollution. The marginal costs of one more unit of degradation can be understood 
to be the “sum of the maximum that each member of society is willing to pay” for 
avoiding that unit. But measuring and calculating true social costs of certain 
economic activities is highly sophisticated, requiring much expert knowledge (that 
can be biased), interdependent, includes vague estimates on risks taken and 
throws up the difficulties of calculating the impacts on the quality of life and 
assigning a value to these impacts. Therefore “[a]s a result, society often under-
estimates the true marginal costs of society”.266 Governmental decision processes 
to practical problems therefore need to diligently estimate benefits and costs to 
society as a whole, aided by social cost-benefit-analyses, trying to incorporate as 
many aspects as possible, also accounting for intangibles invisible as direct 
expenses.267 The case study of this paper will provide an example. 
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8. Critique, Outlook, Final Remarks 
Literature Gap 
The author has experienced a severe literature gap in academic journals on the 
issue of firms’ responses to environmental policy. There were only a handful of 
articles found to include some information on how businesses oppose the 
development of more stringent environmental law. Many kinds of combinations of 
catchwords have been used (firms, companies, economic (system), sector, 
industry, business, economy; resistance, opposition, negotiation, power 
(instruments)/ influence, interaction, interdependencies, reluctance, resistance, 
evasion, avoidance, effect / governmental, environmental regulation, law, policy 
etc.), however it must be stated, that only articles being available free of charge 
(retrieved through the University of Vienna user-login) were reviewed. Also 
Internet searches would not lead to desired inputs. In times of increased CSR 
literature the author has experienced that these are full with success stories 
(firms proudly claiming how well they perform regarding environmental 
concerns), but that there is only little (academic) information on the downsides. 
Although economic pressure certainly existent and are reported by newspapers or 
other media, academic research seems not to have interfered with the 
interactions of environmental law and the opposing power of economy. The 
statement of [Schaffer 1995] still seems to hold: 
“Scholars interested in business political activity are to a large extent fragmented 
by their disciplinary loyalties. As a consequence, research in the general area of 
business political behavior has proceeded unevenly, and is characterized by a lack 
of theoretical and methodological cohesion. […] This convergence suggests the 
potential for improved integration of theories from different fields and 
perspectives, a goal to which this study attempts to contribute.”268 
The author therefore hopes that future academic research will focus more on 
these crucial interdependencies in order to better understand the mechanisms 
and indicate remedies for the social good. 
At least the author has found that other authors (in a similar research field) have 
been facing the same problem, e.g. [Fullerton et al 2007]: “Regulations that 
restrict pollution by firms also affect decisions about use of labour and capital. 
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They thus affect relative factor prices, total production, and output prices. For 
non-revenue-raising environmental mandates, what are the general equilibrium 
impacts on the wage, the return to capital, and relative output prices? Perhaps 
surprisingly, we cannot find any existing analytical literature addressing 
that question.”269 
Outlook and Final Personal Remarks 
Science will have to focus on filling the gaps in literature explained above. 
Academic research is needed to uncover costs, originating from (economic) 
activities, resulting from intangible consequences still lacking our attention. 
Conclusions will help gradually understanding the complex scientific aspects and 
interactions of environmental problems and their possible physical, economic and 
social effects. Adjusting values (costs) to the various forms of environmental 
degradation is necessary to aid governmental decision making processes: 
governmental interference needs guidance by social cost benefit analyses to 
identify the optimum level of environmental protection balancing the costs 
imposed on regulated economies against the estimate of damage of caused 
externalities. Environmental accountancy and the come-back of factual 
discussions in politics coupled with public awareness may disentangle the problem 
of enforcing viable environmental law. Overcoming humane tendencies to 
procrastinate tackling problems, rigorous and prudent steering towards a 
sustainable pathway is necessary for future human existence. The biggest 
challenges of our time, global climate change, will hopefully develop to be a 
trigger for appropriate international environmental law: a global solution for 
global problems. Despite all constructive enthusiasm and the recognition of 
international environmental problems (such as “global warming”), appropriate 
international law and enforcing institutions still fail to exist. Concerning the 
progress of international scope of environmental law, the fusion of countries as 
within the EU helps to achieve goals, which single states could not aim for since 
businesses face a greater barrier of possibilities to overcome these regulations by 
intimidation (e.g. with the threat of migration to a neighbouring country). 
Businesses wishing to bypass the stringency of environmental law conditions are 
therefore encountering higher inhibition thresholds, because needing to move 
outside the EU, helping to diminish the race to the bottom by counteracting 
                                          
269 Emphasis by the author 
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pressures from businesses to “lower” compliance levels to environmental 
regulations. 
Despite the increased direct costs and other efforts entailed with the 
implementation of environmental principles in the economy, a change of 
environmental performance is also linked to benefits in the long run270: since it 
anticipates an adjustment to a changing business environment as environmental 
regulations are becoming tougher on the whole, the return on investment of 
sustainable production methods might not be as high, but more secure in terms 
of financial risk. Following the evolution theory of organisational theory, over time 
only those companies survive which follow the best strategy to adjust to market 
exigencies. The implications through changes of the world climate and the 
consequences of environmental pollution on human health will be the next bottle 
neck to sort out, those being adaptive to future, new requirements. “The 
economy gains its legitimacy through meeting the needs of society, and 
increasingly society (due to the worsening environment and living conditions) is 
expressing a clear need for more environmentally sustainable practices”.271 
Therefore, in the long run businesses will have to follow sustainable business 
practices. If all business activities take full social costs into account at their 
strategical planning and throughout their operations, the adoption of sustainable 
production and consumption practices will be the norm. Environmental protection 
needs to be considered as an integral part of the development process and 
environmental risks associated with human activities have to be assessed.272 
Products should be designed, marketed and licensed to minimise environmental 
costs in manufacturing, usage and also in terms of end-of-life-handling, making 
producers responsible for the end-of-life fate of products.273 Prices of goods must 
reflect all these costs, based on their full environmental impact. 
The application of environmental law to ensure ecological efficiency of economic 
activities is inevitable for the survival of mankind on “spaceship Earth”. Moreover, 
environmental stewardship contributes to the company’s image and could form a 
unique selling proposition making the product stand out of the crowd and 
additionally enabling the skimming of the market, if a consumer surplus exists. 
The continuously growing market for organically grown food, cleaner cars, 
products with the certificates of the Marine and Forrest Stewardship Council 
                                          
270 [UN Global Compact 01], Principle 8 
271 [UN Global Compact 01], Principle 8 
272 [UN Global Compact 01], Principle 7 
273 [EA UK] 
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(guaranteeing sustainable business practices), etc. are evidence for the rising 
consumers’ demand of products avoiding negative external effects on the 
environment. Despite the recent developments on the financial markets the 
author has found an increasing interest (and therefore supply) of investors in 
clean tech industries and sustainability funds. The Dow Jones Sustainability Index 
components e.g. are selected by a systematic corporate sustainability assessment 
and include only the leading companies committing to sustainability, giving 
incentives to firms to increase long-term shareholder value by integrating 
economic, environmental and social factors in their business strategies.274 
                                          
274 [Sustainability Indexes] 
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C A S E   S T U D Y:  
THE AGRICULTURAL USE OF STREPTOMYCIN 
AGAINST FIRE BLIGHT IN AUSTRIA 
(INCLUDING A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS) 
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C1. Introduction 
Fire blight (FB) is an highly infectious275, serious276, plant disease affecting 
several pome fruit and ornamental plants277. Susceptible to FB are fruit trees of 
high commercial interest such as apple, pear and quince; hence the occurrence of 
FB in orchards can cause “severe economic losses”278. Since there are no curative 
FB remedies, it is found hard to control279 and has spread all over the continents 
of the world from America, first being discovered in Austria in 1993. Effective, 
environmentally compatible prevention methods are needed. In Austria (and 
other countries), however, it is still fallen back on the agricultural use of 
streptomycin as a chemical plant protection agent, forbidden on EU-level since 
2004, but enabled by a derogation-clause. Due to possible human health hazards 
caused by the antibiotic and the possibility of contamination of fruit and honey, 
controversies280 have arisen.  
As the theoretical part of this thesis has covered the possible interactions 
between governments and economic power regarding the implementation and 
enforcement of environmental law, this case study shall evaluate the pros and 
cons with a cost benefit analysis to measure the economic reasonableness of this 
procedure. 
The calculation will encompass different scenarios comparing the use of 
streptomycin to another (biological) plant protection agent called “Blossom 
Protect” (produced by bio-ferm GesmbH), which IMHO seems (amongst others) to 
be a viable competitor at hand in Austria. 
C2. Main Issues on Fire Blight 
The (unique281) causative agent of the plant-pathogen FB is a bacteria species 
called Erwinia amylovora (E.a.)282 causing  
• Blossom blight (wilting of blossoms)  
                                          
275 [AGES 01], p. 3; [LKÖ 03], p. 45 
276 [Vanneste 2000]: “most devastating bacterial desease of apples and pears“; 
[Moosbeckhofer et al 2007]; [Cabrefiga 2004], p. 75; [AGES 01], p. 2; [LKÖ 03], p. 45 
277 EC 2000/29, p. 51: “Subject of contamination: Plants of Amelanchier Med., 
Chaenomeles Lindl., Cotoneaster Ehrh., Crataegus L., Cydonia Mill., Eriobotrya Lindl., Malus Mill., 
Mespilus L., Photinia davidiana (Dcne.) Cardot, Pyracantha Roem., Pyrus L. and Sorbus L.” 
278 [AGES 10], p. 5 and [BMLFUW 01], (translated by the author) 
279 [AGES 01], p. 3 et seqq.; [AGES 01], p. 7: “a pear tree can die off within two or 
three weeks, with apple trees the desease is slower and less severe. 
280 On parliamentary level see e.g. [XXIII.GP 448-AB]; [Pirklhuber 03_2008] 
281 [Vanneste 2000], p. 5 
282 Named after the scientist Erwin F. Smith; see [USDA ARS 02] 
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• Twig blight (withering of leaves)  
• Shoot blight (drying out of young shoots) 
• Canker blight (infections can over-winter in cankers, and can cause 
wilting of stems near the canker) 
• Rootstock blight 
• Trauma blight (“sudden, widespread occurrence of fire blight on many 
tissues following hail, severe wind or late frost damage when the 
populations of the bacteria on the foliage are high”283. 
Symptoms observed with FB are the change of young shoots and leaves to brown 
or black colour, sometimes bending in284. This discolouration appears like the tree 
is burnt, the name deriving thereof. Dead leaves and dried-out fruit remain on 
the branches. Further E.a. causes a red-brownish discolouration of tissue 
underneath the bark and can cause (particularly in spring) yellowish bacterial 
ooze dropping down from infected tissues.285 
 
Figure 3: Fire blight infected apple tree; Source: [bio-ferm 01] 
The life cycle of the bacteria causing FB is pointed out to be special, as it can 
survive in inconspicuous cankers and uses symptomless carriers, which may be 
according to [Vanneste 2000], p.3 one of the reasons of the sudden outbreaks of 
FB. 
Climatic conditions in favour of bacterial multiplication on the stigmas are 
temperatures above 18°C286 and humidity above 70%287 (the bacteria needs the 
water to migrate and enter the tissues288). E.a. can enter the tree through natural 
openings (stigmas), e.g. damages caused by hail, with blossoms to be seen the 
                                          
283 [Longstroth 2007] 
284 Because of this, it is referred to a “shepherds crook”, when describing the symptoms. 
285 See [Wilcox]; [Steiner et al 1998]; [Longstroth 2007]; [AGES 01] 
286 [AGES 01], p. 7 
287 [AGES 01], p. 7 
288 [Vanneste 1996], p. 67N 
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“main port of entry”289: “Before entering the tissues, E. a. colonises the stigmatic 
surfaces of the flowers.”290  
The maximum time of risk for the spread of this bacterium is late spring to early 
summer. Infected plants can die off within a short time291, not only destroying the 
crop but the whole tree. 
The bacteria is suspected to be disseminated over long distances via 
contaminated (plant) material292 and (migrating) birds and locally through wind 
(which causes tiny cracks), rain (splashing) and watering, insects293, but also via 
infected gardening tools and tires of vehicles, etc.294 E.a. is being found to have 
many ways to spread295, further contributing to the difficulties to control this 
plant disease. 
At the moment there is no (real) cure (In the sense of really healing the plant 
disease) available against FB, furthermore we still have no information as tot the 
pathogenic character of the bacteria (it is not identified yet, what makes E.a. to 
be the FB tree-killer296). 
Therefore only preventative measures can be taken. If a tree has already been 
attacked by FB the only possibility remaining is to cut infected branches or 
clearing the whole tree. 
                                          
289 [Vanneste 1996], p. 67N 
290 [Vanneste 1996], p. 67N 
291 [Vanneste 2000], p. 2: “[…] the disease can migrate from on infected flower, down 
to the rootstock, killing the tree in one season”; [BMLFUW 01]: “within 2-3- weeks a young pear 
tree can be dead” (translated by the author) 
292 For further information e.g. see [Taylor et al 2003] “Survival of the fire blight 
pathogen, Erwinia amylovora, in calyxesof apple fruit discarded in an orchard” 
293 But according to [Vanneste 2000], p. 10: “the most probable orgin of inoculum to 
start the spring cycle of fire blight is the spread of bacteria from overwintering cankers to open 
flowers.” Other sources (like e.g. beehives) have not been proven to be an orgin of new 
inoculum for new infections. 
294 [AGES RT10], p. 40 
295 But it does not spread via apples as research work suggests. See [Taylor et al 2002]; 
and [Roberts et al 2008]: “An updated pest risk assessment for spread of Erwinia amylovora and 
fire blight via commercial apple fruit”. 
296 [Vanneste 2000], p. 5 
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Figure 4: “Disease cycle of Erwinia amylovora”; Source: [Wilcox]: E. Gotham, 
Cornell University.  
Nowadays FB is dispersed in many countries297 all over the world.  
The symptoms of FB have been reported already 1780 in U.S., from there the 
pathogen made its way around the world reaching the UK in 1957, moving 
westwards on the European mainland arriving in Germany in 1971 and in France 
in 1972, reaching Austria by 1993 in the province of Vorarlberg. 
C2.1. The Costs of Fire Blight 
The damage caused by FB can be substantial for a full-time-fruit-grower. It can 
cause severe losses in one harvest-period. The cost of destruction of orchards is 
to be seen as the sum of: 
• Clearance costs 
• Harvest loss in the clearing period and the following years 
• Planting costs of new trees. 
On the other hand there are costs being saved such as harvest and pruning costs. 
                                          
297 [AGES 01], p. 3: EUROPE: Albania, Belgium , Bosnia-Herzegowina, Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Croatia, Slowenia, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, 
Macedonia, Moldawia, Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Serbia, Czech Republic, United Kingdom, Hungary, Cypress; AFRIKA: 
Egypt; Asia: Armenia, Iran, Israel, Jordania, Libanon, Turkey; AMERICA: Bermudas, Guatemala, 
Canada, Mexico, USA; OCEANIA: New Zealand. 
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[Steinbauer 2008] has served as basis for the calculation.298 Costs per unit of 
machines used (depreciation for wear and tear) and costs for work force are 
subject to change and are to be adapted yearly. These values are calculated via 
the "ÖKL"-standard rate for machines and equipment net cost and the 
"Maschinenring” (MR)-standard rate for working costs. The Maschinenring pays 
out the ÖKL target rates (these are calculated by the Austrian Board of Trustees 
for Land technology and development (ÖKL, Österreichisches Kuratorium für 
Landtechnik und Landentwicklung) and are bindingly acknowledged. Because the 
documents containing these standard rates are subject to payment, they are 
adopted unrevised by the author. Further the units needed per hectare are 
average values of clearances in Styria, which cannot be recalculated by the 
author because of missing raw data299 and are also adopted as per the existing 
calculation [Steinbauer 2008]. The stated sources of this calculation are put in 
parenthesis at the right hand side of the values in the following tables 1-4 and 
are stated at the bottom in table 5. 
Table 1: Basic assumption on Annual gross profit/ha of an Apple Orchard; 
Source: [Steinbauer 2008]: 
 Average Yield/ha  Average Price/kg  
 Winter-Apples Apples 
2005 39,00 (1) € 0,26 (2) 
2006 32,50 (1) € 0,35 (2) 
2007 39,00 (1) € 0,45 (2) 
Average: 36,83  € 0,35  
Average gross profit/ha € 13.014,44 (a) 
(*) Diverging from the value in [Steinbauer 2008]: €12890,50 
 
Table 2: Loss caused by Fire Blight in Intensive Apple Orchards in Austria; 
Source: based on [Steinbauer 2008], adapted by the author: 
First year (year of clearing)      
 Clearing costs/ha Units/ha  Costs/unit  Total/ha 
 
Standard working hours  
(MR / small tool): 125 (3*) € 18,00 (4) € 2.250,00 
 Orchard-Tractor (68PS, 4WD) 35 (3) € 40,12 (5) € 1.404,20 
 Forestry tumbril with crane (6t) 17,5 (3) € 13,31 (5) € 232,93 
 
Tipping trough, hydraulic  
(width: 1,6m)  17,5 (3) € 1,35 (5) € 23,63 
       € 3.910,75 
                                          
298 The calculation requires expert knowledge. Only limitied possibilities were found by 
the author to create a calculation scheme from online available resources ([Handler et al 2006] 
and [Mouron 1999] have been found, but have only delivered fragmented information). The 
AGES has only provided 2 pages ([AGES15] and [AGES 17]) of information, being too unspecific, 
accumulated and out of date for incorporation. 
299 The only comparison data received from AGES is a one-page document ([AGES 17]), 
stating the (estimated?) sum of FB damages in 2003. 
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 0% Harvest      
 Average gross profit/ha: 100% lost     € 13.014,44 
 Reduced harvesting costs/ha: 100%     -€ 832,80 
   Hours/ha  Costs/hour  Total/ha 
  Family worker  113 (6) € 0,00 (10) € 0,00 
  Contract manufacturing worker 120 (6) € 6,94 (7) € 832,80 
      Total € 832,80 
       € 12.181,64 
    Total Costs Year 1 € 16.092,39 
Second year (year of new planting)      
 Costs of reinvestment (replanting) Units/ha  Costs/unit  Total/ha 
 
Planting material  
(2y-tree with 1y-crown) 3230 (8) € 4,10 (9) € 13.243,00 
 Contract manufacturing worker 80 (6) € 6,94 (7) € 555,20 
 Family worker  25 (6) € 10,00 (10) € 250,00 
 Orchard-Tractor (68PS, 4WD) 25 (3) € 40,12 (5) € 1.003,00 
 
Tipping trough, hydraulic  
(width: 1,6m)  25 (3) € 1,35 (5) € 33,75 
       € 15.084,95 
 0% Harvest      
 Average gross profit/ha: 100% lost     € 13.014,44 
 Reduced harvesting costs/ha: 100%     -€ 832,80 
 Reduced pruning costs/ha: 50%     -€ 585,00 
   Hours/ha  Costs/hour  Total/ha 
  Working costs (11) 90 (6) € 13,00 (4) € 1.170,00 
       € 11.596,64 
    Total Costs Year 2 € 26.681,59 
Third year      
 Only 33% Harvest      
 Average gross profit/ha: 67% lost     € 13.014,44 
 Reduced harvesting costs/ha: 67%     -€ 557,98 
 Reduced pruning costs/ha: 33%     -€ 193,05 
    Total Costs Year 3 € 11.871,47 
Fourth year      
 Only 67% Harvest      
 Average gross profit/ha: 33% lost     € 13.014,44 
 Reduced harvesting costs/ha: 33%     -€ 274,82 
 Reduced pruning costs/ha: 16,67%     -€ 97,52 
    Total Costs Year 4 € 12.642,10 
 Possible Total Economic Loss/ha  € 67.287,56 
 
Table 3: Basic assumption on Annual gross profit/ha of a Pear Orchard; 
Source: [Steinbauer 2008]: 
 Average Yield/ha  Average price/kg  
 Winter-Pears Pears  
2003 35,00 (1) € 0,44 (2) 
2004 35,00 (1) € 0,36 (2) 
2005 35,00 (1) € 0,30 (2) 
2006 26,00 (1) € 0,37 (2) 
2007 35,00 (1) € 0,37 (2) 
Average: 33,20  € 0,37  
Average gross profit/ha € 12.217,60 (b) 
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Table 4: Loss caused by Fire Blight in Intensive Pear Orchards in Austria; 
Source: based on [Steinbauer 2008], adapted by the author: 
First year (year of clearing)      
 Clearing costs/ha Units/ha  Costs/unit  Total/ha 
 
Standard working hours  
(MR / small tool): 100 (3*) € 18,00 (4) € 1.800,00 
 Orchard-Tractor (68PS, 4WD) 30 (3) € 40,12 (5) €1.203,60 
 Forestry tumbril with crane (6t) 15 (3) € 13,31 (5) € 199,65 
 
Tipping trough, hydraulic  
(width: 1,6m)  15 (3) € 1,35 (5) € 20,25 
     Subtotal € 3.223,50 
 0% Harvest      
 Average gross profit/ha: 100% lost     € 12.217,60 
 Reduced harvesting costs/ha: 100%      
   Hours/ha  Costs/hour  Total/ha 
  Family worker  70 (6) € 0,00 (10) € 0,00 
  Contract manufacturing worker 74 (6) € 6,94 (7) € 513,56 
      € -513,56 
     Subtotal € 11.704,04 
    Total Costs Year 1 € 14.927,54 
Second year (year of new planting)      
 Costs of reinvestment (replanting) Units/ha  Costs/unit  Total/ha 
 
Planting material (2y-old tree, 
grafted) 1540 (8) € 5,50 (9) € 8.470,00 
 Contract manufacturing worker 45 (6) € 6,94 (7) € 312,30 
 Family worker  15 (6) € 10,00 (10) € 150,00 
 Orchard-Tractor (68PS, 4WD) 15 (3) € 40,12 (5) € 601,80 
 
Tipping trough, hydraulic  
(width: 1,6m)  15 (3) € 1,35 (5) € 20,25 
     Subtotal € 9.554,35 
 0% Harvest      
 Average gross profit/ha: 100% lost     € 12.217,60 
 Reduced harvesting costs/ha: 100%     -€ 513,56 
 Reduced pruning costs/ha: 100%      
   Hours/ha  Costs/hour  Total/ha 
  Working costs (11) 90 (6) € 13,00 (4) €-1.170,00 
     Subtotal € 10.534,04 
    Total Costs Year 2 € 20.088,39 
Third year      
 0% Harvest      
 Average gross profit/ha: 100% lost     € 12.217,60 
 Reduced harvesting costs/ha: 100%     -€ 513,56 
 Reduced pruning costs/ha: 75%     -€ 877,50 
    Total Costs Year 3 € 10.826,54 
Fourth year      
 0% Harvest      
 Average gross profit/ha: 100% lost     € 12.217,60 
 Reduced harvesting costs/ha: 100%     -€ 513,56 
 Reduced pruning costs/ha: 50%     -€ 585,00 
    Total Costs Year 4 € 11.119,04 
Fifth year      
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 33% Harvest      
 Average gross profit/ha: 67% lost     € 8.8185,79 
 Reduced harvesting costs/ha: 67%     -€ 344,09 
 Reduced pruning costs/ha: 33%     -€ 386.10 
    Total Costs Year 5 € 6.671,71 
Sixth year      
 67% Harvest      
 Average gross profit/ha: 33% lost     € 4.031,81 
 Reduced harvesting costs/ha: 33%     -€ 169,47 
 Reduced pruning costs/ha: 16,67%     -€ 195,04 
    Total Costs Year 6 € 3.667,29 
 Possible Total Economic Loss/ha with 100% FB loss: € 67.008,01 
 
Table 5: Footnotes to Table 1-4; based on [Steinbauer 2008] 
(1) The stated source is the Austrian Statistics Office (values are adapted annually) 
(2) The stated source is the Obsterzeugerorganisation Steiermark GesmbH. The organisation 
markets 80% of the Styrian pome fruit production (values are adapted annually) 
(3) Average units needed at clearings in Styria [Steinbauer 2008] 
(4) MR (Maschinenring) -standard rates for labour costs (values are adapted annually)  
(5) ÖKL-standard rate for machine and tool net costs (annually adjusted) 
(6) Economic analysis of the consultancy group "Kernteam"-LK Styria (50 farms, 1999-2001) 
(7) Peasant-collective contract (annually adjusted) 
(8) Average planting density in apple orchards in Styria, (Austrian Statistics Office, adjusted 
every five years); [Steinbauer 2008] 
(9) Average price in Styria (annually adjusted) [Steinbauer 2008] 
(10) Variations of costs in the calculation sometimes using “0.00/h”, then again “10.00/h” are not 
clear to the author, but have been taken over without verification (out of the scope of the paper). 
(*) Seeming appropriate in comparison to Swiss calculation found [Mouron 1999] 
(a) Diverging from the value in [Steinbauer 2008]: €12890,50 
(b) Diverging from the value in [Steinbauer 2008]: €12.284,00 
 
As shown below (in the tables 6 and 7) further the economic loss of caused by FB 
in intensive apple orchards in Austria must be corrected by weighing factors 
depending on the  
• Cultivars (55% of Styrian apple-acreage and 30% of all Styrian pears 
belong to the group 2 with 0% surcharge). 
• Division of (cleared) orchards into three groups according to the 
orchard age. 
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Table 6: Values dependant on (cleared) orchard cultivars; Source: [Steinbauer 
2008]                                      
Group Apple Cultivars Pear Cultivars 
Weighing 
Factor 
1 
Arlet; Braeburn; Elstar; Fuji; Gala; 
Kronprinz R.; Pinova; Roter Boskoop; 
Rubinette; Summerred; Topaz 
Abbe Fetel; Bosc's 
F.; Concorde; Uta; 
William's Ch. +33% 
2 Golden Delicious; Idared; Jonagold 
Alexander L.; 
Packham's Tr.; 
Conference 0% 
3 
Akane; Alkmene; Boskoop; Burgundy; 
Cox Orange; Delbard Estivale; Empire; 
Fiesta; Gloster; Granny Smith; 
Jonadel; Jonathan; Lobo; Mc Intosh; 
Mutsu; Red Delicious; Red Winter 
Guyot; Clapp's L.; 
Gute Luise; 
Pastorenbirne; Pr. 
Drouard -33% 
 
Table 7: Decreased value dependant on (cleared) orchard age; Source: 
[Steinbauer 2008]                                       
 
Age Apple Orchard Age Pear Orchard Deduction 
Group 1 1-10 years 1-18 years 0% 
Group 2 11-14 years 19-24 years -33% 
Group 3 15-18 years 25-30 years -67% 
 
The Net Present Value (NPV) will be needed later on in the Cost Benefit Analysis 
and will therefore be provided at this point. The NPV is calculated by the 
discounted values according to how far ahead in time the benefits or costs will be 
striking. Considering an interest rate of 5% p.a. the author has calculated the 
NPV of the possible 100% loss of one hectare of an apple orchard to be 
(NPVApple): 
16092.32 + 26681.59/1.05 + 11871.47/(1,05)2 + 12642.10/(1,05)3 =63190.92€  
Likewise the NPVPear is:  
14927.54 + 20088.39/1.05 + 10826.54/(1,05)2 + 11119.04/(1,05)3 + 
6671.71/(1,05)4 + 3667.29/(1,05)5 = 46919.09€ 
 
C2.2. Measures Available Against Fire Blight 
In light of the damage FB can cause, measures to minimize the losses have to be 
taken. The following list names the main strategic actions (control methods) 
available to control FB (not making the claim to be complete): 
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Overhead Control: installation of risk assessment systems and central 
management of actions taken is important.300 Austria’s respective body is the 
AGES, being responsible for the coordination of all measures against FB (details 
further down). 
Reduction of further spreading: regulation has to inhibit the transfer of 
infected host plants (from infected regions) to regions still considered to be free 
of E.a. (quarantine rules), also by control and management of (tree) nurseries 
and plant trading (import control).301 In Austria this is realized by the Plant 
Protection Law 1995 and the Plant Protection Regulation 1996.302 
Reduction of planting host plants: the decimation of host plants used for 
decoration including the ban of susceptible plants and symptomless carriers (e.g. 
cotoneaster) from public places such as parks, medial strip of highways or similar. 
This measure also includes informing the general public on the threats of FB on 
plants species found in private gardens. In South Tyrol (Italy) being “the” fruit 
growing country (not falling back on the usage of antibiotics), there have been 
rigorous clearances of shrubs being host plants to FB (also in private gardens), to 
limit the infection pressure. In Austria this strategy was not politically feasible, 
because private garden owners were not cooperative, but it is stated that (some) 
host plants as (e.g. cotoneaster) are now forbidden to be sold by tree nurseries in 
Austria.303 
Selection of less-susceptible plants: pushing selection and engineering of 
plants with Systemic Acquired Resistance (SAR) to the pathogen and tactical 
planting of varieties with a good ratio of low susceptibility to FB and market 
value.304 
Research conclusions: a “thorough understanding of the epidemiology of E.a. is 
critical in controlling this devastating disease. It is possible to utilize 
epidemiological knowledge of the pathogen to find weak spots or areas where the 
pathogen can be eliminated or reduced.”305 For example findings like [Gunen et al 
2005], who have researched on the phenolic content in the leaves of pear 
cultivars combined with the rating of the cultivars’ susceptability grade to fire 
                                          
300 [Vanneste 2000], p. 5 
301 [Donat et al 2007] 
302 [BMLFUW 01], see BGBl. Nr. 253/1996 
303 Stated in [Interview ÖIB] by Mr. Ulz 
304 For a list see [LKÖ 02]; [OÖLR 02]; [AGES 12] and [AGES 13]; for further studies 
[Schlangen 2007] 
305 [Vanneste 2000], p. 30 
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blight, are neeed for forthcomings in breeding resistant plants. Further research 
work has to provide practical action recommendations. Regarding the 
investigation on new plant protection agents, refinement of found agents and the 
possibilities of combination of these trials in laboratories, glass houses or in open 
land are a very important learning source. 
Monitoring: accurate monitoring of particularly orchard trees, but also all other 
host plants is necessary to identify symptoms early. Aware of the fact that E.a. 
multiplies preferentially on the stigmatic surfaces, this calls for regular monitoring 
in endangered areas for the presence of E.a. to anticipate control requirements 
and FB outbreaks.306 The quick clearance lowers the infection pressure by 
eliminating sources of infection is dependent on rigorous monitoring307, but the 
“scouting for the disease is expensive and time-consuming”308. 
Computer-based Forecasting: ensuring control over a wide range of climatic 
conditions information technology helps to develop computerized predictive 
models for infection309. Knowledge about the ecology of E.a. on stigmas 
(favourable environmental and plant conditions of the pathogen) combined with 
actual and forecasted weather condition (monitoring of the many conditions 
influencing the spreading of E.a.) are the input for calculating the infection 
probability and subsequent warnings.  
The installation of computer forecasting systems enables better timing of 
monitoring and spraying strategies. 
The most widely used and best validated systems stated in the “three-country” 
reports (Germany, Switzerland, Austria) on FB are: 
• “Billing’s Integrated System 95 after Billing (1995)” 
• “Maryblyt™ Version 4.3. after Steiner (1996)” 
• “Cougarblight after Smith (1998)” 
Permanent enhancement310 of these systems should be pursued to ensure utmost 
congruency of forecasted and actual conditions. Nevertheless these systems are 
found to be stated using the exact wording, showing that the text has been copy-
                                          
306 [Vanneste 2000], p. 30; [BMLFUW 01] 
307 [DBMELV 2004], p. 29 
308 [Kuflik et al 2008], p. 118 
309 [Johnson et al 1998]; [Kuflik et al 2008], p. 118 
310 See also [Kuflik et al 2008]: ”Optimization of Fire blight scouting with a decision 
support system based on infection risk” 
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pasted from year to year, in the years 2005-2007311, with not even the version of 
the forecasting systems changing. Additionally with the years in the brackets, 
being assumed to describe the systems’ establishing year is IMHO rather strange 
compared to the ongoing developments perceived in the concerned disciplines of 
IT such as Fuzzy Logic, Artificial Intelligence, etc. and it can only be hoped, that 
these systems are calibrated appropriately. 
Sanitary measures (organic control): once a tree shows infections the only 
measure available is to eliminate the pathogen parts: branches must be pruned 
back (cut back) well into sane wood, trees with diseased stems or roots must be 
cleared completely. Infected plant material shall not be transported openly in the 
orchard, because the bacteria can survive also on cleared wood for quite a long 
time312. The infested wood must therefore be burnt and tools used disinfected in 
situ313 to prevent the spreading of the pathogen. 
Well-balanced manuring: heavy nitrogen fertilization should be avoided as it 
causes strong succulent growth, which is most susceptible to FB.314  
Plant Protection Agents: the spraying of plant protection agents shall either 
help killing the E.a.-bacterium (by Antibiotics) or withdraw the means of 
existence (by Antagonists) or enhance the plant resistance (plant resistance 
improvers).315 
Honey-bees as vectors: since “the interaction between the pathogen and 
biological control agents has to occur on the stigmas”316 and pollination in 
orchards is usually reinforced by honey bees contacting the blossoms, using bees 
as vectors to disperse biological control agents to the flowers has been subject to 
scientific research. 317 The antagonist Blossom Protect (hereafter: BP) (which is 
considered more detailed later on in this paper), for example, can be dispersed by 
honey bees, because it has been shown that it is not harmful to the bees, and 
also no residues can be found in honey. But the application of BP via dispenser is 
not always advantageous (secure) since the bees will always take their way to the 
                                          
311 [DBMELV 2005], p. 17; [DBMELV 2006], p. 20; [DBMELV 2007], p. 24 
312 Studies reach from a couple of month to years. 
313 [Vanneste 2000], p. 5 
314 [Steiner et al 1998]; [BMLFUW 01];  
315 See e.g. [Brisset 2007] 
316 [Vanneste 1996], p. 67N 
317 For further studies see [AGES 10] and [Moosbeckhofer et al 2007] 
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most attractive food source: as bees favour e.g. rape above apple blossoms, the 
bees will fly to the rape if available and not in the orchard.318 
Information management: it is also important to inform not only fruit growers 
but also the general public about if informed about the symptoms and the 
possible host plants of the disease, the notification requirement and the actions to 
be taken in case of suspicion are to be used as additional monitoring sources.319 
Further distribution of information encompasses basic information on the 
epidemiology of FB, reports on FB occurrence, possible measures to be taken and 
information regarding scientific forthcomings in all these areas. This can be 
achieved by a multi-media strategy placing articles in newspapers and journals, 
making information available via Internet, distributing flyers and organising 
information-events.320 
The author states explicitly that mentioned actions are only a list of all found 
possibilities without ranking or recommending these. However, to control the 
dissemination of FB a conglomerate of some of these measures mentioned will be 
necessary. [Vanneste 2000] e.g. states that the “control of FB cannot be obtained 
with a single ‘silver bullet’ strategy but requires the utilization of all available 
knowledge about the epidemiology of the pathogen”321. Furthermore it is 
necessary to bear in mind, that some of these measures are obligatory.322 In the 
EU FB is a quarantine pest and is has to be registered. If a FB infection is 
suspected the FB representative of the municipality, the FB expert of the district 
or the Official Austrian Plant Protection Service (APSD) are to be informed and 
samples should be sent to the Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety 
(AGES) for diagnosis. Also there are obligations regarding clearance and pruning 
rules of infected trees (or their parts) in Austria. In Switzerland, however, the 
clearance obligation was recently defeated by an appeal to the court of justice 
worsening the infection pressure situation. There seems to be a clear coherence 
between this year’s authorization of streptomycin even in Switzerland and this 
worsened situation for the orchardists’ infection pressure. Likewise in South Tyrol 
(were antibiotics are strictly not used) holding the pressure from host-plants 
down can be seen as a pivotal factor to success without antibiotics. These 
measures are therefore not to be underestimated. Of course setting standards on 
                                          
318 [Interview ÖIVB] 
319 [DBMLEV 2004], p. 29 
320 As for example suggested in [AGES 11], p. 16 
321 [Vanneste 2000], p. 30 
322 Also for private landowners, see e.g. [LKÖ 01] 
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what a private garden is allowed to have planted is political hara-kiri (the full 
social benefits being underestimated, and individuals reacting in regard to 
personal utility maximization, hence individualism) and was perhaps only feasible 
in South Tyrol, where fruit growing is important to such a high degree that public 
could be convinced of the necessity of this measure. 
However, controlling the spreading of FB also includes the spraying of plant 
protection agents and in this paper the author will explore two different 
possibilities of sprayings against FB: the antibiotic streptomycin and the bacterial 
antagonist Blossom Protect. 
C2.2.1. The Antibiotic “Streptomycin” 
Amongst the measures available for the control of FB the spraying of bactericides 
is a possibility, which is about applying products containing streptomycin (also 
called “streptomycine”). The antibiotic is marketed as the sulphate salt of 
streptomycin (“streptomycin sulphate”) and will be simply referred to as 
“streptomycin” in the following. It is available as a powder, pellets or emulsifiable 
concentrate323, belongs to a class of drugs called aminoglycosides324 and is water-
soluble.325 
Streptomycin has the molecular formula: C21H39N7O12326 and is a bactericidal 
antibiotic, inhibiting protein synthesis by damaging cell membranes of sensitive 
microbial cells, binding to the 16S rRNA of the bacterial327 ribosome, stopping the 
production of essential proteins needed by the bacteria to survive.328 
Streptomycin is a broad spectrum antibiotic as it inhibits both gram positive and 
gram negative bacteria.329 
As stated above there is no remedy for FB once a tree is infected with E.a. 
Therefore antibiotics (as every other plant protection agent) can only be applied 
as a preventative measure before the outbreak of FB. It is important to note that 
also the spraying of antibiotics can not cure trees suffering from an infection. 
                                          
323 [Drugs Pro]; [EXTOXNET] 
324 [Primaryinfo] 
325 [EXTOXNET]: “Solubility in water is greater than 20 mg/ml”. 
326 [ENIUS] 
327 Human ribosomes are structured differently from bacteria. 
328 [Wikipedia 02]; [Primaryinfo], see further: [Gideononline]; [Drugs Pro]; [MP 
Biomedicals] 
329 [Gideononline]; [Primaryinfo] 
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Even in an article in the “Austrian Medicine Magazine”330, available via the AGES 
homepage, it is wrongly (!) postulated that streptomycin is the only “effective 
measure against fire blight, next to clearing”331 under the header “alternative to 
clearing”. 
First isolated in 1943 it was found to help curing tuberculosis332 and other 
infectious diseases, e.g. Pasteurella pestis (plague), also being used in veterinary 
medicine (horse/cattle/sheep)333, and to control bacteria in crops (including E.a.). 
Early production of the drug was dominated by Merck & Co.334; further 
manufacturers of streptomycin are GlaxoSmithKline plc.335, Pfizer Inc.336. See 
[NOAA] for a more extensive list for alternate names for the chemical, including 
trade names, synonyms, and foreign names. 
C2.2.2. An Antagonistic Product: Blossom Protect 
A solution which has been shown to play a role in reducing incidence of FB apart 
from the deployment of antibiotics are other bacterial epiphytes, which also 
colonize stigmas, counter-attacking the bacteria E.a., by filling the ecological 
niche provided by the stigma with a non-pathogenic, competing microorganism, 
taking away or minimizing it’s life conditions and suppressing reproduction and 
hence spreading of the pathogen.337  
Underpinning arguments for the working mechanism of antagonists are for 
example: 
“Preemptive exclusion of the pathogen E. amylovora by surface colonization and 
nutrients depletion, and cell-to-cell interaction appear to be the main mechanisms 
of biocontrol.”338  
“Pre-emptive colonisation by beneficial bacteria of the stigmas, where E. 
amylovora usually multiplies, can be enough to prevent the pathogen from 
multiplying and infecting the plant.”339 
                                          
330 “Österreichische Ärztezeitung”: [Pesata 2008], .p50 
331 [Pesata 2008], .p50 (translated by the author) 
332 “in combination with other drugs” - [WHO 02] 
333 [VN], [Wikipedia 02], [ENIUS], 
334 [Wikipedia 02] 
335 according to [Primaryinfo] 
336 according to [Primaryinfo] 
337 See [Johnson et al 1998] 
338 [Cabrefiga 2004]. p. 75 
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As an example of an antagonistic product the biological plant protection product 
“Blossom Protect” (BP) is reviewed in comparison to the use of antibiotics: BP is 
based on two active ingredients (isolates of Aureobasidium pullulans (Ap.)) which 
are “dematiaceous340 fungi”341 populating the receptacle of the cultivated 
(treated) plant and so inhibiting the intrusion of the FB bacteria: “for blossom 
infection to occur, the causal bacterium, Erwinia amylovora, needs to increase its 
population size through an epiphytic phase that occurs on stigmatic surfaces”342 
but the antagonistic microorganisms contained in BP already grows in the sprayed 
blossoms. Moreover BP produces compounds inhibitory to E.a. due to establishing 
a very low pH-value showing antagonistic potential against E.a.343 Ap. is found to 
be “distributed widely throughout the environment, populating apple trees 
naturally” and “is not genetically modified”. It has been developed and is 
produced by the company bio-ferm GesmbH in Tulln, Austria, being founded by 
scientists of the University of Natural Resources and Applied Life Sciences, 
Vienna. BP has been introduced as an alternative to antibiotic treatment e.g. by 
experts such as [Blum et al 2007] and is strongly recommended by organisations 
directed towards environmental protection (e.g. [Gubler-Merz]; [AG FB 2008]). 
Because this plant protection agent (and other agents working in comparable 
ways) is not killing, but “only” opposing the bacteria, it might have been 
underestimated and shrugged off too quickly in the past. It should be allowed for 
the other side of the medal, that this fact logically excludes concerns regarding 
the threats of resistances (and the correlating problems), for “to oppose the acids 
produced by BP E.a. would have to change their complete genome”. 
                                                                                                                        
339 [Vanneste 1996], p. 67N 
340 So-called “black yeasts”, being pigmented yeasts (dematiaceous = “having a dark 
colour”). 
341 “A.pullulans is a yeast like fungi belonging to the group of dothideales, some strains 
of A. pullulans are used in food technology for the production of 'pullulan’ ( capsules of 
medicaments, 'eatable paper’).” According to [Interview bio-ferm] 
342 [Johnson et al 1998] 
343 [Loncaric et al 2007]; [Purkarthofer 2008]; [Interview bio-ferm]: “[A] low pH is 
known to be unfeasible for propagation of Erwinia [amylovora]” 
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C2.2.3. Excursus: Further Plant Protection Products 
There are also further products available for plant protection against FB. Below a short overview (the list not being exhaustive): 
Table 8: Further plant protection products; Source: [lawa 2008] 
Trade 
name 
Company  Agent; Description Concentra
tion 
Outlay344 Water Effects 
Mycosin
345 
AgraQues
t, Inc. 
USA,  
Clay, Equisetum; “Biological 
bactericide/fungicide with a part 
effectiveness against FB blossom 
infections on pome fruit”346 
0,5% 8kg/ha 400-500 
l/ha 
[Kunz et al 2000] states that Mycosin 
effects up to 85%. “With Myco-Sin a 
considerable effect was also achieved with 
fire blight in pome fruit.”347 
Serenade 
WPO348 
 
Stähler 
Suisse SA 
in CH 
“Bacillis Subtilis”; Valid for organic 
agriculture. Positive environmental 
behaviour not harmful to rainworms, 
bees, etc. 
0,625% 
(625g/l of 
water) 
10kg/ha  Only partial effectiveness: 50%-60% 
 
Regalis Stähler 
Suisse SA 
in CH 
Prohexadione-Calcium; Bioregulator 
against FB-secondary infections on 
pome fruit. 
0,16%* + 
1600l 
water 
2,5 kg/ha   
* with a tree volume of 10000m3/ha 
 
 
 
                                          
344 at a tree volume of 10.000m3/ha 
345 see [lawa 2008], p. 6 
346 [lawa 2008], p. 6 (translated by the author) 
347 [Heitefuss et al]; see also [Agroscope] 
348 [lawa 2008], p. 10-11 
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Further alternatives found by the author are: 
Pseudomonas fluorescens “A biological control agent, Pseudomonas 
fluorescens EPS62e, was isolated from the surface of a pear fruit […] and […] was 
evaluated for suppression of immature fruit, blossom and shoot infections, under 
controlled environment conditions, providing control levels similar to chemical 
control with copper or antibiotic compounds. The strain colonize and survive well 
in wounds on immature fruits, young leaves and flowers, and reduce significantly 
fire blight infections in these plant organs when applied in preventive 
treatments.”349 And [Pujol et al 2005] has published an article "Development of a 
strain-specific quantitative method for monitoring Pseudomonas fluorescens 
EPS62e, a novel biocontrol agent of fire blight” stating that “Pseudomonas 
fluorescens EPS62e has been selected in a screening procedure for its high 
efficacy controlling Erwinia amylovora infections in flowers, immature fruits and 
young pear plants.” Already [Johnson 1998] writes about the “bacterial 
antagonist of E. amylovora (BlightBan, Pseudomonas fluorescens A506)”. 
And even earlier in [FAO 1993] it is stated that “In field trials conducted in 1991 
and 1992 […] Pseudomonas fluorescens strain A506 and Erwinia herbicola strain 
C9-1 established epiphytic populations on pear blossoms and were effective 
antagonists for the biological control of fire blight.” 
In [Cabrefiga et al 2004] the results of three tested bioagents (BION®, etheric 
oil from Thymbra spicata and the antagonistic bacterium Rahnella aquatilis 
Ra39) showed that they could reduce the “disease index of up to 63.7, 30.8 and 
58.6% respectively” and decrease the “growth of bacteria up to 64.2, 49.5 % and 
63.8% respectively”350. The promising plant protection agent BPMC 2023 
mentioned in [DBMELV 2003] is a precursor of Blossom Protect (explained in 
detail in this study). Furthermore one also needs to mention “Bloomtime” of 
Bioscience. 
Eduard Holliger (from the Swiss research institute “Agroscope Changins-
Wädenswil”) also researches on hemp-brew that has been shown to be successful 
against FB.351 
                                          
349 [Cabrefiga 2004], p. 75 
350 [Cabrefiga et al 2004], p. 46 
351 [Schweizer Bauer] 
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Further Engelmeier’s352 study on “leave surface chemistry and sort-specific 
resistance”, “Systemic resistance induced by benzothiadiazole in pear inoculated 
with the agent of fire blight (Erwinia amylovora)” by [Sparla 2004] and the 
finding of [Brisset 2007] that Acibenzolar-S-methyl is a chemical inducer of 
systemic acquired resistance in several annual plants will hopefully lead to further 
conclusions on the epidemiology of FB. [Baysal et al 2005] find that an Extract of 
Hedera helix induces resistance on apple rootstocks against FB. 
As shown above there are many other possibilities yet, which are, moreover 
reinforced by research work such as [Mercier et al 2001]: “Field Performance of 
Antagonistic Bacteria Identified in a Novel Laboratory Assay for Biological Control 
of Fire Blight of Pear”. However the products mentioned should not viewed 
without criticism: copper e.g. entails problems such as “copper residues in soil 
resulting from these fungicides impact adversely on soil biology and fertility”353. 
C3. Layers of Applicable Law 
Regarding the possibilities to fight FB the different measures available were 
explained already. In order to use plant protection products with active agents 
there is a huge normative framework to be considered. For better understanding 
the corresponding organisations in this regulative framework are displayed in the 
following subchapters. 
C3.1. International Level 
Already law on international level regulates measures to hinder introduction and 
dissemination of FB (and other quarantine pests) into new territories. Relevant 
EU-level regulation for Plant health prescribing obligatory measures to be taken 
mostly does not specify exactly on these, but refer to acknowledged techniques of 
the EPPO or others. MS have to secure that measures implemented are adequate 
and effective. The guidelines of the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection 
Organisation (EPPO) provide fighting measures for FB (sampling, diagnosis, etc.), 
but also apply in the procedure of testing possible plant protection agents. 
Additionally EPPO also provides for an “Efficacy evaluation of plant protection 
products” describing “the overall process of efficacy evaluation of plant protection 
                                          
352 Stated in [Zwilling 2007]: "Mag. Dr. Doris Engelmeier Projekt "Feuerbrand 2: 
Feuerbrand auf Kernobst: Blattoberflächenchemie und sortenspezifische Resistenz"“ 
353 [Australian Gov], p. iii; the problem seems to be picked up by the EU by regulating 
that a maximum of 6 kg/ha/year is allowed to be used from 01.01.2006 on. 
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products in the registration procedure”354. Hence tests should be “carried out in 
accordance with specific EPPO Standards, where available”355 It defines the scope 
of efficacy in the following way: “Efficacy can be defined by an equation in which 
the positive effects of the treatment in performing the desired plant protection 
activity (e.g. controlling the target pest or modifying crop growth) and any other 
useful effect, such as controlling other non-target pests, are balanced against the 
negative effects, such as direct damage to the crop (phytotoxicity) or effects on 
pollinators and natural enemies, or development of resistance. Based on EU 
criteria, the efficacy parameters which should be addressed for registration 
purposes, and which are used as the basis of this guideline, are:  
• direct efficacy (effectiveness)  
• resistance risk  
• absence of unacceptable effects on plants or plant products 
(phytotoxicity; yield; quality (including transformation processes); 
plants or plant parts used for propagation; succeeding crops including 
substitute crops; adjacent crops) 
• absence of unacceptable effects on production and production systems, 
in particular on pollinators and natural enemies.”356 
It has been tried by the author to incorporate these issues in the cost-benefit 
analysis established in the scope of this paper. 
Further the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) concluded at the 
United Nation Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) is a standard setting 
committee. For FB the International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures 
(ISPMs) No. 1 “Principles of plant quarantine” and No. 11 “Pest risk analysis” 
apply.357 
But also WTO Rules are applicable in the concern with FB is the “Agreement on 
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures” (SPS Agreement). 
According to SPS Agreement Article 2.1 “Members have the right to take sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or 
plant life or health, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement”. In general the SPS Agreement is designed to avoid 
disguised barriers to trade, but international standards “are presumed to be 
                                          
354 [EPPO 01], p. 98 
355 [EPPO 01], p. 100 
356 [EPPO 01], p. 98  
357 [FAO 2005] 
115 
consistent with the requirements”.358 These requirements are 1. non-
discrimination, 2. scientific justification (being harmonized by standard-setting 
organisations, which in the realm of FB (plant health) is the IPPC), 3. 
equivalence, 4. regionalisation (specifying the pest- or disease-free areas), 5. 
transparency (establishing a contact point359 responsible for the smooth running 
of this agreement, notification if e.g. new regulation is different than the 
international standard), 6. technical assistance/special treatment and control, 7. 
inspection and approval procedures. [Sampson 2002] states that more exacting 
standards (than the international) “can be applied on a provisional basis, but 
cannot be justified in the long term on the grounds of precaution alone”, then 
“scientific evidence to justify the legitimacy of the restriction of imports must be 
provided within a reasonable period of time“.  
In regard to the many missing details on the knowledge of the epidemiology FB 
the pressure that might be imposed on risk-averse nations wanting to install high 
protection to their country and seek to control the pest may be restricted to do 
so. [Geider et al 2002] isolated more than 120 Erwinia amylovora strains to 
follow spread of the disease within Europe and found out that “despite barely 
controlled trade with fire blight host plants and associated plant products within 
Europe, the […] E. amylovora isolates were ordered indicating sequential spread.” 
However, [Anderson 2000] has investigated whether the WTO’s reforms on 
agricultural policy are consistent with domestic objectives regarding “providing 
adequate food security, environmental protection and viability of rural areas” 
(because the agricultural economic sector has a so –called “multifunctionality” 
task360) and gathers that there “is little trade-off required to meet domestic policy 
objectives on the one hand and agricultural protection reform objectives as 
embodied in WTO rules on the other”.361 
As a fact, there has been a dispute in the WTO regarding FB (U.S. vs. Japan), 
with the IPPC giving advice on experts in the dispute settlement.362 
                                          
358 [Sampson 2002] 
359 Oddly the contact point in Austria is the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Labour, see [WTO 08], p. 12 
360 [Anderson 2000]: meaning the “non-marketed externalities and public goods it 
produces jointly with marketable food and fibre”. 
361 [Anderson 2000] 
362 [EPPO 02] 
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C3.2. European Community Level 
The Community plant health regime was established by the Council Directive 
2000/29/EC and its “general principles are based upon provisions laid down in the 
International Plant Protection Convention concluded at the United Nation Food 
and Agriculture Organisation and, in the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures”363. The European Commission364, the Plant Health 
Standing Committee (PHSC) and Panel on Plant Protection Products and their 
Residues (PPR) are existing committees together with the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA). 
C3.2.1. Plant Protection Agents Regulation 91/414/EEC 
1992 the European Commission started a review process of all (active365) 
substances used in plant protection (products) on the supranational level by the 
“Council Directive 91/414/EEC of 15 July 1991 concerning the placing of plant 
protection products on the market”. Member States are required to “prescribe 
that plant protection products may not be placed on the market and used in their 
territory unless they have authorized the product in accordance with this 
Directive”366. Today, only substances listed in the (positive-list) Annex I of the 
directive mentioned above are allowed to be used in the EC. 
On national level each MS can choose which formulas (active substances) from 
the Annex I to implement in national plant protection law (but there is of course 
no requirement to allow these substances in the MS).  
C3.2.2. Regulative Procedure for Adoption in Annex I of 
Council Directive 91/414/EEC 
In order to attain the inclusion of an active substance in the Annex I companies 
have to “defend” their product proving that the “substance could be used safely 
regarding human health, the environment, ecotoxicology and residues in the food 
chain”367, by submitting an application for the substance concerned to a Member 
                                          
363 [EU 01] 
364 Directorate General: Health & Consumer Protection, Directorate E: Food Safety: 
Plant health, animal health and welfare, international questions, Unit E1: Plant Health 
365 91/414/EEC, Article 2 (4): “substances or micro-organisms including viruses, having 
general or specific action”. 
366 91/414/EEC, Article 3 (1) 
367 [EU 02] 
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State (being the “Rapporteur Member State”368, then being the “defender” of the 
substance on the EC-level) together with a complete dossier, including a 
summary dossier demonstrating that the active substance fulfils the requirements 
provided for in Directive 91/414/EEC Article 5 (“1. In the light of current 
scientific and technical knowledge, an active substance shall be included in Annex 
I […] if it may be expected that plant protection products containing the active 
substance will fulfil the following conditions: their residues, consequent on 
application consistent with good plant protection practice, do not have any 
harmful effects on human or animal health or on groundwater or any 
unacceptable influence on the environment […] their use, consequent on 
application consistent with good plant protection practice, does not have any 
harmful effects on human or animal health or any unacceptable [sic!] influence on 
the environment as provided for in Article 4 (1) (b) (iv) and (v)369.”) is being 
fulfilled. For the approval of a substance studies relevant to the assessment of 
the requirements referred to in this article are listed in the Annex II and III to 
Directive 91/414/EEC370. Summaries and results of tests and studies for each 
point of the data requirements for the active substance that is to be listed in 
Annex I have to be provided additionally to the statement of reasons why the test 
and study reports submitted are necessary for first inclusion of the active 
substance. In the Annex VI “uniform principles for evaluation and authorisation of 
plant protection products” are laid down. 
The procedure of attaining listing in Annex I is very costly, because laborious and 
time consuming studies371 have to be undertaken according to certain guidelines 
(EPPO-Guidelines, OECD, etc.) and high fees have to be paid to the “rapporteur” 
member state,372 but therefore aims to ensure risk elimination and install 
certainty on active agents used in the European Community, if there were no 
derogation… 
                                          
368 according to 91/414/EEC, Article 6 (2) 
369 included in the Annex III, lit. b) of this paper. 
370 included in the Annex III, lit. c) of this paper. 
371 [Donat et al 2007] 
372 As learnt from the [Interview bio-ferm], the producer of Blossom Protect (a SME) 
had to pay AGES 145.000€ for taking over the Rapporteur-role on EC-level to attain listing in the 
Annex. 
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C3.2.3. Derogation Provision in Council Directive 
91/414/EEC 
“By way of derogation from Article 4” Article 8(4) 91/414/EEC a MS may 
authorize the placing on the market of a plant protection product which is not 
complying with Article 4 for a maximum period of 120 days and a limited and 
controlled use if such a measure appears necessary “because of an unforeseeable 
danger which cannot be contained by other means”. The mentioned “procedure 
laid down in Article 19, whether and under which conditions the actions are taken 
by the Member State may be extended for a given period, repeated, or revoked” 
refers to 1999/468/EC373 “laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission”. 
C3.2.4. Current Legal Status of the Agents Compared 
C3.2.4.1. Current Legal Situation of Streptomycin on EU Level 
With the EU Commission Decision 2004/129/EC374 the MS were obliged to 
withdraw the authorization for streptomycin375 (inter alia) by latest 31.03.2004376 
the period expiring 31.12.2004 at the latest377. According to Article 1 of respective 
Decision the active substances covered by the Commission Regulation (EC) No. 
1490/2002378 (streptomycin being on the negative-list379) should not be included 
in the Annex I to the Directive 91/414/EEC: the preamble even stating clearly in 
paragraph (16) that “The use of anti-microbials from classes, which are or may 
be used in human or veterinary medicine for the purpose of plant protection 
should be discouraged. Two of the substances concerned by this Regulation — 
kasugamycin and streptomycine — fall into this category. Pending eventual 
decisions on their inclusion in Annex I, their uses should continue to be restricted 
and only be permitted where essential. For the purpose of their evaluation, 
information on anti-microbial resistance will be required”. 
                                          
373 Council Decision of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission (1999/468/EC), OJ L 184, 17.7.1999, p. 23 
374 Commission Decision 0f 30 January 2004 concerning the non-inclusion of certain 
active substances in Annex I to Council Directive 91/414/EEC and the withdrawal of 
authorizations for plant protection products containing these substances (notified under 
document number C(2004) 152); OJ L 37, 10.2.2004, p. 27 
375 2004/129/EC, Annex I, Part B 
376 2004/129/EC, Article 2, paragraph 1 
377 2004/129/EC, Article 3, second sentence 
378 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1490/2002 of 14 August 2002 laying down further 
detailed rules for the implementation of the third stage of the programme of work referred to in 
Article 8(2) of Council Directive 91/414/EEC and amending Regulation (EC) No 451/2000; OJ L 
224, 21.8.2002, p. 23 
379 Annex I, Part A, p. 20 
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Hence in the (positive-list) Annex I, streptomycin (and generally antibiotics) fails 
to be listed “due to missing documentation” 380. No company381 has taken up the 
research work to attain the admission (=”notification process”), because it is 
judged to not match the requirements.382 
Because streptomycin is now forbidden on EU-level it can furthermore only be 
authorized by the derogation-clause in Article 8(4) of 91/414EEC and “three-
country” reports state that “in case of usage the Commission and other MS must 
be informed, with the Standing Committee on Food Chain and Animal Health 
(SCFCAH)383 then deciding if and under which conditions the adopted measure 
may be prolonged by a fixed time, repeated or cancelled”, but further down 
states that the Standing Committee has been involved and has taken note of 
Germany’s decision (to use streptomycin in the year 2004384, 2005385, 2006386 
and 2007387). 
Hence, the use of streptomycin is not allowed anymore within the EC and is 
regarded as highly problematic: the Council Recommendation of 15 November 
2001 on the prudent use of antimicrobal agents in human medicine (2002/77/EC) 
e.g. states that the “use [of antimicrobial agents (remark by the author)] has 
been accompanied by an increasing prevalence of microorganisms that have 
acquired resistance to one or more of these, so-called ‘antimicrobial resistance’. 
Antimicrobial resistance poses a threat to public health, may prolong the suffering 
of patients, increase healthcare costs and has economic implications for 
society”388 and that “there is an association between the growing use of 
antimicrobial agents and an increase in the prevalence of micro-organisms 
resistant to those agents, but this relationship is clearly not a simple one. There 
are many possible factors influencing this relationship, including those related to 
the organism, to the host and to the mode of use of each drug. However, it is 
clear that antimicrobial resistance may not necessarily be overcome by the 
                                          
380 [DBMELV 2003], p. 18 (translated by the author) 
381 There has been one company withdrawing it’s notification again in May 2003; see 
[DBMELV 2003], p. 14 
382 [Interview bio-ferm] 
383 Although also the Standing Committee on Plant Health is stated to be responsible. 
384 [DBVELM 2004], p. 19 
385 [DBVELM 2005], p. 22 
386 [DBVELM 2006], p. 23 
387 [DBVELM 2007], p. 25 
388 Preambel, paragraph 2; Paragraph 3 makes it more clearly: “The Council of the 
European Union on 8 June 1999 adopted a Resolution on antibiotic resistance entitled A strategy 
against the microbial threat. The Resolution highlights that antimicrobial resistance increases 
morbidity and mortality due to communicable diseases and leads not only to a diminution of 
quality of life but also to additional health and medical care costs, and that action needs to be 
taken at Community level.” 
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lengthy process of continuously developing new antimicrobial compounds”389. 
Further the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission states that 
“in the last decades, an increasing dissemination of antibiotic resistant bacteria 
has been observed as a result of the massive and often indiscriminated use of 
antibiotics as therapeutic and prophylactic agents in human and veterinary 
medicine […]. The emergence of antibiotic resistances in previously susceptible 
microorganisms is rightly considered an alarming medical problem since several 
important human pathogens (e.g. Staphylococcus aureus, Streptococcus 
pneumoniae, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, […]) are becoming non-treatable with a 
large number of the antibiotics discovered and developed over the last sixty 
years.”390 Moreover it is stated that “the occurrence of resistant bacteria and 
antibiotic residues is reviewed and the role of horizontal gene transfer in the 
dissemination of resistance traits. Bacteria have not only evolved mechanisms to 
thwart the effect of antibiotics, but have also developed ways to disseminate to 
other susceptible bacteria the genetic information correlated to the resistance. 
[…] However, the exposure to antibiotics not only selects for drug-resistant 
pathogens but also exerts selective pressure on the normal commensal 
microbiota and the horizontal transfer of resistance genes can explain the rapid 
dissemination of resistance from commensal to pathogenic so that the health 
concern for the presence of AR and MAR bacteria between environmental isolates 
and of VBNC cells carrying resistance traits is amplified.”391 
More scientific inputs opening a very sobering view on the threat of the 
agricultural use of streptomycin will be displayed further down in the chapter 
assessing streptomycin. 
C3.2.4.2. Current Legal Situation of Blossom Protect on EU Level 
In 2003392 the exact working mechanism of BP had to be clarified to classify 
whether BP was a plant resistance improver or a plant protection agent 
(implicating the obligatory inclusion to Annex I to allow the use). It has then been 
classified to be an active ingredient and hence has to reach the status of being a 
(permitted) plant protection agent needing to be listed in Annex I of Directive 
91/414/EEC.393 
                                          
389 Preambel, paragraph 5 
390 [Daverio 2004], p. I 
391 [Daverio 2004], p. 32 
392 [DBMELV 2003], p. 9 
393 [Donat et al 2007] 
121 
The inclusion is attained by the evaluation of the two active ingredients isolated 
according to the European regulations, requiring a high extent of supporting 
studies. According to 91/414/EEC, Article 2 (5) BP is a “preparation” (which is a 
mixture or solution composed of two or more substances of which at least one is 
an active substance) intended for use as plant protection products and hence 
actually both micro-organism strains have to fulfil all the criteria listed in the  
• ANNEX II, Part B (Requirements for the dossier to be submitted for 
the inclusion of an active substance in Annex I)  
• ANNEX III, Part B (Requirements for the dossier to be submitted for 
the authorisation of a plant protection product) 
in order to fulfil the ANNEX V, Part II (uniform principles for evaluation and 
authorisation of plant protection products containing microorganisms). 
In the [Interview bio-ferm] it has been learnt, that a so-called “bringing study” 
(being “a very sophisticated “tox study””), was necessary to prove that these two 
strains “are toxicologically evaluated to be the same”. This “short-cut”-possibility 
makes sense IMHO, since studies are mostly carried out with BP (and the product 
contains both strains together), being the mixture as it is released into the 
environment. 
As for chemical plant protection products also Biological Control Agents (BCAs) 
need to be detected during application trials, to enable monitoring of the 
persistence and behaviour of the micro organisms during toxicological and 
environmental studies394, which has been rather difficult, but achieved. 
It is stated by Dr. Donat [Interview bio-ferm] that all the requirements (studies 
and dossiers) needed have been completed as per 2007 and the AGES has taken 
over the rapporteur status for BP in 2008. This will now lead to another 
(approximately) three to five years395 waiting time for the notification-process 
(with Austria being the rapporteur MS) on EC-level, to complete the inclusion in 
Annex I of 414/91/EEC. 
However the requirements for the inclusion to the Annex I positive list can be 
summarized as being fulfilled and hence the risk of usage is calculable due to 
existing data. 
                                          
394 [Loncaric et al 2007] 
395 [Loncaric et al 2007]; [Interview bio-ferm] 
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C3.3. Austrian (National) Level and Applicable Law 
All the plant protection agents approved on European level can be allowed by the 
MS national law, but don’t have to. In Austria, being the country focused in this 
case study, the matching piece of regulation is the Austrian Plant Protection 
Product Law 1997396 (hereafter: PSMG) making specific agents becoming 
nationally permissible. Yet again Austria is a country consisting of nine provinces 
(federal states) with their individual regulations, which can on their behalf again 
choose independentantly to permit only selected agents that are nationally 
approved, resulting in nine Provincial Plant Protection Regulations.  
Up to now (but according to the EU only until end of March 2009397) some 
Austrian provinces (Burgenland, Carinthia, Lower Austria, Tyrol (administrative 
district Lienz), Styria, Vienna)398 are still recognized being free from E.a. (pest 
free area) and are hence obliged to take measures in accordance with the 
relevant FAO International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures399 (ISPM’s), 
having binding character, according to the Council Directive 2000/29EC400 
(monitoring, measures for extermination/embankment, import restrictions on 
host plants) and a yearly monitoring report must be sent to the European 
Commission. The “protected-area-status” shall protect these regions of 
introduction and spreading of the pest by special requirements and the loss for 
Austria implicates that it will also have to accept imports from tree nurseries that 
are not from areas of production subject to certain conditions and can no longer 
sustain its exemption from WTO trade rules. According to the Austrian Plant 
Protection Regulation (BGBl. Nr. 253/1996) plants (and plant products) of the EU 
that require a pass are (except one) exactly those mentioned to be host plants 
earlier in this paper.401 In the EU FB is a quarantine disease, with suspicions of FB 
                                          
396 Österreichisches Pflanzenschutzmittelgesetz 1997 (BGBl. I Nr. 60/1997) 
397 COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 690/2008 of 4 July 2008 recognising protected 
zones exposed to particular plant health risks in the Community 
398 Council Directive 2002/29 EC, p. 55: ANNEX II, Part B “HARMFUL ORGANISMS 
WHOSE INTRODUCTION INTO, AND WHOSE SPREAD WITHIN, CERTAIN PROTECTED ZONES 
SHALL BE BANNED IF THEY ARE PRESENT ON CERTAIN PLANTS OR PLANT PRODUCTS” 
399 [FAO 2006] 
400 “Protective measures against the introduction into the Community of organisms 
harmful to plants or plant products and against their spread within the Community” – obliging 
the APSD and FB-appointees to take and send samples from certain points (public places, 
orchards, private gardens, etc.) to the laboratory. 
401 The only diverging plant mentioned “Prunus” maybe ought to be seen IMHO in the 
light of recent observations made, that even cherry trees can suffer from FB; found in [DBMELV 
2007], p. 37 
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being subject to obligatory registration and obligatory measures to be taken: 
“mechanic operations such as removal or cut-back of infested plants”402. 
Regarding the allowance of plant protection products in Austria the PSMG is the 
respective legal framework, committing to the minimization of risk using plant 
protection products on the basis of a high protection level of human, animal and 
environment with at the same time sufficiently securing the availability of plant 
protection products (§1 PSMG). This task clearly involves weighing up 
controversial factors such as environmental or health hazards (resulting from 
chemical exposure) against better protection of plants (crop).  
In §3 (3) PSMG it is stated, that a new403 active agent may only be placed on the 
market if the commission and the MS have received documents that are expected 
to fulfil the requirements of the Annex II of the Directive 91/414EEC and if 
documents according to the Annex III (= dossier) of at least one formulation 
(containing the active agent) have been submitted. It is furthermore stated that it 
is illegal to put an agent on the market , if there is reasonable suspicion that it is 
not complying with EU law, especially with the Directive 91/414EEC (see 
respectively §3(4) PSMG). 
Upon request a plant protection agent is allowed for by an approval notification 
by the Federal Office for Food Safety (hereafter: BAES)404 (§6 PSMG) if §§8-14 
and §37 (9) PSMG are fulfilled. This also covers §7 PSMG (referred to in §8(1)1) 
PSMG providing for general admission requirement, being the implementation of 
the Article 3 and the very important Article 4 of the Directive 91/414EEC405. 
For the evaluation of the admission requirements the Annex VI of the Directive 
91/414EEC (uniform principles for evaluation and authorisation of chemical plant 
protection products (Part 1) or of plant protections products containing 
microorganisms (Part 2)) has to be applied (mentioned in §6(2) PSMG). 
                                          
402 [Interview AGES 01] 
403 A new active agent is not listed in Directive 91/414 and has not been placed on the 
market before the 26.07.1993 in a MS. This is e.g. the case for Blossom Protect – As a 
comparison an old active agent is also not listed, but has been placed on the market in a MS 
before the deadline, e.g. streptomycin. Hopefully the conclusion that this paragraph does not 
regulate streptomycin is wrong due to circumstances the author is not familiar with. 
404 In German: “Bundesamt für Ernährungssicherheit“ 
405 §7(1)1.-5. equals the Article 4 (!) b-f of Directive 91/414 exactly 
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C3.4. Authorization Procedures of Agents Compared 
C3.4.1. Authorization Procedure for Streptomycin 
But all these requirements displayed in the previous chapter can be jettisoned by 
a legal backdoor stated in § 13 PSMG (being the equivalent to Article 8(4) 
91/414EEC). Paragraph 1 rules that a plant protection product can be allowed for 
in a certain quantity and/or limited and controlled usage (taking into 
consideration the impacts on health of human, animal and environment) if this 
measure is necessary because of an unforeseen danger, which cannot be 
contained by any other means.  
One has to criticise at this point the carelessness setting apart from the “taking 
into consideration the impacts on health of human, animal and environment”, 
which has not been allowed for to an extent that would be prudent for a country 
wanting to safeguard its inhabitants of the danger of resistances and the 
problems explained earlier. 
Furthermore one has to doubt if FB is still an unforeseeable danger: it has 
definitely been established in USA since many years and even in Germany it has 
been declared to be an established plant disease (mentioned in [DBMELV 2008]) 
that will have to be lived with, since it is not possible to be eradicated. 
Moreover the derogation clause is only available if there are NO OTHER MEANS! 
This is not the case with FB. There are other means, as shown in this paper. 
IMHO it is therefore not understood why the EU tolerates these exemptions. One 
explanation found might be that the EU could be considered to consist of 
countries, which might yet again be subject to pressure from their agricultural 
sectors in respect to the legalisation of the agricultural use of the antibiotic. 
A usage by this danger-in-delay-law is limited to four month406 (second 
paragraph) and the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and 
Water management (hereafter: BMLFUW) have to notify the MS and the 
                                          
406 Article 8(4) of the Directive 91/414EEC lays down a maximum period of 120 days. 
Please excuse the author’s academic hairsplitting at this point (it is actually not relevant in 
regard to the allowance of streptomycin, since it will always be allowed for in spring) but it must 
be mentioned by the author, that in the four month period of e.g. June, July, August and 
September the summation of the according days would sum up to (30+31+31+30=) 122 
exceeding the permitted period! 
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Commission (third paragraph), which can actually amend or annul this 
decision407. 
This begs the question why the EU still allows for the usage of streptomycin by 
this method, which has been explicitly banned and does not make use of its 
power to prohibit the use, as it has done in 2004 in Austria (unlike Germany, 
where it has been allowed to use): “Outdoor trials in Styria and Vorarlberg (for 
reasons of analysis of insertion into honey) were suggested 2004, but are lapsed, 
because the EU Commission has excluded a §13 admission [remark by the 
author: PSMG 1997] of streptomycinsulfate (information Dr. Lentsch, 
BMLFUW)”408 
In the following an overview of the authorisation of streptomycin in the last five 
years shall be given: 
2003 “Plantomycin” was not allowed in Austria and Switzerland409 (but in 
Germany for 5000ha pome orchards410). 
2004 In Germany “Plantomycin” was not available and the trade name of the 
plant protection agent was now “Strepto”411 and a total amount of 5119,6 kg has 
been sprayed on 5653,58 ha (representing 21,54% of total pome fruit acreage in 
Germany) by 1409 farms412 (the German “Bundesausschuß Gemüse und Obst – 
Fachgruppe Obstbau” already demanding to allow streptomycin in the following 
year, just as in 2004).413 As mentioned above the EU already banned 
streptomycin at that time (deadline 31.03.2004), authorization in Germany 2004 
was only achieved via the loophole “danger in delay”. In the Austrian part of the 
report it says that “Plantomycin was not allowed in 2004” 414 which is simply not 
true, because during the [Interview Global 2000] it was learnt, that in 2004 the 
§12(10) PSMG 1997 also ruled that all Dutch authorized plant protection agents 
were allowed to be use in Austria (equalization rule). It was then when the 
                                          
407 Also stated in the preface of the Directive 91/414EEC: “whereas such authorization 
should be reviewed by the Commission in close cooperation with the MS in the framework of the 
Standing Committee of Plant Health” and Article 8(4) of respective directive that “it shall be 
decided without delay, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 19 [referring to 
Regulation 1999/468EC] whether and under which conditions the action taken by the MS may be 
extended for a given period, repeated, or revoked.” 
408 [AGES RT 02a], p. 3 
409 [DBMELV 2003], p. 20 
410 [DBMELV 2003], p. 17 
411 [DBMELV 2004], p. 20 
412 Calculations made by the author from the provided table in [DBMELV 2004], p. 22, 
diverging from the numbers given in the text. 
413 [DBMELV 2004], p. 25 
414 [DBMELV 2004], p. 31 
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minister was required to give further details on precisely which agents would be 
allowed, that he referred to a Dutch homepage. Global 2000 revealed, that also 
Plantomycin (an agent containing streptomycin) would be allowed for free sale in 
Austria (actually already forbidden at EU-level), due to a clearance sale-respite 
for Holland. When the minister learnt about this mistake in a conference of the 
Austrian television station ORF415, streptomycin was placed on a list416 that 
explicitly names forbidden agents.  
2005 In Germany “Plantomycin” (Company Asepta) and “Strepto” (Company 
Globachem” were available417 and a total amount of 7724.56 kg was used on 
9060.6 ha (representing 34.14%) by 2052 farms.418 Having just been put on the 
index of forbidden agents in 2004, streptomycin was promptly authorized again in 
2005: In the Austrian part of this years three-country report it is mentioned 
tersely with one sentence at the end of a paragraph, that “this year for the first 
time streptomycin had been allowed to be used by six419 intensive orchardists” (in 
Vorarlberg, Western Austria), unlike in the German part, where there are tables 
showing exact numbers of permitted farms, applying farms, total acreage, total 
kg of agent used, etc. there is no such information to be found for Austria. 
2006 was a “rather quiet FB-year” 420 (same in Germany) because of climatic 
conditions adverse to the expansion of the bacterium. Yet again streptomycin had 
been allowed for eight421 intensive orchardists in Vorarlberg (Western Austria). As 
in the year before this information is found in one sentence at the end of a 
normal paragraph, again lacking any further more detailed information. 
2007 was an extraordinary strong FB year in Austria (and southern Germany), 
with the most FB-cases since the first detection of FB in Austria 1993 according to 
[DBMELV 2007].422 Under an extra header “Usage of Streptomycin” the sentence 
“The agent streptomycin has not been allowed against FB in Austria in the year 
2007” can be found easily. The author wonders whether this format will be 
chosen again in 2008 (again a year of streptomycin usage) or whether it will be a 
                                          
415 in a “ZIB1” conference (the news broadcast mainly watched in Austria) according to 
[Interview Global 2000] 
416 “Verordnung des Bundesministers für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und 
Wasserwirtschaft über das Verbot von Pflanzenschutzmitteln, die bestimmte Wirkstoffe 
enthalten” 
417 [DBMELV 2004], p. 20 
418 Calculations made by the author from the provided table in [DBMELV 2005], p. 24, 
diverging from the numbers given in the text. 
419 [DBMELV 2005] 
420 [DBMELV 2006], p. 34 
421 [DBMELV 2006], p. 35 
422 [DBMELV 2007], p. 37-39 
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sentence hidden in a paragraph again. The German part of the three-country 
report states that the streptomycin-containing products “Strepto”, “Firewall 17 
WP” and “Plantomycin” were allowed for this year. Further it is stated that the 
pest has “finally established”. 
2008: on March 10th the BAES (being Austria’s competent authority) has 
authorized two products containing streptomycin (“Strepto” and “Firewall 17 WP”) 
in Austria, although the infection pressure of FB has not been very high, but there 
is no final report available up to now. Still the author has found a statement by 
the AGES in a cooking journal [AGES K&K] that on 5700 ha the use of 
streptomycin would have been allowed, but it was only used on 150 ha (2.63% 
thereof). The association of the Austrian Fruit Growers (Bundesobstbauverband, 
hereafter: BOV) speaks of approximately 200 ha pome-fruit, stated to be “only 
approximately 2.5 % of the Austrian pome fruit acreage“.423 The author wonders 
what has led to the inconsistency of data. Also in Switzerland the antibiotic was 
allowed for the first time until July 2008424 and maybe the usage has to be seen 
as a consequence explained by Dr. Burtscher in [Interview Global 2000] that the 
change of the legal situation ruling that infected trees would not have to be 
cleared against the will of the owner, led to a “higher infection pressure, therefore 
higher risk for orchardists, which has led to making the position worse of those 
being in favour for consequently pruning their trees instead of using antibiotics 
and might also explain the allowance of streptomycin in Switzerland in 2008.” 
Restrictions  
The authorization is subject to certain conditions such as the application only 
being allowed for full-time425 orchardists involved in intensive pome-fruit-growing, 
for a maximum of three sprayings during blossom time of pome fruit (apple, 
pear, quince and medlar trees) and only after a warning by the installed weather 
forecasting system has been given.426 
C3.4.2. Authorization Procedure for Blossom Protect 
In some countries (as for example in Austria, Germany Slovak Republic, Hungary, 
Slovenia) this product has also been given “danger-in-delay” (emergency-
                                          
423 [BOV HP] 
424 [lawa 2008], p. 15; [CH 2008] 
425 The orchard being the (main?) income source. 
426 [BAES 04] 
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permission) in the last years, just as is the case with streptomycin. The 
notification process on EU-level has started and the inclusion in the Annex I is 
only a matter of time.  
Peculiarity of Austrian Law  
Besides plant protection products, which have been described earlier in this 
paper, also “plant (health) auxiliary agents”427 are available on the market, which 
are “substances without substantive nutrient content, determined to have some 
effect on plants, raise their robustness or influence the processing of organic 
substances”. The Austrian Fertilizer Law 1994 and the corresponding Austrian 
Fertilizer Regulation 2004 regulate these agents, but no EU-wide regulation 
covers these products.428 In the respective laws authorized substances are listed 
(for products regulated within these laws), and can be marketed (in compliance 
with potential further conditions) without further formal act. 
As a peculiarity it is learnt, there is an exception to these legal provisions: 
Germany provides a list of authorized “plant strengtheners” (which can be seen to 
be a loop-hole from the EU Directive 91/414/EEC). According to current law the 
multitude of listed plant strengtheners in Germany are likewise allowed to be 
used in Austria. In the annex of the Austrian Fertilizer Law (section “12. 
Pflanzenhilfsmittel”) these are by law plant auxiliary agents despite Austrian 
authorization rules. The only condition being that no plant protection effect is 
advertised.429 
Being on this list BP the product actually has a legal authorization as a “plant 
strengthener” and is actually allowed to be placed on the market freely in 
Austria at the moment, but this arrangement will only remain upright as long as 
it is furthermore tolerated by the MS of the EC. For this reason, apart from the 
derogation clause possibility BP is also allowed to be sold as such a plant 
strengthener in Austria entailing the disadvantage that the promotion of its 
efficiency against FB is not allowed. Dr. Donat states at the [Interview bio-ferm] 
that “BP has been on the IP-list430 and also on the list for organic farming 
during the danger-in-delay authorization period” meaning that in these phases it 
is allowed to communicate on the fact that BP is a pest control for FB.  
                                          
427 Orginal term in German: “Pflanzenhilfsmittel” 
428 According to Wernitznig, F. and Kohl, J. from the AGES in [BOV 5_2008], p.16 
429 Stated in [BOV 5_2008], p.15 et seq. 
430 Corresponding documents for 2008 are [ÖPUL 03_2008] and [ÖPUL 05_2008] 
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C4. Assessment of Streptomycin 
C4.1. Direct Costs of Spraying Streptomycin 
The company Globachem, producer of “Strepto” has not replied to the emails of 
the author. Since the online search for other information sources available has led 
to an average price of more than double the price stated in a document of the 
relevant Swiss governmental institution, the calculation of an averaged price per 
kilo of agricultural streptomycinsulfate has only been set aside by the author. It is 
assumed that the prices found431 relate to medical and not agricultural 
streptomycin (surely requiring a much higher standard) or have not been subject 
to the price reduction that a bundled order by all pome-fruit growers of a country 
(in which the product is allowed) can achieve. The Swiss price found, can be 
assumed to apply to all Swiss farmers432 and has served as the information base 
in this case study, until eventually, shortly before the completion of the case 
study the author was able to retrieve a price of streptomycin applying to the 
Austrian farmers in 2008 that will be used for the calculations in this paper. 
As can be seen from the table below the price retrieved on the Austrian 
streptomycin does not include the company, concentration data etc, but it is 
strongly suspected that it is actually the same product, but no more detailed 
information is provided. 
Table 9: Median Price per kg of Streptomycin in EUR 
Price Information Streptomycin Switzerland Austria433 
Company Schneiter Agro AG (CH) ? 
Product trade name Strepto “Streptomycin” 
Content of Streptomycinsulfate (%) 21.6%434 ? 
Content of Streptomycinsulfate (g) 180g/kg  ? 
Quantity needed for 1 ha 600g 600g 
Dilution % 0.0375 ? 
Efficiency 70-90% ? 
Unit Quantity 600g ? 
Unit Price 145.00435  ? 
Cur. CHF EUR 
EUR/kg 156.52 130.00 
Costs per ha, per treatment in € 93.91€436 78.00€ 
                                          
431 E.g. [Sciencelab.com]; [MP Biomedicals P]; [Invitrogen]; [Chemicalland21] 
432 [lawa 2008] 
433 According to a calculation of Dr. Steinbauer (Styrian Provincial Government): 
[Steinbauer Prices] 
434 [lawa 2008], p. 15-21; [BAES 04] 
435 [lawa 2008], p. 21 
436 600g package unit is for 1 ha, 600g cost 145 Swiss franc as stated in [lawa 2008], p. 
21); 145.00 CHF equal 93,91 EUR. 
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Price Information Streptomycin 
(continued) Switzerland Austria437 
Annual costs per ha (3 treatments) 281.73€ 234.00€ 
Further remarks 
“sale in Germany since 
2004, in Austria since 
2006” 438 
Price for Austrian 
farmers in 2008 
 
As the Austrian governmental notice allows for a maximum of three oversprays 
per year, the costs will be calculated assuming these three possible spraying to 
achieve the highest possible efficiency grade resulting in annual total plant 
protection cost of 234.00 € per hectare. In Switzerland “gun-applications” are not 
allowed439, whereas in Austria they seem to be allowed.440 
Further the costs of spraying streptomycin include the use of equipment and 
working time. The calculation retrieved from the Styrian Government by Dr. 
Steinbauer [Steinbauer Spraying Costs] has assessed these costs to be follows: 
Table 10:  Cost of Spraying Streptomycin; Source: [Steinbauer Spraying Costs] 
 Cost/h hours/ha Cost/ha Total/ha Total/ha/year 
Material costs      
(Orcharding) Tractor, 
4WD, 50 KW 40.12€ 0.75 30.09€   
Spraying equipment 
(“30.000 m3, 550 lt”) 15.36€ 0.75 11.52€   
    41.61€ 3 x 41.61 = 124.83  
Working costs  12.00€ 0.75 9.00€ 9.00€ 3 x 9.00 = 27.00 
Total per application    50.61€ 151.83€ 
 
These costs are accumulative to the costs for the spraying agent itself 
aggregating to annual costs of 385.83€/ha/year (151.83 + 234.00) for 
protecting one hectare of the orchard so far.  
In [Steinbauer Spraying Costs] furthermore inspection rounds are mentioned as 
matter of expenses (two working hours, 2x12€). It is understood by the author to 
be a voluntary action (because it cannot be found to be a requirement in the 
“authorized conditions of use” of streptomycin (issued in [BAES 04]). Since 
monitoring the orchard closely during springtime is a quite necessary action 
anyway to (as described earlier) discover contingent infections of FB, these costs 
are omitted in the following Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA). 
                                          
437 According to a calculation of Dr. Steinbauer (Styrian Provincial Government): 
[Steinbauer Prices] 
438 [lawa 2008], p. 21: “excl. postage fees” 
439 [lawa 2008], p. 15 
440 [BAES 04]: “Method: Spritzen oder spruhen“ 
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Furthermore the plant protection agent needs to be diluted in water. In [BAES 
04] it is stated, that 1000 litres are needed per ha. These costs are omitted in 
both scenarios (streptomycin and Blossom Protect), for following reasons:  
1.) water prices are not the same all over Austria, but vary between 
municipalities;  
2.) the total amount of water needed is stated to be the same in both scenarios 
([bio-ferm 04]: 500 litres for 1 m crown height, 1000 litres for 2 m crown height 
respectively441);  
3.) these costs were not included in [Steinbauer Spraying Costs], and the reasons 
for this might be that farmers very often have wells they therefore do not use 
water from a public source. The costs in St. Florian, Upper Austria, for water 
would be: 1.40€/m3 obtainment-costs and 3.28€/m3 sewage system fees, in total 
4.68€/m3 (excl. VAT).  
Required Personal Protective Equipment includes chemical goggles (or 
shielded safety glasses), Emergency eye-wash, Chemical-resistant long-sleeved 
shirt, trousers, socks, shoes, gloves, Emergency water shower, approved air-
purifying respirator approved against pesticides.442 Also these costs were not 
included in the price calculation retrieved from the Styrian Government by Dr. 
Steinbauer and since the author has found it very hard to obtain these costs, they 
are omitted in both scenarios (streptomycin and Blossom Protect), but can easily 
be incorporated by experts, recalculating this CBA. 
The mowing goods or crops of cultured plants underneath are forbidden to be 
used for animal feed. Additionally blooming cultures must be eliminated before 
each (!) treatment (probably in order to restrict the probability of bees coming 
into contact with contaminated flowers) and must be mowed or mulched.443 These 
costs therefore result in additional mowing costs (working time and 
material/equipment cost) or the lost profit for selling/using the cultured plants 
(e.g. hay). Whereas the lost profit for these cultures is found hard to estimate by 
the author (due to lacking market expertise), the additional material and working 
costs are tried to generate according to the calculation of [Steinbauer Spraying 
Costs]: it can be assumed, that for mowing a tractor is needed (costing 
                                          
441 Also e.g. in [ÖPUL 01_2008] the basis for calculations in Austria is stated to be 1000 
litres per ha and a crown height of two metres. 
442 E.g. [lawa 2008], but also [Nufarm]; [Farm$aver] 
443 [BAES 04]: “Other conditions and particulars“ 
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40.12€/h), and further that it can be worked with the same velocity as with 
spraying (0,75h/ha), and the working costs are equal to spraying, too (this is also 
underpinned by the same costs calculated for inspection rounds). If the author’s 
assumptions are correct, this would result in additional mowing costs of 
39.09€/ha per spraying. The three sprayings allowed therefore amount to 
additional costs of 117.27€/ha. 
Table 11: Additional Mowing Costs; Source: based on [Steinbauer Spraying 
Costs] 
 costs/h hours/ha costs/ha 
Material costs    
Tractor, 4WD, 50 KW 40.12€ 0.75 30.09€ 
Working costs  12.00€ 0.75 9.00€ 
Total per application   39.09€ 
 for 3 applications 117.27€ 
 
C4.2. Indirect Costs and External Effects 
C4.2.1. General Side Effects of Streptomycin 
It is a fact that the following reactions (side-effects of streptomycin on humans) 
are “common”444 “vestibular and auditory damage”445 (ototoxity446, naussea447 
causing vomiting, vertigo), nephrotoxity448 (amongst other problems with 
nerves449 and allergies)450. Special precautions are to be taken with infants, 
children451, pregnant452, breastfeeding women and elderly453. It is also stated that 
“long-term exposure might cause fertility problems in the female”454. 
[Kastanioudakis et al 1993] e.g. report “hearing loss and vestibular dysfunction in 
childhood from the use of streptomycin in Albania.” 
                                          
444 [RXMED] 
445 [WHO 02] 
446 [ENIUS]; [Wikipedia 02]; [VN]; [Gideononline]; [Drugs Pro]: “Both vestibular and 
auditory dysfunction can follow the administration of Streptomycin. The degree of impairment is 
directly proportional to the dose and duration of Streptomycin administration, to the age of the 
patient, to the level of renal function and to the amount of underlying existing auditory 
dysfunction.”; [RXMED]: “Loss of hearing has been reported following long-term therapy.” 
447 [ENIUS]; [Drugs Pro] 
448 [ENIUS]; [Wikipedia 03]; [VN] 
449 [VN] 
450 Also listed on [Nufarm], a label of an agriculturally used streptomycin product. 
451 See the study of [Kastanioudakis 1993] 
452 [Drug Pro] 
453 [WHO 02]; [Drug Pro]: “Streptomycin can cause fetal harm.” [RXMED]: “Since 
streptomycin readily crosses the placental barrier, caution in use of the drug is important to 
prevent ototoxicity in the fetus.” 
454 [Eggcentris] 
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However, streptomycin is not effective when orally taken and is therefore 
administered by intramuscular injection in medication, because it is “not absorbed 
from the gastrointestinal tract when given orally”455. A typical adult dosage would 
be 1g of streptomycin sulphate by deep intramuscular injection456. Patients over 
60 years or patients weighing less than 50 kg may not tolerate doses above 500–
750 mg daily457.  
“At present there is no binding limit value regarding human health 
available for long-term exposure or exposure at application” is stated by [AGES 
18]458. However even if available these studies should be viewed with some 
reservations, e.g. the stated “acute toxity” (measured by the lethal dose) etc. 
“does not reveal anything useful” according to Prof. Pittner, arguing that the 
values “says that 50% of the rats die at a certain level of intake. But rats have a 
completely different metabolism as humans and there is no data concerning other 
physiological damages, as e.g. providing information on allergies induced.” 
C4.2.1.1. Resulting Handling Risks 
The following section addresses the possible hazards streptomycin may have on 
individuals handling streptomycin at the process of spraying. 
An argument has to be introduced at this point, bearing in mind that, according to 
Prof. Pittner synergies arise here: even if not effective when orally given the 
antibiotic is leading to resistance, on interaction with the human body and can 
cause allergies, etc.. 
In the document [EPA streptomycin] it is stated that after conducting a review 
process of incidents reports there were “relatively few reports of ill effects from 
exposure to streptomycin”459 and workers are therefore recommended to use skin 
and eye protection and should be protected from “drift or other residue after 
application”.460 The findings of the EPA on spraying accidents must be seen in the 
light of the fact that streptomycin is not metabolised orally, but antibiotic 
resistances build up unnoticed in these individuals not having a direct effect, until 
an infection strikes the individual necessitating antibiotic cure.  
                                          
455 [RXMED] 
456 [Gideononline]; [WHO 02] 
457 [WHO 02] 
458 [AGES 18], p. 2 (translated by the author) 
459 [EPA streptomycin], p. 4 
460 [EPA streptomycin], p. 4 
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Risk / Cost Rating:  
Thus on the whole the risk hazardous health exposure at spraying and the risk of 
spraying accidents is judged not too high461 in respect to observable body 
reactions (such as skin rashes, allergies, etc.) but high in terms of breeding 
antibiotic resistance inside the individuals handling the product. 
C4.2.2. Antimicrobial-Resistant (AMR) Bacteria 
Resistances occur by mutation in rpsL (gene for S12 ribosomal protein), that 
prevents binding of streptomycin to ribosome462, “meaning that the bacteria gain 
the ability to generate a resistance against antibiotics in that they change their 
metabolisms either in degrading the antibiotics or establishing metabolic 
mechanisms to expel them when the antibiotics penetrate the cells.”463 
As with other antibiotics, the use of streptomycin may result in overgrowth of 
non-susceptible organisms, including fungi,464 because “surviving microorganisms 
can use biocide molecules as an energy source and nutrient source”465. 
The problem of development of resistant strains occurs within agricultural as well 
as within medical applications.466 [McManus] states that “low doses of antibiotics 
applied to large areas over long periods of time contribute to the build-up of 
resistance in clinical bacteria”. 
 
                                          
461 In the [Interview Global 2000] Dr. Burtscher e.g. states, that “[c]ompared to other 
pesticides, the problem with streptomycin is not so much a problem because of the direct health 
reasons of farmers working with it […]” (but then refers to the severe health risks interlinked 
with antibiotic resistance (to be discussed further down). 
462 [MP Biomedicals] 
463 [Interview Pittner] 
464 [Drug Pro]; [RXMED], [Interview Pittner] 
465 [Badalucco et al 1994], p. 334 
466 [Interview Pittner]; [Primaryinfo];  
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Figure 5:  Resistance gene transfer; Source: [McManus] 
With streptomycin bacterial resistance develops rapidly (compared to other 
antibiotics)467 and [McManus] also identifies another problem that even “reagent 
and veterinary formulations of antibiotics have been found to contain antibiotic 
resistance genes” and is sceptical about higher purity of antibiotics used for 
plants posing the question whether the antibiotics used could “themselves be an 
origin of antibiotic-resistance genes in agroecosystems?”. 
C4.2.2.1. Agricultural Risks 
Professor Pittner argues that as far as agriculture is concerned the usage of 
streptomycin is a problem, because the antibiotic does not only kill the bacteria 
causing FB, but also bacteria in the surroundings (air, soil). Whereas the 
substance is well-balanced through evolution in its places of natural existence 
(e.g. in the soil of forests), it is now sprayed on blossoms, leaves, branches and 
tree-trunks where it does not occur naturally there is no longer such a balance 
(besides the differing natural quantity). 
It is a fact that strains of the pathogen E.a., resistant to streptomycin, are 
already present in some orchards in eastern U.S.468, they are also widespread in 
most apple and pear regions of western U.S.469, New Zealand and Israel:470 
“However the bacterium has developed resistance to streptomycin in several 
states [...]. Thus streptomycin is losing its effectiveness.”471 
                                          
467 [Interview Pittner] 
468 [Wilcox] 
469 [Wilcox] 
470 [McManus]; [Manulis 1998] 
471 [Cornell University et al 2003], p. 10 
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The threat for agriculture lies within the establishment of resistant FB bacteria, 
leading to the impossibility to plant pome fruit. 
 
Figure 6: The stars indicate regions with streptomycin-resistant Erwinia 
amylovora; Source: [McManus] 
In the following, parts of the interview with Prof. Pittner on the risks associated 
with the agricultural use of streptomycin shall be stated472: “Streptomyces 
species naturally occur in soil and use streptomycin to compete with other 
microorganisms. But if streptomycin comes into soil in high doses because of 
spraying, then this can in the long run lead to massive imbalances of the 
composition of the microflora of the soil. Furthermore the streptomycin resistant 
bacteria (the ones surviving the streptomycin-attack) can use streptomycin 
available (but not harmful to them anymore) as a carbon-source (energy), even 
pushing growth of resistant and insusceptible bacteria.  
Streptomycin is water-soluble and penetrates the soil with rain. The result may 
be that these soils cannot be used as cropland anymore and are turned into 
devastated areas. It will lead to a similar situation as experienced in many 
regions in U.S. where it is already impossible to grow plants belonging to the 
family of rosacea.  
Because we have not scientifically observed yet, what happens, if we disturb the 
balance (equilibrium) in the soil, this can lead to incalculable damages: unknown 
damages of the ecosystem will have to be faced for sure, insecure is only the 
extent of the risk taken.” 
                                          
472 For the whole Interview please refer to [Interview Pittner] in the Annex 
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Responding to the interjection of the author, that the arguments of protagonists 
of the agricultural use of streptomycin often ward off this threat emphasizing the 
limited application, Prof. Pittner states, that “exactly this kind of use produces 
resistances!” explaining this by a striking comparison: “If in human medication 
antibiotica have to be prescribed, it must be a dosis to surely kill ALL the bacteria, 
so that no resistances build up, and you will be warned to take all the pills, and 
not to stop until the packet is finished, even if you feel better already.” 
The argument of the BOV473 stating that “a comparison of the American usage 
modalities is not admissible” (because in America streptomycin can be sprayed 
more often than 4 times and has been sprayed much longer than in Europe) in 
view of the resistances-problem, is therefore proved wrong. Furthermore 
[Pesata 2008] states that “for the usage as a plant protection agent Streptomicin 
[Remark by the author: SIC!] must be imported; AGES reckons an amount of up 
to 10.000 kilogram”474. 
Risk / Cost Rating 
Due to the emergence of strains of E.a. resistant to antibiotics, it is only a 
delaying strategy and other instruments will have to be found to keep the 
danger of infection in the affected orchards at a tolerable level and further entails 
severe risks for society as a whole (as shown in the next chapter). 
C4.2.2.2. Human Health Risks 
Antibiotics are an important and widely used medical intervention preventing 
“incalculable suffering and death”.475 But bacterial adaptation and resistance 
cause a “struggle to stay one step ahead of pathogens […]” and the “rise of 
multidrug resistance and the ready transfer of resistant traits among pathogens 
require heightened action if we are to prevent increasing outbreaks of infections 
that become more difficult, or even impossible, to treat.” Also [Heilig et al 2002] 
claims that subtherapeutic doses are worrisome because “they seem to provide 
ideal environments for the selection of resistant pathogens.”  
This is what the World Health Organisation (WHO) states about antibiotic 
resistance: According to Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland (WHO Director-General) we 
ought to protect the effectiveness of antibiotics, otherwise “we could be heading 
                                          
473 In [BOV 5_2008], p. 3 (translated by the author) 
474 [Pesata 2008], p.51 (translated by the author) 
475 [Heilig et al 2002] 
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for a post-antibiotic age in which many medical and surgical advances could be 
undermined by the risk of incurable infection.” Life saving discoveries made by 
medical science (and the adherent investments – stated to be US$ 17 billion 
between 1996 and 2001) is at risk due to growing threats of drug resistance. 
Further the WHO states: “Drug resistance is a natural biological occurrence, but 
one that can kill.” Moreover, it is remarked, that drug resistance is spreading fast 
and corresponding drugs are becoming ineffective. An example is given: “[…] in 
several countries strains of tuberculosis have become resistant to at least two of 
the most effective drugs used against the disease.” And further: “It is a global 
problem. No country can afford to ignore it, no country can afford not to 
respond. At the same time, action taken in any one country will have clear and 
positive results around the world.”476 
Also [Angula et al 2004] postulate that “[c]linicians should be aware that 
antimicrobial resistance is increasing in food-borne pathogens and that patients 
who are taking antimicrobial agents […] are at increased risk for acquiring 
antimicrobial-resistant food-borne infections.” 
[Shea 2003] states that “[a]ntimicrobial resistance has reached crisis stage in 
human medicine. The rapid acceleration of multidrug-resistant bacteria in the 
past 2 decades has overtaken new drug development, and patients and clinicians 
are faced with the prospect of untreatable infections. Although much of the 
problem stems from overuse and misuse of antimicrobial agents in human 
medicine, large-scale use of antimicrobials in agriculture also contributes 
to the crisis. Agricultural uses of antibiotics produce environmental exposures in 
a variety of reservoirs, which select for resistant microbes and microbial genes.” 
In her article she documents evidence on human health risks as a consequence 
thereof to provide background knowledge and necessary evidence to “advocate 
for judicious use of antimicrobials in all sectors.”477  
All these warnings should be considered in combination with the annual report of 
the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) on Diseases in 
the EU and EEA/EFTA countries.478 
Questioned for his opinion on the health risks for humans, Dr. Burtscher from the 
NGO “Global 2000” also warns of “[…] emerging resistances (against antibiotics 
                                          
476 [WHO 01] (emphasis by the author) 
477 Emphasis by the author 
478 [ECDC 2007] 
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used in medicine for humans) and the interchange of resistances” and further 
claims that a ban in Europe “was a great success”, now “carelessly jeopardized by 
the Austrian danger-in-delay-admission” stated to be “bursting of a dam” 
(again).479 
Prof. Pittner states that “[t]he dangerousness of the agricultural use of 
streptomycin is not assessable today, because there is no binding480 data 
available. The “hazardous substance labelling” is “unknown” for streptomycin. 
This does not mean that there is no danger, but on the contrary we do not know 
anything about them up to now. This bears a high risk!”481  
A) The Risk of Streptomycin-Resistant Bacteria  
Due to the adverse side effects of streptomycin (already shown), it is only subject 
to limited482 use in human medicine nowadays: according to [Oberdisse et al 
2002] mainly for the treatment of so-called “problem germs” if other antibiotics 
(due to resistances or incompatibility) cannot be used and names as one of the 
main indications (still) the treatment of tuberculosis (together with other 
antituberculotica). Prof. Pittner refers to an imminent threat linked to the 
resistances caused due to the fact that tuberculosis is not banned, but is 
introduced from Eastern Europe. These tuberculosis bacteria, are stated by Prof. 
Pittner to be “highly resistant against antibiotics, are moving towards our 
latitudes, against which our common antibiotic medication is already without 
effect. Furthermore in central Europe tuberculosis has no longer been inoculated 
against because it has been perceived to be extinct. This problem can lead to 
deaths because there is no treatment available!” 
B) Cross-Resistances 
A report of the [Cornell University et al 2003] states that there are “[…] concerns 
that antibiotic resistance in Erwinia amylovora could spread to other bacteria that 
infect humans.” 483 
An article rated to be very important by Prof. Pittner is [Sundin et al 1996], 
pointing out the threat of antibiotic resistance gene transfer: 
                                          
479 [Interview Global 2000] 
480 Found to be stated e.g. in [AGES 18], p. 2 
481 Please also refer to the Annex III d) of the case study, showing how many times 
“n.a.” (no information available” is stated for streptomycin. 
482 [Pesata 2008]; [Sundin et al 1996], p. 133; [VN] 
483 [Cornell University et al 2003], p. 10 
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“Gene transfer within bacterial communities has been recognized as a major 
contributor in the recent evolution of antibiotic resistance on a global scale.”484 
Research conclusions have revealed that similar antibiotic resistance gene 
sequences may be present in unrelated organisms suggesting that these 
sequences are accessible from a microbial gene pool (having facilitated their rapid 
dissemination into a wide variety of organisms). 
“The linked strA-strB genes, which encode streptomycin-inactivating enzymes, 
are distributed worldwide and confer streptomycin resistance in at least 17 
genera of gram-negative bacteria. The wide distribution of the strA-strB genes in 
the environment suggests that gene transfer events between human, animal, and 
plant-associated bacteria have occurred.” And a “large body of evidence suggests 
that transfer of strA-strB among unrelated bacteria in the environment has 
occurred recently.”485 
Evidence for gene transfer between distantly related species is not only describing 
the antibiotic resistance problem in clinical bacteria, but is expanded by the use in 
both animal husbandry and plant disease control.  
Also Sundin (just as Prof. Pittner) argues that the “utilization of antibiotics in 
these agricultural applications directly affects the ecology of bacterial populations 
at the target sites” resulting in the dissemination of antibiotic resistance bacteria 
(or determinants) into additional environmental niches which may likewise alter 
the ecological interactions in communities which were not subjected to antibiotic 
exposure.486 
The threat of cross-resistances must be feared following from Sundin’s finding 
that “In bacterial isolates from humans and animals, strA-strB are often linked 
with the sulII sulfonamide-resistance gene”487 - with sulfonamides being an 
important class of antibiotics needed in medicine.488 
                                          
484 [Sundin et al 1996], p. 133 
485 [Sundin et al 1996], p. 133 et seq. 
486 [Sundin et al 1996], p. 134 
487 [Sundin et al 1996], p. 133 
488 [Sundin et al 1996] states that “[t]he societal and epidemiological risk factors 
involved in the persistence of Abr genes in clinical bacteria have been detailed in”: Cohen, M.L. 
(1992) Epidemiology of drug resistance: implications for a post-antimicrobial era. Science, 257, 
p. 1050-1055. 
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Further the group of aminoglykosides, which streptomycin belongs to, is 
stated to show partial cross resistances among each other.489 
C) Allergies and other Risks 
Prof. Pittner explains the following: “Concerning allergies, for example, it has 
been known for a long time, that people having much contact with soil have a 
better immune-response due to actions caused by the microflora. However this 
triggering of the immune-system may also result in overreactions of the body: 
i.e. allergies. 
If streptomycin is now found to be in places (drinking water, air, trees) where 
evolution has not been able to counterbalance its existence (as explained in the 
previous question) it cannot be decomposed. But also in its natural environment 
soil the microflora is changed due to its impact leading to imbalances. Because of 
this reason streptomycin is also a strong allergen.” 
At the same time one must bear in mind, that agents causing health risks to us, 
will also have a similar impact on animals. Especially people involved in animal 
husbandry ought to consider, that the growing problem of resistance might affect 
their animals if more and more medicine will no longer be able to assist and cure 
bacterial infections. 
Total Risk / Cost Rating 
The need to preserve the efficacy and supply of antibiotics (by an appropriate use 
of antimicrobial agents) is therefore rated to be crucial490 by the author. 
The threat to human health is judged to be very high and has to be seen in 
connection with the findings of the following paragraph: 
C4.2.3. Displacement of Streptomycin  
C4.2.3.1. Dispersion of Resistances and Allergies 
Prof. Pittner states that “[s]treptomycin is no reactive substance, not 
decomposing right away. It needs to be broken down by microorganisms.” As 
explained above, streptomycin is now found on ecological niches it is not normally 
found in. Prof. Pittner therefore argues, that if these microorganisms (braking 
                                          
489 [Oberdisse et al 2002], p. 662 
490 Supported by [Heilig et al 2002]: comparably rating it as “crucial”  
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down streptomycin) are missing, the substance “can disseminate in the 
environment through wind, rain etc.” Because of its water solubility it can reach 
the ground-water (e.g. washed out with rain). If streptomycin finds its way into 
water, it can remain there virtually forever. The Professor of Biochemistry at the 
University of Vienna argues: “If we then drink water containing streptomycin, 
certainly the interaction on the metabolism of the human body is not the 
problem, but it has all the other negative impacts explained before (e.g. 
allergies). Additionally, by consuming water and food (e.g. honey), which have 
been contaminated by antibiotics and by spraying it into the environment, we are 
breeding streptomycin-resistant bacteria so that we have no defence against 
them anymore. If resistant bacteria afflict us the antibiotics streptomycin will not 
help us anymore.” 
C4.2.3.2. Ecotoxity 
Even in the Austrian notification for the authorization of streptomycin it is stated 
that it is “toxic for aquatic organisms and can have long-term damaging effects 
on lakes and rivers”.491 For this reason the spraying of streptomycin is only 
allowed at a distance of 20m.492 A producer states that “streptomycin is toxic to 
algae and fish prey organisms”493 and also in the Austrian streptomycin 
assessment document [AGES 18] it is stated, that it may be toxic to rainworms 
and certain algae. Thus some sources refer to the risk of displacement of 
streptomycin by rain into ground water and surface water, thereby harming small 
organisms and fish, which could lead to reduced fertilization of these.494 
Mr. Zainer from the Environmental Institute states that soil and water samples of 
treated areas show no residues, but grass samples under treated trees showed 
residues for several weeks.495 But the same Institute did not, however, detect 
residues in apples, which were later on shown to be there (outlined in the 
following chapter). 
                                          
491 [BAES 04] (translated by the author) 
492 [BAES 04] 
493 [lawa 2008], p. 18 (translated by the author) 
494 E.g. [VN] 
495 [ORF 03] 
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C4.2.4. Residues of Streptomycin in Food 
C4.2.4.1. The Legal Situation on Maximum Residue Limits in Honey  
The antibiotic can be sprayed at blossom time during different stages of open 
blossom, which has been allowed for a maximum of three times in Austria. As it is 
claimed that streptomycin is metabolised until the harvest of the apple, 
honeybees cannot be kept from collecting honey from recently sprayed blossoms 
and can therefore collect honeydew contaminated with streptomycin. Because 
streptomycin is water-soluble there is the risk of its displacement in honey. 
For antibiotic residues in honey the EU Regulation 2377/90 did not define 
maximum residue limits. Austrian law (the same as German law496) defined this 
level to be 20 µg/kg for streptomycin in honey in the “Vermin Remedy Peak 
Values Regulation”497. In order to protect consumer health the EU has regulated 
that the maximum tolerable streptomycin residue in honey must be below 10 
µg/kg (regulated in the Annexes of the EU-regulation 396/2005) from 1st of 
September 2008 on498. 
C4.2.4.2. Costs of Preventing the Sale of Contaminated Honey 
How high are the costs accompanying the agricultural usage of streptomycin 
regarding the possible content of honey and the adherent measures to prevent 
the fact that these contaminated products are marketed? 
Monitoring / Laboratory testing: it is stated by the Styrian “Imkerbund”-
Chairman Mr. Josef Ulz that in order to make sure that no contaminated honey is 
marketed, monitoring by the (Styrian) provincial government of the beekeeper-
organisations has been organized, surveying all affected locations of bee-hives.499 
If streptomycin is used “AGES calculates how many bee-hives are in the region 
and how many samples have to be taken” 500. Ulz even states that honey will be 
taken off the market if residues are tested positively in honey, regardless of 
regulated residue limits , because only residue-free honey shall be passed on to 
consumers (standing in for the so-called zero tolerance). Real “zero”-
contamination though is technically not feasible: the testing on residues of 
streptomycin in honey has a detection limit (being the value above which with a 
                                          
496 [DBMELV 2003], p. 11 
497 In German: “Schädlingsbekämpfungsmittel- Höchstwerte-Verordnung BGBl 
2002/441“ 
498 [AGES 09] 
499 [APA 09052008]; [Interview ÖIB] 
500 [Interview ÖIB] 
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certain significance level it can be determined whether a certain substance is 
existent within a sample or not), hence there is an operative restriction due to 
technical feasibility.501 There is a certain risk of wasting non-contaminated honey 
due to test failures, but the author cannot estimate that. For cost and time 
efficient testing, a two-step procedure is recommended502:  
1. Screening (“ELISA”, “CHARM II”, etc.) to find possible positive results: 
(state of the art) screenings are stated to have a detection limit at 5 
µg/kg; 
2. Verification analysis for non-negative results by chromatographic 
methods.503 
The price for a screening-test at AGES (competence centre for veterinary 
medicine and hormones) is stated to be 75.00 € excl. VAT.504  
C4.2.4.3. Costs of Contaminated Honey (incl. Disposal) 
Also if beekeepers do not suffer financial damage because costs are covered by 
the government (as for example the Styrian provincial government has decided), 
the honey is actually produced to be sold, but further economic damage could be 
derived due to the risk that costumers move on to other sources. 
The median price (calculation by the author) of the most common honeys listed in 
[ÖIZ] is 8,72 €/kg incl. VAT505, hence 7, 93 €/kg excl. VAT, representing the real 
market value of honey according to the following calculation by the author:  
Table 12: Median Price of Honey per Kilo; Source: calculated by the author from 
Quotation [ÖIZ], p.12 et subs. 
 
“The kg honey is worth 7.50€/kg (on average)” is stated by Mr. Ulz (Chairman of 
the Beekeepers Association in Austria) in [Interview ÖIB]. According to the 
                                          
501 [AGES 07], p. 6 et seq. 
502 [AGES 09], p. 1 
503 [AGES 08], p. 1; The interested reader might find the article of [Bruijnsvoort et al 
2004], [Edder et al 1999], [Gaudin et al 2004] and [Ye et al 2007] worth reading. 
504 [AGES 08], p. 2 
505 [ÖIZ], p. 25 
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Austrian Statistics Office506 the producer price of honey per kg is 5.98 €. But since 
not only the actual costs of producing honey are lost, but also the profit margin, 
the (market-) price stated by Mr. Ulz should be taken in consideration.507 
The provinces have taken over these compensation payments (being a provincial 
matter). Mr. Liedlbauer (from the Upper Austrian Beekeeper association) has 
forwarded the respective agreement with Upper Austria508 to the author, stating 
that the beekeepers will be compensated for the costs509 of testing the honey-
samples from risk zones (a three km radius of the spraying area) amounting up 
to €75.00 and that in case of contamination the honey will be bought up for 
€5.00. The agreement, although never signed, has been upheld according to the 
information of Mr. Liedlbauer. But it must be remarked, that this has been IMHO 
a very unsure status that is actually unacceptable in this economically damaging 
situation, originally provoked by governmental interference (by authorizing 
streptomycin). 
According to a telephone call with Mr. Fröhlich510 from the company “Linz AG”, 
department of Waste Management (Upper Austria), the following information has 
been given to the author: honey can be disposed of in normal residual waste 
containing up to 25% (!) of antibiotics (but according to a paragraph in the Waste 
Management Law it is not allowed to obtain this percentage by dilution). This is 
astounding when one considers the hazards of developing resistances! It is clear 
that a failure to regulate has been found (and therefore discussed outright). A 
regrettable peculiarity of inflexibility and regulation by environmental standards 
completely missing the actual issues can be observed in connection with the 
information on Blossom Protect. BP being actually a totally harmless substance, it 
nevertheless has to be disposed of as special waste511, simply because it is a 
plant protection agent, without regard to its actual toxity, although “nobody 
would dispose baker’s yeast as special waste”512 under normal circumstances, as 
Dr. Donat remarks, on the other hand it is allowed to discard antibiotics in normal 
residual waste! The costs for residual waste were obtained from Mr. Glasner (also 
                                          
506 [Statistik Austria 2007 agriculture], p. 126-131: Agricultural and Forrestry Producer 
Prices 2007, Annual Average for Austria in Euro (excl. VAT) (translated by the author) 
507 [Brent 1991], p. 13: “Costs are usually measured in market prices”. 
508  Although the agreement says “signatures” naming “LR Dr. Stockinger, LKÖ-
Präsident, Ing. Schiefermüller (Erwerbs-Obstbau), OÖ. Landesverband für Bienenzucht” at the 
bottom. 
509 As stated in [Interview OÖLVB] the Upper Austrian beekeepers have purchase their 
own analysation instrument for testing on streptomycin. 
510 After speaking to Mr. DI Singer from the Landesabfallverwertungsunternehmen 
(LAFU) in Wels, Austria 
511 [Interview bio-ferm] 
512 [Interview bio-ferm] 
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from Linz AG) and were stated to be 3.56€ excl. VAT for the one-time disposal of 
a 120 litre container.  
According to [ORF 04] AGES has not found residues in honey in 2008. From the 
viewpoint of the beekeepers this was “quite surprising” because “in Switzerland 
there were contaminations”.513 
C4.2.4.4. Market Response Risk (Image Loss) for Beekeepers 
In [APA 09052008] the Styrian “Imkerbund”-Chairman Mr. Josef Ulz stated that 
“beekeepers in the region [remark by the author: where streptomycin is used] 
struggle with a possible image-damage”514. As beekeepers mostly market their 
honey directly, they may face severe problems as to market response. If it is 
assumed that Austrian honey is purchased because of expectations of high quality 
and the natural state of the product (which may not be expected of e.g. honey 
from China), especially regular customers might be scared off. Asked for these 
costs, Mr. Ulz stated in the [Interview ÖIB] that the costs to preserve their image 
and the losses of sales to the beekeepers are “hard to estimate”. Using 
streptomycin in the long run and having public discussions on the possible 
contamination of honey each year will not be very damaging to the bee-keepers. 
C4.2.4.5. Further Costs for Beekeepers 
Further costs for the beekeepers due to the use of streptomycin are additional 
working hours spent with  
• coordinating work regarding the monitoring (e.g. the information of all 
beekeepers within the organisations, but also those not belonging to 
organisations515); 
• communication work to prevent an image loss amongst consumers (PR 
work done by beekeepers),  
• moving of bee-hives (out of areas, where spraying is planned) 
• taking samples of honey (honey has to be mixed and samples have to 
be packed and sent in for testing). 
• Streptomycin is not on the lists of the BAES naming agents that are 
(slightly) hazardous to bees516, but long-term consequences and 
effects of which have to be expected on bees (and other insects, 
                                          
513 [Interview ÖIB] 
514 Translated by the author 
515 E.g. [OÖLR 01] 
516 [BAES 01] “hazardous to bees” and [BAES 02] “MINDER hazardous to bees” 
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worms, etc.) which are not known yet and consequently could be 
another risk. 
C4.2.4.6. Costs of Residue Testing of Streptomycin in Fruit 
Because of the food retailers’ and the “AMA” quality seal concerns (most 
presumably provoked by the massive consumer reaction, because there were no 
reactions from these stakeholders in previous years of streptomycin usage) 
samples had to be tested for residues. The cost for testing fruit (apples and 
pears) from sprayed areas can only be guessed and be even higher than the 
testing of honey (stated to be 75.00 € excl. VAT517) due to new methods now 
used, that have resulted in the following, absolutely new findings, as stated in the 
next paragraph. 
C4.2.4.7. Health Risks Deriving from Residues in Fruit 
Just before closing the study, news has been reported on the sudden findings of 
streptomycin in apples (against all previous assumptions). Of course this has to 
be judged as a further source of risk for breeding antibiotic resistance and has 
immediately been objurgated by a physician interviewed in an ORF news show.518 
C4.2.5. Further Indirect Costs and Risks for Farmers  
C4.2.5.1. Market Response Risk (Image loss) 
As the media has taken up the issue of agricultural use of streptomycin this year 
(2008) there has been a huge public response. Food retailers, in their desire to 
satisfy their customers, have reacted quite differently from each other (see Annex 
II for responses of food retailers to emails sent by the author). Hofer KG has not 
seen any reason for not selling apples from treated areas, if it was proven that 
they would not contain streptomycin, but others have been considering to exempt 
apples from streptomycin-treated acreages from stores of some supermarket-
chains (see e.g. [ORF 01]). 2008 the problem could be avoided because only 
(approx.) 150 ha were treated with streptomycin and apples from these acreages 
are not being sold in Austria, but are destined for export. Regarding future 
sprayings, the conflict will no longer be avoidable, since the apples have just 
recently been proven to contain streptomycin. 
                                          
517 [AGES 08], p. 2 
518 Watched by the author on ORF on the 14.11.2008 at 17:00pm 
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With 55% of all pome-fruit-farms stating to sell at least part of their products 
mainly by direct marketing,519 it should be considered that consumers might react 
very sensitively to the agricultural use of streptomycin. 
C4.2.5.2. Lost Subsidies and Risk of Loosing Quality Labels 
The ÖPUL subsidy amounting up to 300€/ha is granted to farmers for the total 
acreage of their farm, if they restrict their production measures to the use of 
plant protection agents issued on the IP-List. If an agent is used, that is not on 
the list, the subsidy is lost for the whole farm. This is the normal procedure. But 
farmers using streptomycin (clearly not being on the list) only loose the subsidy 
for the sprayed acreages in 2008.  
Moreover there have been discussions on whether apples from the streptomycin-
treated acreages would be allowed to carry the quality seal of the AMA 
GesmbH. The loss of the quality seal bears the risk of reduced sales-prices and 
diminishing the achievable profit. 
C4.2.6. Further Indirect Costs and Risks for the Austrian 
Society 
The author has found it very difficult to allocate the state overhead costs of the 
usage of streptomycin against FB, because data was not found to be available in 
an adequate time frame (see e.g. [Interview AGES 01]. Apart from the costs 
already mentioned, the process to authorize streptomycin in Austria involved the 
communication of many parties and it has been found difficult to determine the 
costs of time efforts in exact quantities. Therefore these shall only be mentioned, 
but not calculated: 
• The negotiation process in the round tables involved many 
stakeholders, necessary to reach an agreement. 
• The appeal for exemption to the Directive at EU-level (and notifying all 
other MS) was necessary. 
• The legal notice had to be issued and security preconditions 
elaborated. 
• The beekeepers had to be informed about the possible contamination 
of honey. 
• The monitoring of honey had to be planned (screening of samples 
                                          
519 [Statistik Austria 2007 census], p. 18 
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taken has been mentioned already). 
• Communication with the alarmed public (for example by an ad in a 
cooking magazine520) reassuring the consumer that Austrian apples 
which can be bought, are not contaminated in any way (which is 
furthermore not true –as revealed now) – it is not an easy issue and 
also the media has been observed to state that “apples are vaccinated 
with streptomycin”521) Risk of a possible loss of image and (loss of faith 
in) the Austrian Government. 
 
C4.3. Benefits of Streptomycin 
C4.3.1. Efficiency of Streptomycin  
The grade of efficiency of streptomycin regarding FB ranges between 70% and 
90%.522 In the Austrian Plant Protection Product Register ([BAES 04]) it is stated 
that “for reasons regarding the active substance a sufficient efficiency is not given 
in all cases. Possible damages due to lacking efficacy or damages on cultured 
plants are in the area of responsibility of the user” and that a “repeated usage 
can lead to reduced efficacy”523. 
Table 13: Efficiency of Streptomycin 
Trade name (Company) % of 
strepto-
mycin 
sulphate 
Strepto-
mycin/kg 
Application rate524 Efficiency 
“Strepto“525 (Globachem 
nv, Belgium526, producer) 
21,6%527 180g/kg  0,0375% (600g/ha) 
 
70-90% 
“Strepto” (Schneiter Agro 
AG, assumed to be the 
retailer in Switzerland)528 
21,6%529 180g/kg  0,0375% (600g/ha 70-90% 
 
Furthermore, no matter what the weather conditions would suggest there are 
only three applications allowed as a maximum and only if the forecasting systems 
                                          
520 [AGES K&K] 
521 Cited and criticized by [Liedlbauer 2008] (translated by the author). 
522 Critics claim that there are also studies (conducted by the AGES) showing an 
efficiency grade of 23% only, but this information is not verifiable by the author. 
523 [Cornell University 2003], p. 10 
524 At a standard tree volume of 10.000m3/ha 
525 [lawa 2008], p. 15-21 
526 [BAES 04] 
527 [BAES 04] 
528 According to [lawa 2008], p. 21: “sale in Germany since 2004, in Austria since 
2006”; further information see [lawa 2008], p. 15-21 
529 [lawa 2008], p. 15-21; [BAES 04] 
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issue warnings. One must bear in mind that during a warm and humid spring (like 
e.g. 2007) weather conditions favourable to the growth of the bacteria would 
apply to much more than three days, and hence must be seen as a problem in 
the connection with streptomycin use.  
Streptomycin cannot be mixed530 with any other plant protection product (not 
enabling cost savings). 
C5. Assessment of Blossom Protect 
C5.1. Direct Costs of Blossom Protect 
The producing company “bio-ferm GesmbH” recommends four applications of the 
product at 10%, 40%, 70% and 90% open blossom.531 These intervallic 
oversprays during blossom time seek to optimally protect the maximum number 
of flowers, which do not all open at once but in delayed phases, and to exploit the 
maximum efficiency (independently from the weather and forecasting systems). 
The farmer can spray whenever he (based on his knowledge of the respective 
orchard and the expertise regarding weather) judges it to be important, which is 
a great advantage, but also requires the farmer to take responsibility. 
Table 14: Quantities and cost chart; Sources: [lawa 2008], p.8 and [Steinbauer 
Spraying Costs] 
 Component A Component B Total Costs/kg Costs/ha 
Tree volume 10.000m3 10.5kg 1.5kg 12kg/ha 7.92€ 95.04€ 
Proportion A/B 87.5% 12.5% 100%   
 
According to the information from bio-ferm the end user price is 95€ per 
treatment, resulting in annual protection costs for one hectare of 380€ excl. VAT. 
This information equals the assumptions of the calculation provided for in 
[Steinbauer Spraying Costs].  
Also with BP (likewise to streptomycin) the costs of spraying include the use of 
equipment and working time. The calculation retrieved from the Styrian 
Government by Dr. Steinbauer [Steinbauer Spraying Costs] has assessed these 
costs to be following (following the procedure already outlined with 
streptomycin): 
                                          
530 [lawa 2008], p. 15 
531 [bio ferm 04] 
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Table 15: Cost of Spraying Blossom Protect; Source: [Steinbauer Spraying Costs] 
Total Application Cost/ha (for 1 application): 50.61€ 
Total Application Cost/ha (for 4 applications): 202.44€ 
 
Again, these costs are accumulative to the costs for the spraying agent itself, 
aggregating to annual costs of 582.44€/ha/year (202.44 + 380.00) for 
protecting one hectare of the orchard.  
Further direct costs involved with BP 
Although current understanding based on contemporary results is that there are 
no human health risks involved with handling the product it is obligatory to wear 
a special mask and gloves etc. As learnt from the [Interview bio-ferm] these 
measures are obligatory as soon as plant protection agents are concerned 
regardless of the actual expected harm. Likewise rests have to be disposed as 
special waste: “Nobody would dispose baker’s yeast as special waste, but as soon 
as it is sold as a plant protection agent” Dr. Donat stated in the [Interview bio-
ferm]. Further the label532 has to carry “R42/43” which is obligatory because it is 
a microorganism (according to EU regulation).  
There are no costs for additional technical prerequisites: the normal spraying 
device can be used without additional appliances afforded.  
Treatment of susceptible apple cultivars (e.g. Fuji, Golden Delicious, Pinova, 
Elstar533) can lead to increased fruit-russetting but is not scientifically proven: 
“In some years, on some susceptible cultivars it can lead to fruit russeting534. But 
there is no real quintessence gained form statistics. Also other plant protection 
agents and even water can cause fruit russeting.” The only optical deficiency of 
the apple peal (not being shiny and smooth), but a bit rough, has to be seen as a 
possible reduction factor to prices realized on the market. The author must state 
at this point that in organic fruit growing these optical deficiencies are much more 
accepted due to the customers’ orientation; not on the appearance, but on the 
contents and taste of the fruits. 
                                          
532 See [bio-ferm 10] 
533 [lawa 2008], p. 8 
534 Fruit russeting is solemnly an optical blemish, but can lead to lower price yields on 
the market. 
152 
C5.2. Risks and Indirect Costs of Blossom Protect 
For BP all this information is available and the requirements are met for the 
inclusion to the Annex I of the Council Directive 91/414/EEC – now only being a 
matter of (bureaucratic waiting) time. In the Annex III of the Case Study the 
author has consolidated all the data requirements in order to comply with the 
Directive that are completed by BP: risks involved with the usage of this product 
are profoundly tested and results are available. 
Table 16: Cost-Benefit-Analysis Input Factors (left hand side questioned by the 
author, right hand side answers given by Mrs. Dr. Donat); Source: [Interview bio-
ferm] 
Risks involved with application of the 
plant protection agent 
“None, because there are finished studies proofing 
this” 
Costs of additional technical 
prerequisites 
“Normal spraying device, no additional appliances 
afforded” 
Toxicity studies “Done according OECD, EPA, EPPO” 
Risk factor resistances “None” 
Risk of residuals in honey “No risks: The use of this product does not result in 
problems with contaminations of honey and also not 
for bees. BP can even be dispersed by honeybees, 
using them as natural vectors for the application.” 
Testing of honey “Not required” 
Disposal of honey “None” 
Compensation for beekeeper “None” 
 
It can further be assumed that there are no risk factors deriving from bad 
handling and/or illegal application given, if a normal use of the product is 
understood. Because it is impossible to predict every possible eventuality of the 
term “bad handling”, it has been agreed, for legal reasons, that there can’t be a 
guarantee of no risk, e.g. eating a can of BP might, in fact, have an effect on the 
digestion…535 
C5.3. Benefits of Blossom Protect 
Since 1997 outdoor experiments have been undertaken, since 2002 trials (in 
controlled laboratory conditions and in outdoor trials) were done to quantify the 
efficiency of BP.536 Trials follow the strict standards defined by the EU: EPPO 
PP1/166 (3), which regulates studies to implement standards for comparing the 
                                          
535 Please refer to the Safety Data Sheets [bio-ferm 05] and [bio-ferm 06] and read 
further application instructions, e.g. [bio-ferm 04] bio-ferm GesmbH: “Blossom Protect; 
Instructions” and [bio-ferm 07] 
536 [bio-ferm 03] 
153 
performance of new agents to other well known products. In the trials therefore 
streptomycin and other microorganisms were used.537 
Regarding the efficacy of BP the author has found many different inputs:  
• 78,4 in [bio ferm 08] 
• 71% in [bio-ferm 02]  
• 83,5 % (± 4,2 %) in [Pirklhuber 04_2008]) 
 
During the [Interview bio-ferm] it was learnt, that the “different values for 
efficacy data being in circulation are a consequence of which trials are accepted to 
be valid.” 
The validation question is about a certain level of FB infection pressure that has 
to be observed in the untreated control: trials are generally set up by treating 
different compartments of the trial zone with the different agents, but leaving one 
compartment untreated. The EPPO criteria prescribes, that the “untreated 
control” has to show a minimum of 5% of FB infection, so that the data gained on 
efficacy can be validated. 
The author has received the most current status summary of studies on the 
efficiency grade available per email [bio-ferm 09] showing the efficacy grades 
that have been proven in accredited trials (according to international standards) 
from 2003 to 2008. From this document it can be gathered that the average 
grade of all studies for BP show an efficiency grade of 76.6%, whereas 
streptomycin reaches 81.9%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
537 [bio-ferm 02] 
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Figure 7: Comparison of the efficiency factors of Blossom Protect to 
“Plantomycin” (a plant protection product containing streptomycin); Source: [bio-
ferm 09] “Efficiency grades against Fire Blight Blossom Infection”, edited by the 
author 
Hence, streptomycin achieves only approx. 5.3% better results than BP 
demonstrating that the performance of BP is comparable to the efficiency of 
antibiotics.538 Results further showed that forecasting systems can be used to use 
yeast more targeted and that a combination with yeast-incompatible fungicides 
can be combined without losing efficiency.539 
These values must been seen in the light of Dr. Donat statements in the 
[Interview bio-ferm]: “Efficiency grades are such instable factors that they should 
be regarded to by 10%-steps. Stating decimal places is actually doubtable. 
Overall Blossom Protect is approximately 10% under the efficiency grade of 
antibiotics on average.” 
Further the product can be applied, in combination with other products540, 
enabling the saving of the fixed costs of spraying-tours. It is also possible to 
reduce the risks of the fruit-russeting this way. 
                                          
538 [bio-ferm 02] 
539 DBMELV 2006], p. 16 
540 According to [bio-ferm 04] and [bio-ferm 02] mixtures are possible with Pyrimethanil 
(Scala), Fluquinconazol (Vision), Thiacloprid (Calypso), Imidacloprid (Confidor WG70), Pirimicarb 
(Pirimor Granulat), Profital, ProAsete, Calciumchlorid and Biopro®. 
BP Streptomycin 
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C6. Assessment of Stakeholders (incl. 
Bargaining Power) 
C6.1. Austrian Pome Fruit Economic Sector 
The economic power of farmers is not as (economically) important as other 
sectors and as it might have been 100 years ago. Today the whole share of the 
agricultural and forestry sector (including fishery) of the Austrian economy as a 
whole in 2007 is stated to be responsible for a share of 1,8% (4,35 billion €) of 
the Austrian total gross value added of 245,20 billion€.541 In another source of 
the Austrian Statistics Office the composition of the production value of the 
agricultural economic sector in 2007 at basic prices (values at current prices) is 
stated to be 6.355,9 million €, with fruits covering a total of 399.5 million €.542 
There is no further detailed statement on the share of the GDP of pome fruit 
growers. 5.1% (as per agricultural total account) of the total Austrian workforce 
is (at least) partly generating their income in the agricultural sector.543 While the 
number of agricultural firms is to be observed to have a stable tendency to 
decrease over the years (from 308.246 farms in 1980 to 189.591 farms in 2005) 
the average acreage worked on per farm is constantly increasing (from 24,8 ha in 
1980 to 39,9 ha in 2005):544 A trend also monitored in fruit growing (nearly two 
third of orchardists, growing fruit as the main source of income, belong to the 
group of medium sized farms with acreages of more than 5 ha).545 
Although the agricultural economic sector is not that big, the economic power 
might have derive from the fact that farmers still actually own546 and cultivate 
most of Austria’s land, extracting a great share of food for Austria’s population. 
The Austrian self-sufficiency balance of apples ranges between 94 and 98% over 
the last years (pear 84% respectively) and is published in many documents.547 
Also a look back in history might explain why the agricultural sector has high 
bargaining power towards the ruling ministry, despite it’s decreasing economic 
                                          
541 [Statistik Austria 2007 agriculture], p. 50, table 15 
542 [Statistik Austria 2007 GR], p. 5, table 2 
543 [LKÖ 03], p. 272 
544 [LKÖ 03], p. 313 
545 [Statistik Austria 2007 census], p. 14 
546 Also being an explanation found in [Interview bio-ferm] 
547 [Statistik Austria 2007 agriculture], p. 57, table 28: “Austrian self-sufficiency balance 
of fruit 2005/06 and 2006/07"); [LKÖ 03], p. 228: “Crop self-supply balance 2006/2007"; [LKÖ 
03], p. 229: “Crop self-sufficiency grade" from Statistik Austria, Agrarpreisstatistik; the 
document [BMLFUW 2007] regards to the topic many times 
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importance: being a remnant of earlier times when globalisation and mobility had 
not facilitated international trade yet. Farmers were the only deliverers of food in 
the country, and therefore had an important status (depending on the size of 
land, farmers were wealthy entrepreneurs with a lot of staff working for them). 
C6.1.1. Intensive Pome Fruit Orchardists 
To fulfil the criterion of being a “full-time pome fruit orchardist” (whether organic 
or not) the minimum acreage laid down by the Austrian Statistics Office is 15 Ar 
(1500m2). Pome fruit plantations are defined to be income sources if the trees 
are planted according to a certain scheme and feature care conditions allowing for 
the production and marketing of high quality eating fruit (dessert fruit). Only 
apples and pears are regarded to fall under the term “pome fruit” in this concern 
by definition of Austrian Statistics Office.548  
According to the EU-Directive 2001/109/EC the production potential of Europe 
regarding certain cultivars (apples and pears amongst them) has to be monitored 
every five years in a census: the latest report issued by the Austrian Statistics 
Office was 2007, from which the information in the following paragraph is taken, 
because none of the relevant institutions (especially AGES, BOV) provided 
information.549 
On 7700 ha (62% of the Austrian fruit growing acreage) pome fruit were 
cultivated in 2007. 7200 ha thereof are apple orchards that are cultivated by 
2391 farms (231 farms growing organic apples, who therefore have to be 
discounted). Hence, approximately 2160 orchardists were able to apply for 
streptomycin. Since the organic fruit growers have cultivated their products on a 
total acreage of 435 ha these have to be deducted respectively, leaving 6765 ha 
for a possible treatment with streptomycin. 80% of the apple orchards are located 
in Styria. The total numbers of trees in 2007 was 22.2 million trees (the number 
of trees has grown by 13% since 2002) and the apple-tree density has grown by 
236 trees (+9%) to 3100 trees per ha. This fact alarms the author and must be 
seen as critical, considering the problem of a higher infection risk due to 
splashing water and wind (inter alia): the denser the trees are, the easier it is for 
the bacteria to disperse! 
                                          
548 For example stated in [Statistik Austria 2007 census], p.12 
549 See [Interview AGES 01]; [Interview BOV] 
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Over 50% of apple-acreage has been planted before 1998 and the orchards 
average age has even increased by one year (from 9 to 10 years),550 the Austrian 
Statistics Office reckoning that this implies a decrease in the clearance of older 
orchards551, despite the “heavy FB”-denoted year 2007! 
Pears were cultivated by 1191 farms on a total acreage of 506 ha (increasing by 
8% compared to 2002), 122 ha thereof (cultivated by 161 farms) have been 
cultivated according to organic criteria. 60% of the pear trees have been planted 
before 1998, 15% between 2005 and 2007.552 
Accordingly, the author has calculated that “all”553 stated farms, less the farms 
stated to grow fruit according to organic criteria, leaving the total number of 
farms for a possible streptomycin usage to be: 
• 2160 apple orchards ( = 2391 total554 - 231 organic555) 
• 1030 pear orchards ( = 1191 total556 - 161 organic557) 
It must be remarked, that these values are not accumulative, deriving from the 
fact that the total number of pome-fruit growers is smaller than the sum of above 
stated orchards, namely 2600.558 A farmer cultivating both apples and pears is 
counted in both categories. 
Respectively the total acreages that could be treated with streptomycin are 
calculated: 
• 6999 ha apple acreage ( = 7230 total - 231 organic) 
• 384 ha pear acreage ( = 506 total - 122 organic) 
According to another source559 intensive fruit-growing of apples has been 
undertaken on 6061 ha (winter apples: 5864 ha + summer apples: 197ha) and 
pears on 414 ha (winter pears: 200 ha + summer pears: 214) in 2007. 
                                          
550 [Statistik Austria 2007 census], p. 14 and 45 
551 [Statistik Austria 2007 census], p. 13 
552 [Statistik Austria 2007 census], p. 15 and 48 
553 Although oddly the Statistics Austria Office has specified the sizes of the orchards in 
a way that all of them have to be assumed to be orchards serving as income source, because the 
data on the acreage is not available for values smaller than 0.26 ha (the smallest acreage group 
is bundled for all orchards smaller than 0.26ha): therefore farms smaller than 0.15 ha cannot be 
deducted. See: [Statistik Austria 2007 agriculture], p. 58 
554 [Statistik Austria 2007 census], p. 44 
555 [Statistik Austria 2007 census], p. 48 
556 [Statistik Austria 2007 census], p. 45 
557 [Statistik Austria 2007 census], p. 48 
558 [Statistik Austria 2007 census], p. 44 
559 [LKÖ 03], p. 224 
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The Fruit Growers’ Economic Situation 
The impact of FB striking a farm (economic loss per ha) has already been 
displayed earlier in this paper. Here only further assumptions on the current 
economic situation of fruit growers shall be discussed: 
2007 was stated to be a strong FB year560: the Agricultural Chamber reported 
that in Styria 542 fruit orchards (serving as income source) with approximately 
2.000 ha acreage were affected by FB and 41 farms and two nurseries had to 
clear 22.2 ha apple and quince orchards.561 In Vorarlberg 3 ha had to be cleared 
and 20 ha had to be pruned (of a total of 30 ha in Vorarlberg). 
However, the pome fruit yield (of full time orchards) has been as high as 231.600 
tons (more than 20% higher than 2006 and nearly 18% above the long-term 
average), a good crop yield was attained, particularly with winter apples and 
summer pears.562 For “eating apples” the average price of 2007 was € 49.64/100 
kg (constituting a price rise of 60.2% compared to 2006.563 In [Statistik Austria 
2007 agriculture] it is stated that “an exceptionally good result564 has been 
attained in fruit growing. The considerable increase of production value (+31.3% 
compared with 2006) can be attributed for a big part to the strong increase of 
producer prices particularly of apples and stone fruit. At the same time the 
production quantity was higher than in the year before.”565 Accordingly for apples 
in 2007 the crop yield has been 221458 tons, increasing by nearly 20% compared 
to 2006 (184667 tons; oddly the LKÖ states a 17%566 compared to the previous 
year). For pears an increase of nearly 30% has occurred with a harvest of 10158 
tons (compared to 7825 tons in 2006). 567 Styria, stated to provide about 85% of 
Austrian apples, has had a 16% higher568 yield than in 2006 (184147569 tons of 
apples harvested) and “market prospects for the selling period 2007/2008 are 
judged positively on total”.570 From the [Interview OÖLVB] it has been reasoned 
that “an explanation could be the rigorous pruning back [Remark by the author: 
                                          
560 [DBMELV 2007], p. 37 et seq., even stated to have been the most difficult FB year in 
Austria by the [LKÖ 03], p. 45 
561 [LKÖ 03], p. 45 
562 [Statistik Austria 2007 agriculture], p. 9 in combination with p. 18 et seqq. 
563 [Statistik Austria 2007 agriculture], p. 27 
564 Also in the [Interview OÖLVB] it was stated, that by a agricultural chamber staff 
member the harvest was stated to be the “best ever”. 
565 [Statistik Austria 2007 agriculture], p. 29 (translated by the author) 
566 [LKÖ 03], p. 44 
567 [Statistik Austria 2007 fruit], p. 3 
568 Data could not be counterchecked by the author, because of a different system of 
data consolidation used in the fruit crop report of the previous year [Statistik Austria 2006 fruit]: 
2006 data is not comparable to 2007 data (by the author). 
569 [Statistik Austria 2007 fruit], p. 3 
570 [LKÖ 03], p. 45 (translated by the author) 
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cutting back of tree parts], which can trigger the fruit production of a tree and 
hence the crop obtained.” 
Also in 2008 the harvest has been very good (but no final data has been available 
until the closing of this case study).  
It must therefore be assumed, that the sector does not suffer any severe 
damage as a whole (this is of course only to be observed on the base of these 
averaged values, not expressing the individual damage a farm might have been 
suffering). In May this year the [BOV 5_2008] says “the prices for apples from 
European production rise and rise”571 and a month later it is even stated that the 
“mood amongst the representatives and producers respectively of the west 
European apple arable lands couldn’t be better. A continuous active demand 
from east Europe and the unexpectedly smaller supplies from overseas push up 
prices.”572 
C6.1.2. Lobby Groups  
C6.1.2.1 The Austrian Agricultural Chamber 
The Austrian Agricultural Chamber (Landwirtschaftskammer Österreich, LKÖ) 
provides legal, economic, technical and social advice to those involved in 
agriculture and forestry. For better understanding a short look back in history 
shall be summarized from the information made available via the institution’s 
website:573 It is stated that already during the second half of the 18th century the 
first signs of representation for agricultural and forestry interests emerged in 
Austria. By 1850 “Agricultural chambers” were created by law, after the system of 
peasant subordination and dependency dissolved. In 1922 the first chamber of 
agriculture according to regional law in Lower Austria (followed by other federal 
regions) was established. It was an “autonomous interest representation” and 
coordinating body for the entire agricultural and forestry sector, with direct 
democratic elections and the right to raise funds, with costs being covered from 
the contributions of its members, and having sub-divisions. After the Second 
World War and the post-war confusion, the Austrian Chamber of Agriculture 
became a legally recognized body in 1953. “The main tasks of the Austrian 
Chamber of Agriculture are to support its members, represent farming and rural 
                                          
571 [BOV 5_2008], p. 22 (translated by the author) 
572 [BOV 6_2008], p. 18 (translation and emphasis by the author) 
573 The subsequent paragraph is based on [Agrarnet] (translated and summarized by 
the author). 
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interests to the state and other professional associations, and participate in 
official responsibilities of the government.” It submits “proposals and expert 
opinions to authorities, especially in draft legislation and regulations, and 
consultation with officials” and assumes “administrative tasks which the 
government delegates to the regions (e.g. the formal processing of supportive 
measures)”. As laid down by federal law, the Austrian Chamber of Agriculture has 
the right to examine and assess all draft regulations.  
Today nine regional chambers of agriculture represent the agricultural and forest 
interests in the country, being public bodies, being centrally organized by the 
Austrian Chamber of Agriculture, with its head office in Vienna. The main purpose 
of this association is to represent the joint interests of the agricultural and 
forestry population to government officials and to public authorities in economic, 
cultural and taxation issues as well as in matters of taxes and fees, improving the 
overall situation of the agriculture (and forestry) sectors. 
The LKÖ’S self-perception, despite the trouble caused for beekeepers in the 
streptomycin-cause, is “performing a major contribution being a connective link 
towards production”574 the fruit production and the beekeeping industry. The 
author wonders where this link is between the use of streptomycin and the 
contamination of honey ruining the business of beekeepers. 
The author has found that there are alarming views being bluntly declared to the 
media as e.g. Mr. Christian Krumphuber has revealed following opinion in the 
biggest Upper Austrian Newspaper (OÖN) that “intensive agriculture would be 
best for climate protection”575. Dr. Burtscher stated on the “information policy the 
Chamber of Agriculture 2008” during the interview that “on the occasion of the 
first application of streptomycin to pear trees the heading of the article said “No 
danger for apple trees”576 and meant, that it would normally be expected, that 
“the main news of an article to be contained in the header.” This rather 
uncommon information policy has also been found in the AGES.577 
                                          
574 [LKÖ 03], p. 45 (translated by the author) 
575 [OÖN 01] (translated by the author); response from the LKÖ stated, that this is only 
the “personal opinion of Krumphuber” (see [OÖN 02], translated by the author), along with 
opposing arguments, e.g. in [OÖN 03], that for the reason of higher energy demand, fertilizer-
use, soil-erosion etc. this is not true. 
576 “Keine Gefahr für Apfelbäume” 
577 See chapter C8.3.1.4. 
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C6.1.2.2 Austrian Fruit Growers 
The “Austrian Fruit Growers” (Bundesobstbauverband, hereafter: BOV) are the 
representation committee within the Austrian Agricultural Chamber. In the 
[Interview BOV] it was learnt that agricultural economic chambers are the 
representation bodies by law, and then there are voluntary representatives, like 
the BOV. These are often identical in staff: as for example the counsellor of the 
agricultural economic chamber responsible for fruit growing is also the General 
Executive Director of the BOV. Just as the LKÖ itself, the BOV is also the 
centralizing organisation at federal level and has its regional subunits in the nine 
provinces of Austria.  
DI Greimel stated that “[o]rchardists are members of the nine regional fruit 
growing associations in the Austrian provinces. On provincial level there are 
managing committees of 8-10 people and their executive directors take part at 
the board meetings on federal level (Austrian Fruit Growers Association). 
Decisions taken in the board meetings are preferably aimed at achieving 
coordinated results.” 
The BOV clearly takes the position (reported578 and also stated by the 
organisation itself579) that streptomycin is the only adequate remedy to FB. This 
is also communicated to the farmers via the internet or the magazine “Besseres 
Obst” etc. In this magazine the BOV states that “against the massive plant 
disease [remark by the author: FB] the most efficacious direct pest control is to 
choose, that is streptomycin at present”.580 Mr. Moosbrugger even states that 
“there is no other efficacious measure against fire blight” in [ORF 01] (translation 
and emphasis by the author) - another prevailing dogma besides the one that 
streptomycin cannot be found in apples anymore. In the next edition of the BOV-
magazine it is proclaimed that “the BOV is not against alternatives. On the 
contrary, we would be happy, if we would not need streptomycin. We are only of 
the opinion that a pest of this extent also needs a commensurate answer, which 
can only be provided by the agent [remark by the author: streptomycin] at the 
moment.”581 Further on in this issue the BOV even stated that “as also 
international experts582 confirm, yeast compounds do not have sufficient effect at 
the present and moreover side-effects (fruit russeting), which can also destroy 
                                          
578 [Interview OÖLVB]; [Interview ÖIB]  
579 [Interview BOV] 
580 [BOV 5_2008], p. 3 (translated by the author) 
581 [BOV 6_2008], p. 2 et seq. (translated by the author) 
582 Remark by the author: But no further explanatory notes on these experts is given. 
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the harvest.”583 Messages like these are without any foundations, but of course 
scare off farmers thinking about alternatives like this. Further streptomycin is 
defended by the following sentence: “Also if “Global 2000” apparently refuses to 
believe it, there is an expert report of a top-class working group of physicians584 
in the AGES that has come to the conclusion that “due to the default of firmed 
alternatives for the combat of fire blight nothing seems to oppose the usage of 
streptomycin for the therapy of acute threateningly plant diseases as “danger-in-
delay”-provision under strict official control with regard to the inferior importance 
of streptomycin in medicine””.585 
Farmers not living on apples however seem to be much more critical and some 
have proclaimed that there would be health considerations especially if the agent 
is sprayed near living areas because there are not studies on possible risks 
available586 – just as Prof. Pittner argues. 
C6.1.3. Assessment of Austrian Pome Fruit Economic Sector 
In the agricultural sector the IMHO is involved in a very dense cooperation with, 
and dependency on, associations: partly because they lack the resources to 
gather information themselves and maybe also influenced by the factor, that their 
products bare highly technical differences, making it easy to bundle interests. It 
may be supposed, that the individual farmers act corresponding to what is 
perceived as being given, without further involving into literature search and EU 
law. As there are many plant diseases requiring solutions and numerous laws 
(and paperwork) applying to the individual farmer, they cannot be expected to 
get to the bottom of everything by scrutiny. Furthermore there is a very high 
degree of governmental interference and ongoing changes in regulation making it 
very difficult to struggle through all the applicable law regarding the size of an 
average farm, meaning some institution is needed to filter the information 
avalanche for relevant inputs for the individual farmer.  
C6.2. Beekeepers 
Formerly all Austrian beekeepers were organized under the Austrian Beekeeper 
Confederation (Österreichischer Imkerbund, ÖIB, presided by Mr. Josef Ulz), with 
                                          
583 [BOV 6_2008], p. 3 (translated by the author) 
584 However, the cited original statement and the persons responsible referred to in this 
statement has not been made available to the author (neither by the AGES nor the BOV). 
585 [BOV 6_2008], p. 3 (translation and emphasis by the author) 
586 [ORF 01] 
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sub-divisions in all 9 provinces of Austria (for hobby beekeepers) and a tenth 
sub-division for the full-time beekeepers. Because of controversies this 
organisation has been remodelled. The ÖIB is now the organisation only for 
beekeepers not depending on the apiary income and the full-time beekeepers 
have built up their own union, now called the Austrian Full-time Beekeepers 
Confederation” (Österreichischer Erwerbsimkerbund, ÖEIB, presided by Mr. Josef 
Stich). Because for the administration of subsidy-programs it was then necessary 
to build an umbrella organisation, called Bee Austria (Biene Österreich, BÖ, 
managed by Mr. DI Christian Boigenzahn).  
The following information in the subsequent paragraph is taken from the 
[Interview ÖIB] with Mr. Ulz stating that within the ÖIB there are 22500 
members within the EIB 252 together managing an estimated quantity of 
450.000 bee-hives in Austria.  
The honey production each year is approximately 5 million kg, being a long-term 
average (with production values normally ranging between 3.5 – 7 million kg). 
With the kg honey being worth 7.50€/kg (on average) the pollination work of the 
bees can be estimated to be a (more or less) ten-fold of this value:  
7,5€/kg x 5 million kg = 37.5 million € x 10 = 375 million € 
This only includes the pollination work on cultivated plants. Calculating the 
pollination work on wild plant has to be seen to deliver an additional value that is 
very hard to measure.  
From the interview with Mr. Liedlbauer [Interview OÖLVB] it is learnt that around 
7000 beekeepers are organized via the OÖLVB in Upper Austria.587 “The value of 
the honey-production in Upper Austria amounts to €10-12m a year” and the yield 
of 2007 sums up to 2170 tons of honey for Upper Austria alone and likewise it is 
stated that the “pollinations work performed by the bees amounts up to the 
decuple and can be specified with €100m.” 588 
For a wider view of the problem the phenomenon of the "Colony Collapse 
Disorder" (CCD) should be considered: a “significant disappearance of honey bee 
colonies” is threatening ”the production of crops dependent on bees for pollination 
                                          
587 2003: 7500 beekeepers [Frühwirth 2003], p. 96 ff, Article by DI Hermann 
Wahlmüller and Ing. Ernst Simader, from the Agrarian and Forestry Law Department of the 
Province Upper Austria; 2006: 6712 beekeepers [ÖIB Statistic] 
588 [OÖLVB 2007], p. 15 (translated by the author) 
164 
as well as honey production” experienced in America (but also e.g. Germany), 
which led to the calculation of the worth of pollination (undermining the 
calculation above) held “responsible for $15 billion in added crop value, 
particularly for specialty crops such as nuts, berries, fruits, and vegetables.”589  
For the beekeepers the market response is perceived to have reacted very 
sensibly and customers were rattled when the media reported the threat of a 
possible honey contamination. This is why the beekeepers have decided on the 
following strategy: every honey that is tested positively is disposed, not only the 
ones above the allowed 10µg/kg (at the moment the detection limit is 5µg/kg). 
The relevant governmental authorities and the fruit growers did not understand at 
first, why beekeepers restricted themselves voluntarily to this so-called “zero-
tolerance” approach. According to [Interview ÖIB] Mr. Ulz states, that 
“experiences have shown that residues are practically never higher than 20µg/kg” 
(of course resulting in lesser costs for governmental compensations and no 
problems for the fruit growers), but the beekeepers needed to react according to 
the wants and expectations of their consumers. Mr. Ulz states that the customer 
does not care about residue being within levels: “residues” generally are rejected, 
whether g or µg, the customer is concerned about his health. If any health risk is 
perceived to exist the product is easily substituted (demand being elastic). Also 
food retailers do not accept honey products with antibiotic residues (testing for 
themselves). Only when the discussions on possible residuals in apples came up 
in the context of the withdrawal of the AMA-quality seal and the boycott menaces 
of the food retailers, the fruit growers have experienced that the customer is not 
able to judge on the dimension of the human health risks, but only wants to 
know: has the product been sprayed or not sprayed? 
C6.2.1. Assessment of the Beekeepers 
Despite the economic benefit drawn from the beekeepers (as stated above) it is 
claimed in [Interview OÖIV] by Mr. Liedlbauer, that beekeeping is “a hobby-
sector in Austria” and that there is not much economic power. The 
beekeepers have no real lobby. But the authorization (and usage) of streptomycin 
“was politically decided and not preventable”590 (by the beekeepers). The 
beekeepers have shown much understanding591 for the problems of the fruit 
growers and the governmental decision: Mr. Ulz stated in the [Interview ÖIB] 
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that “[T]he minister [Remark by the author: of the BMLFUW] of course had to 
weigh up the economic impacts of the big group of farmers (2400 full-time-
orchardists) against the relatively small group of beekeepers (in Styria e.g. there 
are only 40 full-time-beekeepers). Anyways it should not be that the beekeepers 
don’t care about the orchardists going bankrupt. But we also had to fight for the 
understanding that a solution cannot be achieved by setting the residue limit up 
to 30µg (as suggested) because (as explained before) then there would be 
practically no honey above the residue limit. In my opinion it was 
underestimated, that beekeepers would refuse such a solution (but the reasons 
why have been made clear).” 
Of course the reactions of the beekeepers have to be seen in the context of being 
affected by two different aspects of the streptomycin problem: their products are 
at risk of being disposed of rather than sold (affecting the customer base) but at 
the same time the discussion on streptomycin-contaminated honey causing 
human health hazards worsened their situation even more (due to the problem of 
reporting the issue correctly to the recipients (general public), which might come 
to conclusions based on fragmented or wrong information, deriving from the 
implications of residue limits, detection limits, etc). 
Mr. Ulz in the [Interview ÖIB] states that in the long run the beekeepers “will not 
have the staying power to stand the loss of customer trust and sales: if every 
year there is a discussion in media on the use of streptomycin and every year the 
customer is made insecure again - this is not sustainable. The beekeepers have 
their backs to the wall.” But the decision was conceived politically and was not 
preventable (by the beekeepers). 
Fruit growing and bees are known to be linked, making it more incomprehensible 
that fruit growers are risking causing major existence problems in this branch of 
the economy (in America great parts of their have been considerable crop 
shortfalls of the almond harvest have already been caused by the shortage of 
bees). 
C6.3. Consumer Market (Public) Forces 
C6.3.1. Consumers 
According to [AMA 2008a] apples are the most favoured fruit in Austria, with an 
annual average of 28kg eaten per person and 70.600 tons being sold each year. 
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There was a huge medial echo on the agricultural use of streptomycin in Austria, 
but what do the customers’ scruples regarding streptomycin imply?  
The Willingness to Pay (WTP) can be empirically assessed by means of revealed 
(indirect measurement of consumer utility by observation of consumer behaviour) 
or stated preference methods (trying to receive a WTP by asking for the 
evaluation of an improvement of their own safety (but also possibly including a 
positive eternality also on others).592 
The WTP could be measured in the case of FB by asking people how much more 
they would pay, if apples were untreated. Because there has been no WTP 
measured up to now; it can only be inferred from consumers’ indirect market 
behaviour.593 The revealed preferences of consumers are observed by their 
decisions related to risk: [de Blaeij et al 2000] brings up the examples of buying 
a car with or without an airbag or whether a seatbelts are used or not and argues 
that “if sufficient information is available regarding the choice alternatives 
actually considered by the consumers, the implicit tradeoffs determining their 
behaviour, will be revealed.”594 
It must be strongly assumed, that a great proportion of the consumers of apples 
would not be able to assess the topic in the way outlined in this paper. “Sufficient 
information” is hard to obtain and necessitates engaging in the search of scientific 
journals, since the homepage of the AGES (the competent authority in regard to 
both the plant health risk of FB, as also the health risk issues of antibiotic 
resistance) has rather preferred to appease and placate their homepage visitors. 
No critical view on the antibiotic resistance risk is displayed; streptomycin is 
delineated, rather, to be “harmless”595. 
There is no exact WTP measured, because people have not been asked how much 
more they would pay for untreated apples and therefore it is not empirically 
assessed by means of stated preference methods. But as described above the 
WTP could also be inferred from the consumers’ indirect market behaviour. Again 
this is not feasible because there are not treated apples being sold in Austria this 
year, but it is strongly suggested to assume that the customer wants untreated 
apples from the following study: 
                                          
592 See e.g. [de Blaeij et al 2000] 
593 See e.g. [Brent 1991], p. 61 
594 [de Blaeij et al 2000], p. 8 
595 See e.g. [Telephone Call Hofer] 
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In August 2008 a market-survey has been conducted by [Integral 2008], trying 
to measure the market response on the spraying of streptomycin. Asked for the 
willingness to purchase apples from treated orchards, only 26% were willing to 
buy such apples, 71% would surely or rather not buy treated apples. 60% 
responded to the question whether they expected only non-treated apples to 
carry the AMA quality seal: “Yes, sure”. Furthermore it was found out that 45% 
were strictly (and another 22% tending to) favouring supermarkets, which would 
not sell treated apples.  
C6.3.2. Food retailers  
The retailing sector was not included in the decision on the agricultural use of 
streptomycin from the beginning. Only when the media took up the topic and 
public response grew huge did retailers clearly became aware of the issue, some 
of them even reacting with the threat to boycott apples stemming from sprayed 
areas, not wanting to sell these products in their stores.596 In the [BOV 5_2008] it 
has been stated, that Spar, Billa, Merkur and Penny have announced to only 
purchase goods from untreated cultivations. 
The author has therefore tried to gather information on the viewpoints of the 
main Austrian food retailers by conducting an online survey597 on how these 
companies are striving to take up on their consumer’s wants and needs address 
the issue regarding the agricultural use of streptomycin.  
The author wrote to following food retailers: Spar, the REWE group (Merkur, Billa, 
Penny), Unimarkt, Lidl, Hofer, Adeg, Plus (Zielpunkt). Respondents to the survey 
were Hofer KG, Spar and the REWE group (their inputs are attached in full length 
in the Annex to this case study). Zielpunkt responded that it could not take part 
at for corporate guidelines reasons. The other companies have not responded at 
all. 
Summarizing, it can be said, that this year the actually sprayed acreage was so 
little that the apples from these areas were not marketed in Austria, but exported 
and the retailers had no problems obtaining untreated pome fruit in the needed 
quantities in Austria. In the [Telephone Call Hofer] it is assumed that this decision 
was also taken “because of the considerations and the reservations (of possible 
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597 See [Survey on Food Retailers] in Annex II 
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negative impacts on animal, human and health) other food retailers have 
declared”. 
SPAR made clear, that in their opinion antibiotics have no place in food 
production, even if not detectable on fruit itself, Spar points out to the ecological 
consequences (resistances and soil problems being named explicitly) and argues 
that they know that their customer do not want medicine-treated apples on 
the shelves.598 Furthermore it is argued, that the agricultural usage of 
streptomycin is a far-reaching issue, resulting in agriculture reflecting, because 
sometimes the easy way out is taken and it is not acted on behalf of the 
customer. Spar is the main purchaser of Vorarlberger apples and the only food 
retailer chain selling these.599 
The REWE group only response to the results of the residue monitoring ordered 
by the AMA was that there are no residues to be proven on fruit, just as with 180 
honey samples that were tested, and that the AGES is elaborating a holistic 
strategy for 2008-2013 to maintain nature-related pome-fruit growing in Austria 
in future. 
Hofer KG responded with a phone call stating that it would have been “willing to 
sell apples from streptomycin-treated areas in Austria, demanding that residues 
of streptomycin would not be found on the apples or would be below 
measurability of scientific proof of the residuals”. 
C6.3.3. Media 
The involvement of media is not to be forgotten and must be attributed to be a 
major force in information transport and public force activation. Because of media 
interest that led to picking up the issue, the resulting public outcry and serious 
concern became possible and suddenly the issue preoccupied a great share of the 
public, internet blogs filled (see e.g. [ORF 01]) and public nuisance was 
proclaimed. The difference must be seen particularly in connection to the years 
2005 and 2006, when streptomycin was used in Vorarlberg only and the media 
could not be motivated (although Global 2000 had tried to do so). It must be 
assumed, that considerate media attention and the corresponding food-retailer 
reaction has caused the withdrawal of the AMA-quality seal, because it could not 
be risked to loose the image of the quality seal in public opinion. 
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C6.3.4. Assessment of the Public Force 
Although streptomycin has already been used in the two years before 2008 (as 
displayed before) the public discussion experienced in this year has provoked a 
completely different attitude towards the issue by the stakeholders. Farmers 
naturally producing to sell their fruit on the market have experienced rising 
consumer resistance to the production process involving antibiotics, and the 
resultant reluctance of customers, whether these are based on understanding the 
issues completely or not, to purchase these goods.  
Considering customers who are concerned to such an extent that they only want 
to buy unsprayed apples, the food retailers clearly have to provide these goods 
for purchase. This implies that unsprayed fruit has to be distinguishable from 
sprayed as markets ought to reflect the wants and needs of buyers with the 
appropriate goods from the producers. As a result food retailers could cream off a 
consumer surplus. 
But market failures can occur due to asymmetric information problem and the 
requirement of sufficient availability of information on the alternative choices 
(considered by the consumers). It is stated by [de Blaeij et al 2000] that this 
requirement is very unlikely to be fulfilled. In the case discussed individuals 
consuming pome-fruit will presumable not overcome the following obstacles: 
• Time constraints of searching for information on the mode of action of 
agricultural antibiotics and the effects on human health. 
• Uncritical acceptance of the information failure provided by the 
relevant governmental authorities (conveying the impression, that 
there are no risks involved with spraying streptomycin). Efforts to 
involve with the topic might even be left undone because of complete 
trust in governmental action. 
• The topic is highly technical and sophisticated. It cannot be assumed 
that everyone is capable of understanding what consequences 
(externalities) will have to be faced by the agricultural use of 
streptomycin and how these could affect him. A 
• A possible bias reported in literature is the “perceptual disorder” (in 
fact a human error) occurring regarding the perceived value of risks of 
statistical lives compared to identified lives600 and the attitude that it 
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will not strike exactly me, but others and (being a problem of 
subjectivity). Sizeable literature documents that overstating low 
probability events and underestimating the risk of high probability 
events bias individual risk assessments.601 [Viscusi 1993] highlights 
this to be the finding that workers will not demand compensation 
proportional to the rise of actual risk involved with their job because 
they underestimate the risk.602 
However, it may be interposed that customer reaction must also be seen from the 
viewpoint that ecological awareness is rising and individuals wish to curb 
environmentally damaging behaviour. The purchase of an eco-efficient car might 
not be feasible, but preventing the antibiotic use in agriculture with the purchase 
of untreated apples, may seem a small, but constant contribution to the 
customer.  
C6.4. AMA 
The Agrarmarkt Austria Marketing GesmbH (AMA) is the institution granting the 
AMA quality label: “The AMA quality seal guarantees by independent control 
quality food that fulfils criteria above the legal requirements and of which the 
origin is traceable”603. The label has a key function being the “only quality and 
origin seal, that is known by consumers and confided in”.604 
It is stated by [AMA 2008a] that “the consumer can put trust in a responsible-
minded and resource-considerate production method of indigenous farmers with 
the purchase of a AMA quality seal product and be sure of the safeness of food 
stuff.”605 That the production method of apples from streptomycin-treated 
acreages does not fit in this description has been shown within the previous 
chapters of this case study and is important to keep in mind during the following 
chapter/paragraphs. 
The basis for the AMA label being granted is the production of agricultural goods 
according to the “ÖPUL-special directive”606 and the coherent IP-list607 - 
restricting the production process to a (positive) list of agents (excluding agents 
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603 [BMLFUW 2007], p. 27 (translated by the author) 
604 [LKÖ 03], p. 96 (translated by the author) 
605 Translation by the author 
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that would be allowed for by law).608 Of course, streptomycin has not been on the 
IP-list, whereas Blossom Protect, for example, has been.609 
In December 2007 the fruit of 180 Austrian orchardists (with a total acreage of 
1600 ha) were authorized to carry the AMA-label. Just recently on 01.01.2008 the 
Obst Partner Steiermark GmbH (OPST) has joined with additional 759 producers 
(4.447 ha). Now three quarters of fruit of the sold in Austrian food retailers are 
labelled with the AMA-seal.610 
In Spring 2008 the AMA announced in a press release, [AMA 2008] (translated by 
the author), that it has, together with the BOV, come to following agreement: 
under the header “withdrawal of usage rights for AMA quality seal at all fire blight 
treatments” it is stated that “the AMA label is withdrawn for pome fruit of those 
acreages which have been treated with the active substances “streptomycin” or 
“yeast preparations” during blooming time. The plant protection agents 
“Strepto”, “Firewall 17 WP” and “Blossom Protect” have been authorized for 
limited time according to §13 [Austrian] Plant Protection Law 1997 (in the actual 
version in effect) specially for the control of fire blight”611 The next paragraph 
says: “Additional residue monitoring and risk assessment” as a header and 
further claims: “The concerned pome fruit-cultivates of the quality-seal producers 
will be from now on examined an additional residue monitoring as well as a risk 
assessment regarding these agents. The representatives of food retailing are 
invited to cooperate. After risk assessment has taken place an evaluation of 
results will be done. If no residues of streptomycin or of yeast preparations (and 
their brake down products) are proved, this pome fruit will be entitled to carry 
the AMA quality seal after harvest in autumn” (of 2008). A procedure being 
completely unintelligibly and definitely lacking scientific reasons for the biologic 
agent BP!  
According to Dr. Donat [Interview bio-ferm] the AMA gave two arguments:  
• The products have only emergency use permission, which is correct, 
but altogether 11 plant protection products were on the market under 
this permission, AMA withdrew the quality label only for the products to 
be used against FB. Furthermore the author remembers that the 
product is listed on the IP and organic list and even legally authorized 
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as a “plant strengthener” (not only by exemption rule) in Austria due 
to the legal peculiarity already described in a previous section of this 
paper. 
• Possible residues on fruits AMA stated in spring 2008 that fruits will be 
investigated from AMA concerning residues of both products, and if no 
residues will be found the labels will be restored. On the [BOV HP] it is 
stated that „the results of the residue monitoring concerning pome 
fruit and honey are not available yet, but are expected for pome fruit 
in August“. Interestingly on the 14th November the news brought the 
fact, that residues were found in apples! Whereas it is now clear, that 
the label for streptomycin treated acreage will not be restored 
(because of the found residues), Dr. Donat claims that “there were no 
investigations done for Blossom Protect, and the label was not returned 
till now (November 2008)”. Whereas BP is completely harmless for 
humans, nevertheless the quality label was withdrawn from both 
products. 
Recalling the fact that BP is a product having a legal authorization as a “plant 
strengthener” and is actually allowed to be placed on the market freely in 
Austria at the moment (as already outlined earlier in this paper), it has also 
been found to be stated on the IP-lists in 2008 and on the list for organic 
farming (during the danger-in-delay authorization period) it is not understood by 
the author on which legal grounds the AMA has based these constraints! 
C6.4.1. Assessment AMA 
Of course the proceeding described above must be rated to have severe economic 
consequences for farmers using BP by potentially not obtaining the AMA quality 
seal: 
Despite the “higher” direct costs, (although this has been proved wrong by the 
cost benefit analysis) and the ecologically sound behaviour, not causing any 
negative external effects, these farmers are “punished” (and not given the chance 
to obtain the AMA quality seal again, because the tests for residues are simply 
not undertaken) the regulating institution creates a completely adverse effect to 
the issue. Farmers using environmentally sound methods should be supported 
(maybe even by financial compensation – the author knows a case, where the 
community has actually granted the farmer the difference between the costs of a 
streptomycin product and BP). Despite the transported information, they are 
foresighted and concerned about the environment, willing to internalise 
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(perceived) indirect (external) costs. By their decisions (whether scientifically 
founded or not) the AMA can also greatly influence the economic well-being of the 
farmers.  
Moreover, the importance as a stakeholder is also to be seen from the fact, that 
the AMA is the authority responsible for the control, handling of payments (and 
penalizing) of the ÖPUL-subsidy612 but also in regard to all other agricultural 
subsidies, for example the EU-subsidies for beekeepers. Furthermore the AMA is 
also involved with PR for the industry. 
C6.5. NGOs 
Despite my many efforts it was not possible to obtain any information directly on 
their opinion on the agricultural use of streptomycin neither from the WHO 
(status 15.11.2008), nor from the WWF. But the organisation “Global 2000” has 
picked up the issue613 given an interview and seems to have been contributing to 
the public discussion on the issue through its PR measures (press conferences, 
Internet articles, networking). 
As described before, Global 2000 revealed the mistaken allowance of 
streptomycin in Austria (when it was actually already forbidden by the EU) due to 
an equalization rule with Holland and confronting the minister publicly, with the 
effect, that streptomycin was placed on a list of forbidden agents in 2004. 
Although streptomycin was authorized again in 2005 Global 2000 has played a 
crucial role in detecting these malfunctions of governmental regulation and 
furthermore has tried to tackle the information asymmetry providing information 
on the “other side of the coin” by organising press conferences, penning internet 
articles, etc. 
C6.5.1. Assessment NGOs 
Dr. Burtscher from Global 2000 claims that he (his organisation) has never been 
invited by any authority to submit the organisations view, aligning with the 
statements of [Interview AGES 01] regarding the not open but closed 
participation at the FB-Round Tables (exclusively for invited persons). There was 
no interest of authorities to involve other parties than the ones directly involved. 
                                          
612 As learnt from the [Interview AGES 01]; However, the responsibility has not been 
clear (details further down). 
613 See [Global2000 01]; [Global2000 02]; [Global2000 03]; [Global2000 04]; 
[Global2000 05]; [Global2000 06]; [Global2000 FOEa]; [Global2000 FOEb] 
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Hence NGO could not play a part in the policy decision process, although maybe 
indirectly advancing customer resistance due to educational work: only by public 
relations, informing the public (overcoming the information deficiencies explained 
before), can the consumer have had access to the ((opposing) expert information 
(Dr. Burtscher is a qualified biochemist) of non-governmental institutions. As 
pointed out in the theory part of this paper the information provisions of these 
institutions therefore can play a crucial role; being the possible bridge in an 
information gap situation and the national (federal level) free-rider problems in 
international concerns (antibiotic resistance is a international concern, please 
remind the call of the WHO displayed earlier in this paper).  
C6.6. Austrian Governmental Institutions 
C6.6.1. Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, 
Environment and Water management (BMLFUW) 
The Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water 
management (hereafter: BMLFUW), Division III/9 – “General Plant Health 
Affairs”, is the supreme Austrian national level authority with it’s field of activity 
covering legisprudence, issuing instructions to BAES and the provinces, political 
policy (fundamental) decisions and reporting to EC. The BMLFUW “represents 
Austria at international level (e.g. EPPO, OECD, EU)” and “is also participating in 
all relevant European Union Committees”614. The role of the BMLFUW in the 
authorization process is not retrieved by any direct information on the institution 
but more has been learnt from the [Interview BOV] mentioned in the assessment 
at the end of this chapter. 
C6.6.2. Federal Office for Food Safety (BAES) 
The BAES is the first instance (also as per EC-law) for execution of material law 
such as the Austrian Plant Protection Law615 and the Austrian Plant Protection 
Agent Law (PSMG) 616. From a hierarchical perspective the BAES is a subordinated 
authority (bound to instructions to BMLFUW) and is integrated in the organisation 
structure of the AGES. Dr. Blümel states that the “[t]asks of the BAES cover 
issuing orders (as a federal office) to the AGES but also externally to customs 
authorities (e.g. regarding import controls), but the BAES itself does not perform 
                                          
614 [AGES 14], p. 1 
615 In German: “Pflanzenschutzgesetz 1995”; stated in §6 (1) No. 5 GESG  
616 In German: “Pflanzenschutzmittelgesetz 1997”; stated in §6 (1) No. 4 GESG  
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analyses or other functional tasks and the decision competences and 
responsibilities are separated”617. On the homepage [AGES BAES] it is stated that 
the tasks of the BAES are (inter alia) the control of putting into circulation, and 
the authorization of, plant protection agents being the relevant authority of first 
instance for the enforcement of the Austrian Plant Protection Agent Law 1997 (as 
per §6 (1) GESG No. 4). 
The BAES has been the authority responsible for authorizing the two plant 
protection agents containing streptomycin according to the §13 PSMG 1997 
(danger-in-delay) on the 10th of March 2008 (just as in the years 2005 and 2006 
for Vorarlberg).618 
According to the Federal Austrian Law for Health and Food Safety (Gesundheits- 
und Ernährungssicherheitsgesetz, hereafter “GESG”) rules in its first article that 
“for the safeguarding and the quality of nutrition a high level of health protection 
and the protection of consumer interests shall be aimed at in consideration of the 
precautionary principle and with the state of the art of science”619. Interestingly 
the articles §§2-5 GESG (§2: definition of terms; §3: health protection in the 
nutrition scope; §3a: health protection in the medical scope; §4: the 
Precautionary Principle in the area of nutrition safety; §5: protection of consumer 
interests) do not apply620 for the fulfilment of the §6 GESG (laying down the 
different laws for which the fulfilment is incumbent upon the BAES: e.g. (inter 
alia) the fulfilment of the Austrian Plant Protection Agent Law 1997). This is, 
indeed, a very awkward provision, but maybe explains why the precautionary 
principle is set aside to such an extent by the authorization of streptomycin, 
because, as outlined before, the allowance of plant protection products clearly 
involves weighing up environmental/health hazards against better protection of 
plants (crop). Maybe this provision has to be seen as an extension of the room to 
manoeuvre in these realms. 
C6.6.3. Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety (AGES) 
“The Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety (AGES) is responsible for 
several tasks in regard to nutrition for the Austrian government. The organisation 
researches, analyses and performs inspections according to the policy guidelines 
                                          
617 [Interview AGES 01] 
618 [LKÖ 03] p. 46 
619 Translation by the author 
620 Laid down in §19(3) GESG 
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of Austrian Food Laws”621 and delivers i.e. the laboratory analysis for detecting FB 
infection on host plants (required by the EC monitoring rules).  
It is the relevant body coordinating all activities622 and persons/organisations 
involved concerning FB in Austria (partially in cooperation with the provinces and 
respective professional associations including the realization of outdoor-test and 
alternative combat methods also including the use of bees as vectors).623 
The AGES is owned by the Austrian Republic, represented by the (Austrian) 
Federal Ministry for Health, Family and Youth (“BMGFJ”, current minister: Mrs. Dr. 
Andrea Kdolsky) and the BMLFUW (current minister: Mr. DI Josef Pröll). 624 
Further the (Austrian) Federal Ministry for finance (BMF) is concerned with import 
controls by customs in collaboration with BAES and the allocation of financial 
resources, hence also playing a role in the organisational structure. 
C6.6.3.1. Institute for Plant Health of the AGES  
Together with BAES it “provides scientific advice on all phytosanitary matters” 625 
(e.g. FB) “to the plant health authorities of the Provinces and to the Austrian 
Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water 
Management”626.  
Round Tables are organized by the AGES Institute for Plant Health regularly,627 
but can only be attended on invitation, usually attended by members of two bee-
organisations, the organic fruit growers association, the BOV (Austrian Fruit 
Growers), Consultants, the nine Chambers of agriculture, the agricultural 
experimentation centre (FA 10B Referat APSD, Graz (Haidegg))628, the BMLFUW, 
attorneys of the provincial governments and, in the case of research-round-
tables, all research partners. 
Further tasks of the Institute for Plant Health of the AGES relevant to FB are 
(inter alia) the  
• Diagnosis, identification and monitoring of occurrence and 
                                          
621 [AGES 03] 
622 [AGES 01], p. 10 - “(z.B. Schutzgebietsregelung)“ 
623 [AGES 02], p. 77 
624 [AGES 04] 
625 [AGES 14], p. 2 
626 [AGES 14], p. 2 
627 16.10.2003, 27.11.2003, 27.01.2004, 15.04.2004, 07.10.2004, 23.11.2004, 
18.01.2005, 24.11.2005, 5.12.2006, 5.12.2007, 30.06.2008 
628 [APSD 01] 
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dissemination as well as analyses on the biology and regulation of 
plant pests, particularly of quarantine pests 
• Development of integrated and biological plant protection concepts, in 
particular within the scope of emergency plans for quarantine pests 
and diseases. 
• Specific assessments on plant protection agents and methods, 
particularly in connection with the “ÖPUL” subsidy program629 
(evaluation for IP-OEPUL subsidy and trials of biological efficacy) 
 
Further in [AGES K&K] (in accordance with the above mentioned first task) it is 
stated that “at the Institute of Plant Health the notices of the competent regional 
offices on the occurrence of FB converge”. However, it was still not possible to 
retrieve any consolidated information on the development of FB damages in 
Austria. The author has ploughed through the information available via internet 
(Round Tables protocols on FB) many of them not including630 detailed and 
ordered information (e.g. tables are not provided), which can be used as a base 
for calculations, being of a more general descriptive character.  
The only two departments found by the catchword “plant protection agent test”631 
are within the Institute of Plant Health. 
C6.6.3.2. Institute for the Evaluation & Authorization of Plant Protection 
Products of the AGES632 
This institute is stated to be responsible for the 
• Active substance testing within the scope of 91/414/EEC (in contrast to 
the “plant protection agent test” just stated above) 
• for the enforcement of the Austrian Plant Protection Agent Law 1997 
and Regulation as authority of first instance, including monitoring and 
control of putting on to the open market;  
• Co-design of legalistic norms and IP-regulations,  
Who exactly is responsible within the AGES for pesticide residues testing of 
foodstuff (e.g. testing on residues of streptomycin in sprayed apples) has not 
been retrieved by the author. 
                                          
629 [AGES 02], p. 82 
630 No data on FB occurrence in [AGES RT 01] 
631 Original Term in German: “Pflanzenschutzmittelprüfung” 
632 [AGES 02], p. 77 
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C6.6.4. Official Austrian Plant Protection Service 
The Official Austrian Plant Protection Service633 is at federal level only (with 
regard to FB), concerned with import controls as formal official function. 
Organisationally separated from the Institute of Plant Health (AGES) it is 
subordinated to the BAES. It is not involved in laboratory diagnoses, but passes 
on the contracts to the technical part of the Institute, from which it also obtains 
expertise opinion and issues legal notifications.  
Regional Administrative Authorities (of the nine Austrian provinces), each with its 
Head of Provincial Government, have their “Official Plant Protection Service of the 
Provinces” (also called “9 Regional Plant Protection Authorities”634). The Official 
Plant Protection Service of the (nine) Provinces “are responsible for implementing 
plant health legislation for which they are competent for on regional level”, e.g. 
carrying out the (obligatory) monitory inspections regarding FB (coordinated by 
the Official Austrian Plant Protection Service (APSD), with the BMLFUW being the 
central superior authority).635 Furthermore, every township has a FB delegate and 
every province district has a technical expert reporting to the APSD. 
According to [Interview AGES 01] the controls of the usage of streptomycin 
take place by the APSD via random inspections following a raster (or in case of 
suspicion) and in operating controls. Information exchange is stated to take place 
“regularly” between the APSD, the agricultural chamber(s) and the AGES in 
coordination meetings. 
C6.6.5. Assessment of the Governmental Authorities 
At [Interview BOV] it was stated that “[u]ltimately the BMLFUW decides (on the 
allowance of streptomycin), but strongly attends the opinion of the AGES in 
technical terms. In my opinion if the AGES would be strictly against it, the Federal 
Ministry would not oppose the AGES being the technically competent authority.” 
When the author interposed the question, “What about the BAES?”, DI Greimel 
(from the BOV) responded that “[t]he BAES is the technical/functional competent 
authority issuing the §13-authorisation for streptomycin. The Federal Ministry 
[remark by the author: BMLFUW] is the political competent authority: because 
the usage of streptomycin is a thorny question having a political dimension, the 
                                          
633 In German: “Amtlicher Österreichischer Pflanzenschutzdienst”, [AGES 05] 
634 [AGES 14], p. 2 
635 [AGES 14], p. 2 
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BMLFUW takes over this task. For the authorization the Federation636 and AGES 
(respectively BAES) are responsible. The use of the plant protection products is 
matter of the provinces, but the use is only allowed after the AGES has given its 
permission.” Furthermore, DI Greimel of the BOV provides the information that 
the Federal Ministry ultimately bears responsibility and decides on the 
authorization of streptomycin after hearing all concerned parties in the Round 
Tables (at the AGES).637 
Therefore the BAES, AGES and BMLFUW are the competent bodies located in this 
case study to interfere with market failures caused through the externalities (by 
adjusting shadow prices) displayed above. The Austrian Chamber of Agriculture 
states that the coordination of measures for 2008 has taken place since June 
2007 via the BMLFUW and the AGES (FB Round Tables) involving (inter alia) the 
preparations regarding a possible usage of streptomycin.638 
The presented governmental bodies would be responsible for installing a socially 
optimal solution for the Austrian society as a whole, balancing the failure of the 
market to adjust a price to all the indirect costs caused by the agricultural usage 
of the antibiotic streptomycin.  
C6.7. Producers of Streptomycin (Pharmaceutical 
Industry) 
As the author tries to introduce all stakeholders involved in the issue of the case 
study in this paper, clearly the behaviour of producers of plant protection agents 
containing streptomycin (e.g. the Belgian company “Globachem”) should be 
discussed and assessed. Unfortunately the author has not retrieved any 
information from Globachem: although Mr. Koen Quaghebeur Globachem has 
responded to the author by referring to Mr. Zorn from “Zorn Pflanzenschutz” 
being their Austrian distributor, the author’s questions have been left 
unanswered.  
From all other information retrieved by the author during the occupation with the 
case study there has not been any evidence for the pharmaceutical industry 
interfering in the decision processes or using their bargaining power. Of course it 
can only be estimated by the author what is observed, and not what is going on 
                                          
636 Remark by the author: original term used in German “Bund” 
637 Stated by Mr. Greimel in the [Interview BOV] 
638 [LKÖ 03] p. 45 
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behind the scenes, but the author believes that no pressure has been used by the 
manufacturers of streptomycin: streptomycin is not a “push” but a “pull”-product 
(in marketing terminology) – the pome-fruit growers have demanded it at their 
own accord. 
C.7. Cost Benefit Analysis  
Economic efficiency of a procedure (or project) is given when the benefits are 
greater than the costs, and only projects with a positive net benefit should be 
realized. Assessing all alternatives, the one with the highest positive difference 
should be picked,639 according to the general aim of maximizing the difference 
between costs C and benefits B. As explained in the theoretical part of this paper, 
if external costs exist, that are failed to be internalised by governmental 
interference, the CBA, calculated by a private firm, will lead to results which are 
different from the social CBA. The scope of the social CBA is wider because it 
accounts for all costs (whether they are direct, indirect, tangible or intangible) 
and the time frame can encompass a more long-run efficiency aim.640 Future 
benefits can be discounted to deliver the net present value (NPV) to be 
comparable to costs in the present. “Costs are usually measured in market 
prices”.641 
The CBA established in this paper will take a closer look at two of the different 
possibilities that exist, to limit the risk of infection of pome-trees in intensive 
orchards: on the one hand spraying of the antibiotic streptomycin and on the 
other hand the antagonist (Blossom Protect). The evaluation of the alternatives is 
based on the following assumptions: mechanical operations (removal or cut-back 
of infested plants) are obligatory to be taken as soon as FB is discovered because 
it is a quarantine organism in the EU. Therefore a scenario of “non-action” is not 
feasible. Further, the probability of the exposure to (latent) FB infections cannot 
be assessed (and are not known for each orchard), because of numerous 
influencing factors: climate conditions in general (especially of previous winters), 
humidity and temperature during the infection period, rainfall-quantity and 
incidence, hail, wind, impeded drainage, potential vectors, susceptibility of host 
plant species, infection pressure in the orchard and adjacent vegetation, 
composition of adjacent vegetation (host plants) etc. All these factors together up 
                                          
639 [Brent 1991], p. 6: “the greater the difference, the greater the contribution of the 
project” 
640 [Brent 1991], p. 4 
641 [Brent 1991], p. 13 
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to now cannot be standardized. Therefore there are no data on the average 
infestation rate of orchards with FB in Austria and according to Dr. Blümel it does 
not seem feasible to try to calculate average infection rates (at least not in the 
scope of this thesis). The basic scenario therefore is based on the assumptions 
that all measures like pruning (cutting back of infected tree-parts or, in the worst 
case, clearance of the tree) are done, since these measures are obligatory. 
Considering the value of the orchards being at risk to be totally cleared and 
replaced by new ones, the NPV of the possible total economic loss per hectare 
due to a 100% FB infection has been calculated earlier in this paper. E.g. 
63190.92€ has been calculated to be the NPV of the total costs incurred if one 
hectare of an intensive apple orchards is lost due to FB. And likewise these costs 
have been determined to be 46919.09€ for intensive pear orchards per year. As 
shown above earlier there is a total of 6999 ha apple acreage and 384 ha pear 
acreage that could possibly be sprayed with streptomycin (in 2600 intensive 
orchards).  
So what is the maximum benefit from spraying streptomycin and the biological 
plant protection agent BP (later on compared to the costs) if we consider an 
absolute worst case scenario, assuming that otherwise the total acreages would 
be infected, when not sprayed? “Saving” the total acreages of intensive pears and 
apples in Austria by spraying would generate a benefit of 6999 ha x 63190.92€ 
(NPV Apples) + 384 ha x 46919.09€ (NPV Pears) = 460290179.70 € (460 
million €). These 460 million € could be saved, if there were a 100% remedy. As 
it has be shown, this is not the case, but available plant protection agents will 
only be useful up to their efficiency grade. The author has decided to assume the 
efficiency values according to the figures shown above. The efficiency grade of 
streptomycin is assumed to be 81.9%, and BP 76.6% respectively. Therefore the 
total benefits of spraying streptomycin will be saving costs of 376977657.20 € 
(376 million €). By using BP the costs of 352582277.7 € (352 million €) are 
saved respectively. 
But as explained earlier the “efficacy” of a control measure is seen to consist of 
the following factors: efficiency, costs/ha (direct and indirect), but also 
intangibles risk for public health and ecotoxity. These costs shall be summarized 
in the following CBA. 
Actual imposed costs (only variable in their height) and risks taken (which may 
cause costs as well) are found to be distributed amongst different parts of the 
Austrian economy (the pome-fruit orchardists and the beekeepers) as well as to 
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Austrian society as a whole and are therefore allocated to these three different 
groups. Of course costs (and risks) imposed on society as a whole involve the 
pome-fruit orchardists and the beekeepers as well. Because the government does 
not carry the costs per se, but imposes costs on the general public (funded by 
taxes), the author has subordinated activities requiring governmental capacities 
(overhead costs) to be borne by society as a whole. As the author has not been 
able to feasibly adjust reliable values to these factors (because of missing data) 
the indirect costs are only listed. It has e.g. not been possible for the author to 
calculate how many samples would have to be tested in the case of a countrywide 
use of streptomycin (following the worst case scenario). The calculation cannot be 
done by simply assuming that all Austrian beekeepers are located in spraying 
areas, given the fact that orcharding is not undertaken in all parts of Austria (not 
congruent with bee-keeping) and would not affect ALL beekeepers. But it can be 
assumed, that nearly all Styrian beekeepers would be affected. Furthermore, 
estimates of the beekeepers’ costs of moving bee-hives, of their sales reductions 
etc. have not been accessible to the author (because they do not exist), although 
it has been tried to at least describe the problem in detail in the respective 
chapter. Therefore the values of the existing indirect costs and risks are 
missing, but for reasons of visualization have been marked red and the absence 
of risks and costs green. 
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C.7.1. Putting it all together in the CBA 
Table 17: COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
 
SZENARIO  
"STREPTOMYCIN" 
SZENARIO  
"BLOSSOM PROTECT" 
  
Full-time-
Farmers 
Bee- 
keepers 
whole 
Society  
Full-time-
Farmers 
Bee- 
keepers 
whole 
Society  
Direct Costs for plant protection per ha 
and year (maximum sprayings)             
Quantity (kg) of streptomycin/ha needed x cost 
of kg 234,00 €     380,00 €     
Equipment Costs (Tractor, 4WD, 50 KW + 
Spraying equipment, 30.000 m3, 550 lt) + 
working costs x sprayings 151,83 €     202.44€     
Costs of additional technical prerequisites 
Special 
protection gear?     0,00 €     
Quantity of water needed x cost of water omitted     omitted     
Safety measures to be taken omitted     omitted     
(Aftercare) walks through orchard omitted     omitted     
Non-use of other cultivars (e.g. grass below 
sprayed trees) (elimination required) costs     0,00 €     
Elimination of these cultivars (Mowing costs) 117,27 €     0,00 €     
Lost ÖPUL subsidy per ha sprayed 300,00 €     0,00 €     
Subtotal direct costs / ha / year 803,10 €     582,44 €     
Sprayable apple acreages in Austria 6999 ha    
Sprayable pear acreages in Austria  +384 ha    
Possibly sprayed area =7383 ha    
The usage of BP is not limited to this 
area, but will be calculated for these 
acreages for comparison reasons. 
Total direct costs spraying 100% of 
Austria's intensive pome fruit acreage 5.929.287 €     4.300.154 €     
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Benefits (cost savings) from the possibility of 
mixing other plant protection products in tank not possible     
cost savings 
possible (-% 
equipment+work
ing costs)     
Calculated efficiency grade x NPV of all Austrian 
intensive pome fruit acreage protected 376.977.657 €     352.582.277 €     
Deducting direct costs only -5.929.287,30 €     -4.300.154,52 €     
Benefits for farmers excl. indirect and 
external costs 371.048.369 €     356.882.432 €     
Difference Str-BP (absolute maximum possible 
excess direct costs to pome fruit farmers), not 
including indirect, external costs and risks! 14.165.937,68 € 
Indirect and external Costs              
Appealing for exemption law at EU-level (and 
notifying all other MS) (governmental 
administration work)     costs     ? (*) 
Issuing of the notice of exemption allowance and 
elaborating the security preconditions      costs     0,00 € 
Negotiation process to reach an agreement (in 
the round table, with the AMA, the food retailers 
etc.) costs costs costs 0,00 € 0,00 € 0,00 € 
Cost of movement of bee-hives because of 
spraying    costs         
Costs of taking and testing honey samples (costs 
of preventing the sale of contaminated honey): 
Residue-test costs x number of samples tested     
75,00€ 
/sample     0,00 € 
Costs of compensating contaminated honey     5,00€/kg     0,00 € 
Costs of disposing of contaminated honey     
3,56€  
(for 120l)     0,00 € 
Profit losses of beekeepers (of the difference 
between sales price and compensation) 7,50€-
5,00€   2,50€/kg     0,00 €   
Counteractions to save image (PR towards 
consumer) costs costs   0,00 € 0,00 €   
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Time used for application, bureaucracy and 
controls (in honey monitoring processes; e.g. 
coordinating work regarding the information of 
all beekeepers   costs costs   0,00 € 0,00 € 
Costs of inspections on legal spraying (control 
quota, detection quota, sanctions etc.)             
Communication efforts with the alarmed public 
on possible health hazards (e.g. ad found in 
cooking magazine) by the government     costs     0,00 € 
Costs of residue testing in fruit from treated 
acreages     
>75,00€/ 
sample ?     
0,00 € 
(**) 
Costs for loosing "AMA"-quality seal (sale 
volume and price reductions) due to residues in 
pome fruit costs     0,00 € (**)     
List of further risks associated with 
application             
Risk of fruit russeting (subordinated under 
"risks" because fruit russeting is not a sure cost, 
but is dependant on certain conditions without 
statistical significance)  0,00 €     risk     
Possible adverse human health effects due to 
higher exposure to the substance and residues 
for those handling the agent: side effects e.g. 
allergies, antibiotic resistance risk         0,00 € 
Resistance risk in farming: disturbance of soil 
equilibrium, including effects on species such as 
rainworms, etc. risk         0,00 € 
Risk of selecting antibiotic resistant E.a. strains 
and the resulting risk of higher FB infection rates risk         0,00 € 
Resistance risk in human medicine (likewise in 
animal husbandry), treatments of no/little avail, 
VSL losses due to fatalities and increased pain 
risks      risk     0,00 € 
Risk of Allergies and other side-effects for 
general public (VSL losses due to pain etc.)     risk     0,00 € 
186 
Effects on certain aquatic organisms 
(environmental fate and behaviour in 
surface/ground water)     risk (toxic)     0,00 € 
Short-term loss of sales (impact on sales of 
honey in sprayed season) and long-term sales 
losses (image loss of honey products) --> Risk 
of driving beekeepers out of business 
risking 37.5 million € and 375 million € 
pollination work 0,00 € 
Risk of a possible loss of faith in the Austrian 
Government     risk     0,00 € 
Risk factor of illegal sprayings      risk     0,00 € 
Risk of boycott by food retailers of pome fruit 
from treated acreages risk     0,00 €     
Short- and long-term image costs for orchardists risk     0,00 €     
 
(*) because the product is permitted due to a peculiarity in Austrian law (as explained earlier). 
(**) should be zero! 
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C.7.2. Assessing the results of the CBA 
The benefits for farmers excl. indirect and external costs result in a “gap-value” of 
14.165.937.68€ (entailing all the other costs and risks pointed out in the CBA), 
which can be seen to be the difference between the two alternatives in an 
absolute worst case scenario for the 2600 farmers allowed to spray, A “gap-
value” of 5448.43€ exists per farm. 
This is the absolute maximal economic advantage for 2600 firms, but will surely 
be much smaller due to listed indirect costs that may apply. Society as a whole 
faces only costs (particularly the beekeepers). 
The governmental implicit evaluation of the WTP of the Austrian population (as 
per 1.1.2008 is 8.331.930 people642) is revealed to be lower than 1.70 € 
(14.165.937.68€/ 8.331.930) per year. This means that the governmental 
authorities assume that the average Austrian prefers to be exposed to the risks 
stated above rather than “paying” this amount. Considering that there is a 
considerable segment of customers purchasing organic food, and the market 
study revealing the preference of customers for untreated fruit, it is very likely 
that this WTP is underestimated. 
Which value should be assigned to intangibles such as the reduction of quality of 
life because of prolonged suffering (due to resistant bacteria, as described before) 
or even loosing a life? The following chapter shall deal with this issue. 
EXCURSUS: The Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) 
Because many policy decisions affect at least the quality of human life (in regard 
to the health status of the individual), if not fatalities, these decisions are nolens 
volens related to attributing value to human life. Following the rule of economic 
efficiency the value of saving a statistical life must exceed the costs incurred to 
make the measure worthwhile. So what is the appropriate value of a life that 
should be worked into cost-benefit analyses? When does it pay off to prevent a 
fatality? Despite the question of whether it is ethical to adjust a value to (the 
quality of) life and however uncomfortable this question is - it is unavoidable in 
the realms of cost benefit analysis:  
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The degree of safety of (healthy) human life can be seen to be the degree of 
protection from risk, which is defined by the probability of health defector fatality 
in a certain time period.643 However, preventing health risks (or attenuating a 
certain hazard) are normally achieved by the use of resources that are now 
unavailable to other utility increases: the more is spent on safety, the less can be 
spent on other needs of society. The same welfare problem of competing goals 
has already been outlined, discussing the allocation of the social optimum level of 
the environmental condition and the parallelism of the two areas is stated clearly 
by [Johansson 2006]: “The value of preventing a fatality or (saving) a statistical 
life is an important question in health economics as well as environmental 
economics.”644 In the case of environmental pollution the estimation of the 
benefits and costs of measures reducing risks are of interest.645  
Restoring society’s optimum safety level, the problem of competing goals occurs 
respectively: not ALL safety measures can be taken but rather the size of the 
achievable safety improvement has to be compared to the installation (reduction) 
costs, evaluating the safety measure at stake. Economic actions include certain 
risks, therefore [Viscusi 1993] argues that economic constraints hinder the 
reducing of risk to zero646. This can be seen in connection to the discussion in the 
theoretical part on the subject of the impossibility to restore a perfectly healthy 
environment, because utility is also driven out of goods even if their production 
entails certain environmental degradation. There is a certain social optimum level 
to be stabilized in the right trade off quantity between these competing goals. 
“Public health”, just as the environment, is a public good. Hence, ignoring the 
adherent effects of activities there will be under-provision in case of positive 
externalities (human health safety benefits) and over-provision in case of 
negative externalities (adverse effects on human health safety). Governmental 
interference and its attitude towards human health risk create the balance 
between the “necessary evil” and its accruing benefits. If put on sustainable 
pathways “rising societal wealth will continue to generate greater levels of health 
and safety”.647 
Bearing in mind the fact, that (ceteris paribus) society prefers lower levels of 
exposure to risk of fatality or physical harm, it has to be appropriately traded off 
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against other competing uses of resources, therefore being subject to economic 
valuation.648 But as Jones-Lee puts it: “[p]erhaps the most difficult item of all to 
value is human life.”649 Using the definition provided by [Blomquist 2004] “The 
economics of the value of life is about what individuals and societies are willing to 
sacrifice to get longer expected lifetimes.” 650  
Adjusting informal judgements of certain political decisions is at least better than 
simply neglecting and ignoring these issues (and realizing projects that allocate 
resource on a random base). Nevertheless, as outlined before, policy is subject to 
everyday decisions that which cannot be decided on such a basis, because it will 
not only lead to problems of inconsistency of decision-making on several 
alternatives but also between different decision makers. It seems, therefore, that 
there is no way of “getting around” the adjustment of a value to (healthy) human 
life in evaluating projects.651 As [Blomquist 2004] puts it: “While ethical and 
estimation concerns remain, these values have proved useful in policy decisions 
about health, safety, and the environment.”652 
Empirical estimates of the value of life can be achieved by revealed preferences 
(retrieving implicit values from observations of individual’s behaviour) or 
contingent valuation (by asking individual). Both techniques have their 
advantages and disadvantages and may well be seen as complementary653 to 
each other as they tackle the problem from two sides. Not only consumers (as 
the paper has outlined before) make choices about their health and safety but 
also public sector agents reveal their preferences through their actual behaviour 
(“concerning tax and expenditure programs which affect expected lifetimes”654): 
simply put, a safety measure implemented at a certain cost, “C”, that shall reduce 
a certain number of fatalities, “F”, reveals the statistical life being valued C/F.655 
[Viscusi 1993] suggests that the “appropriate measure of value of life from the 
standpoint of government policy is society’s willingness to pay for the risk 
reduction, which is the same benefit formulation in all policy evaluation contexts” 
(not only in the risk-money tradeoffs observed in labour market assessments that 
Viscusi originally researched on). 
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Literature clearly demonstrates that the implicit values regarding human life show 
high volatility (high variances). [Layard et al 1994] for example state the range 
from ₤1,000 to more than ₤20,000,000 per (statistical) life.656  
Setting aside the reasons of these high variances (due to governmental failure), 
the author has tried to figure out an appropriate order of magnitude of the value 
of life used in public decision making. [Layard et al 1994] suggests that “if a 
“true” value of statistical life exists, it is very unlikely to be much less than 
₤500,000 in 1987 prices and may, indeed, be well in excess of ₤1,000,000”657: 
72.7%658 of the most reliable estimates adjusted the value of life being “worth” 
more than ₤1,000,000. [Blomquist 2004] yields VSL typically in a range from 
US$1 million to US$9 million.659 [Viscusi 1993] sets the cluster for reasonable 
estimates to be in the 3-7 million US$ range660 and finds that the trade-off 
estimates can vary considerably, and are not only dependent on the population 
exposed to the risk and their income level, but also on the nature of the risk itself 
(inter alia). [de Blaeij et al 2000] attribute these variations to the “persistent 
information problem facing governments” that can cause the revealed 
preferences by individuals to be “markedly” different from “the implicit individual 
marginal rates of substitution implied by governmental decisions on 
allocations”.661 Also [de Blaeij et al 2000] have shown the VSL to depend on the 
initial risk level regarding a (fatal) accident and on the risk decline that is being 
considered.662 [Johansson 2006] finds that “income levels as well as risk attitudes 
also differ between countries”. This, in his view, is an explanation for the 
phenomenon that “some studies arrive at very modest values while other studies 
report surprisingly high values”663 which is found to be underpinned by the 
findings of [Gibson et al 2007]664. Furthermore [Moore 1996] shows that “People 
value identified lives more than statistical lives because we are influenced by 
certain cognitive preferences inherent to human nature.” 665 
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The values proposed in [Layard et al 1994] at least suggest a range of the value 
of a statistical life “for all commonplace “everyday” risks of quick and (one 
assumes) painless death”. Others may have to be seen accordingly. But what 
about the value of injuries or deterioration in health (non-fatal hazards)? 
[Cohen et al 2003] examined the non-monetary damage compensations for 
“pain and suffering” (hence a measure for non-fatal injuries) yielding the 
implied value of a statistical life at approximately US$1.4 to US$3.8 million666, 
being well within the range of the VSL stated above. 
[Viscusi 1993] notes that previously only the lost present value of earnings was 
assessed, which led to dramatic underestimations of benefits evaluations and that 
the “policy makers’ recognition of the nonpecuniary aspects of life is an important 
advance”.667 Differences arise for imposing protection policies on societal (social) 
groups who bear risks involuntarily (but thus have a high risk-aversion) in 
comparison to groups of individuals incurring risks knowingly (e.g. dangerous 
jobs), but it is also argued, that the temporal dimension668 of risks is important, 
because health risks to future generations needs governmental interference much 
more. 
[Viscusi 2007] reminds that not all market failures regarding risks are too great 
(and may be overcome by simple measures such as for example information 
asymmetry which can be rendered harmless by hazard warning policies) and that 
also in this case governments can exacerbate the problem (by causing 
inordinately high costs per live saved). 
Which VSL to assume in the paper’s CBA? 
The author has cogitated over the question how to incorporate the provisions of 
the assumption on the VSL discussed within this paper in the CBA at stake. 
It has been found extremely difficult to contrast the “maximum additional benefit 
value” of the usage of streptomycin (which is surely biased, because the 
deduction of external costs and risks due to missing values is not possible), with 
the VSL on the other hand, because risks are not known and there is no evidence. 
Despite the possibility of prolonged suffering and pain because of resistance to 
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antibiotics, and even fatalities due to missing medication, it is, however, very 
hard for the author to estimate how many people may be affected. 
But, given the assumptions that there will be suffering and early deaths, the 
values have to be put in contrast somehow, so that calculations are not biased. 
The VSL has therefore tried to retrieve implicitly the Government’s decision to 
impose higher risks on Austrian society as a whole, because the bearing of this 
higher risk is outweighed by the better economic situation of the 2600 fruit 
farmers by the value of life adjusted by Austrian Government permitting this 
procedure in the following example-scenarios: if only one person dies, the value 
of life will be smaller than 14.165.937.68€ (because further indirect costs have 
not been deducted from this value). If 10 people suffer their suffering will surely 
be “worth” less than 1.4 million €. But the author does not feel competent to 
judge these values and therefore calls upon the opinion of experts. Regarding the 
calculation of the risks to human health, but also the risks to farmers using 
streptomycin, this calculation must be seen in the light of the statements made 
by Prof. Pittner: “For the calculation of the adverse effects that the agricultural 
use of streptomycin brings about, it is probably only possible to calculate the 
minimum-damage (being the minimum, that has to be counted with), then 
explaining the nescience (lack of information) on many aspects. Only a semi-
quantitative estimation of risks exposing ourselves to in the long run is possible. 
But it is important to note: dealing with the streptomycin problematic one has to 
bear in mind that there are many synergistic parameters intercalating, many of 
them still unknown. The impact on human health and the agricultural problematic 
are always to be seen connected. Risks taken do not have additive character, but 
multiply!”  
It is therefore very likely that there would have been other possibilities to attain 
the real social optimum. The CBA makes clear, that efficacy at all cost does not 
reflect real economic efficiency, which needs to incorporate total costs caused 
against the benefits of the alternative measures. 
C8. Conclusion of the Case Study’s Findings 
C8.1. Market Failures in the Case Study 
Human health safety and a healthy environment possess the properties of joint-
supply and non-excludability and are therefore both public goods, entailing all 
the problems of market failures attached to these.  
193 
Fruit growers, as participants of the market, are striving for their own profit 
maximization669 (individualism) only bearing the direct costs (private costs) of 
their activities, whereas the full social costs are imposed on society as a whole. Of 
course, as described before, there is also the phenomenon of non-
individualistic behaviour which can be observed when farmers who are 
authorized to do spray, but do not use the antibiotic and also from (reported) 
reactions of farmers not living on the growing of fruit. 
The market activity producing fruit treated with antibiotic clearly creates side 
effects (externalities) affecting uninvolved individuals (society as a whole) as 
outlined in this paper. Not only will people - possibly - suffer from allergies (and 
other unforeseeable health hazards), but certainly this activity can lead to 
prolonged suffering (pain and stress) and even fatalities because of missing 
medical aid against infections due to certain bacteria resistant to antibiotics. Also, 
regarding the environmental risks taken, these are borne partly by the public as a 
whole (increased resistance pressure), and partly by the agricultural sector itself 
(loosing arable land because of resistances). The full costs due to the agricultural 
use of antibiotics are not taken into account by the economic sector of intensive 
fruit growing (not even concerning the risks inflicted to itself) caused by the 
intangibility of the impact and the difficult calculation due to uncertainties and 
gaps in knowledge. Although the products (fruit) increase utilities of consumers, 
they at the same time include these costs (health risks etc.). Hence a desire of 
the affected parties to modify the behaviour of the fruit growers should clearly be 
given, because loss of human welfare derives from health damage (diminishing 
quality of life), increased suffering, pain and fatalities, but also deserted 
acreages. 
In the case analysed the insufficient provision of the goods public health and 
environmental protection emerges from the missing “market” of the benefits of 
streptomycin avoidance, or expressed in another way, because the prices of fruit 
of treated acreages (also relative to the ones of non-treated acreages) do not 
reflect the real costs of its production. The difference of these costs results in 
market distortions of the private market activity of “spraying” because it is 
subject to externalities. 
                                          
669 Even if the case has shown that there are fallacies attached to the comprehension of 
the direct costs and farmers have not even chosen the cheapest production technique. 
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The market equilibrium can only be reached if external costs and benefits are 
integrated. How is the integration to be achieved? As outlined before, following 
the Coase theorem, governmental intervention is not always needed to obtain a 
socially efficient outcome: if property rights are adjusted (in this case the 
farmers having the right to spray), affected individuals could start up negotiations 
with the farmers and tyro find an agreement for compensation payments for the 
non-use of the antibiotic. Considering that society as a whole (and even people 
beyond national boundaries) are affected in their welfare by this omission, it is a 
fact, that exponential transaction costs exist during this bargaining process, which 
does not make this allocation algorithm feasible.  
Taxes (recommended by Pigou, in order to install an equilibrium) are a way to 
internalise the externalities caused in the case. As a matter of fact this 
mechanism is already used in the (reverse) form of subsidies for integrated 
production techniques (that will be granted the ÖPUL-subsidy and lost if using 
streptomycin). However, (as mentioned in the theory part) there are crucial 
problems of adjusting the right value. To outweigh the market failure completely 
the exact shadow prices of the externalities caused and their internalisation in the 
economic processes would lead to an increase of marginal costs (benefits) and 
therefore modify the supply curve (production decision failures). This implies 
that the shadow prices are known and can be determined on a calculable scale, 
which is shown to be extremely hard, if not impossible in this case study. The 
underlying interdependent risks and costs imposed on intangibles like the value 
(of the quality) of life make the estimation of “real social costs” of the usage of 
streptomycin more than vague. Costs and risks that are calculable at present are 
to be seen as the complete minimum (the tip of the iceberg). For completeness 
reasons of completeness, it has to be remarked that adjustments of taxes can 
also result in a segment of consumers being worse off: namely the ones who do 
not care about their health status670.  
Of course also consumption decision failures arise when individuals fail to 
consider the interdependence of their consumption pattern impacting the well-
being of others: inhabitants of Vienna (where there is no direct spraying in living 
areas) do not necessarily consider the health hazards imposed on e.g. to people 
in Styria living close to the spraying areas, but only weigh up their private 
benefits against the purchase price (not considering external costs arising for 
                                          
670 E.g. assume certain individuals taking hard drugs (apart from alcohol & co) it is most 
likely, that these persons do not care about the health hazards deriving from the agricutural use 
of streptomycin. 
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others, apart from the risks incurring to their own health from the threats of 
rising antibiotic resistance). 
To install sustainability also on the demand side, full social costs and benefits 
must be reflected and the consumer surplus has to be measured. Yet again it is 
shown, that private decision making differs markedly from public decision making 
and fails to measure the full social benefits – a market failure rising with the 
importance respective to the size of the project (as outlined earlier in the theory 
part).  
If all the costs and risks would be reflected in the higher price of such fruit, the 
elasticity of demand would shift demand onto fruit from other production 
techniques (as e.g. fruit from organic production or from regions strictly not using 
the antibiotic like South Tyrol is available, substitution is possible). However, 
asymmetric information problems associated with market failure in this case 
study have derived from the fact, that the agricultural use of antibiotics against 
FB is a highly sophisticated, interdisciplinary and crosscutting issue additionally 
including many framing conditions and circumstances (a flood of existing 
regulations and regimenting bodies on all levels). The “burden” of retrieving 
information on the actual utilities driven from the use or non-use of antibiotics 
cannot be borne by either the consumers (fruit-eaters), or the producers 
(farmers). This claim is simply based on the reasons that calculations have not 
existed in the form demonstrated in this paper (hence, were not obvious for 
farmers beforehand) and the collection and processing of information has taken 
the author a long time. Thus, the market is surely handicapped to remove these 
distortions by its own mechanisms. 
Also, market power (defined as the ability to alter the market price of a good or 
service) must be seen to distort the market, if producers attain (full) discretionary 
powers on the behaviour on the market. Austrian Farmers are to be seen in 
control of essential resources: Austrian comestibles. But given the fact, that 
neighbouring countries are also involved in agriculture, this power cannot be 
judged too highly regarding the consumers. If consumers are scared off by the 
farmers’ ignorance of the outlined facts, and unsprayed fruit is available (e.g. 
from South Tyrol), the market power of Austrian farmers will be broken. If 
spraying will go on in Austria and apples will be categorized into ‘sprayed’ and 
‘unsprayed’ by food retailers, at least in some respect the market will show the 
consumers’ WTP with the help of the contingent valuation of customer reaction 
(choice). However, if the market does not reward the production of 
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environmentally sustainable production techniques, the costs will not be 
internalised voluntarily by the farmers. 
Only the measurement of external benefits and costs enables governments to 
correct coherent market-failures moving to market equilibrium by installing 
measures to adjust (shadow-)prices to negative external effects, so that these 
have to be internalised by the economy and by providing subsidies for positive 
externalities, taking into account monetary benefits for excluded factors.671 The 
case is therefore a typical reason for governmental intervention. 
C8.2. Bargaining Process 
Fruit growers retrieve bundled information from the BOV but also from 
information exchange amongst each other. As for example stated in the 
[Interview BOV] the information of the severe economic losses caused by FB in 
2007 (a heavy FB-year) have made the rounds quickly amongst the fruit growers: 
DI Greimel from the BOV states in the interview that “[t]he pressure regarding 
the permission for the use of streptomycin in Austria came from the fruit growers. 
2007 there had been clearances. This information travelled among the fruit 
growers and there was great fear of fire blight posing a threat to their existence 
and pressure on the BOV has been great to attain [said] permission. From the 
perspective of the BOV it is also judged reasonable to demand [the use of] 
streptomycin.” Also in the [Interview Global 2000] it is stated by Dr. Burtscher, 
that (regarding the authorization in 2005 and 2006) “[t]he pressure for 
permission of streptomycin emanated from Vorarlberg. The Vorarlberger Fruit 
Growers looked with envy at their German colleagues at the other shore of the 
lake who were allowed to use streptomycin.” It is claimed that although the 
minister remarked not to authorize streptomycin in early 2005, however it was 
allowed in Vorarlberg that year. In the “three-country” report on FB ([DBMELV 
2005]) it says that it had been allowed for six intensive orchardists (but as 
mentioned before already no further information is revealed). In the [Interview 
Global 2000] it is learnt that 19.5 ha (only!) were involved in the exemption of 
the ban - one really has to ask the questions as to whether these acreages really 
needed the levering of a European-wide ban?! 
The [ORF 01] reports, that “because orchardists in Vorarlberg had suffered severe 
losses in the past years they campaigned for the authorization of the 
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antibiotic”.672 On the occasion of the authorization of streptomycin in 2008 (10th 
of March until 15th of June) the LKÖ states that “without the authorization 
intensive orchardists in Vorarlberg would not have survived anymore”.673 This is 
somewhat exaggerated IMHO, since the organic fruit growers also managed to 
survive without streptomycin. Mr. Moosbrugger (from the Agricultural Chamber in 
Vorarlberg) has stated that the Voralberger orchardists would not want to use 
streptomycin at any cost, but that the agent would only be used where there is 
no alternative.674 How could a farmer possibly judge this situation? 
In [LKV 01] the following is stated675: “After the late authorization of 
streptomycin in Austria in 2007, which has led to severe damages in Vorarlberg, 
it seems that one has reacted on the pressure of the agricultural chambers 
and the fruit growers associations” (because the BAES has approved the 
antibiotic streptomycin 2008). The full-time-fruit growers have clearly achieved 
what they wanted in 2008 (it needs to be seen whether this was a positive result 
for them) and the BOV is noticeably satisfied stating that “[t]he aim of the BOV, 
the achievement of a federal uniform and efficient pest control concept, has been 
reached” and the Executive Director thanked “BMLFUW, AGES, the Provinces and 
the representatives of the beekeepers on behalf of the BOV for their good 
cooperation“.676 
Regarding the authorization for agricultural use of streptomycin the BOV was, 
according to the information of DI Greimel, involved in the decision process “in 
close cooperation with the BMLFUW and AGES in the Round Tables, where all 
stakeholders are represented. By (direct) communication with and hearing of all 
parties it has been tried to balance the interests of all parties involved. The 
Federal Ministry decides after this hearing (ultimately bearing responsibility).”677 
Further stating the BOV could take influence on the decision process “[i]n 
personal contact with the bodies.”  
Furthermore, the author reckons that the unintelligibly withdrawal of the AMA 
quality seal for both the streptomycin and the BP treated acreage must have been 
some kind of “act of reprisal” against the alternative producers, who have been 
suspected to have caused the media response and the coherent problems of 
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public awareness (and therefore a relapse for the protagonists of streptomycin). 
This explanation is undermined by an article of the BOV magazine “Better fruit” 
[BOV 5_2008] on this issue: the sentence explaining the issue that BP is now 
subject to the same procedure as streptomycin (clearly causing discontent for 
bio-ferm) is followed by the statement: “it has also denied having been behind 
the boycott of the supermarket chains (mentioning that there was a newspaper 
article, in which an agricultural member of the Styrian government has claimed 
that producers of alternative products have succeeded to cause the hype (medial 
response) on the antibiotic issue.”678 It is supposed by the author, that the 
withdrawal of the AMA quality seal has to be seen to be some kind of payback for 
this, to suppress future actions. Dr. Donat, (from bio-ferm, the producer of BP) 
however, quoted in the same article, argues that apparently “beekeepers have 
found out about the existing biological alternative and have on their part 
recommended the product (also by press releases) because this constituted a 
solution for their problems and they could offer the fruit growers an ecological 
alternative” 679. 
C8.3. Assumed Governmental Failures in the Case 
Study 
C8.3.1. Information Failures 
C8.3.1.1. “No Health Risk Deriving from Residues in Fruit”  
According to [ORF 01] the Styrian Agricultural Economic Chamber argues that the 
antibiotic is degraded within hours and fruit is guaranteed to be free of 
residues. Also the chairman of the Vorarlberg full-time-orchardists Jens Blum, is 
cited to guarantee, that the apples would be free of residues (he is again of the 
opinion that it is broken down within hours).680 Presumably this opinion was 
based on the streptomycin assessment issued by AGES claiming that there are 
“no residues given with the blossom-usage of streptomycin in pome fruit 
growing”681. [ORF 03] reported the Environmental Institute to have proclaimed in 
September that apples from sprayed areas have not shown to contain residues, 
but already in September 2008 “knowledge” on the time-span of the breaking 
down of streptomycin had to be revised. Suddenly it was stated that “to date it 
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was assumed that the antibiotic is degraded within a few days”682: Mr. Zainer 
from the Environmental Institute stated that “this assumption would now have to 
be questioned” and that “it is indicated, that this phase takes longer” 683. The 
question arising for the author is why it is questioned only now, and why it has 
not been subject of exact examination beforehand? As stated by Prof. Pittner 
where streptomycin is sprayed in agriculture, it lacks natural surroundings and 
the “normal conditions” (formed through evolution) and therefore also breaking 
down of streptomycin is doubtful. Maybe this is the explanation for the recent 
findings: on the 14.11.2008 AGES has, for the first time, proved the existence of 
antibiotic residues in (8 out of 12684!) apples, containing between 1.9 and 12 
µg/kg685. A new method of analysis disproves all the experts’ positions (opinions,) 
claiming that the antibiotic, because it was being used on the blossoms, is not 
contained in the apples at harvest. The reaction of AGES was (as it might already 
be expected by the reader) to play down the issue. In its official paper [AGES 19] 
the agency states that residues were only found in “a few cases” (please refer to 
the numbers provided above: are 8 out of 12 samples “a few”? This is indeed, 
without a doubt, the majority!). 
Furthermore it is stated that before the new detection method (now revealing the 
existence of residues), detection limits lay between 0.02 – 0.05 mg.686 With the 
allowed residue limit being 50µg/kg687 with apples, this is just enough to proof 
the allowed contamination?! What seems strange to the author is the fact, that in 
honey the detection limit has been 5µg/kg for quite some time. Further it is 
judged quite alarming that apples have a higher residue limit than honey, given 
the fact that the per capita consumption of honey is about 1.5kg/year688 and 
28kg/year689 for apples respectively. AGES states that the “products are safe 
comestibles and that no risks at all exist when consumed.”690 After the scientific 
inputs were collected and presented in this paper, and the need to knock over 
other dogmas already, the author is not so sure about that! Other “scientific” 
false information has also been proclaimed erroneously: “Girsch691 sees no 
danger for the later fruit: this has been confirmed at scientific meetings.”692 
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Anyways: as outlined before at least one physician from the biggest hospital in 
the capital of Austria (AKH Vienna) has been seen on TV by the author to respond 
negatively to these emergences in the subsequent press conference on the news 
on residues in apples (as outlined earlier). 
Therefore, although §1 GESG rules for AGES that the precautionary principle 
should be considered when aiming for the protection of consumer interests, it is 
not realized and appropriate prevention-measures for “potential” (and surely 
existing, but not disentangleable to measure the absolute impact (yet)) 
endangerment is not taken. 
C8.3.1.2. Missing Information on the Negative Effects of Streptomycin  
As a fact, by the reports available online by AGES the following message is 
delivered: streptomycin is subject to strict constraints of which NO risk to human 
health is resulting from: on the homepage of AGES it is e.g. stated, that the 
usage of streptomycin is “bound to strictest constraints, so that no danger the 
health of human, animal and environment results” and accordingly the BOV 
transmits this information to the farmers, that there are “no health risks to 
worry about from the usage of streptomycin for the neighbours of fruit 
orchards”.693 This is simply not true. In contrast to these claims, other scientific 
opinions have been displayed in depth. Maybe this is even understood by the BOV 
when it further argues in the same issue that “the calculable risk of streptomycin 
exertion stands opposite the no longer calculable danger of further exhaustive 
occurrence of a plant disease endangering national fruit growing in its 
existence”694 nevertheless clearly showing, that there is incoherency in 
information and misinformation regarding the fact that the risks of agricultural 
usage of streptomycin is calculable and that economic pressure is great. 
Competent governmental authorities have failed to point out the risks involved 
with the agricultural use of streptomycin, have missed out on warnings on the 
hazardous facts of streptomycin, extenuating these and failing to understand and 
manage risks. This has to be seen in the context of a statement of [Telephone 
Call Hofer], where the interviewee stated, that Dr. Girsch (AGES) has presented a 
slide-show on streptomycin with the basic message that it is used internationally, 
except in South Tyrol, and that streptomycin was “harmless”. It must be feared, 
that this kind of information policy has been addressed by the statement printed 
in the BOV magazine, that during the meeting on the 29th of April 2008 “many a 
                                          
693 [BOV 5_2008], p. 3 (translated by the author) 
694 [BOV 05_2008], p. 2 (translated by the author) 
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misunderstanding could be cleared up between the representatives of the big 
chains of the food retailers, AGES, the AMA and the BOV and the understanding 
for the fruit growers could be improved.”695 The same failure of information is 
found in Upper Austria [Interview ÖOLVB] Mr. Liedlbauer explaining the case of 
an orchardist in Goldwörth (being a major supplier of drinking water for the city 
of Linz) where the “mayor and the community doctor opposed the use of 
streptomycin” with the result that the applicant for streptomycin was convinced to 
refrain from the usage, claiming that he had not known about the danger to 
health.. The same has been achieved in the hometown of the author, where 
another orchardist, applying for streptomycin in 2008, could be convinced to 
forego the usage of streptomycin in favour for the organic alternative BP, after 
introducing the “other side of the coin”. It must therefore be assumed, that 
unbiased information of the orchardists, would result in more understanding of 
the actual impacts caused, even resulting in voluntary non-individualism as 
shown in at least these two cases. 
C8.3.1.3. Dismissing Alternatives 
Dr. Blümel answers the question of the author whether there are other plant 
protection products effective against FB by stating that “[t]here are other plant 
protection products achieving comparable696 efficacy, but only under certain 
conditions (climate, etc.), however with streptomycin a continuous high effect can 
be expected.” Also Dr. Burtscher in [Interview Global 2000] claims that “AGES 
continuously transports the information, that streptomycin is the only effective 
agent there is, which is not true” (shown and discussed in previous chapters of 
this paper). In his regard “[s]treptomycin seems to be a tranquilizer, but other 
measures that will lead to containment of the infection pressure will have to be 
found.” AGES itself therefore seems to be conveying the information on the 
insufficient efficacy of alternatives such as BP and hinders the changeover to 
environmentally sustainable practices. 
C8.3.1.4. Uncommon Information Policy 
Given the striking news of (disclaimed) antibiotic residues found in treated fruit 
AGES provides this information in an article on their homepage saying “Fire Blight 
Pest Control 2008 - current situation”697 in a paragraph way down in the 
respective document (playing down the issue as explained before). The Media has 
                                          
695 [BOV 6_2008], p. 3 (translated by the author) 
696 Remark by the author: to streptomycin 
697 [AGES 19] 
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published much more detailed information than stated by AGES (actually having 
the actual information at first hand). The procedure is very similar to the 
communication policy of the Austrian Chamber of Agriculture noted by Mr. 
Burtscher (Global 2000) in 2008: “on the occasion of the first application of 
streptomycin to pear trees the heading of the article said “No danger for apple 
trees”. The author can only agree that “[n]ormally you might expect the main 
news of an article to be contained in the header.”698 
C8.3.1.5. Missing Transparency and the “Public’s Right to Know” 
The author has to criticise heavily AGES for ignoring the request for information 
of the author by the “Institute for the Evaluation & Authorization of Plant 
Protection Products”, an important interview partner in regard to this case study. 
Despite the many efforts of the author of this thesis these were simply ignored 
and it was not possible to obtain information from this institute at all. The 
questions provided in the Annex of this study [Interview AGES 02], which the 
author has addressed to this Institute therefore remain without answers. Only 
contact with AGES Institute for Plant Health could be achieved ([Interview AGES 
01]. 
Furthermore, in the interview with the BOV, when again it was claimed that “[i]f 
the substance is used according to the obligations, risk is negligible” and that 
AGES has also sought the “expert opinion of physicians” the author requested for 
this expert opinion to be shown, because it has not been retrievable via AGES. DI 
Greimel answered that the BOV might not be allowed to pass on this expert 
opinion: “I don’t think it is open to the public” - apart from being outdated, 
because of the residues found in fruit. It is actually completely unclear and very 
baffling, that this document should be subject to secrecy by AGES and has been 
unavailable to the author. There is no reason why these assumptions are hidden 
from the public, since there are also no concerns over “data privacy”. 
Art. 4 of the Aarhus Convention, international law established under the 
auspices of the UN, ruling the public’s right to access information (also known by 
the public’s right to know), must therefore be seen to be ignored by the Austrian 
authorities. 
                                          
698 [Interview Global 2000] 
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C8.3.2. Individualism Failures 
C8.3.2.1. Rent Seeking 
According to Mr. Burtscher “AGES has always boasted about resisting 
persuasion”699 in regard to the authorization of streptomycin. It can only be 
guessed, what has led AGES to change their minds… …obviously the BOV’s 
(wrong) argument that “[t]he economic risk of a non-application [remark by the 
author: of streptomycin] is many times higher [remark by the author: than the 
health risk].”700 
C8.3.2.2. Regulatory Capture - The ÖPUL-Subsidy Exemption  
Interestingly there has been an exemption for the ÖPUL-subsidy in connection 
with FB: The “ÖPUL”701-subsidy is normally only granted to a farm for the total 
acreage if it exclusively makes use of permitted plant protection agents (named 
in the positive “IP”-list). But in 2008 the usage of streptomycin, which is of 
course not allowed on the IP-list, did not imply the loss of the whole subsidy, but 
only the part of the farming land treated with streptomycin due to special 
arrangements. Trying to find out who has caused this exemption, the 
responsibility concerning the ÖPUL has not been easy ascertain. Dr. Blümel from 
AGES states at [Interview AGES 02] that “[r]egarding the control, handling of 
payments (and penalizing) of the ÖPUL-subsidy the AMA is responsible”. But DI 
Greßl from the AMA responds (to the author’s questions whether the organisation 
played any role regarding the decision process and which view the AMA takes and 
above all how the special regulation of the ÖPUL emerged) that the AMA is the 
wrong point of contact, because the BAES has issued the admission of 
streptomycin and that the question “regarding the ÖPUL neither the AMA 
Marketing GesmbH nor the AMA as appointed paying agent are responsible, but 
the Life-Ministry (BMLFUW).”702 Mr. Lukas Weber-Hajszan from the BMLFUW then 
responded to the author confirming the exemption703 for streptomycin in 2008 
(for 2009 the exemption will depend on gathered experience): although 
streptomycin is not included in the list, (only!) for the acreages with 
streptomycin-usage no IP-premium (300 € per ha) will be granted. DI Greimel 
                                          
699 [Interview Global 2000] 
700 [Interview BOV] 
701 A certain amount depending on the “soil index” influenced by many factors such as 
climate, height, etc.  
702 See Annex II, “AMA” 
703 Due to the regulations of the “Sonderrichtlinie ÖPUL 2007” (chapters 1.6.10.9 and 
1.6.10.10) included in the Annex III. 
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from the BOV responded on the reasons for this exemption that “[i]t constitutes a 
compromise between the BOV and the BMLFUW. Background is that fruit growers 
would have been forced into illegality, because of demoralized reporting 
behaviour. There were reasonable fears that farmers would have used 
streptomycin illegally, if the subsidy would have been handled so strictly.”704 
Further the interviewee stated that exemptions like these were no common 
practice. The author judges this exemption to be perverse subsidisation. 
C8.3.2.3. Regulatory Capture Institutions’ Mission Failure 
The Minister of the BMLFUW is devoted to the economic well-being of this sector 
and as learnt in [Interview ÖIB] clearly orientates towards the greatest share of 
interest groups, which in this case study are found to be the 2600 pome-fruit-
farmers rather than the 252 beekeepers living on the honey-production – totally 
ignoring the economic losses of the 22500 “hobby”-beekeepers and the health 
risks of the general public (> 8 millions). Insuring the economic safety of a small 
group of intensive fruit farmers reveals a great preference over the safety of 
Austrian society as a whole.  
Further the assumptions on the information failures (“no health risk deriving from 
residues in fruit”, “no health risks to worry about from the usage of 
streptomycin”) leads to the question why AGES, actually being the institution to 
ensure Health and Food Safety in Austria, trades these aims off somewhat lightly 
against economic power. 
C8.3.3. Quality of Leadership 
C8.3.3.1. Missing Consolidated Data 
As pointed out in chapter “C3.4.1. Authorization Procedure for Streptomycin” 
before, this is all the information that has been obtained from AGES (in the 
“three-country” reports, criticized before to miss out on ordered and complete 
data, please refer to the underlined passages in the chapter). Apart from these 
inputs no more detailed data was available to the author. 
a) Missing Consolidated Data on Fire Blight Damage 
Because no “Pest Risk Assessment (PRA) for FB was carried out specifically for 
Austria up to now, as the relevant PRA procedures were not existent in the form 
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which is applied today at the time when fireblight was first detected in Austria” 
(as Austria at was not part of the EU in 1993).705 Asked for data on the economic 
loss of FB since we have the problem here in Austria, had been answered in the 
following way: “due to the organisational changes, data (regarding FB infection) 
of the respective period is not available electronically at AGES (data from EU 
monitorings are available since 1995 when Austria was recognised as protected 
zone for FB)”706.  
Asking AGES at [Interview AGES 01] for bundled information on FB occurrence 
(e.g. on an Austria-wide map) it was stated that “[t]he operation data of the 
individual farmers with fire blight infections is collected by the Official Regional 
Plant Protection Service and is only made available to the province authorities, 
but are not forwarded to the state level under the cover of data privacy 
protection. Generally there are no problems to bundle national monitoring data 
for EU surveys on quarantine pests, but the collection of data points for a 
distribution map on federal level of FB is not possible at present. Therefore there 
is no detailed national data map of the fire-blight disease for Austria as a whole.”  
b) Missing Consolidated Data on Authorised Farmers and Streptomycin Usage 
The BOV, when asked for a list of the Austrian full-time orchardists with the 
according size and value (according to their annual crop yield) of their orchards, 
had no consolidated data at hand, but referred to the Austrian Statistics Office. It 
has been stated, that classification of the BOV is equal to the one used by the 
Austrian Statistics Office707 in combination with a further criterion (“fruit-growing-
surcharge”; which could not be worked out by the author in the scope of this 
paper to adjust the calculation presented above by the author). But DI Greimel 
judged the author’s calculations to “seem to be correct”, confirming that 
“[a]dditional information regarding accumulative data on federal state level is not 
available to the BOV apart from the Statistics Austria data” at [Interview BOV]. 
The number of potential applicants for streptomycin (number of full-time 
orchardists) could also not be obtained by the AGES Institute of Plant Health 
because it is claimed not to fall in “its area of responsibility”708 and the question 
should have been addressed to the Institute for the Evaluation & Authorization of 
                                          
705 [Interview AGES 01] Dr. Blümel 
706 [Interview AGES 01] Dr. Blümel 
707 I.e. being 0,15 ha and trees that are planted according to a certain order. A census 
is conducted every five years. 
708 [Interview AGES 01] 
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Plant Protection Products of AGES, which unfortunately was not responding to the 
author. It has therefore been very difficult and laborious to retrieve the data 
concerning the whole of Austria, because it was not available on a federal level 
(although it is stated that data is forwarded from the provinces to the federal 
state level) and the author has refrained from culling data from provincial level 
for reasons of effort (time constraints). Therefore there no “official” number of 
qualified applicants for streptomycin-use could be retrieved from official sources. 
The yearly reports on FB in Austria issued by AGES, that include “details on who, 
when, where, has used which quantities of streptomycin” are claimed to exist by 
DI Greimel (BOV), but have not been found by the author. 
Additionally data has been found to be contradictory between the Austrian 
Statistics Office and the Agricultural Chamber. One Austrian Statistics Office 
reports on the crops of fruit of “extensive orchards”709 providing the following 
data: 
Table 18: Crops of fruit of “extensive orchards”, Source: [Statistik Austria 2007 
agriculture] 
Year Apples (in tons) Pears (in tons) 
2003 175.184 8.917 
2004 197.703 9.483 
2005 219.598 9.746 
2006 184.667 7.825 
2007 221.458 10.158 
 
But in [LKÖ 03], p. 224 the table "Crops of fruit 2006-2007" (although 
mentioning the source to be “Statistik Austria, Ergebnisse der landwirtschaftlichen 
Statistik”) draws up the same numbers to be the yield of intensive fruit growing. 
Table 19: [LKÖ 03] p. 224, table "Crops of fruit 2006-2007" 
Kind of fruit Total harvest (in tons) Acreage in ha 
 2006 2007 2006 2007 
     
Apples summer 3.780 3.758 197 197 
Apples winter 180.887 217.700 5.863 5.864 
Apples total 184.667 221.458 6.060 6.061 
     
Pears summer 2.789 3.484 200 200 
Pears winter 5.036 6.674 214 214 
Pears total 7.825 10.158 414 414 
Total 372.123 446.400 12.320 12.322 
 
                                          
709 [Statistik Austria 2007 agriculture], p. 46, table 4 
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It must be assumed, that the Statistic Austria Office has lapsed. But the author is 
somewhat irritated, that data is not convincingly validated and was not available 
(to the author) by the authorities and had to be retrieved under laborious efforts 
from partly contradictory sources, requiring the author to draw up his own 
calculations, because data was not at hand from authorities. This is quite an 
astonishing fact in times of electronic data processing and again shows the big 
gap between the possibilities of IT and the real facts. Reasons provided are data 
privacy, which is not a constraint for the availability of consolidated information: 
the author did not want to retrieve personal data of certain farmers, but an exact 
overview on the Austrian situation - and so should the managers! 
C8.3.3.2. Absence of Full Social Cost Calculation for Evaluation 
Asked for the pre-existence of a CBA within AGES, Dr. Blümel has stated, that the 
Official Plant Protection Services of some Austrian provinces, but also the Austrian 
Fruit Growers “have established rather “simple” calculations. Starting from the 
summation of all pome fruit acreage the cost of crop failure (costs of clearing, 
income-loss in the year of clearing and the following years, costs of replanting) 
was apportioned on a hectare-basis to oppose the costs of non-action. Clearly the 
result was that some action had to be taken.”710 
Hence there is no aggregated data available on the farmers, there is no 
conclusion on the FB damage caused up to now and clearly no social CBA exists 
within AGES. Supposedly the risk imposed on society is judged to be at a level 
considered ‘acceptable’. 
Also “[o]n the part of the BOV regarding the risk factors of streptomycin no 
calculations exist. […] Only calculations relating to the economic scope exist, as 
for example the calculation of Dr. Steinbauer from Provincial Government of 
Styria, considering the economic loss of fire blight for compensation matters.”711 
C8.3.3.3. Delaying Usability of Alternatives 
It has to be remarked by the author at this point that despite the additional 
criticisms regarding the unavailability of exact data on FB in Austria (as 
mentioned before (permission procedure of streptomycin) it is noticed that by 
both the German and the Austrian authorities establishing the annual “three-
country”-report on FB seem to have been sleeping on quickly establishing 
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knowledge on useful alternatives. Streptomycin may have created a backlog on 
the intensive search and refinement of alternatives perceived IMHO reading the 
FB-Reports of 2003-2007:  
Already in the report of 2003 the antagonistic product “BPMC 2023” was found to 
have an efficiency grade of 77% (with in the same trial “Plantomycin” only 
reaching up to 71%). The question whether it was to be classified as a plant 
protection agent or a plant resistance improver (Pflanzenstärkungsmittel) 
arose.712 Likewise the author has noticed is that text is repeatedly copy-pasted in 
these protocols, e.g. the complete text of [AGES RT 01], p.13 is repeated in 
[AGES RT 02a], p.7, further [AGES RT 01], p.5 = [AGES RT 02a], p.6 and the 
calls (for a consistent FB host plant rule) have already been postulated in [AGES 
RT 01], p.18.713. 
In 2004 this question was still not solved and it is postulated, that it should be 
found out, whether the 4-times application could be reduced without loosing 
effectiveness, whether forecasting systems could be used to reinforce this 
effectiveness and whether the combined spraying of yeast-incompatible 
fungicides could be accomplished714. In the conclusion it is stated that results 
indicate an aptitude (suitability) of yeasts but that these cannot be recommended 
for practical use. 715 In the Austrian part of the report it is stated, that yeast-
preparations are partly very satisfying, but that the dispersion by bees should be 
modified.716 
2005 Blossom protect fb, BPASc and Funguran have shown an effectiveness of 
more than 70%717 and it is concluded that further efforts in 2006 have to be 
made in optimising the usage of BP and possible rise of efficiency by a 
combination of certain products. 
In 2006 BP had been found to have an efficiency above 60%, two other yeast 
preparations even reaching 70% and above, which is stated to be not 
significantly different to the efficiency of “Strepto” – but not supplying any more 
detailed data and concluding that it has to be examined if this efficiency will be 
                                          
712 DBMELV 2003], p. 9 
713 Further examples: [AGES RT 02a], p. 23 = [AGES RT 01], p. 15; one part of [AGES 
RT 02a], p. 21 is the same as [AGES RT 01], p. 14 and the question in the second paragraph 
(regarding a possible data privacy issues) has already been postulated in [AGES RT 01], p. 1; 
[AGES RT 03], p. 9 = [AGES RT 02a], p. 16; [AGES RT 03], p. 8 = [AGES RT 02a], p. 14 
714 DBMELV 2004], p. 12 
715 DBMELV 2004], p. 26 
716 DBMELV 2004], p. 30 
717 DBMELV 2005], p. 15 
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achieved over several trial years and that the effects on fruit-russeting is to be 
examined closer.718  
Research work has been undertaken, but it must be assumed that the procedure 
would have been different in the absence of the existing possibility to fall back on 
streptomycin: the hesitating evaluation of possible alternatives is very critical and 
cautious (an approach missing in judging streptomycin) and is, however, always 
compared to a measure, that is actually forbidden. Further these measures have 
only been compared by their efficiency values and not by their true social costs! 
C8.3.3.4. Interwoven Institutions (Authorities and Competence Jungles) 
The relationship between AGES and BAES is not easy to understand. “AGES 
partners with BAES and the organisations share the same services, personnel and 
building.”719 The question arises how an Office (organisation) can “lend” its 
personnel to another (without actually being the organisation)? Does the BAES 
only exist “virtually”? Contradictions related to this issue are: 
• “The BAES is the competent authority of first instance for the 
enforcement of the […] Austrian Plant Protection Law 1995 (as per §6 
(1) GESG No. 5)”720. But also regarding the Institute for Plant Health of 
AGES it is stated “Enforcement of Austrian Plant Protection Law 1995 
as the authority of first instance […].”721 How can both authorities 
(BAES and AGES) be authorities of first instance for the Austrian Plant 
Protection Law 1995? When asked by the author, Dr. Blümel 
responded that the BAES is the authority of first instance for the 
Austrian Plant Protection Law 1995. 
• Further, whether APSD is subordinated to either AGES or BAES is not 
apparent because of following contradictory statements found again on 
the official homepages: “The tasks of the Official Austrian Plant 
Protection Service at AGES […]”722, then again “Management and 
coordination of the Official Austrian Plant Protection Service at the 
                                          
718 DBMELV 2006], p. 16 
719 [AGES 06] (translated by the author); similarly formulated on [AGES 05]; Legal 
basis is §6(5) GESG (“Das Bundesamt für Ernährungssicherheit hat sich, um die Vollziehung in 
der in Abs. 1 angeführten hoheitlichen Aufgaben [Remark by the author: number 4 = Plant 
Protection Agent Law] zu bewirken, auch der der Agentur zu Gebote stehenden Mittel zu 
bedienen.”) 
720 [AGES BAES] (translated by the author) 
721 [AGES 02], p. 82 (translated by the author); also stated in [AGES 04] 
722 [AGES 05] 
210 
BAES […]”723 further “The tasks of BAES are […] Official Austrian Plant 
Protection Service (APSD)”.724 But the APSD is also found to be listed 
as a part of the Institute for Plant Health of the AGES, but then again 
stating the APSD “at the BAES”725. 
• Dr. Bernhard Url is managing director of AGES and director of BAES726 
appointed by notice from BMLFUW (in agreement with BMFGJ)727, 
hence being IMHO a strategic political figure. 
The relationship is apparently not only confusing the author: Even the Austrian 
Chamber of Agriculture728 states that AGES is the administrative body having 
authorized streptomycin in Austria (which is actually BAES…). Further in [BOV HP] 
the Executive Director thanked “BMLFUW, AGES, Provinces and the 
representatives of the beekeepers on the behalf of BOV for the good 
cooperation“, not at all naming BAES, although actually being the institution 
issuing the allowance?! This leads to the assumption that BAES is practically not 
perceived to have an autonomous role in the bargaining process. 
Further in [LKÖ 03] it is stated that the “Agricultural Economic Chamber is 
represented in all AMA Marketing advisory boards. Together with agreements on 
concrete measures, thereby the strategic alignment towards the quality segment 
is always minded”729. AMA also seems to work closely together with BMLFUW: 
cited over a hundred times in the “Green report”, while AGES (as a comparison) 
is only cited five times.  
The process of attaining listing on the IP-list (necessary for ÖPUL-subsidy) is that 
the Industry and the Agricultural Chambers suggest plant protection products, 
these are then evaluated by the Institute of Plant Health of AGES (interestingly 
not the Institute for the Evaluation & Authorization of Plant Protection Products of 
AGES), suggesting to BMLFUW to accept or reject the agents on the list (in a 
reiterative process). 
C9. Concluding Remarks and Outlook 
Since the agricultural sector can heavily impact and interact with the state of the 
environment it is therefore crucial to direct the actions of farmers in the best way 
                                          
723 [APSD 02] 
724 [AGES BAES] 
725 [AGES 02], p. 83 (translation by the author) 
726 [BMLFUW 02] 
727 According to §6(4) GESG 
728 E.g. in [LKÖ 04] and [LKÖ 05] 
729 [LKÖ 03], p. 96 (translated by the author) 
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possible. Thus, which information is passed on by competent authorities, and 
which incentives are given, will be crucial for endowment of a country’s public 
good and “healthy environment”. 
Already outlined market and government failures interact with the social optimal 
quantity of innovation, enhancement and dissemination of environmentally 
sustainable methods.730 The substance streptomycin (authorized year after year 
again), has not interfered in the lengthy, laborious and extensive risk-minimizing 
requirements to minimise risks as per the EU Directive 414/91, and of course can 
provide a product at a lower price: the research costs are not imposed on the 
product, but therefore the risk taken is very high! With the use of biological 
agents, like Blossom Protect, the EU level requirements have been fulfilled and 
are now only subject to bureaucracy. 
The issue of antibiotics used against FB necessarily has to lead to the agricultural 
sector’s awareness of producing what the customer wants (being perceived to not 
want antibiotics in food production as pointed out by the food retailer Spar and 
the market study). When there is a lack of good governance, consumer 
awareness has the power of driving decision processes towards internalising 
externalities that are burdened on the beekeepers and the customers at the 
moment. 
C9.1. Restoring Austrian-wide Management 
Also regarding the compensation payments for the financial losses due to FB 
(clearing and planting of new trees) there are different schemes in the individual 
provinces731 and the advantage of Federalism is dubious. Bacteria do not stop at 
the borders of the provinces and the plant-pathogen FB is the same everywhere. 
It does not seem clear why we need nine different regulations and approaches. 
An Austrian-wide national approach would be more advantageous showing 
synergy-effects. Capacities to restore the individual laws could be saved (or 
above all exist), the nationwide handling of compensation payments (or the 
installation of an insurance against FB) would generate more security and 
uniformity for the relevant farmers, etc. Further it can only be recommended to 
intensify the strict eradication of ornamental shrubs host plants (e.g. cotoneaster) 
at least from public places and within the agricultural sector (according to the 
                                          
730 Compare the case in [Jaffe et al 2005] 
731 [DBMELV 2003], p. 18 
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example of South Tyrol), one of many measures, which additionally will diminish 
the danger of infection. 
C9.2. Related Studies 
Also [Heilig et al 2002] tried to demonstrate governmental failure and short-
sightedness of the pharmaceutical industry in the use of the antimicrobial 
“fluoroquinolones”, likewise calling for governments to act in the public interest732 
to stop the contributions of bacterial resistance in humans demanding that 
“[n]ontherapeutic agricultural use of antibiotics should stop while its risks are 
fully assessed”.733 
[Maumbe 2003] showed a case where better education for farmers and full 
accounting for the hidden health costs of pesticide use results in better decisions 
about agricultural pest management of small cotton growers in Zimbabwe.734 
The article of [Bøgelund 2007] investigates on this reality of policy making (within 
the policy area of car taxation) trying to find out “how environmental discourses 
may or may not impact on contemporary policy processes”735. According to her 
article “the existing dominating institutional system related to car taxation deals 
only superficially and disengaged with the immense environmental problems that 
face the transport sector of today”, rated as being evidence for a system that is 
robust and resistant against alternative discourses, underlined by the finding that 
the “Ministry for Finance is still the dominating actor within the field and car 
taxation is still primarily a matter of yield, growth and welfare.” [Bøgelund 2007] 
has found that “In situations where the environmental question clashes with more 
essential concerns of the dominating discourse, the dominating actors have 
successfully acted to encapsulate or roll back the attempts of shaping the tax 
system according to environmental aims” and that “the economic ministries have 
been increasingly able to reject environmental demands on the car taxation 
system; if they have not at the same time served more traditional economic 
aims”.736 
                                          
732 For the interested reader: The profit-motivated pharmaceutical industry (Bayer 
Corporation) reacted in the guise of a trade association of manufacturers of animal drugs and 
[Heilig et al 2002] state that the Animal Health Institute erroneously claimed that “The assertion 
that there is increasing evidence that resistance developed in animals is spreading to humans is 
not true,” and it went on to oppose any further restriction on agricultural use. 
733 [Heilig et al 2002] 
734 [Maumbe 2003] 
735 [Bøgelund 2007], p. 79 
736 [Bøgelund 2007], p. 88 et seq. 
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One of the main strategies identified by [Bøgelund 2007] maintaining the status 
quo, are:  
• access-denial of environmental actors “to the central decision-making 
circles” 
• the “salami method” which is according to [Bøgelund 2007] used in 
several policy processes and works by challenging environmental aims 
by argumentation bound in the old regime cutting off one slice after 
amputating original proposals and changing the agenda to a more 
traditional economic agenda 
• delaying tactics used to “prolong the process or perhaps to wear out 
environmental actors” 
• jurisdictional power is a good power base and used for instance to 
shape the content of directives.  
“It is however easier to obstruct, to deny and to delay, if the aim is to avoid 
rather than to obtain something”.737 and the “broader and more sustainability 
oriented”738 environmental issues are framed the more they tend to loose ground, 
because they need to imply something completely new in existing structures 
opposing the change. 
C9.3. Outlook 
In [DBMELV 2008-2012] the strategy paper for FB from 2008 to 2012 Germany 
draws the conclusion that it is necessary to end the use of streptomycin because 
of the resulting “residual” risk and the precautionary principle towards the 
consumer, further claiming, that it is to be assumed that public acceptance for 
further usage is now only given for a limited time.739 That was the case even 
before the antibiotic residues in apples were proven. As a result of the findings of 
antibiotic residues in apples, Erich Schwärzler (Vorarlberg State Councillor) stated 
that the results (regarding the residues in apples) would have to be checked and 
a usage of streptomycin would be reconsidered in 2009.740 Whether the new 
findings would have consequences on the use of antibiotic is considered to be 
doubtful by AGES according to [ORF 04]. The author hopes that the externalities 
showed in this paper will be borne in mind and both market and governmental 
failures can be overcome. However, there is a positive development of AGES 
                                          
737 [Bøgelund 2007], p. 89 
738 [Bøgelund 2007], p. 90 
739 [DBMELV 2008-2012], p. 5 
740 [ORF 04] 
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becoming more open by planning to involve experts from all economic areas of 
the food chain (even naming consumer protection organisation and NGOs) in 
advisory councils to collaborate on future strategies.741 
In conclusion, the author subscribes to the view of [Bøgelund 2007] that “[m]ore 
attention needs to be paid to the institutional setting of the policy-making process 
if the goal is improved decision making on sustainability” and “understanding of 
contemporary policy-making, as it looks in real life” is being judged to be a key 
challenge for ecological economics to implement sustainability in the policy 
debate,742 since the “[g]overnment alone cannot provide the basis for making 
informed decisions about environment and development.”743 
This paper shall be finalized with a statement that an environmental actor in 
Bøgelund’s case study has made: “to be right is only 10% of success, the 
rest is the process”744. 
                                          
741 [AGES 19] 
742 [Bøgelund 2007], p. 80 
743 [Bøgelund 2007], p. 92 
744 [Bøgelund 2007], p. 92 
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ANNEX I to the Case Study: Interviews 
Prior to the interview the author has declared the reasons for need of inputs:  
“The author (Simona Winkler, Linzerstr. 14, 4490 St. Florian) is writing a thesis 
(in order to attain the academic title “Mag. rer. soc. oec.”) on “Interactions 
between Environmental Law and Economic Power” at the Institute of Industry, 
Energy and Environment at the University of Vienna (Univ.-Prof. Franz Wirl, 
Assistant Professor: DDr. Jürgen Noll) and has decided to provide a case study on 
the contentious issue of agricultural usage of streptomycin against fire blight in 
Austria including making a cost-benefit-analysis. The paper is written in English.” 
Furthermore, it has been stated that the acquired information was going to be 
used to create this case study. In order to distinguish comments and questions by 
the author from the responses of the interviewees, inputs from the author are 
written in italics.  
Following procedure has been developed during the case study to obtain validated 
interview inputs: 
1. Interview questions in advance per Email (has not been the case with all 
interviews right from the beginning). 
2. The interviews were all held in German. 
3. Notes were taken at the interview (the intended recording of the interview 
with a dictating machine has not been used, partly because the interviews 
were too long anyway, or held on the phone, partly because it is maybe 
reminiscent of examinations). 
4. The notes were translated into English. 
5. The protocol was submitted to the interviewee for revision (also including 
further questions of re-assurance or problems of understanding). 
6. The interviewees’ comments on which alterations would have to be done 
to reach status “approved” were incorporated. 
7. The last two steps were re-iterated until… 
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8. … the approval of the interviewee validating the translation to display the 
statements in an authentic way and the consent with for printing of the 
interview in the final version of the thesis were given. 
All interviews and telephone calls included in this Annex are approved, except the 
[Interview AGES 01]: The validation of data has been a laborious process, but 
has nevertheless been included in its UNAPPROVED status (the author explicitly 
stating at this point, that the interview is only the last version of correspondence 
with Dr. Blümel). This “emergency-brake”-procedure was agreed with the 
assistant professor DDr. Noll (being the supervisor of this paper), because the 
(incessant) effort to further re-write or change the statements in some way, did 
not seem helpful in order to carry on with the scope of this paper. Moreover, the 
actually really important inputs would have had to be retrieved by the other AGES 
Institute “for the Evaluation & Authorization of Plant Protection Products”, which 
(as pointed out before) has decided to neglect this study.  
There was also the possibility for interviewees to remain anonymous, as for 
example it has been requested by the interviewee of the company Hofer KG, due 
to “corporate terms of philosophy”. The author has therefore published the 
correspondence without the corresponding data. 
 
1. [Interview bio-ferm] 
Company/Institution: bio-ferm GmbH 
Interviewee(s)/Function(s): Mrs. Dr. DI Christina DONAT (Technical Manager, 
International Registration, R&D) 
Interview Location: c/o IFA (Interuniversitäres Forschungsinstitut für Agrarbiotechnologie), 
Konrad Lorenz Straße. 20, 3430 Tulln, Austria 
Date and Time: 16.07.2008, 10:00-11:30 + 04.11.08  
Document Status: APPROVED 
 
Author: What is “Blossom Protect” (BP), who produces it and how does it work? 
Dr. Donat: Blossom Protect (BP) is an biological plant protection product based on two 
active ingredients (isolates of Aureobasidium pullulans (Ap.). These are “dematiaceous 
fungus” isolated from apple trees. The antagonistic microorganisms are growing in the 
blossoms off apple and pear trees, so inhibiting the infection of the blossoms with Erwinia 
amylovorum, the causal agent of Fireblight. A possible mode of action is the production of 
organic acids, this results in a low pH in the blossoms and this low pH is known to be 
unfeasible for propagation of Erwinia.  
BP is produced by the bio-tech company bio-ferm, the company was founded by scientists 
of the University of Natural Resources and Applied Life Sciences, Vienna. 
Author: What is “Aureobasidium pullulans” (Ap.)? 
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Dr. Donat: A.pullulans is a yeast-like fungi belonging to the group of dothideales, some 
strains of A. pullulans are used in food technology for the production of "pullulan" 
(capsules of medicaments, "eatable paper"). Ap. is distributed widely throughout the 
environment, populating apple trees naturally. It is not genetically modified. 
Author: What is the difference compared to the working mechanism of streptomycin? 
Dr. Donat: It does not kill the E.a. bacteria, causing accusations, but it must be 
considered, that therefore BP is also not causing resistances. To oppose the acids produced 
by BP E.a. would have to change their complete genome (therefore no resistances).  
But on the whole the mode of action of both plant protection products is the same: they 
are both preventive measures. Spraying after infection is too late.  
Bacteria directly in contact with the antibiotic are killed, but not all bacterial cells are 
encountered: if E.a. reaches the blossom, infection proceeds quickly and if bacteria enters 
the plant antibiotics cannot follow. 
Author: What is in your opinion the problem of the agricultural usage of streptomycin? 
Dr. Donat: Streptomycin causes plant pathogens resistances (on the E.a.), which is 
playing with fire! In USA there is meanwhile the (officially, according to rumors more) 
fourth antibiotic substance in use, because all others are not effective anymore, moving 
closer to the categories of antibiotics currently used in human medicine.  
Author: When and how many times should BP be sprayed, and what is the price for 
Blossom Protect that a farmer has to spend per year per hectare? 
Dr. Donat: The Austrian Agricultural Chamber has established an early warning system 
(so-called Mary Blight System). But forecasting weather [remark by the author: regarding 
the infection conditions for FB] is extremely difficult, because it is influenced by a few 
degrees in temperature or a few percents of humidity more or less. 
This is why bio-ferm recommends 4 applications of the product, in the different phases of 
blossoms opening, independently from the weather, to exploit its efficiency to a maximum. 
But in the end the applicant has to decide when to use the product to protect the open 
blossoms from fire blight infection. This year more than 90% of the purchased products 
have not been in use, because of the (adverse) weather conditions. 
Dr. Donat: The costs for 4 treatments per hectare is 380€745 excl. VAT. 
Author: What about the fruit russeting of fruits that is sometimes argued to be a drawback 
of your product? 
Dr. Donat: In some years, on some susceptible cultivars it can lead to fruit russeting. But 
there is no real quintessence gained form statistics. Also other plant protection agents and 
even water can cause fruit russeting. 
Author: What is the result and validity of efficacy studies undertaken for Blossom Protect? 
The author has found different input on the efficacy of BP (78,4 in [bio ferm 08]; 71% in 
[bio-ferm 02]; 83,5 % (± 4,2 %) in [Pirklhuber 04_2008]) 
Dr. Donat: The different values for efficacy data being in circulation are a consequence of 
which trials are accepted to be valid. Efficiency grades are such instable factors that they 
should be regarded to by 10%-steps. Stating decimal places is actually doubtable. Overall 
                                          
745 According to [bio-ferm04] four intervalled oversprays are recommended during 
blossom time to optimally protect the maximum number of flowers which do not all open at once 
but in different (delayed) phases. 
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Blossom Protect is approximately 10% under the efficiency grade of antibiotics on 
average.746 
Author: What are the costs that have to be faced in the notification process (to attain 
listing to the Annex I of the Directive 91/414)? 
Dr. Donat: Laborious and time consuming studies have to be undertaken according to 
certain (international) guidelines (EPPO-Guidelines, OECD, etc.).  
The procedure to attain the listing in Annex I is very costly, and fees have to be paid in 
magnitudes quite unfeasible for start-up companies and SME (like bio-ferm). Bio-ferm had 
to pay 145.000€ (2x10.000 basic fee + 2x25.000 examination on completeness fee + 
75.000 fee for passing an expert opinion) to the Austrian Health Agency (AGES) according 
to the Austrian Pflanzenschutzmittelgebührentarif 2008 (PGT 2008) issued by the BAES747. 
Attempts to obtain a reduction were not successful. 
Author: Where supporting studies required for each of the two active ingredients 
separately according to the European regulations? 
Dr. Donat: No, but we had to undertake a so-called “bringing study”, a very sophisticated 
“tox study”, which resulted in the same result for both strains. One can therefore assume 
that these two strains are toxicologically evaluated to be the same. Many studies have 
been carried out with the product (both strains together), how it finally also released into 
the environments. 
Author: What about the current status of approval of BP? 
Dr. Donat: All the requirements have been completed as per 2007. In 2008 the Austrian 
Health Agency has taken over the rapporteur status for BP, entailing a waiting time of 
approximately 3-5 years for the notification-process, to complete the inclusion in Annex I 
[remark by the author: of the European Directive 91/414/EEC]. 
Author: In which countries is Blossom Protect used? 
Dr. Donat: In some countries (as for example in Austria, Slovak Republic, Hungary, 
Slovenia) an “emergency use -permission” has been given in the last years. In Germany 
the product has an authorization as a “plant strengthener”. That’s something like a 
fertilizer. Only the Germans have maintained this loop-hole from the EU Directive [remark 
by the author: 91/414/EEC]. And Austria has adhered to it: all products authorized in such 
a way [remark by the author: in Germany] are allowed to be placed on the market here 
[remark by the author: in Austria] as a fertilizer. The other MS are not very happy about 
that- this is why it [remark by the author: this arrangement] is constantly on “shaky 
ground”. As a fact we would have also been allowed to sell BP as a fertilizer in Austria. The 
disadvantage is: one is not allowed to promote with “efficiency against” [remark by the 
author: for example “fire blight”] and [remark by the author: the agent] is placed on a list 
with quite esoteric agents. 
Author: Has BP been on the IP-list? 
Dr. Donat: BP has been on the IP-list and also on the list for organic farming during the 
danger-in-delay authorization period.  
Author: What about other viable plant protection products? 
Dr. Donat: There are no other antagonist plant protection agents dealing with fire blight 
as effectively as BP does.  
                                          
746  Remark by the author: The current studies on the efficiency grade available have 
been sent to the author by email [bio-ferm 09]. 
747 [BAES 03] 
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Interposed question by the author: What about “BPMC 2023” for example stated in 
[DBMELV 2003]? 
Dr. Donat: This has been another formulation of Blossom Protect (in its trial denomination 
at that time). 
Author: Please state on following Input-Factors for the Cost-Benefit-Analysis of my paper: 
Factors questioned by the 
author 
Answers given by Mrs. Dr. Donat 
Risks involved with application 
of the plant protection agent 
None, because there are finished studies proofing this 
Safety measures to be taken 
working with the plant 
protection agent? 
There are safety measures to be taken – please refer to 
the label [bio-ferm 10]. 
One part of these instructions is obligatory, simply 
because it concerns plant protection agents, for example 
the matter that is has to be disposed as special waste. 
Nobody would dispose baker’s yeast as special waste, but 
as soon as it is sold as a plant protection agent… 
Another part is obligatory, because it is a microorganism, 
having to be labeled with “R42/43” (according to the EU) 
According to present study results there are no risks, but 
please refer to the details provided on the package. 
Costs of additional technical 
prerequisites 
Normal spraying device, no additional appliances afforded 
Toxicity studies Done according OECD, EPA, EPPO  
Risk factor resistances None 
Testing of honey Not required 
Disposal of honey Not required 
Compensation for beekeeper Not required 
 
Author: The food retailers have protested against the use of streptomycin because of 
worries that the apples could contain residues of streptomycin.  
Dr. Donat: From the scientific point of view this is nonsense. Neither Streptomycin nor 
Blossom Protect will be found on fruits, because both products are used during blooming. 
The reason why food retailers worried about that is not clear for me. However, most of 
them decided to sell only fruits with AMA quality label, and so they passed the topic to 
AMA management.  
Author: Why was the AMA quality label at the same time withdrawn for acreages treated 
with Blossom protect (unless it was proved, that BP was not to be found in the apple - of 
course entailing costs)? 
Dr. Donat: I did not understand why. 
The AMA quality label guarantees in its constitutions that the label will be only on products 
which follow the guidelines of integrated plant production (IP). There is a list of plant 
protection products which are allowed to be used under this guideline. Blossom Protect 
was on this list, Streptomycin not. Nevertheless the quality label was withdrawn from both 
products. They gave two arguments:  
1. The products have only emergency use permission. 
This was correct, but altogether 11 plant protection products were on the market under 
this permission, AMA withdrew the quality label only for the products to be used against 
fire blight.  
2. Possible residues on fruits. AMA stated in spring 2008 that fruits will be 
investigated from AMA concerning residues of both products, and if no residues will 
be found the labels will be restored.  
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As explained before this nonsense, there will be no residues. Besides this the microbial 
antagonists that are the active substance in Blossom Protect are harmless: in studies it 
was shown that mice can eat the highest biological possible dose which is 2000mg/kg body 
weight without showing any symptoms.  
There were no investigations done for Blossom Protect, and the label was not returned till 
now (November 2008).  
Of course for farmers using BP (being a harmless substance) it is a severe problem if they 
have to face the problem of potentially not obtaining the AMA quality seal. 
Author: Why is the bargaining power of the agricultural sector so immense to lever out 
valid ban of the agricultural use of streptomycin, law to protect human health safety? 
Dr. Donat: The bargaining power of the agricultural sector (regarding the GDP and 
employment) has to be seen rather historically. But the farmers own property: this is 
Austria! 
Author: What is the future outlook in your opinion? 
Dr. Donat: FB is everywhere and we will have to learn to live with it, as with other plant 
diseases, too. And we will have to use plant protection agents that do not endanger the 
environment (and human health) to excessive extent. There are so many plant diseases or 
damages caused by weather conditions like hail that it cannot be to rely on loop-holes in 
law forever. 
Author: Is there anything else you would like to state? 
Dr. Donat: No 
Author: Thank you very much for the interview! 
Documents received: [bio-ferm 08]; [bio-ferm 09]; [BAES 03]  
 
2. [Interview AGES 01] 
Company/Institution: Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety (AGES), Institute for 
Plant Health 
Interviewee(s)/Function(s): Mrs. Univ-Doz. Dr. DI BLÜMEL Sylvia (Director of the Institute 
for Plant Health, I-PGH), Mrs. DI PERSEN Ulrike (Assistant Department Head of 
Department of Phytopathology in Fruit Production & Viticulture, being part of the I-PGH) 
Interview Location: Spargelfeldstrasse 191, 1220 Vienna, Austria 
Date and Time: 24.07.08, 14:00-15:30 (Blümel; Persen) and 02.10.08, 10:00-14:00 
(Blümel) 
Document Status: NOT APPROVED - the yellow highlighted passages, though, are 
directly inserted by Dr. Blümel in this latest version of correspondence. 
 
Dr. Blümel: Austria is still being recognized as being free from E.a. (pest free area)748, 
hence obliged to take measures in accordance with the relevant FAO International 
Standard for Phytosanitary Measures749 (having binding character) according to the Council 
                                          
748 Remark by the Author: but there is a new EU regulation 2008/690: for Austria the 
recognition as of the protected zones could soon be cancelled. It will be sent to the author; 
Status: done 
749 Remark by the author: [FAO 2006] 
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Directive “2000/29EC”, also scheduling the use of plant protection measures, without 
explicitly designating individual products, but recommending a bundle of contra-actions.  
Dr. Blümel: Austria, as all EU member states have to send annual monitoring reports to 
the European Commission. 
 
Dr. Blümel: But the loss of the recognition of the status as a protected zone (for 
Fireblight), does not change the status of FB as quarantine organism: once the quarantine 
status has been held, it is not lost, unless there is general decision within the EU to 
remove a quarantine pest from the annexes of the EU-directive 2000/29/EC. 
 
Author: Which measures exactly does the FAO/IPPC regulate concerning the combating of 
fire blight (mentioning the use of streptomycin or other plant protection agents)? 
 
Blümel: Measures are not defined in specific detail (e.g. recommendation of plant 
protection products). It is always only referred to “appropriate measures” to be taken. 
 
Author: What about the PRA that is usually foreseen to be calculated by standards laid 
down in the ISPM’s (international standards for phytosanitary measures [FA0 2006]) for 
FB? 
 
Dr. Blümel: No Pest Risk Assessment (PRA) for FB was carried out specifically for Austria 
up to now, as the relevant PRA procedures were not existent in the form which is applied 
today at the time when fireblight was first detected in Austria. It must be considered that 
Austria at that time had not yet joined the EU. When Austria had joined the EU and when 
the relevant EU-directives for Plant health had been implemented the necessary and 
obligatory measures which are layed down in the relevant EU legislation were applied.  
 
[Dr. Blümel: (Frau Winkler bitte beachten Sie, dass hier meistens keine konkreten 
Angaben gemacht werden, sondern auch z.B. Verweise auf anerkannte Methoden der EPPO 
oder andere publizierte und agreed methods gemacht werden oder einfach auch auf 
angemessene, anerkannte und wirksame Methoden allgemein verwiesen wird, die die 
einzelnen EU Mitgliedsstaaten umsetzen sollen; d.h. die Mitgliedsstaaten übernehmen die 
Verantwortung dafür, dass die von ihnen gesetzten Massnahmen wirksam und angemessen 
sind)] 
 
Dr. Blümel: When the AGES was formed in 2002 the Institute of Plant Health was 
constituted as a new organizational unit by the transfer of parts of the former Institute for 
Phytomedicine. Due to the organisational changes data (regarding FB infection) of the 
respective period is not available electronically at AGES.(data from EU monitorings are 
available since 1995 when Austria was recognised as protected zone for FB).  
[Remark by the author. It has the,refore been set aside to quest for data dating back so 
far:] it is not possible to consolidate the infection development (and the damage caused 
since 1993) in the scope of this paper. 
 
Dr. Blümel: Due to this new formation of the AGES in 2002 the formerly Institute of 
Phytomedicine, which has been working on holistically plant health concepts, with 50 
employees has been replaced by the Institute of Plant Health with a staff of 30 persons, 
now mainly responsible for the monitoring, detection and laboratory diagnosis and PRA of 
quarantine pests. 
 
Author: What is the role of the I-PGH regarding the combating of fire blight in Austria? 
 
Dr. Blümel: The Institute for Plant Health is (inter alia) responsible for monitoring, 
control-measures of the causative agent (for example training courses) and pest risk 
analysis. 
DI Persen: On behalf of fire blight in Austria Round Tables are organized by the AGES 
Institute for Plant Health regularly. The fireblight round tables can only be attended on 
invitation and and are usually attended by members of  
• 2 bee-organisations, 
• organic fruit growers association, 
• BOV (Federal Association of Fruit Growers) 
• Consultants (Originalausdruck war “Berater”) 
• Chambers of agriculture (9) 
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• Agricultural experimentation center (FA 10B Referat APSD), Graz 
• Attorneys of the provincial governments 
• BMLFUW 
• In case of research-round-tables all research partners. 
 
Author: In the author’s opinion the following tasks of the Institute for Plant Health, 
translated from the document [AGES 02], could (eventually) be agreed on (?) with Dr. 
Blümel: 
1. Enforcement of Austrian Plant Protection Law 1995 as the authority of first 
instance and Austrian Plant Protection Regulation 1996 
2. „Evidenzführung und Auskunftserteilung aus Warndienstuntersuchungen in allen 
Bereichen des Pflanzenschutzes.“750 = does this e.g. comprise the Mary blight 
system? Dr. BLümel; NO, a number of other pests, such a sharmful arthropods and 
fungi. 
3. Development of recommendations, statistics, expert opinions for material law 
(GESG, PSG, PGG, SGG), guidelines, norms and of parliamentary inquiries for 
ministries and the EC. 
4. implementing relevant EU regulation and directives (e.g. 2000/29/EC) 
5. National coordination authority for the implementation of measures necessary 
according to the EC monitoring  
6. analysis, risk valuation, risk analyses and risk communication regarding plant 
health as per PPL 
7. plant protection agent testing (concerning fire-blight only taking place in the 
laboratory or glasshouse under special quarantine conditions and terms, because 
Austria is still a protected (quarantine) zone751) 
8. consultancy for the provinces 
9. detection and monitoring of occurence and dissemination of plant pests and 
diseases 
10. research on the biology and control-measures for epidemics (for example training 
courses),  
11. Technical representation of Austria, BAES and AGES in (inter-)national committees 
and organisations. 
12. Development of integrated and organic plant protection strategies, in particular 
emergency plans for quarantine pests and diseases. 
 
Author: What is the relation between the BAES and the AGES? 
Dr. Blümel: Tasks of the BAES cover issuing orders (as a federal office) to the AGES but 
also externally to customs authorities (e.g. regarding import controls), but the BAES itself 
does not perform analyses or other functional tasks and the decision competences and 
responsibilities are separated. 
 
Author: Is the AGES or the BAES authority of first instance for the Austrian Plant 
Protection Law 1995? 
Dr. Blümel: The BAES 
 
Author: What is the scientific advice given specifically regarding FB exactly? Is there a 
conclusion document? 
Sg. Frau Winkler: das war ein schriftlicher nachträglicher Kommentar von mir; bitte 
extrahieren die Information auf die ich verweise ; Dr. Blümel: Take a look on the AGES 
website. All information which is presented there with the different documents e.g. 
research-round table is AGES scientific and technical advice; but also all the 
recommendations which are derived from the different research projects of AGES on 
fireblight (see also the ppts. of the round table). 
 
Author: Does a Cost Benefit Analysis already exist in your organisation? 
Dr. Blümel: the Official Plant Protection Services of some Austrian provinces and (nicht 
together, jeder hat seine Zahlen getrennt zusammengestellt) the BOV have established 
                                          
750 Remark by the author: [AGES 02], p. 82 
751 In Austria (unlike Germany) outdoor tests are not allowed in yet because of the 
status of a quarantine zone. 
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rather “simple” calculations. Starting from the summation of all pome fruit acreage the 
cost of crop failure (costs of clearing, income-loss in the year of clearing and the following 
years, costs of replanting) were apportioned on a hectare-basis to oppose the costs of 
non-action. Clearly the result was that some action had to be taken. 
 
Author: Is this cost-calculation (BOV-article estimating the possible damage fire-blight 
could cause, available by your Institute? 
Dr. Blümel: No. ???Ich hatte Sie auf eine/mehrere Presseaussendungen bzw. 
Zeitungsartikel dazu vom letzten Jahr verwiesen und erwähnt dass es mich einige Zeit 
kosten würde diese auszuheben; ich habe nicht gesagt, dass diese Presseaussendungen 
bzw. Zeitungsartikel gar nicht bei uns verfügbar wären) 
 
Author: Are bundled Austria maps available for the years since first dealing with Erwinia 
amylovora, making the areas infected with fire-blight visible? 
Dr. Blümel: The operation data of the individual farmers with fire blight infections is 
collected by the Official Regional Plant Protection Service and is only made available to the 
province authorities, but are not forwarded to the state level under the cover of data 
privacy protection. Generally there are no problems to bundle national monitoring data for 
EU surveys on quarantine pests, but the collection of data points for a distribution map on 
federal level of FB is not possible as present. Therefore there is no detailed national data 
map of the fire-blight disease for Austria as a whole. 
 
Author: Please describe the process of approval and the reasons for approval of 
streptomycin although banned in EU and Austrian law? 
Dr. Blümel: I must refer you to the Institute for the Evaluation & Authorization of Plant 
Protection Products of the AGES. 
 
Author: What is the role of the AGES regarding the approval of streptomycin? 
Dr. Blümel: The other Institute will have this information available. It is also in charge for 
the calculation of ecotoxicological (etc.) risks.  
 
Author: How are the risks of illegal spraying of streptomycin estimated?  
Dr. Blümel: controls of the use of streptomycin take place by the Plant Protection Services 
of the Provinces via random inspections following a raster (or in case of suspicion) and in 
operating controls. Information exchange takes place regularly between the Plant 
Protection Services of the Provinces, the agricultural chamber(s) and the AGES/BAES in 
coordination meetings. 
 
Author: Are there other plant protection products effective to combat fire-blight? 
Dr. Blümel: There are other plant protection products achieving comparable752 efficacy, 
but only under certain conditions (climate, etc.), however with streptomycin a continuous 
high effect can be expected. 
 
Dr. Blümel: There are a number of international and national research projects including 
tests with alternative plant protection products to control FB and there was one national 
research project in which some "hobbyists' homebrew remedies" (e.g. colloidal silver, herb 
mixes, etc.) were tested and results are published in the round table protocols. 
 
Author: What is the contribution of the Institute for Plant Health, AGES (I-PGH) regarding 
the ÖPUL–(positive)-list? 
Dr. Blümel: The process is following: Industry and Agricultural Chambers suggest plant 
protection products to be evaluated for an approval for the ÖPUL lists to the BMLFUW. The 
Institute of Plant Health (AGES) is authorized by the BMLFUW to carry out the evaluation 
of the PPPS and to recommend acceptance or rejecttion to the BMLFUW (reiterative 
process; evaluation process according to an evaluation scheme). Usually the §13-agents 
(permission on exemption) are not on the IP-list at the time when the recommendations 
annual lists is established. 
 
Author: But Blossom Protect is on the IP-list 01.03.2008-30.04.2008 and 01.05.2008- 
30.06.2008. 
                                          
752 Remark by the author: to streptomycin 
248 
Dr. Blümel: Regarding the control, handling of payments (and penalizing) of the ÖPUL-
subsidy the AMA is responsible. 
 
Regarding the structure of the CBA: 
Data of number of full-time orchardists cannot be obtained by the AGES (only data on the 
total amount of cultivated land). Frau Winkler: es ist einfach nicht die Aufgabe der AGES 
Statistiken über die Anbauflächen zu führen. 
 These data are forwarded from the Provinces to the Federal state level. 
Dr. Blümel: Bitte klären Sie das nochmals ab; in manchen Bundesländern gibt es auch 
Erhebungen durch die Landwirtschaftskammern.  
 
The number of potential applicants for streptomycin is not available at the I-PGH and the 
question has to be addressed to Institute for the Evaluation & Authorization of Plant 
Protection Products of the AGES. 
 
The probability for FB-infection is not calculable, because of the numerous influencing 
factors amongst them: climate conditions in general, especially of previous winter, 
temperature during the infection period, humidity during the infection period, rainfall-
quantity and incidence, hail, wind, impeded drainage, potential vectors, susceptibility of 
host plant species, infection pressure in the orchard and adjacent vegetation, composition 
of adjacent vegetation (host plants) etc.  
 
Dr. Blümel: The latent infection by fireblight which might be present in an orchard is not 
known for each orchard. 
 
All these facts together up to now cannot be standardized. Therefore there are no data on 
the average infestation rate of orchards with FB in Austria (but not only in Austria) and 
according to Dr. Blümel it does not seem feasible to try to calculate average infestion rates 
(in the scope of a thesis). But maybe the BOV has more details. 
 
The scenario of “non-action” is not calculable, because a certain situation has to be 
assumed as basis: measures that are obligatory to be taken (mechanic operations: 
Removal or cut-back of infested plants) as soon as FB is discovered because it is a 
quarantine-pest (the status of FB being a quarantine organism for the EU remains 
unchanged, although it might loose it’s status as a protected zone  The loss of the 
recognition of the status as a protected zone for Austria implicates that it will also have to 
accept imports from tree nurseries that not from areas of production subject to certain 
conditions). 
 
The division into IP and organic would be most advisable as it seems (skipping the 
extensive meadow orchards (scattered fruit-trees) because of too great uncertainty, just 
as private gardens, public places and nurseries). 
Cultivation measures alone as effective control measure could be applied until 30% 
infestations rate, for infections rates higher than 30% the application of PSM could be 
assumed (difference in organic farming/IP). 
 
Further regarding the input factors of the CBA should be considered: 
Cleaning of the spraying equipment  
• Emptying of the tank and filling the residues into special canisters. 
• Protective clothing 
• Working time 
 
Regarding the price of streptomycin: 
• Important to refer to ready-for-use dilution (% of streptomycin) 
• Amount of product in amount of water and application rate in the field (amount 
of water sprayed to the plants) 
 
Regarding the administrative costs for issuing conditions, sending these to the provinces 
etc. data are hard to be retrieved – the inspection costs of the Provinces might be easier to 
obtain, because they have their staff assigned to these tasks quite specifically. 
 
Further spoken about: 
Updated AGES homepage (e.g. new document on streptomycin (oct.08) 
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Author: Thank you very much for the interviews! 
 
Documents retrieved: [AGES 14]; [AGES 15]; [AGES 16]; [AGES 17]; [EPPO 02]; 
VERORDNUNG (EG) Nr. 690/2008 DER KOMMISSION vom 4. Juli 2008; Flyer of 
EPPO-Colloquium on the 25.09.2008 at AGES, 2 pages; 
 
3. [Interview OÖLVB] 
Company/Institution: Österreichisches Imkereizentrum - Oberösterreichischer 
Landesverband für Bienenzucht (Austrian center for beekeeping – Upper Austrian 
Provincial Association for beekeeping, OÖLVB) 
Interviewee(s)/Function(s): Mr. Hofrat Mag. LIEDLBAUER, Maximilian (Chairman) 
Interview Location: Voglgutstraße 1, 4484 Kronstorf, Austria 
Date and Time: 25.07.2008, 09:00-12:30 and Telephone Call on 13.11.2008 
Document Status: Approved 
 
Author: Please provide some background knowledge about the beekeeping industry sector 
in Austria: 
Liedlbauer: Formerly all Austrian beekeepers were organized under the “Austrian 
Beekeeper Confederation” (“Österreichischer Imkerbund” (ÖIB), presided by Mr. Josef 
Ulz), with sub-divisions in all 9 provinces of Austria (for hobby beekeepers) and a tenth 
sub-division for the full-time beekeepers. Because of controversies this organization has 
been remodeled. The ÖIB is now the organization only for beekeepers not depending on 
the apiary income. 
Full-time beekeepers have built up their own union, now called the “Austrian Full-time 
Beekeepers Conferderation” (“Österreichischer Erwerbsimkerbund” (ÖEIB), presided by Mr. 
Josef Stich) and also joined the “European Professional Beekeeper Association”. 
Because of the administration of subsidy-programs it was necessary to build an umbrella 
organization, called “Bee Austria” (“Biene Österreich” (BÖ), with Mr. DI Christian being the 
managing director Boigenzahn). 
EU-Programs (subsidies) supporting beekeeping are negotiated by the BMLFUW, but 
operated by the AMA, which is the respective authority in charge of controlling, disbursing, 
and amercing (also with regard to all other agricultural subsidies), also involved with PR 
for the sector. 
Beekeeping is more a hobby-sector in Austria and that there is not much economic power. 
Author: What are your experiences, what is your point of view concerning fire blight and 
the use of streptomycin in (Upper) Austria?  
Liedlbauer: Starting in the year 2000 fire blight has been a topic for the beekeepers in 
Austria. A person from the Chamber of Agriculture in the Tyrol claimed that the “bees were 
to blame for the dissemination of fire blight” – although no evidence could be adduced. 
This brought about FB regulations in all provinces, willing a 48 hours quarantine before a 
bee-hive is allowed to be moved. In Upper Austria this regulation has been suspended 
again, because the measure showed clearly that bees cannot be (if any) the only effect. 
Since 2002 the topic has been held in abeyance (from the viewpoint of the beekeepers) 
until on the 18.12.2007 the Upper Austrian Chamber of Agriculture (LKOÖ) invited to a 
meeting indicating that 2008 streptomycin will be used and what consequences this will 
bring for beekeepers. 
Interestingly although 2007 the Styrian fruit growers claimed to have faced a very 
intensive fire blight year, the harvest was stated to be the “best ever” by a chamber-staff 
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member. An explanation could be the rigorous pruning back, which can trigger the fruit 
production of a tree and hence the crop obtained. 
Mrs. Mag. Almuth Leitner from the “Amt der Oberösterreichischen Landesregierung” was in 
charge with the formulation of the regulation  
The LKOÖ, Department for Crop Production consists of  
• Mr. DI Christian Krumphuber (Director of Crop Production Department), 
• Mr. Ing. Heimo Strebl (Upper Austrian Fruit Growers) for vegetable and fruit. 
 
Responsible for plant health in general: Mr. DI Hubert Köppl, being the APSD-staff of the 
LKOÖ. The APSD actually is a Federal (state) duty which is out-sourced in Upper Austrian 
to the LKOÖ (e.g. having the Maryblight™ wheather forecasting prediction system under 
control and being in charge for the publication of recommendations on the basis of the 
computer forecast). 
This double function of normal staff members of the chamber (actually for representing 
interests of the farmers) on the other hand APSD in Upper Austria (in contrast to e.g. 
Styrian organisation where the APSD is not incorporated in the agricultural chamber but 
performed by staff of the province authorities). 
The Upper Austrian Chamber of Agriculture is funded by membership fees only by one 
third. The rest is remunerated by the Federation (state level) for consultancy activities and 
dealing with subsidy-allocation. 
With the bundling of various Federal Offices into the AGES, the Institute for Apiculture 
(Director Mr. Dr. Moosbeckhofer) has been reduced to only one full-time and two half-time 
jobs, only being in charge for bee epidemic (control) in contrast to former times when it 
was also responsible for research work and laboratory testing. Today this work is only 
available on payment. Because historically these tasks were fulfilled by the state (but not 
any longer making the resources available in the AGES) private companies are still missing 
out and research assignments are normally still placed at the AGES. The AGES has not 
enough financial resources anymore: many (dispersed) Federal Offices were shut down.  
For this reason the OÖLVB has bought an instrument for the detection of streptomycin in 
honey-samples for its “Center of beekeeping” in Linz for 30.000€ in 2007, so that these 
residue-tests can be made independently (and not anymore by the AGES). The Province 
Authority has recognized these tests. 
From my viewpoint the EFSA and AGES are to industry-driven and their risk assessments 
of pesticides concerning the agreeableness of honey-bees is insufficient.  
Excursus: Mr. Liedlbauer also refers to a study by Prof. Tautz from the University of 
Würzburg753(Institut für Zoologie, beegroup) which has partly (and in German translation) 
been published in a technical beekeeper journal in Germany (“Imkerei-Technik – 
Fachzeitschrift der Berufsimker in Deutschland”). The subject matter is also discussed 
because of recent problems of sudden deaths of bees in, linked to be a result of maize 
seed treatment with clothianidin (a pesticide against the Western corn rootworm). 
Regarding the information flow it is claimed that there have not been any information 
events from the AGES for the OÖLVB (i.e. no information regarding the epidemiology of 
fire blight, alternative combating methods, etc.). Although an association member is sitting 
in the meetings “Round Table” no information has reached Upper Austria in this concern. 
                                          
753 Bienenforschung Würzburg e.V., Prof. Dr. Jürgen Tautz (Uni Würzburg), 
tautz@biozentrum.uni-wuerzburg.de, http://www.beegroup.de/ 
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The author informs briefly on antagonistic plant protection agents and their efficiency 
grades etc. (e.g. also the possibility to disperse Blossom protect via honeybees).  
Liedlbauer: I am aware that, the AGES (Institute for Apiculture, Mr. Dr. Moosbeckhofer) 
has tested Blossom Protect against fire blight, but there was (unfortunately) no practical 
result.  
The application of BP via bees is interesting, but may not always be advantageous since 
the bees will always take their way to the most attractive food source: if e.g. rape is 
available bees will fly there and not to the orchard. But BP can also be sprayed (just as 
other plant protection products).  
Author: please report more on the situation in Upper Austria: 
Liedlbauer: In Upper Austria there are 85 full-time orchardists. Nine of them have applied 
for the allowance to use streptomycin in 2008, with only two having sprayed it eventually.  
One of the applicants was situated in Goldwörth (a major supplier for drinking water for 
the Upper Austrian capital Linz). In response beekeepers concerned with the contingent 
spraying had announced their moving away with the bees. The mayor and the community 
doctor opposed the use of streptomycin, too. The farmer has refrained from streptomycin-
use voluntarily, conceding that he “did not know, that it was so hazardous to health”. 
Author: Is there a regulation that forces beekeepers to test their honey? What is your 
estimation of the propability of dispersion of streptomycin-contaminated honey? 
Liedlbauer: There is no law regulating that the beekeepers HAVE TO undergo laboratory 
testing with the honey produced. But members of the OÖLVB have to send in samples of 
their honey in order to receive the Upper Austrian quality label. Further all members of the 
OÖLVB from critical zones are tested. Beekeepers who are not organized via the OÖLVB 
are contacted by the local authority informing them on the necessity of laboratory testing, 
but there this is not regulated by law. Another problem of this communication is, that staff 
working in the local authority do not know these “black sheep”. It is more probable that 
members of the OÖLVB know non-organised beekeepers and persuade these few to make 
their way to the local authority. 
Asked for the risk of untested honey being consumed although streptomycin residues are 
too high is judged by Mr. Liedlbauer to be “very low”. 
Author: How high are the costs? 
Liedlbauer: Because there is a law allowing the farmer to use streptomycin, the farmer 
has the right to do so and can not be sued by the beekeeper to cover these costs. This is 
why the provincial authorities take over the costs. But it is only an agreement under 
private law and not even signed by an authority. 
The promised compensation for contaminated honey by the Province Upper Austria will be 
5€/kg. 
The costs for the residue-tests are also promised to be carried by the Authority, with 
75€/tested sample. 
2008 there were only 23 examinations (all of them negative). 
Samples are taken in the following way: from one location of bee-hives in a critical area all 
honey are mixed. In Upper Austria every location within a sprayed area is monitored, in 
the other provinces according to the monitoring plan elaborated by the AGES. 
Author: What are your future visions, suggestions to find a sustainable solution? 
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Liedlbauer: I see a possibility that the Upper Austrian Environmental Bar754 of the 
Provincial Authority might have the resources to fill this gap of information forwarding 
regarding alternatives and other information on fire blight. The Upper Austrian Academy 
for Environment and Nature (OÖ. Akademie für Umwelt und Natur, Kärtnerstr., Linz, 
Director DI Wolfgang Rescheneder) may even be an recognized partner with enough 
resources to organize meetings for the discussion of alternatives. 
Author: Are there any further comments you would like to state? 
Liedlbauer: At the meeting (18.3.2008, 19.00 Uhr LKÖ) in Wels, Upper Austria with on 
the one hand bee keepers and the fruit growers concerned, alternatives have not been 
discussed. The fruit growers are of the opinion that: “alternatives do not work and cause 
fruit russeting”, and that the only solution is spraying (Remark by the author: of 
antibiotics).  
Author: Thank you very much for the interview! 
Documents/Information obtained at interview: [OÖLVB 2007]; [DORIS]; [Frühwirth 2003]; 
[OÖLR 01]; [Vereinbarung Punktation Stand 18.3.08] 
 
4. [Interview Global 2000] 
Company/Institution: Global 2000 
Interviewee(s)/Function(s): DI Dr. Helmut BURTSCHER , Biochemist 
Interview Location: Neustiftgasse 36, 1060 Vienna, Austria 
Date and Time: 05.08.08, 10:45- 12:00 
Document Status: APPROVED 
 
Author: Please state your view of and opinion on the agricultural use of streptomycin. 
Dr. Burtscher: Regarding the developments in Switzerland permitting the use 
streptomycin: There were strict clearing rules for infected trees in (extensive) fruit-tree 
meadows. But there has been an incident of a farmer who has refused to remove an 
infected peartree. Legal action was taken, going through the stages of appeal, conceding 
right to the farmer in the end: he did not have to clear the tree. This new legal situation 
brought about higher infection pressure, therefore higher risk for orchardists, which has 
led to making the position worse of those being in favour for consequently pruning their 
trees instead of using antibiotics and might also explain the allowance of streptomycin in 
Switzerland in 2008. 
The authorization on to use streptomycin in Germany 2004 through the loop-hole “danger 
in delay” has been given by the German Agricultural Minister Mrs. Künast from the Green 
party! 
In February 2004 there was following situation in Austria:  
§12(10) PSMG 1997 ruled, that all plant protection agents allowed for in the Netherlands 
would also be allowed for in Austria. At that time the Netherlands had for reasons of 
provisional regulation to clearance sale Plantomycin (today "Strepto") for one more year. 
Hence, streptomycin at that time was available freely on the market without control in 
Austria, actually by mistake. (Mr. Pirklhuber asked Minister Pröll in a parliamentary inquiry 
                                          
754 Oberösterreichische Umweltanwaltschaft: http://www.land-
oberoesterreich.gv.at/cps/rde/xchg/SID-9B305832-
2DF014E2/ooe/hs.xsl/ooe_uanw_DEU_HTML.htm 
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which plant protection products exactly were now allowed by this equalization with the 
Netherlands. Minister Pröll refered to a dutch internet-homepage (The Standard reported). 
Global 2000 found out, that amongst many hundred other “dutch” pesticides amongst 
others there was also a streptomycin-agent (Plantomycin), which some in Austria wanted 
to use against FB, but was not allowed in Austria and recently forbidden by the EU. In 
Holland it was at that time allowed because of the clearance sale-respite. Because Global 
2000 pointed this out to Minister Pröll in a ZIB1 conference streptomycin was then placed 
on a prohibition-regulation. 
In Austria only agents are allowed, that explicitly have an authorization. But there is also a 
list explicitly naming forbidden agents: 
„Langtitel: Verordnung des Bundesministers für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt 
und Wasserwirtschaft über das Verbot von Pflanzenschutzmitteln, die 
bestimmte Wirkstoffe enthalten 
StF: BGBl. II Nr. 308/2002 
Änderung 
idF: BGBl. II Nr. 128/2004 
Präambel/Promulgationsklausel 
Auf Grund des § 17 des Pflanzenschutzmittelgesetzes 1997, BGBl. I 
Nr. 60/1997, in der Fassung des Agrarrechtsänderungsgesetzes 2002, 
BGBl. I Nr. 110/2002, wird verordnet: 
  § 1. Pflanzenschutzmittel, die 
  1. einen der im Anhang der Richtlinie 79/117/EWG des Rates vom 
     21. Dezember 1978 über das Verbot des In-Verkehr-Bringens und 
     der Anwendung von Pflanzenschutzmitteln, die bestimmte 
     Wirkstoffe enthalten (ABl. Nr. L 33 vom 8. Februar 1978, 
     S. 36), in der jeweils geltenden Fassung, genannten Wirkstoffe, 
  2. den Wirkstoff Azocyclotin, Carbaryl, Cyhexatin, Kasugamycin, 
     Paraquat oder Streptomycin oder 
  3. Bariumverbindungen 
enthalten, gelten als nicht zugelassen und dürfen nicht in Verkehr 
gebracht werden. 
  § 2. Pflanzenschutzmittel gemäß § 1 dürfen jedoch in Verkehr 
gebracht werden, soweit sie gemäß § 13 (Zulassung bei Gefahr im 
Verzug) des Pflanzenschutzmittelgesetzes 1997, BGBl. I Nr. 60/1997, 
in der Fassung des Agrarrechtsänderungsgesetzes 2002, BGBl. I 
Nr. 110/2002, zugelassen sind.” 
 
At that time antagonists of the agricultural use of antibiotics thought this issue was settled 
at last, but promptly one year later the prohibited streptomycin was again authorized 
again.  
Author: Did the  “danger-in-delay”-exemption in Germany play a role in this concern? 
Dr. Burtscher: The pressure for permission of streptomycin emanated from Vorarlberg. 
The Vorarlberger Fruit Growers looked with envy at their German colleagues at the other 
shore of the lake who were allowed to use streptomycin  
Minister Pröll said to the ORF in Vorarlberg in January 2005 that he would not authorize 
streptomycin, but in April 2005 streptomycin was authorized to treat 19,5 ha – and 
because of these 19,5ha an agent forbidden at EU level had to be authorized! 
Author: How is the substance streptomycin and it’s health risks for humans judged? 
Dr. Burtscher: Compared to other pesticides, the problem with streptomycin is not so 
much a problem because of the direct health reasons of farmers working with it, but for 
emerging resistances (against antibiotica used in medicine for humans) and the 
interchange of resistances. 
The application of streptomycin in 2008 in Styria has been very small (only 2%-4% of the 
approved acreages used it)  
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The risk of distribution of antibiotic resistances of course rises through the use of 
pesticides in fruit growing with the used quantities.  
That in Europe the agricultural use of antibiotics was generally forbidden was a great 
success in the combat against the dissemination of antibiotic resistances.  
This success is carelessly jeopardized by the Austrian danger-in-delay-admission, which is 
considered to be a “bursting of a dam” again.  
Author: What is your opinion on the economic powers acting here? 
Dr. Burtscher: Amongst the fruit growers it is reported that there have been protagonists 
of an admission since years. But the AGES has always boasted with resisting persuasion. 
The reasons leading to the about-turn might be known better by Mr. Purkharthofer. Hint: 
also check out press releases on www.ots.at. 
On the homepage of the AGES there is an opinion of persons in the medical profession (in 
a medical magazine), which the AGES has posted to guard itself and demonstrate that 
doctors of medicine are not object the intended use of streptomycin. 
Author: Have you ever been invited to submit your view by any authority? 
Dr. Burtscher: No, never. Only after we had taken the initiative because of the §12(10) 
problems (remark by the author: description above) we have received a draft of the 
forbidden-agents list. 
Author: What are your future visions, suggestions to find a sustainable solution? 
Dr. Burtscher: The AGES continuously transports the information, that streptomycin is 
the only effective agent there is, which is not true. But it is forbidden! Streptomycin seems 
to be a tranquilizer, but other measures that will lead to containment of the infection 
pressure will have to be found. 
Author: Is there anything else you would like to state? 
Dr. Burtscher: It might be worth stating the information policy the Chamber of 
Agriculture 2008: on the occasion of the first application of streptomycin to pear trees the 
heading of the article said “No danger for apple trees” (“Keine Gefahr für Apfelbäume”). 
Normally you might expect the main news of an article to be contained in the header. 
One of the acknowledged experts in the matter of FB is Mr. Eduard Holliger at the 
Forschungsanstalt Wädenswil (Projektleiter Feuerbrand; eduard.holliger@faw.admin.ch). 
Further Dipl.-Ing. Dr. med. Hans-Peter Hutter, from the Advisory Centres for 
Environmental Medicine (Institut für Umwelthygiene), University Vienna, Austria (hans-
peter.hutter@univie.ac.at) might be of any help. 
Author: Thank you very much for the interview! 
Documents obtained at interview: none 
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5. [Interview Pittner] 
Company/Institution: University Vienna, Department for Biochemistry 
Interviewee, Function: Mr. Univ.-Prof. Fritz PITTNER, Professor for Biochemistry 
Interview Location: Dr. Bohr Gasse 9 / 5th Floor / Room No. 5610, 1030 Vienna, Austria 
Date and Time: 07.10.08, 10:00- 13:00 
Document Status: APPROVED 
 
Author: Please describe your educational career, to display your competence regarding the 
topic. 
Prof. Pittner: I am a studied chemist, biochemist and physicist, (graduation “sub aucpiciis 
praesidentis”) and have been involved in studies concerning the biosynthesis of 
streptomycin. 
Author: How would you explain the working mechanism of streptomycin?  
Prof. Pittner: Streptomycin is a bacterial antibiotic, inhibiting cell growth of susceptible 
bacteria. 
Author: How do resistances against streptomycin occur? 
Prof. Pittner: Bacteria gain the ability to generate a resistance against antibiotics in that 
they change their metabolisms either in degrading the antibiotics or establishing metabolic 
mechanisms to expel them when the antibiotics penetrate the cells.  
Bacteria have the ability to interchange their acquired resistance by forwarding these to 
other bacteria and of course all daughter cells produced are resistant as well. 
Compared to other antibiotics resistance occurs already within short time periods, which is 
(amongst others) a reason for the non-use in human medication. 
Author: Which other reasons are there for the discontinued use of streptomycin in human 
medicine? 
Prof. Pittner: Apart from the resistance-problem mentioned, streptomycin causes side 
effects such as allergies, vestibular ototoxity (nausea, vomiting, vertigo), etc. are 
common, further streptomycin can cause fetal harm. See [RXList 01] and [RXList 03]. 
Author: What happens if streptomycin is used in agriculture? 
Prof. Pittner: Streptomyces species naturally occur in soil and use streptomycin to 
compete with other microorganisms.  
But if streptomycin comes into soil in high doses because of spraying, then this can in the 
long run lead to massive imbalances of the composition of the microflora of the soil.  
Furthermore the streptomycin resistant bacteria (the ones surviving the streptomycin-
attack) can use streptomycin available (but not harmful to them anymore) as a carbon-
source (energy), even pushing growth of resistant and insusceptible bacteria. 
Streptomycin is water-soluble and penetrates the soil with rain. The result may be that 
these soils cannot be used as cropland anymore and are turned into devastated areas. It 
will lead to a similar situation as experienced in many regions in USA where it is already 
impossible to grow plants belonging to the family of rosaceous.  
Because we have not scientifically observed yet, what happens, if we disturb the balance 
(equilibrium) in the soil, this can lead to incalculable damages: unknown damages of the 
ecosystem will have to be faced for sure, insecure is only the extent of the risk taken. 
256 
Author: But it is argued by the protagonists of the agricultural use of streptomycin, that its 
application is very limited: to be sprayed only in the blossom time and only up to three 
times. 
Prof. Pittner: Exactly this kind of use produces resistances! If in human medication 
antibiotics have to be prescribed, it must be a dose to surely kill ALL the bacteria, so that 
no resistances build up, and you will be warned to take all the pills, and not to stop until 
the packet is finished, even if you feel better already. 
Author: For the agriculture you have already explained the problems with occurring 
resistances caused by streptomycin? How high is this risk judged to impact on human 
health? 
Prof. Pittner: Increased resistances are very bad.  
Actually the antibiotic is sprayed to extinct Erwinia amylovora (bacteria causing fire blight) 
but it kills also all the bacteria in the surrounding in the air, soil, and with rain can reach 
the ground-water (remember: streptomycin is water-soluble!). 
Streptomycin is normally only found in soil (e.g. in forests), where evolution has well-
balanced it’s existence. But if it is sprayed on blossom, leaves, branches, tree-trunks 
where it is not naturally belonging, there is no such a balance. Streptomycin is no reactive 
substance, not decomposing right away. It needs to be broken down by microorganisms. If 
these are not on the branches etc. it can disseminate in the environment by wind, rain etc. 
In water streptomycin can stay virtually forever. If we then drink water containing 
streptomycin, certainly the interaction on the metabolism of the human body is not the 
problem, but it has all the other negative impacts explained before (e.g. allergies). 
Additionally, by consuming water and food (e.g. honey) which have been contaminated by 
antibiotics and by spraying it into the environment we are breeding streptomycin-resistant 
bacteria so that we have no defence against them anymore. If resistant bacteria afflict us 
the antibiotics streptomycin will not help us anymore. 
This risk is to be seen in the connection with the matter of fact that from east Europe 
tuberculosis bacteria, that are highly resistant against antibiotics, are moving towards our 
latitudes, against which our common antibiotic medication is already without effect. 
Furthermore in central Europe tuberculosis has no longer been inoculated anymore 
because it has been perceived to be extinct. This problem can lead to deaths because 
there is no treatment available! 
Author: What about other impact on human health? 
Prof. Pittner: Concerning allergies, for example, it has been known for a long time, that 
people having much contact with soil have a better immune-response due to actions 
caused by the microflora. However this triggering of the immune-system may also result in 
overreactions of the body: i.e. allergies. 
If streptomycin is now found to be in places (drinking water, air, trees) where evolution 
has not been able to counterbalance its existence (as explained in the previous question) it 
cannot be decomposed. But also in its natural environment soil the microflora is changed 
due to its impact leading to imbalances. 
Because of this reason streptomycin is also a strong allergen. 
Author: What about the studies available for streptomycin provided for example by the 
AGES and the EPA? 
Prof. Pittner: In the studies the “acute toxity” is described, but the LD-factor (lethal 
dose) does not reveal anything useful. It says that 50% of the rats die at a certain level of 
intake. But rats have a completely different metabolism as humans and there is no data 
concerning other physiological damages, as e.g. providing information on allergies 
induced. 
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Author: Regarding the CBA constructed by the author so far: are there impacts (risks) of 
streptomycin that the author should additionally assess in the CBA? How high are these 
risks judged by you?  
Prof. Pittner: Again: The dangerousness of the agricultural use of streptomycin is not 
assessable today, because there is no binding data available. 
The “hazardous substance labelling” is “unknown” for streptomycin. This does not mean 
that there is no danger, but on the contrary we do not know anything about them up to 
now. This bears a high risk! 
For the calculation of the adverse effects that the agricultural use of streptomycin brings 
about it is probably only possible to calculate the minimum-damage (being the minimum, 
that has to be counted with), then explaining the nescience (lack of information) on many 
aspects. Only a semi-quantitative estimation of risks exposing ourselves to in the long run 
is possible. But it is important to note: Dealing with the streptomycin problematic one has 
to bear in mind that there are many synergistic parameters intercalating, many of them 
still unknown. The impact on human health and the agricultural problematic are always to 
be seen connected. Risks taken do not have additive character, but multiply! 
Author: What is your consolidated opinion on the agricultural use of streptomycin (in 
Austria)? 
Prof. Pittner: Streptomycin should not be used because of various reasons: 
• Streptomycin is forbidden on EU-level – and for good reasons! 
• The danger of resistances not only for humans, but also for the consequences 
for agriculture. 
• The effect of streptomycin against fire blight is only modest, because it only 
reduces infections over the blossom and nothing else, not justifying such a 
“bomber”. 
• Beekeepers who are making efforts to produce high quality natural products 
suffer because of the agricultural use of streptomycin. 
• As already pointed out in this interview the negative impact on human health is 
severe. 
 
Author: What does the article [Sundin et al 1996] I have found imply? 
Prof. Pittner: This is an important article you have found here. It happens from time to 
time that genes can “jump”. This of course intensifies the problematic regarding synergies 
and above that shows, how hard it is to compute overflowing side-effects when interfering 
with the biological equilibrium. That means, whatever you can calculate here it is to be 
feared that reality will result to be worse, because it is not possible at the moment to 
capture ALL necessary parameters and moreover to quantify these. This article underlines 
the problems with resistances.  
Author: Thank you very much for the interview! 
Documents obtained at interview: [RXList 01]; [RXList 02]; [RXList 03]; [Cunliffe et al. 
2006]; [Badalucco et al. 1994]; (et. al.) 
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6. [Interview BOV] 
Company/Institution: Austrian Fruit Growers (Bundesobstbauverband, BOV), at the  
Austrian Agricultural Chamber 
Interviewee, Function: Mr. DI Johann GREIMEL, General Executive Director Interview 
Location: Schauflergasse 6/3rd floor, 1014 Vienna, Austria 
Date and Time: 30.10.08, 10:00-12:00 
Document Status: APPROVED 
 
Author: The Austrian Fruit Growers (in German: Bundesobstbauverband, hereafter “BOV”) 
is the organisation in charge for bundling interests of pome fruit growers. How has the 
internal decision process resulted in the demand for streptomycin?  
DI Greimel: The Austrian Chambers of Agriculture are the representation bodies by law. 
Then there are voluntary representations, like the BOV. These are often identical in staff: I 
am, for example, counsellor of the Austrian Chambers of Agriculture responsible for fruit 
growing755 and General Executive Director of the BOV.  
DI Greimel: Orchardists are members of the Regional Fruit Growing Associations756 in the 
Austrian provinces. On provincial level there are managing committees, their executive 
directors and chairmen taking part at the board meetings on federal level (Austrian Fruit 
Growers Association)757. Decisions taken in the board meetings are preferably aimed at 
achieving coordinated results. 
DI Greimel: The pressure regarding the allowance of streptomycin in Austria came from 
the fruit growers. 2007 there had been clearances. This information gets around between 
the fruit growers and there was great fear of fire blight posing an existence threat and 
pressure on the BOV has been great to attain allowance. From the perspective of the BOV 
it is also judged reasonable to demand for streptomycin. 
Interposed question by the Author: And regarding the decision process on streptomycin? 
DI Greimel: The decision-making on the best means of pest control (for fire blight) 
involved a whole package of measures, also including direct measures (plant protection 
agents). Because streptomycin is the most effective plant protection agent, the §13-
authorization758 was needed. Laboratory tests and open land usage (e.g. in Vorarlberg) 
have shown this. 
Practice is decisive – laboratory tests are often not transferable to practice. 
Interposed question by the Author: Please state further on the other pest control 
measures. 
DI Greimel:  
• Usage of plant protection agents 
• Mechanic and hygienic measures (conducted by the provincial plant protection 
services) 
• Research (regarding genetics of resistant cultivars) 
• Alternative substances (the BOV does not want to be bound to streptomycin) 
• Basic testing of new plant protection agents on the market regarding their 
proclaimed effectiveness (costs are not covered by the BOV) 
• EU-wide organization and coordination of pest control measures to mutually 
learn of each other. The pest control in all countries lowers the infection 
pressure. 
• Compensation matters 
 
                                          
755 Remark by the author: original term used in German “Obstbaureferent der 
Landwirtschaftskammer” 
756 Remark by the author: original term used in German “Landesobstbauverbände” 
757 Remark by the author: original term used in German “Bundesobstbauverband” 
758 Remark by the author: danger-in-delay clause in the Austrian Plant Protection Agent 
Law 1997 
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Author: Where does the BOV retrieve its information from? 
DI Greimel: From the 
• AGES (trial results of comparative tests (streptomycin and other plant 
protection agents; Three-country-reports; research findings (on cultivar 
resistances) 
• BMLFUW (regarding EU-level forthcomings, e.g. on the protection zone status) 
• Information meetings, international symposia, technical conferences, internet 
 
Author: Regarding the approval of agricultural use of streptomycin: how was your 
organization involved in the decision process (of authorizing streptomycin)?  
DI Greimel: In close cooperation with the BMLFUW and AGES at the Round Tables, where 
all stakeholders are represented. By (direct) communication with and hearing of all parties 
it has been tried to balance the interests of all parties involved. The Federal Ministry 
decides after this hearing (ultimately bearing responsibility).  
DI Greimel: Ultimately the BMLFUW decides (on the allowance of streptomycin), but 
strongly attends the opinion of the AGES in technical terms. In my opinion if the AGES 
would be strictly against it, the Federal Ministry would not oppose the AGES being the 
technically competent authority. 
Interposed question by the Author: What about the BAES? 
DI Greimel: The BAES is the technical/functional competent authority issuing the §13-
authorisation for streptomycin.  
The Federal Ministry is the political competent authority: because the usage of 
streptomycin is a thorny question having a political dimension, the BMLFUW takes over this 
task. 
For the authorization the Federation759 and AGES (respectively BAES) are responsible. The 
use of the plant protection products is matter of the provinces, but the use is only allowed 
after the AGES has given its permission. In 2005 and 2006 only Vorarlberg has been 
allowed to use streptomycin. 2008 the use of streptomycin has been allowed throughout 
Austria, the decision has been left up to the provinces. 
Interposed question by the Author: so how could the BOV take influence on the decision 
process (of authorizing streptomycin)?  
DI Greimel: In personal contact with the bodies. 
Author: Is there a list of the Austrian full-time orchardists with the according size (value) 
of their orchards (and their annual crop yield)? According to which criteria (ha, etc?) and 
by whom is the classification of “full-time” done (thereby being qualified for streptomycin-
use)? 
DI Greimel: The classification is equal to the one used by “Statistik Austria”760 in 
combination with a further criterion: whether the fruit grower falls into the “fruit-growing-
surcharge”761. 
The author remarked, that data is not explicitly stated (but has to be calculated by 
deducting the organic farmers from the total) and some tables (or headers) seem to have 
been confused in the documents found, and hereby sends these contradictory statements 
to DI Greimel.  
In a follow-up phone call DI Greimel stated: These calculations seem to be correct. 
Subtracting the organic farmers from the total number of farmers results in both IP and 
conventional farmers, with the IP-farmers being approximately 80%. Additional 
information regarding accumulative data on federal state level is not available to the BOV 
apart from the Statistics Austria data. In 2008 in Austria 80 farms have used streptomycin. 
                                          
759 Remark by the author: original term used in German “Bund” 
760 Remark by the author: 0,15ha + trees planted according to a certain order; census 
every 5 years 
761 Remark by the author: original term used in German “Obstbau-Zuschlag”; increasing 
the assessed value serving as the tax base in farming 
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Interposed question by the Author: Why is there a fruit-growing-surcharge? 
DI Greimel: Because fruit growing involves profit margins above the agricultural average. 
Author: Who controls the necessity of use of streptomycin in each individual case and on 
which preconditions was the use allowed? 
DI Greimel: there are warning systems in the provinces (consisting of several 
measurement stations in important regions) controlling humidity and temperature. These 
are operated by the fruit-growing consultancy services of the Provincial Agricultural 
Chambers762 bearing the costs alone. The approval for the usage of streptomycin occurs 
only if the conditions (remark by the author: for the population growth of the bacteria) are 
fulfilled. The current status is published via the internet. 
The use of streptomycin must be reported to the provincial governments within two days. 
Using streptomycin without a prior issued warning would be illegal and will be sanctioned, 
because it does not comply with the notice763 issued between the AGES and the Provinces 
(being responsible for control and execution). 
Author: Normally if a product is not listed in the IP-list (e.g. streptomycin) is used, the 
ÖPUL-subsidy is lost for the whole farm, but with the use of streptomycin an exemption 
has been made: ÖPUL-subsidy is not lost for the whole farm but only for the parts treated 
with streptomycin. Why is there a special regulation for the ÖPUL-subsidy concerning the 
use of streptomycin? 
DI Greimel: It constitutes a compromise solution between the BOV and the BMLFUW. 
Background is that fruit growers would have been forced into illegality, because of 
demoralized reporting behaviour. There were reasonable fears that farmers would have 
used streptomycin illegally, if the subsidy would have been handled so strictly. 
Interposed question by the Author: Please explain why the subsidy is so essential to the 
farmers. 
DI Greimel: Generally this is the case for mixed agricultural holdings, where the subsidy 
would also have been lost for other parts of the production (mixed agriculture not only 
concerns fruit/non-fruit crop, but also variations within the fruit, e.g. apples and cherries). 
The ÖPUL-subsidy in fruit-growing is the area-related compensation payment for  
• increased time and efforts (because certain plant protection agents cannot be 
used),  
• higher production risk 
• lower output (because of restricted manuring) 
• higher costs for biotechnical measures 
• and coherent control walks times 
 
Interposed question by the Author: Are exemptions like this a common practice (is it 
frequently used with other plant protection agents, too)? 
DI Greimel: No, in practice this exemption clause is not often used. 
Author: Who was in charge for ordering streptomycin and at which price has it been 
purchased? (Costs for farmers/ha?) 
DI Greimel: The respective provinces are responsible for purchasing streptomycin, on the 
base of the issued qualification certificates.  
By the Austrian distribution partners of the Belgian producer, streptomycin has been 
delivered to the collection points where it is handed out (controlled). 
DI Greimel: Concerning the information on the price at which streptomycin is purchased 
by the provinces. 
Author: Are there further calculations beneficial for data input to CBA available e.g. have 
calculations been made regarding the necessity of the agricultural use of streptomycin on 
                                          
762 Remark by the author: original term used in German “Obstbauberatung der 
Landwirtschaftskammern der Länder“ 
763 Remark by the author: original term used in German “Bescheid” 
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exemption or on the damages fire blight can cause? How are cost/risk-factors of enclosed 
CBA estimated by your institution? 
DI Greimel: On the part of the BOV regarding the risk factors of streptomycin no 
calculations exist. If the substance is used according to the obligations, risk is negligible. 
The economic risk of a non-application is many times higher. The AGES has also reinsured 
itself by the expert opinion of physicians.  
DI Greimel: On provincial level there are also no such risk calculations. Only calculations 
relating to the economic scope exist, as for example the calculation of Dr. Steinbauer from 
Provincial Government of Styria764, considering the economic loss of fire blight for 
compensation matters.  
Interposed question by the Author (on 4.11.08; answered on the 21.11.08): Is this expert 
opinion available by the BOV (it has not been retrievable online nor via the AGES)? 
DI Greimel: I do not know, whether the BOV is allowed to pass on the expert opinion. I 
don’t think it is open for public. Moreover it is now outdated, because residues have been 
found in apples and it has to be regenerated. 
Author: Is there a summary on how high the fire blight infection pressure and coherent 
losses due to fire blight have been in Austria in the last years? Are there maps showing the 
spreading of infection? 
DI Greimel: Not at the BOV. But the AGES is currently working on a strategy paper 
(probably finished by the end of this year) and also has to issue national reports765 to the 
BMLFUW (being the principal and the responsible institution) which are necessary for 
reporting to the EU (monitorings). In these yearly report statements on the appearance of 
fire blight in Austria (in the respective year) can be found (but not visualized, just written). 
Author: Is there a list on how much streptomycin has been used in the last years in 
Austria? 
DI Greimel: The report, which I have just mentioned before, that is issued by the AGES at 
the end of the year, includes all these details on who, when, where, has used which 
quantities of streptomycin – constituting an obligation of the notice allowing the limited 
use of streptomycin in Austria. 
But information could also be obtained at the responsible regional offices (of the provincial 
governments): For example for 2005 and 2006, when the use was only allowed in 
Vorarlberg, the Chamber of Agriculture Vorarlberg could be contacted, to provide exact 
data. But it has not been much, since the pomiculture of Vorarlberg does not carry much 
weight regarding Austria’s fruit growing in total.  
Author: Which information is forwarded by your organization to qualified applicants 
regarding the use of streptomycin? 
DI Greimel: The BOV is responsible for strategic and political questions. In the provinces 
the regional fruit growers associations766 and the regional economic chambers together 
perform the consulting service of the fruit growers arranging information events, 
operations consulting, trainings and technical events in winter. 
Author: Which measures against fire blight are recommended by the BOV on the one hand 
for full-time orchardists and on the other hand to organic farmers? 
DI Greimel: There is no difference between organic farming and IP except for the use of 
streptomycin and the shifted stress to mechanic measures. Although there is a plant 
protection agent for organic farmers, Blossom Protect, it is not so effective according to 
the current state of knowledge and streptomycin is still the most effective substance. 
Author: Are farmers compensated when affected by fire blight? (if yes: to which extent, by 
whom) Is there an insurance against the risks of fire blight losses? 
                                          
764 Remark by the author: these calculations have been forwarded to the author: 
[Steinbauer 2008]) 
765 Remark by the author: in contrast to the “three-country” reports (of Germany, 
Switzerland, Austria) 
766 Remark by the author: original term used in German “Landesobstbauverbände” 
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DI Greimel: Compensation payments are different in the individual provinces, because it 
is a provincial matter. In Vorarlberg (approximately) 80%767 are compensated, in Styria 
only (approximately) 30-40%. The differing intensity of fruit-growers and the coherent 
importance of fruit-growing in the respective province explains this difference (for example 
Styria cannot pay as much as Vorarlberg to all of it’s many fruit growers). There is no 
insurance against the risks of fire blight losses. 
Interposed question by the author: is it assumable that compensation will be harmonized 
across Austria someday (would it not be a solution to regulate this issue nationwide)? 
DI Greimel: No, the plant protection agent usage and the compensation payments will 
stay province matter. 
Author: Regarding the further outlook: Is the agricultural use of streptomycin based on 
§13 also planned in future? How many times can the §13 be used? 
DI Greimel: As far as I know there is no limitation (to the usage of the danger in delay 
clause). 
As soon as there is another plant protection product available, that can replace 
streptomycin, it will not be needed anymore. But as long as there is none, the BOV will 
adhere to its demand for the usage of streptomycin. In my opinion, it will not be that 
another substance is as effective as streptomycin in the short-run. 
Author: Is there anything you would like to remark additionally? 
DI Greimel: No, I thing the most important facts have been addressed. 
Author: Thank you very much for the interview! 
Documents sent by the author: CBAv1.1.xls 
Documents handed over by the interviewee: none 
Further agreements: A copy of the case study will be submitted after completion. 
 
7. [Interview AGES 02] 
Company/Institution: Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety (AGES), Institute for the 
Evaluation & Authorization of Plant Protection Products 
Interviewee(s)/Function(s): Hofrat Robert Womastek 
Interview Location: Spargelfeldstrasse 191, 1220 Vienna, Austria 
Date and Time: no response to despite the author’s many efforts  
Document Status: The author was ignored, the interview could not be held 
 
1. Decision process regarding the approval of agricultural use of streptomycin 
1.a. Please describe the process of approval and the reasons for approval of streptomycin 
although banned in EU and Austrian law: Which persons from which institutions/authorities 
in what order were involved in the decision process? Please state the legal framework 
regulating this decision process. 
1.b. Document request for the official approval of plant protection agents regarding to 
exemption §13 PSMG in Austria (and on EU-level according to Art. 8(4) of 91/414 EEC) 
published? 
                                          
767 Calculations on the base e.g. provided by Dr. Steinbauer; Remark by the author: see 
[Steinbauer 2008] 
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1.c. What is the role of the AGES exactly regarding this approval of streptomycin and in 
what way is the AGES being subject to directives? 
1.d. Were NGO’s involved in the decision process? Which ones? 
2. Pressure of which players influenced the decision process? 
2.a. Was the approval in Germany a lever? 
2.b. What did the BOV and the LKÖ want? 
2.c. Is it correct, that normally, if a product not listed in the IP-list is used, the ÖPUL-
subsidy is lost for the whole farm? 
2.d And is it correct, that with the use of streptomycin an exemption has been made: 
ÖPUL-subsidy is not lost for the whole farm but only for the parts treated with 
streptomycin? (additional costs to be implemented in CBA) 
3. Procedure regarding applications for agricultural use of streptomycin: 
3.a. Classification of qualified applicants according to which criteria (ha?) and by whom? 
Does the AGES have a list of the Austrian full-time orchardists with the according value of 
their orchards, and (in comparison) other orchardists (no. + value)? 
3.b. Which information is forwarded to qualified applicants regarding the use of 
streptomycin? 
3.c. Procedure of ordering streptomycin by applicants? 
3.d. Who controls the necessity of use of streptomycin in each individual case and on 
which preconditions was the use allowed? (e.g. Mary Blight-System) 
4. Cost-Benefit-Analysis (CBA): 
4.a. Availability of calculations beneficial for data input to CBA (e.g. have calculations been 
made regarding the necessity of agricultural use of streptomycin on exemption?) 
4.b. Is there a summary (pooled information) on how much fire blight infection pressure 
(losses due to fire blight) of the last years in Austria? 
4.c. Is there a summary (pooled information) on how much streptomycin has been used in 
the last years in Austria? 
4.d. How are cost/risk-factors of enclosed CBA estimated by your institution?  
4.e. Are there any additional factors to be included? 
5. General information: 
5.a. Which measures against fire blight are recommended by the AGES and why? 
• for full-time orchadists 
• for organic farmers, scattered fruit trees, trees in private gardens? 
 
5.b. Are farmers compensated when affected by fire blight? (if yes: to which extent, by 
whom) 
Is there an assurance against the risks of fire blight losses? 
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5.c. Outlook: Is the agricultural use of streptomycin based on §13 also planned in future? 
How many times can the §13 be used? 
5.d. How is the development of alternatives supported by the state? E.g. tax reductions, 
research subsidies, admission to Annex I of EC 91/414 
6. Additional Remarks: 
Are there any additional remarks, you would like to state from your side? 
Documents attached by the Author: CBAv 1.1.xls 
 
8. [Interview ÖIB] 
Company/Institution: Austrian Beekeepers Association (“Österreichischer Imkerbund” 
(ÖIB)) 
Interviewee(s)/Function(s): Mr. Josef ULZ (President) 
Interview Location: via Telephone Calls 
Date and Time: 08.11.08, 09:25 – 09:40 and 10:30-10:40 and 13:00-14:45 
Document Status: APPROVED 
 
Author: What is the economic value of bee-keeping regarding honey(products) and 
pollination? 
Ulz: The honey production each year is approximately 5 million kg. This is a long-term 
average (10-year-average) with production values between 3,5 – 7 million kg. 
The kg honey is worth 7,50€/kg (on average). 
Pollination work of the bees can be estimated to be approximately a ten-fold of this value 
[Remark by the author: 7.5€/kg * 5 million kg= 37.5 million€*10= 375 million€] 
This does not include the pollination work on wild [Remark by the author: non-cultivated] 
plants, which has to be seen delivering an additional value, but is very hard to measure. 
In America calculations have assumed the value to be the 135-fold – but there are other 
preconditions: agriculture is structured differently with big areas, that are more dependant 
on pollination by bees. 
In Austria there are two associations: 
• the Austrian Beekeeper Association (Imkerbund (ÖIB)) and the  
• Austrian Full-time Beekeeper Association (Erwerbsimkerbund (ÖEIB)).  
 
Within the IB there are 22500 members and within the EIB 252. 
The IB officially has 291.000 bee-hives, the EIB 35.000.768 
Because the membership fee for the associations is dependent on the number of bee-
hives, these official values are not the real ones. (Beekeepers tend to forget to report 
                                          
768 The number of bees within a hive varies depending on the time of the year (season) 
starting in spring with 10-11.000 bees growing up to 35-40.000 in summer. 
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some bee-hives in order to lower their fees). In reality there is an estimated quantity of 
450.000 bee-hives in Austria. 
Author: In which costs are entailed by the agricultural usage of streptomycin for the 
beekeepers (image-loss, sales losses, disposal fees, laboratory analysis, bee-hive moving, 
etc)? 
Ulz: The problem was that in media it was communicated that there was a possible 
antibiotic contamination of honey, that it even would have to be discarded, by which the 
customers were rattled that they would maybe consume honey with streptomycin residues.  
Although the quantity we are speaking of is extremely low: The beekeepers have chosen a 
so-called zero-tolerance: everything above the detection limit of 5µg/kg is discarded.  
To draw comparisons which other residue levels exist: Meat: 500 µg/kg; Milk: 300µkg 
(/kg?); Intestines: 1000µg/kg. 
The average consummation of meat/year is about 90-110 kg, honey only 1,5 kg/year. 
But the costumer sees this differentiated: hears “residues” and is scared of hazardousness 
to health. Above that with honey the customer takes it for granted that there is nothing 
allowed to be in the honey. With other products there may be a lack of knowledge, or it is 
simply tolerated out of the fact, that it is accepted because there is no will to quit on 
eating meat (for example). With honey the expectations are different. This is why the 
beekeepers have decided for the zero-tolerance, although it is daring, because the 
accuracy of analysis methods develops and the detection limit (at the moment 5µg/kg) will 
lower. Exaggerating it could be said, that if this would be done with all food stuff virtually 
no food stuff could be eaten anymore, if there are no residues tolerated. That is why it is 
important to install residue limits, which is set at 10µg by the EU. The Austrian beekeepers 
are even stricter. Also the food retailers are very strict and test the honey themselves: 
products containing antibiotic769, will be resent to the producer.  
Experiences have shown that residues are practically never higher than 20µg/kg and the 
beekeepers have been asked why they are so strict by the fruit growers (who would not 
have the problem with the beekeepers with higher limits) and the provincial governments 
(who would not need to pay). But the beekeepers have tried to argue, that the customer 
generally reacts very vehement on “residues” if these are µg or mg is not of interest – 
(s)he hears “residues” and rather chooses to eat jam, if one has to suppose that there are 
unwanted contents in the honey. It can be observed from the reactions of our customers 
that honey seems to have a relative importance/respect from remarks like “now you can’t 
even eat honey anymore”. It shows that in the customer view honey is a natural product. 
Residues might be accepted in other food stuffs, but not with honey. The fruit growers 
have after the public discussion, the withdrawal of the AMA-label and the supermarket’s 
resistance to sell fruit from areas where streptomycin has been used, experienced this 
year how the sensitive the market can react even if residues on the fruit are not the topic. 
The customer cannot bother to judge about residuals - he wants to know: are the apples 
sprayed or not sprayed? Also the fruit growers will not be able to endure such reactions 
each year. 
Mankind has become more attentive and sensitive, however public by itself is powerless, 
because policy has the power to rule - but public discussion can have a corrective impact: 
when public discussion arose on streptomycin and the supermarkets and the AMA reacted 
correspondingly, that took effect - because if the product cannot be sold anymore, then it 
hurts. 
The image costs and sales losses of the beekeepers are hard to estimate. 
Consumer behaviour often calms down again after the first shock. The effect seems to be 
rather short-termed. There are no reports from the beekeepers, only discussions on the 
                                          
769 Regardless whether within the allowed interval 5-10µg/kg or above that. 
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experiences of customer reactions. Very probably the issue will be forgotten by the 
customers until Christmas (which is the time with the highest sales in the honey-business). 
In the end impact on customer reaction as a whole is estimated to be rather low at the 
moment [in the short term]. 
What defused the situation a little, so that customers would not have to be worried about 
residues, was the Austria-wide honey monitoring everywhere, where there has been 
sprayed. The AGES has elaborated a security concept, determining where samples would 
have to be taken to see whether there is a risk. 
In Styria there are more than 2000 full-time-orchardists (which were entitled to use 
streptomycin), but only 170 farmers really used it this year (due to the weather 
conditions). The EU at the moment allows for 10µg/kg residues of streptomycin in honey. 
It has been tested for the detection limit of 5µg/kg. 110 samples have been under the 
detection limit, only one sample has been above the detection limit of 6µg. This sample 
has been drawn from a rather small beekeeper, who has stated, that he will not sell the 
honey anyway (because of his small production volume) and he himself and his 
family/friends will eat the honey. Otherwise it would have been disposed by the Styrian 
Province.  
The beekeepers are not pleased. We don’t want to produce to then dispose the honey, also 
if the honey is purchased (compensated). We are against the agricultural use of 
streptomycin and hope it will soon not be needed anymore. In the long run (e.g. the next 
ten years) we will not have the staying power to stand the loss of customer trust and 
sales: if every year there is a discussion in media on the use of streptomycin and every 
year the customer is made insecure again - this is not sustainable. The beekeepers have 
their backs to the wall. 
But it was politically decided and not preventable.  
The minister [Remark by the author: of the BMLFUW] of course had to weigh up the 
economic impacts of the big group of farmers (2400 full-time-orchardists) against the 
relatively small group of beekeepers (in Styria e.g. there are only 40 full-time-
beekeepers). Anyways it should not be that the beekeepers don’t care about the 
orchardists going bankrupt. But we also had to fight for the understanding that a solution 
cannot be achieved by setting the residue limit up to 30µg (as suggested) because (as 
explained before) then there would be practically no honey above the residue limit. In my 
opinion it was underestimated, that beekeepers would refuse such a solution (but the 
reasons why have been made clear).  
2008 no honey had to be disposed, which was quite surprising: in Switzerland there were 
contaminations. Maybe it has helped, that in the intensive negotiations where all 
concerned parties are bound in, we have demanded the BOV to ensure that the sprayings 
only take place at night times, where there are no bees flying. Whether or not the farmers 
have kept to it or not, cannot be proofed. 
Author: What about the compensation payments, who pays, under which circumstances 
and how much? 
Ulz: Compensation payments are always provincial matter and must be negotiated with 
the provinces, because fire blight is provincial matter. For Styria (being the most 
concerned area) the monitoring-concept has been drawn up by the beekeepers association 
(together by the AGES) and could be used by other provinces as a base.  
Author: What is your view on the procedures in the decision process on the agricultural 
use of streptomycin? 
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Ulz: There are Round Tables with the AGES involving all concerned parties (orchardists, 
tree nurseries, beekeepers, provincial governments, …). The information passing on the 
agricultural use of streptomycin has worked similar to military precision770 and exemplary.  
A useable solution was needed, that can be sustained by everyone. The beekeepers have 
made their point of view clear - but for political and economic reasons streptomycin was 
accepted to be necessary. The beekeepers have therefore set the precondition that:  
• A) data of all beehives concerned was collected 
• B) and that there is a monitoring where it is sprayed. The data on when and 
who has sprayed have been made public in the internet by a map open to 
everyone. [Remark by the author: asked for the address the URL Mr. Ulz has 
assumed that it should be found by the catchwords “Feuerbrand, Bekämpfung, 
Steiermark” found to be 
http://www.agrar.steiermark.at/cms/beitrag/10885917/13082183/] 
This way beekeepers had the possibility to know whether streptomycin has been sprayed 
in his area. Sprayed areas were included in the monitoring, if the beekeeper was part of 
the sample taking program, the sample was taken. 
In Styria money was also secured for the worst case scenario: if all orchardists that could 
have sprayed and the whole honey would have to be disposed: 1 million Euro was set 
aside for this worst case. 
Author: What has been communicated about existing alternatives e.g. Blossom Protect? 
Ulz: I am not an expert; I am only stating what I have heard from the AGES and the fruit 
growing research centers (e.g. Haidegg in Styria). Two disadvantages have been 
mentioned in the discussions at the Round Tables: 
• In outdoor test there are not the same results as in glasshouse (the efficiency 
is worse) 
• The product results in fruit-russeting. 
 
It has always been stated that there is no such efficient product as Plantomycin [Remark 
by the author: streptomycin-product]. 
In summer this year [Remark by the author: 2008] the results of efficiency tests claimed 
by the producers of BP were not identical with the ones found out by the AGES and 
research centres of Vorarlberg and Styria (Haidegg). There have been discussions on 
whether the efficiency test results from the company selling Blossom Protect have been 
“massaged” or whether the trial centres have done something wrong. As a solution it has 
been agreed, that a member of the company will join and watch the trials in future.  
I (as layman) cannot judge who is right, but of course there is the need to let research be 
objective, not influenced by the interests of groups. The AGES, being independent of 
sponsors can be neutral and objective in this situation. In my subjective opinion I have the 
impression that it is tried to get away from streptomycin. The AGES is now working on a 
strategy paper, so that not every year again we have to start from the scratch, but giving 
a perspective on how FB shall be controlled the next years, the main task being to find 
alternatives to get away from streptomycin. The provinces shall bring in proposals, than 
there will be discussions on the discrepancies with all participants, finding solutions 
acceptable for all. Nobody is happy with streptomycin and it is a shared opinion, that we 
have to get away from the streptomycin use, but there is disaccord on the way how. 
What has shocked me has been a conference on the alternatives measures against fire 
blight that has been attended by me and fruit growers around the 10./11. December 2007 
in Dossenheim (BBA) where it has been presented how far research has come regarding 
                                          
770 Originally term used in German: “generalsstabmässig” 
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alternatives: a known German medic (some honoured President of the Medical Association) 
has held a talk on the impacts of streptomycin in the environment, the bottom line being 
that from the viewpoint of human medicine there are no worries regarding the use of 
streptomycin in the environment. He has reasoned very scientifically, so that I have 
actually not understood, why exactly there are no effects, but also nobody opposed him. 
He has conveyed the impression that there is no problem at all from the environmental 
side, which in fact is against what the issue suggested always to me. Actually the question 
arose inside me, whether this man was “bought”. If he would have also said, there is much 
that we don’t know, but so it sounded more like a dogma to me… 
This is the problem: science has not delivered clear messages and the experts have still 
not come to an agreement. How shall a layman then know what is right? 
When the fire blight problem turned up and we (beekeepers) noticed, that we were right in 
the middle, we have tried to find alternatives on our own. If bees fly to orchards (also 
possibly causing the dispersion of FB) they could also help to control FB and not only in 
intensive orchards. In New Zealand there were already trials with yeast products, with 
which the bees would be covered, taking the substance to the plants. Unfortunately there 
was disillusionment: apples showed fruit-russeting and the efficiency was not as good as 
observed in New Zealand. The bees cannot be steered and therefore the high efforts did 
not pay off. 
According to experts it takes time until 2011/12 to be able to do without antibiotics. This is 
because for example the growing of FB-resistant plants is a longsome matter (developing, 
planting until apples are available). Up to now there is no radical success, but of course 
this can change in future. This is why the beekeepers require the stress on research 
(research program) because otherwise in 10 years we will still be put off. 
In South Tyrol antibiotics are generally forbidden to use in the environment. Being the 
typical fruit-growing-province it has in comparison only suffered little losses due to FB: If 
there is FB it is rigorous cleared. Further in South Tyrol it has been politically feasible, that 
all host plant have been cleared, maybe because the region depends so much on 
orcharding that it was accepted. So the infection pressure could be lowered in general for 
the orchards. In Austria it has also been tried but the resistance of private garden owners 
has been very high, they were not willing to clear existing plants in their garden (not 
feeling concerned with FB), therefore there are only recommendations and there is the law 
prohibiting further spreading of host plants like e.g. cotoneaster – it would be a punishable 
offence to sell such a plant in a tree nursery, market. It is also not feasible to compensate, 
payments would be too high. Therefore in Austria streptomycin seems to be the lesser of 
the two evils. The orchardist only sprays because he has a problem, after all: the agent is 
expensive and the ÖPUL subsidy is lost, resulting in high costs. But on the other hand the 
orchardists also have to put themselves in our position! Also for private neighbouring 
gardens it is actually also unacceptable that they have to tolerate sprayings of antibiotics 
next to them. 
The Austrian food-retailers have an alternative because apples from untreated orchards of 
South Tyrol where Streptomycin is forbidden to use are available. If every country would 
use antibiotics there would be no chance anyway, but this way the retailers can choose… 
Author: Thank you very much for the interview! 
Further Remarks: The telephone call was held in German language. Despite all the inputs 
acquainted during this very interesting and extensive discussion held on the phone, not all 
inputs could be transformed into a minutes of meeting, since this would have gone far 
beyond the scope of this paper and would deliver inputs for another case study. 
Nevertheless the author has tried to translate the most important statements. 
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9. [Survey on Food Retailers] 
From: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
To: office@spar.at; office@merkur.co.at; hotlinebilla@billa.co.at; office@unimarkt.at; 
hotline@lidl.at; kundenservice@adeg.at; servicecenter@penny.at; 
kundenservice@zielpunkt.at 
Subject: Streptomycin-Fallstudie an der Uni-Wien 
Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2008 14:39:47 +0200 
 
Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren! 
Im Rahmen meiner Diplomarbeit zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Mag. rer. soc. oec a der 
Universität Wien (Lehrstuhl für Industrie, Energie und Umwelt, Prof. Wirl, Betreuer: DDr. Noll) verfasse 
ich eine Fallstudie über den Einsatz von Streptomycin in der Landwirtschaft und erstelle dabei eine 
Kosten-Nutzen-Rechnung. Dabei werde ich auch den (angedrohten)Handelsboykott des 
Lebensmitteleinzelhandels bewerten und möchte diesbezüglich auch nachfragen, wie diese Causa nun 
letzten Endes gehandhabt wurde/wird.  
Bitte beantworten Sie untenstehende Fragen, damit ich meine Kalkulation abschliessen kann. 
1. Verkaufen Sie nun Äpfel von streptomycinbehandelten Flächen?  
Wenn Antwort = Nein: 
2. Aus welchen Gründen/Überlegungen heraus haben Sie das angedrohte Boykott wahr gemacht? 
Wenn Antwort = Ja: 
3.a. Wenn ja, wieviel? (Prozent des gesamten Apfelsortiments) 
3.b. Tragen diese dennoch das AMA-Gütesiegel? 
3.c. Sind diese sonst durch irgendwelche Kennzeichnung von anderen (nicht streptomycin-behandelten) 
unterscheidbar? 
3.d. Aus welchen Gründen/Überlegungen heraus haben Sie das angedrohte Boykott nun nicht wahr 
gemacht? 
4. Sonstige Angaben, die Sie gerne angeben würden? 
Ihre Antworten werden, mit Ihrem Einverständnis, in voller Länge im Annex der Diplomarbeit 
veröffentlicht.  
Vielen Dank für Ihre Mühe! 
MfG,  
Simona Winkler 
Linzerstr. 14 
4490 St. Florian 
0660-4025090 
Schreiben ergeht an: Spar, Merkur, Billa, Unimarkt, Lidl, Hofer, Penny, Adeg, Plus (Zielpunkt) 
 
1) [SPAR] – original response 
E-Mail am 15. January 2009 
 
SPAR-Info 
Liebe Frau Winkler! 
Vielen Dank für Ihr Interesse an unserem Unternehmen.  
Hier die Antworten (siehe kursive Schrift) auf Ihre Fragen: 
1. Verkaufen Sie nun Äpfel von streptomycinbehandelten Flächen? 
Nein. Man muss aber unbedingt wissen, dass Streptomycin heuer kaum eine Rolle gespielt 
hat: Es wurden heuer lediglich 2 Prozent aller Äpfel-Anbauflächen mit Streptomycin 
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behandelt. Wir haben daher überhaupt keine Probleme gehabt, die von uns benötigte 
Menge an unbehandelten Äpfeln von den Lieferanten zu bekommen. 
Wenn Antwort = Nein: 
2. Aus welchen Gründen/Überlegungen heraus haben Sie das angedrohte Boykott 
wahr gemacht? 
Antibiotika haben unserer Meinung nach bei der Lebensmittel-Produktion nichts verloren. 
Auch wenn sie auf den Früchten nicht mehr nachweisbar sind, haben sie doch größere 
ökologische Folgen (Boden, Resistenzen, ..). Ein zweiter Grund: Wir wissen, dass unsere 
Kundinnen keine Äpfel in den Regalen haben wollen, die mit Medikamenten behandelt 
worden sind. 
Wenn Antwort = Ja: 
3.a. Wenn ja, wieviel? (Prozent des gesamten Apfelsortiments) 
3.b. Tragen diese dennoch das AMA-Gütesiegel? 
3.c. Sind diese sonst durch irgendwelche Kennzeichnung von anderen (nicht 
streptomycin-behandelten) unterscheidbar? 
3.d. Aus welchen Gründen/Überlegungen heraus haben Sie das angedrohte Boykott 
nun nicht wahr gemacht? 
4. Sonstige Angaben, die Sie gerne angeben würden? 
Das Thema „Stryptomycin bei Äpfeln“ ist für uns ein Thema, das sehr viel weitreichender 
ist: Es geht auch darum, die Landwirtschaft zum Nachdenken zu bringen – die machen es 
sich manchmal zu einfach (indem sie nicht im Sinne der Konsumenten handeln). 
Außerdem: Es muss auch ein staatliches Entschädigungssystem geben für betroffene 
Bauern. 
Frau Winkler, wir hoffen, Ihnen mit diesen Infos weitergeholfen zu haben und wünschen 
Ihnen viel Erfolg für Ihre Fallstudie! 
Freundliche Grüße aus Salzburg 
 
Mag. Verena Wegscheider 
PR & Information 
 
2) [REWE] – original response (BILLA, MERKUR, PENNY) 
Subject: Streptomycin-Fallstudie an der Uni-Wien 
Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2008 15:46:23 +0200 
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From: C.Tinkler@rewe-group.at 
To: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
CC: H.Fleischhacker@merkur.co.at; T.Englisch@rewe-group.at; K.Nakhai@rewe-group.at 
Sehr geehrte Frau Winkler, 
sehr gerne informieren wir Sie seitens REWE Group Austria über den Verkauf von Äpfel 
streptomycinbehandelter Flächen. Sollten Sie darüber hinaus Fragen haben, würde ich Sie 
bitten mit der AMA beziehungsweise auch mit der AGES (Österreichische Agentur für 
Gesundheit und Ernährungssicherheit) Kontakt aufzunehmen. 
Mit freundlichen Grüßen, 
Corinna Tinkler 
         2008 wurden aufgrund der günstigen Witterung nur zirka 2% der heimischen 
Kernobstflächen (inkl. Junganlagen) zum Schutz gegen den Feuerbrand mit dem Wirkstoff 
Streptomycin ausschließlich während der Blüte behandelt. 
         Da im Jahr 2008 der Einsatz von Streptomycin in Österreich so gering war, ist es 
für diese Vermarktungssaison (2008/2009) möglich, nur jene Äpfel über den 
Lebensmitteleinzelhandel zu vermarkten, die von Kulturen stammen, welche NICHT mit 
Streptomycin behandelt wurden. 
         Ein zusätzliches von der AMA Marketing beauftragtes Rückstandsmonitoring nach 
neuesten Untersuchungsmethoden bzw. Nachweisgrenzen ergab, dass in den Früchten 
keine Rückstände nachweisbar sind. Weiters konnten in allen bis dato über 180 
untersuchten Honigproben keine Rückstände von Streptomycin nachgewiesen werden. 
         Um den naturnahen Kernobstbau in Österreich in Zukunft aufrecht zu erhalten 
bzw. abzusichern, ist es notwendig, die Forschung zur Bekämpfung von Feuerbrand weiter 
zu intensivieren und geeignete Maßnahmen zu setzen. Zu diesem Zweck wird von der 
AGES unter Einbeziehung der Fachöffentlichkeit eine "ganzheitliche Strategie zur 
Feuerbrandbekämpfung 2008-2013" ausgearbeitet und einer jährlichen wissenschaftlichen 
Evaluierung unterzogen.  
Mag. Corinna Tinkler   
REWE GROUP Austria 
Pressesprecherin  
Leiterin Unternehmenskommunikation  
REWE Austria AG  
Industriezentrum NÖ-Süd, Straße 3, Objekt 16 
A-2355 Wiener Neudorf  
Firmenbuch: LG Wr. Neustadt, FN 82769w  
Tel.: +43 2236 600-5262 
E-Mail: c.tinkler@rewe-group.at 
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3) [Zielpunkt] – original response 
 
To: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
Subject: WG: Streptomycin-Fallstudie an der Uni-Wien 
From: baigner@zielpunkt.at 
Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2008 13:45:41 +0200 
Sehr geehrte Frau Winkler,  
vielen Dank für Ihr Email vom 08. Oktober, in dem Sie Fragen zum o.g. Thema stellen.  
Aufgrund konzerninterner Richtlinien können wir uns der Fallstudie nicht beteiligen.  
Vielen Dank für Ihr Interesse an der Marke Zielpunkt.  
Mit freundlichen Grüßen  
Bettina Aigner 
Abteilung Marketing 
ZIELPUNKT WARENHANDEL GmbH & Co KG 
A-1239 Wien, Heizwerkstraße 5 
www.zielpunkt.at 
Tel.: +43/1 / 610 45/ 293             
Fax.: +43/1 / 610 45/ 280 
 
4) [Telephone Call Hofer] 
Company/Institution: Hofer KG, Stockerau, Management 
Interviewee: Interviewee wants to stay anonymous, for corporate strategy reasons 
Date and Time: 10.10.08, 13:50-14:03 
Document Status: APPROVED 
 
Interviewee: No apples will be retailed from streptomycin-sprayed areas in Austria. 
Nevertheless Hofer would have been willing to sell apples from streptomycin-treated areas 
in Austria, demanding that residues of streptomycin would not be found on the apples or 
would be below measurability of scientific proof of the residuals. 
Apples from streptomycin sprayed areas are not sold because of two major reasons: 
The weather conditions have been good this year, so that only 2% of the areas have 
actually been treated with streptomycin. 
The farmer representatives (who exactly was not known by the interviewee) have decided 
to export these apples, so that no apples from treated areas in Austria are on the market 
this season. This decision is assumed to be taken partly because of the considerations and 
the reservations (of possible negative impacts on animal, human and health) other food 
retailers have declared. 
There have meetings at the AMA with some representatives of the retailers and sometimes 
also farmer representatives.  
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From the AGES, Dr. Girsch has presented a Powerpoint slide-show, informing on 
streptomycin. The main information transported was that streptomycin was used 
internationally, except in South Tyrol, and that streptomycin was “harmless”771. 
But as explained before Hofer would have been willing [remark by the author to retail 
apples from treated areas] and had a practical attitude towards the issue: if the apples did 
not contain streptomycin, then the treatment would be irrelevant. 
Author: Thank you for time and the information shared! 
                                          
771 Remark by the author: German orgininal “unbedenklich” 
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ANNEX II to the Case Study: Further 
Communication 
A) EFSA 
From: Simona Winkler [mailto:diewinklers@hotmail.com] 
Sent: 21 July 2008 22:52 
To: info@efsa.europa.eu 
Subject: Data request for thesis 
Dear ladies and gentlemen,  
since I have not attained any entries for the search on "streptomycin" nor "fire blight" nor 
"Erwinia amylovora" but on your hp you state to be "the keystone of European Union (EU) 
risk assessment regarding food and feed safety" [...] and that your organization" provides 
independent scientific advice and clear communication on existing and emerging risks" I 
would like to kindly ask you, if there is any risk assessment on the use of streptomycin 
against the plant disease fire blight in the EU. 
Your input would be highly appreciated because I am writing a thesis at the University of 
Vienna, (Institute for Industry, Energy and Environment) treating this topic in a case 
study. 
Best regards,  
Simona Winkler 
Subject: Streptomycin 
Date: Mon, 4 Aug 2008 18:22:38 +0200 
From: Juergen.STURMA@efsa.europa.eu 
To: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
CC: Lara.CONGIU@efsa.europa.eu; Jane.BARLING@efsa.europa.eu; 
Ragnor.PEDERSEN@efsa.europa.eu; Tunde.MOLNAR@efsa.europa.eu 
Dear Ms Winkler, 
the active substance streptomycin is part of the so called 3rd stage of the review 
programme for existing active substances and therefore the evaluation would fall under 
EFSA's responsibility. Nevertheless this substances has never been evaluated, because it 
was not included in Annex I of the Council Directive 91/414(EEC). The related decison, 
which is also available on the internet, is attached to this message. 
Unfortunately within EFSA there is no additional information avialble. 
Best regards 
Jürgen Sturma 
********************************** 
Jürgen Sturma 
Scientific Co-ordinator 
European Food Safety Authority 
Pesticide Risk Assessment Peer Review (PRAPeR) 
Largo N. Palli 5/A 
I-43100 Parma 
Tel: +39 0521 036 655 
Fax: +39 0521 036 0 655 
Email: juergen.sturma@efsa.europa.eu 
Website: http://www.efsa.europa.eu 
Subject: FW: Data request for thesis 
Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 11:46:53 +0200 
From: Elzbieta.CEGLARSKA@efsa.europa.eu 
To: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
Dear Simona, 
Confirming what my colleague has already informed you about, namely that the EFSA 
Panel on Plant Health has not dealt with the issue you are interested in, I would like to call 
you attention to a recently published opinion by the Panel on Biological Hazards on "Food 
borne antimicrobial resistance as a biological hazard", along with the comments received 
during the public consultation, on EFSA's website: 
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902034881.htm 
Kindest regards 
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******************************** 
Elzbieta Barbara Ceglarska 
HoU, Scientific Co-ordinator 
Panel on Plant Health 
European Food Safety Authority 
Largo N. Palli 5/A 
I-43100 Parma 
Italy 
Tel.: +39 0521 036 476 
Fax: +39 0521 036 0476 
E-mail: elzbieta.ceglarska@efsa.europa.eu 
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/ScientificPanels/efsa_locale-1178620753812_PLH.htm 
 
B) WWF - NO RESPONSE 
From: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
To: fp@wwf.at 
Subject: Streptomycin Fallstudie an der Uni Wien 
Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2008 09:31:24 +0200 
 
 
C) WHO - NO RESPONSE 
From: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
To: info@who.int 
Subject: Case Study at the University of Vienna: Streptomycin 
Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2008 14:32:00 +0200 
 
From: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
To: info@who.int 
Subject: Urgent Request: Case Study at the University of Vienna - "Agricultural use of 
Streptomycine" 
Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2008 11:12:40 +0200 
 
From: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
To: aidarakanea@who.int 
Subject: Streptomycin 
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2008 08:55:09 +0200 
 
 
D) EPA  
From: diewinklers@hotmail.com  
To: wormell.lance@epa.gov  
Subject: Case Study at the University of Vienna - "Agricultural use of Streptomycine" 
Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2008 13:13:13 +0200 
Dear Mr. Lance Wormell,  
for the completion of my thesis at the University of Vienna (Austria) on the topic 
“Interactions of Environmental Law and Economic Power” I am writing a case study 
(creating a cost-benefit-analysis) on the approval of Streptomycin for agricultural use 
against fire-blight, although European (common) and national (Austrian) law had already 
banned it. For a detailed and comprehensive representation of the issue I would like to 
incorporate many viewpoints regarding the use of this antibiotic in farming.  
As I have just browsed through the EPA’s articles on Streptomycin I have not found, 
whether any (more recent) risk assessment(s) (calculations) exist apart from EPA-HQ-
OPP-2005-0493-0025. Your input would be very much appreciated! 
Thank you very much for your efforts! 
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Best regards,  
Simona Winkler 
 
Subject: Re: Case Study at the University of Vienna - "Agricultural use of Streptomycine" 
To: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
From: Wormell.Lance@epamail.epa.gov 
Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2008 10:54:46 -0400 
Simona, 
The most recent EPA Office of Pesticide Programs assessments are 
available in the public docket at regulations.gov: 
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocketDetail&d=EPA-HQ-
OPP-2005-0493. 
In addition to the tolerance reassessment decision you referenced below, you may find the 
human health assessment useful in your review: 
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&d=EPA-
HQ-OPP-2005-0493-0011. 
Feel free to contact me with additional questions. Best of luck completing your thesis. 
Lance Wormell 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
Office of Pesticide Programs 
Wormell.Lance@epa.gov 
(703) 603-0523 
 
E) BMLFUW 
Sehr geehrter Herr Lukas Weber-Hajszan! 
Wie aus untenstehendem Mail ersichtlich, bin ich von Herrn DI Martin Gessl an Sie 
verwiesen worden. 
Im Rahmen meiner Diplomarbeit "Wechselwirkungen zwischen Umweltrecht und 
Wirtschaft" an der Universität Wien (Institut für Energie, Industrie und Umwelt) verfasse 
ich eine Fallstudie über den Einsatz von Streptomycin in der Landwirtschaft inklusive einer 
Kosten-Nutzen-Rechnung. 
Für die Kalkulation brauche ich verschiedenste Daten. Unter anderem muss ich auch eine 
etwaige Ausnahmeregelung der ÖPUL-Förderung in Bezug auf den Streptomycin-Einsatz 
gegen den Feuerbrand miteinrechnen. Könnten Sie mir bitte genauere Angaben zu dieser 
Regelung und die Gründe für diese Ausnahme mitteilen? 
Ausserdem wird in der Fallstudie der Ablauf (Prozess) der Ausnahmeregelung für 
Streptomycin dargestellt. Ich habe diesbezüglich mit der AGES bereits Kontakt 
aufgenommen und bereits mit dem Institut für Pflanzengesundheit gesprochen und werde 
noch einen weiteren Termin mit den Institut für Pflanzenschutzmittelbewertung und -
zulassung wahrnehmen dürfen. 
Wie auch unten angeführt hat das BAES die Zulassung von Streptomycin veranlasst. 
Welche Rolle hat das BMLFUW im diesem Ausnahme-Genehmigungsverfahren gespielt? 
Ich bin Ihnen dankbar für alle weiterführenden Informationen.  
Mit freundlichen Grüßen,  
Simona Winkler 
 
From: Lukas.WEBER@lebensministerium.at 
To: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
CC: Matthias.LENTSCH@lebensministerium.at 
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2008 12:53:17 +0200 
Subject: AW: Fallstudie Streptomycin 
Sehr geehrte Frau Winkler, 
im Zusammenhang mit Ihrer zweiten Frage (Rolle des BMLFUW im Zusammenhang mit der 
Gefahr in Verzug Zulassung) muss ich Sie leider weiter verweisen und zwar an Herr 
Matthias Lentsch (matthias.lentsch@lebensministerium.at; Tel. 01/71100-2870), wobei ich 
glaube, dass auch die AGES Ihnen dazu ausreichend Information geben wird können. 
Zur Ausnahmeregelung im ÖPUL ist eigentlich nur soviel zu sagen, dass es im Jahr 2008 
auf Grund der vorgegebenen Bestimmungen (1.6.10.9 und 1.6.10.10 der Sonderrichtlinie 
ÖPUL 2007) auch für an der Maßnahme "Integrierte Produktion (IP) Obst und Hopfen" 
teilnehmende Betriebe möglich war Streptomycin einzusetzen, auch wenn dies in der 
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verpflichtend vorgeschriebenen Pflanzenschutzmittelliste nicht beinhaltet ist. Dabei wurde 
jedoch auf diesen Flächen mit Streptomycin-Einsatz keine IP Prämie (300 €/ha) gewährt. 
Die weitere Vorgangsweise im Jahr 2009 ist noch nicht endgültig festgelegt und hängt 
auch von den im Jahr 2008 gesammelten Erfahrungen ab. Die Sonderrichtlinie und die 
Pflanzenschutzmittellisten finden sie auf der Homepage des Lebensministeriums. 
Mit freundlichen Grüßen 
Lukas Weber-Hajszan  
Abteilung II 8, Biologische Landwirtschaft und Agrarumweltprogramme 
Stubenring 1, 1012 Wien 
Tel. (+43 1) 711 00-6816 
Fax (+43 1) 711 00-6507 
lukas.weber-hajszan@lebensministerium.at  
 
 
F) AMA 
From: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
To: unternehmenskommunikation@ama.gv.at 
Subject: Fallstudie an der Universität Wien: Streptomycin – Zulassung 
Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2008 11:56:47 +0200 
Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren! 
Im Rahmen der Diplomarbeit "Wechselwirkungen zwischen Umweltrecht und Wirtschaft" an 
der Universität Wien (Institut für Energie, Industrie und Umwelt) hat die Causa 
Feuerbrandbekämpfung mein Interesse geweckt und ich verfasse darüber eine Fallstudie 
im Rahmen der Diplomarbeit. 
Mein Betreuer (Herr DDr. Noll) möchte, dass ich herausarbeite welche 
Interessensvertretungen hier auf wen Druck ausübten, wer die bestehenden Gesetze zum 
Verbot des Streptomycins ausgehebelt hat (Instanzenzug), und dass ich Kosten-Nutzen-
Relationen aller Alternativen darstelle um die wirtschaftlichen Überlegungen ganzheitlich 
(wissenschaftlich) abzubilden.  
Im Zuge dieser Thematik hätte ich auch versucht über Ihre Homepage eine Stellungnahme 
zu diesem Thema zu finden, allerdings fehlen hier Inputs zu Streptomycin. Ich würde 
gerne wissen ob und welcher Form Ihre Organisation hier am 
Entscheidungsfindungsprozess beteiligt waren und hoffe, dass Sie mir bei meinen 
Recherchen zu dieser Fallstudie weiterhelfen können, damit ich diese Thema möglichst 
umfassend und lückenlos beleuchten kann. 
Ich wäre Ihnen daher ausserordentlich dankbar, wenn Sie diesbezüglich Zeit für ein 
Gespräch hätten oder mir mit Informationsmaterial weiterhelfen könnten und verbleibe mit 
freundlichen Grüßen,  
Simona Winkler  
Linzerstr. 14 
4490 St. Florian 
0680-2075465 
 
Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2008 17:54:27 +0200 
From: Hermine.Hackl@ama.gv.at 
To: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
CC: Martin.Gressl@ama.gv.at 
Subject: Antw: Wtrlt: Fallstudie an der Universität Wien: Streptomycin – Zulassung 
Sehr geehrte Frau Winkler!  
Der Leiter unserer Qualitätsmanagement-Abteilung, DI Martin Greßl, wäre da am ehesten 
der richtige Ansprechpartner dafür. Darf ich Sie bitten, sich unter Tel. 01/33151-444, E-
mail: martin.gressl@ama.gv.at gleich direkt an ihn zu wenden?  
Mit besten Grüßen  
Hermine Hackl  
Mag. Hermine HACKL 
Leiterin Unternehmenskommunikation  
Agrarmarkt Austria Marketing GesmbH. 
Dresdner Straße 68a, A-1200 Wien 
Tel. *43/1/33151-404  
Fax: *43/1/33151-499 
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Mobil 0664/837 61 78  
E-Mail: hermine.hackl@ama.gv.at 
Internet: www.ama-marketing.at 
 
From: diewinklers@hotmail.com  
To: martin.gressl@ama.gv.at 
Subject: Fallstudie an der Universität Wien: Streptomycin – Zulassung 
Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2008 03:18:05 +0200 
Sehr geehrter Herr Greßl! 
Im Rahmen der Diplomarbeit "Wechselwirkungen zwischen Umweltrecht und 
Wirtschaftsmacht" an der Universität Wien (Institut für Energie, Industrie und Umwelt) hat 
die Causa Feuerbrandbekämpfung mein Interesse geweckt und ich verfasse darüber eine 
Fallstudie. 
Ich soll herausarbeiten, wie es hier zu der Ausnahmeregelung und Umgehung des Verbots 
von Streptomycin kam (von welchen Institutionen/Interessensvertretungen das Vorgehen 
in dieser Richtung gefordert wurde), wer die bestehenden Gesetze zum Verbot ausgehebelt 
hat (Instanzenzug), und (um die betriebswirtschaftliche Beleuchtung zu vervollständigen) 
eine Kosten-Nutzen-Rechnung aller Alternativen anstellen.  
Über die Suchfunktion auf Ihrer Homepage habe ich leider zum Stichwort Streptomycin 
keine Ergebnisse gefunden. Ich würde gerne wissen ob und in welcher Form Ihre 
Organisation hier am Entscheidungsfindungsprozess beteiligt war und welchen Standpunkt 
Sie in dieser Angelegenheit vertreten. Vor allem erhoffe ich mir auch Informationen wie es 
zu der Sonderregelung kam, dass der Einsatz von Streptomycin nicht zum Verlust der 
ÖPUL-Förderung für den gesamten Betrieb, sondern nur zum Abzug der Förderung für 
behandelte Flächen erfolgt, und andere Spezialfragen, für die Sie mir von Frau Mag. 
Hermine Hackl als Ansprechpartner empfohlen wurden. 
Ich hoffe, dass Sie mir bei meinen Recherchen zu dieser Fallstudie weiterhelfen können, 
damit ich dieses Thema möglichst umfassend und lückenlos beleuchten kann und wäre 
Ihnen daher außerordentlich dankbar, wenn Sie diesbezüglich Zeit für ein Gespräch hätten 
oder mir mit Informationsmaterial weiterhelfen könnten. 
Mit freundlichen Grüßen,  
Simona Winkler 
Linzerstr. 14 
4490 St. Florian 
0680-2075465 
 
Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2008 13:58:43 +0200 
From: Martin.Gressl@ama.gv.at 
To: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
CC: Harald.Waitschacher@ama.gv.at; Hermine.Hackl@ama.gv.at; 
Rudolf.Himmelsberger@ama.gv.at 
Subject: Antw: Fallstudie an der Universität Wien: Streptomycin – Zulassung 
Sehr geehrte Fr. Winkler, 
Ich muss Sie leider nochmals auf andere Stellen verweisen, da die AMA Marketing GesmbH 
der falsche Ansprechpartner ist: 
Die Zulassungen zweier Mittel mit Streptomycin ("Strepto" und "Firewall 17 WP") bei 
Gefahr in Verzug gem. § 13 PMG wurden seitens des Bundesamtes für 
Ernährungssicherheit (BAES) erstellt.  
Für die Fragen zur ÖPUL-Förderung ist weder die AMA Marketing GesmbH noch die AMA als 
Zahlstelle zuständig, sondern das Lebensministerium (BMLFUW). Ich ersuche Sie daher 
direkt mit dem zuständigen Sachbearbeiter, Hr. Lukas Weber-Hajszan vom BMLFUW, 
Kontakt aufzunehmen (Tel. 01/71100-6816).  
mfg aus Wien 
martin greßl  
________________________________ 
DI Martin Greßl 
Leiter Qualitätsmanagement 
Agrarmarkt Austria Marketing GesmbH. 
Dresdner Straße 68a 
A-1200 Wien 
Tel: +43/1/33151-444 
Fax: +43/1/33151-499 
email: martin.gressl@ama.gv.at 
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G) Bauernbund OÖ - NO RESPONSE 
From: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
To: office@ooe.bauernbund.at 
Subject: Fallstudie an der Universität Wien - Zulassung von Streptomycin 
Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2008 12:02:54 +0200 
 
 
H) Globachem – NO RESPONSE 
From: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
To: globachem@globachem.com 
Subject: streptomycin 
Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2008 12:26:22 +0200 
 
Subject: RE: streptomycin 
Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2008 18:15:53 +0200 
From: Koen.Quaghebeur@globachem.com 
To: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
CC: erwin.zorn@zorn-pflanzenschutz.at 
Dear Ms. Winkler, 
Thanks for your interest in the product Strepto. 
I have put Herr Zorn from Zorn Pflanzenschutz in copy, as he is our distributor in Austria. 
He is the best person to reply on your questions. 
Can you please contact him ? 
Best regards, 
Koen Quaghebeur 
GLOBACHEM NV 
Leeuwerweg 138 
B-3803 Sint-Truiden 
Belgium 
Tel. 0032 11 78 57 17 
Fax 0032 11 68 15 65 
Mobile 0032 474 95 13 91 
Email: koen.quaghebeur@globachem.com 
Web: http://www.globachem.com 
 
From: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
To: erwin.zorn@zorn-pflanzenschutz.at 
Subject: Streptomycin 
Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2008 05:35:43 +0200 
 
 
I) Patty McManus – NO RESPONSE 
Patty Mc Manus 
mailto:psm@plantpath.wisc.edu 
http://www.pen.wisc.edu/mail/mail.php 
Referring: Case Study at the University of Vienna - "Agricultural use of Streptomycine" 
 
 
280 
J) Prof. Tautz – NO INPUTS 
From: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
To: tautz@biozentrum.uni-wuerzburg.de 
Subject: Improved risk assessment of pesticides using fitness tests for honey 
bees 
Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2008 11:35:57 +0200 
Sehr geehrter Herr Professor Tautz! 
Bei einem Interview zu meiner Diplomarbeitsfallstudie mit dem 
Oberösterreichischen Bienenvereinspräsidenten, Herrn Mag. Liedlbauer, bin ich 
auf Ihre Studie "Improved risk assessment of pesticides using fitness tests for 
honey bees" aufmerksam gemacht worden. 
Thema meiner Diplomarbeit: "Interactions of Environmental Law and Economic 
Power" Fallstudie: "Usage of Streptomycin to combat fire blight in Austria – a 
cost-benefit-analysis" an der Universität Wien, Institut für Industrie, Energie und 
Umwelt, Diplomarbeitsbetreuer: DDr. Noll Könnten Sie mir bitte den 
genannten Artikel weiterleiten, damit ich Ihre Argumente evtl. in meiner Arbeit 
zitieren kann? Haben Sie auch konkret bezüglich des Streptomycineinsatzes 
Artikel geschrieben oder andere Inputs, die mir hier weiterhelfen eine Kosten-
Nutzen-Rechnung des Antibiotika-Einsatzes umfassend zu erstellen? Ich wäre 
Ihnen um weiterführende Literatur sehr dankbar. 
Mit freundlichen Grüssen,  
Simona Winkler 
 
Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2008 11:46:24 +0200 
From: Tautz@biozentrum.uni-wuerzburg.de 
To: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
Subject:  
Liebe Simona, 
danke für Ihre mail. 
Bei dem Beitrag, den Sie zitieren, handelt sich es sich um ein unveröffentlichtes 
Schriftstück mit dem Hinweis auf die Fitnesstests, die die BEEgroup unter dem 
Namen BEEgnosis entwickelt hat und weiter entwickelt. Einen Einatz mit Agro-
Chemie gab es noch nicht. 
Herzlichst, 
Ihr Jürgen Tautz. 
-------------------------------------- 
Prof.Dr.Juergen Tautz 
Tel: (49) 931/888-4319 
Fax: (49) 931/888-4309 
BEEgroup Biozentrum Universitaet Wuerzburg 
Am Hubland, D-97074 Wuerzburg, Germany 
homepage: http://www.beegroup.de 
e-mail:tautz@biozentrum.uni-wuerzburg.de 
 
From: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
To: tautz@biozentrum.uni-wuerzburg.de 
Subject: RE: 
Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2008 11:56:41 +0200 
Sehr geehrter Herr Professor! 
Bei dem Interview wurde mir eine Ausgabe einer Imkerei-Technik Fachzeitschrift 
der Berufsimker in Deutschland gezeigt, in welcher eine Zusammenfassung Ihres 
Artikels in deutscher Übersetzung abgedruckt war!!! Genauer sind meine 
Aufzeichnungen leider nicht, weil ich annahm auf Ihrer Homepage mehr dazu zu 
erfahren. Herr Liedlbauer, meinte Sie wären vielleicht jemand der auf diesem 
Gebiet abschätzen kann, welchen Schaden der Streptomycin-Einsatz nicht nur 
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am Honigerlös (wegen der etwaigen Kontamination), sondern evtl. auch an den 
Bienen anrichtet. 
Mit freundlichen Grüßen,  
Simona Winkler 
 
Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2008 12:19:40 +0200 
From: Tautz@biozentrum.uni-wuerzburg.de 
To: diewinklers@hotmail.com 
Subject:  
Liebe Simona, 
in dem Beitrag wurde höchstwahrscheinlich aus einem offenen Schreiben von mir 
zitiert, vermute ich mal. Da wissen Sie mehr als ich ;-) 
herzlichst,  
Ihr Jürgen Tautz. 
-------------------------------------- 
Prof.Dr.Juergen Tautz 
Tel: (49) 931/888-4319 
Fax: (49) 931/888-4309 
BEEgroup Biozentrum Universitaet Wuerzburg 
Am Hubland, D-97074 Wuerzburg, Germany 
homepage: http://www.beegroup.de 
e-mail:tautz@biozentrum.uni-wuerzburg.de 
 
Hence: No inputs retrieved 
 
K) GREENPEACE - – NO RESPONSE 
To: attila.cerman@greenpeace.at 
Subject: Streptomycin Fallstudie an der Uni Wien 
Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2008 09:20:07 +0200 
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ANNEX III to the Case Study: Legal Texts 
 
a) Excursus on 91/414/EEC Article 4 (1) b  
(As mentioned before only substances listed in the in the Annex I of the directive are 
allowed to be used,) “unless it is established, in the light of current scientific and technical 
kowledge and shown from appraisal of the dossier provided for in Annex III, that when 
used in accordance with Article 3 (3)772, and having regard to all normal conditions under 
which it may be used, and to the consequences of its use:  
• it is sufficiently effective;  
• it has no unacceptable effect on plants or plant products;  
• it does not cause unnecessary suffering and pain to vertebrates to be 
controlled;  
• it has no harmful effect on human or animal health, directly or indirectly (e.g. 
through drinking water, food or feed) or on groundwater;  
• it has no unacceptable influence on the environment, having particular regard 
to the following considerations:  
• its fate and distribution in the environment, particularly contamination of water 
including drinking water and groundwater,  
• its impact on non-target species;” 
 
b) 91/414/EEC Article 4 (1) (b) (iv) and (v) 
“Member States shall ensure that a plant protection product is not authorized unless: (b) it 
is established, in the light of current scientific and technical kowledge [sic!] and shown 
from appraisal of the dossier provided for in Annex III, that when used in accordance with 
Article 3 (3)773, and having regard to all normal conditions under which it may be used, 
and to the consequences of its use: (iv) it has no harmful effect on human or animal 
health, directly or indirectly (e.g. through drinking water, food or feed) or on groundwater; 
(v) it has no unacceptable influence on the environment, having particular regard to the 
following considerations: — its fate and distribution in the environment, particularly 
contamination of water including drinking water and groundwater, — its impact on non-
target species” 
 
c) 91/414/EEC Annex II-IV Requirements 
Requirements of the Annex II - IV from the Council Directive 91/414/EEC (existent data 
for BP):  
“ANNEX II - REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DOSSIER TO BE SUBMITTED FOR THE INCLUSION 
OF AN ACTIVE SUBSTANCE IN ANNEX I - PART B (Active substances) 
1. IDENTITY OF THE MICRO-ORGANISM 
1.1. Applicant 
1.2. Producer 
1.3. Name and species description, strain characterisation 
1.4. Specification of the material used for manufacturing of formulated 
                                          
772 MS shall prescribe that plant protection products must be used properly. Proper use 
shall include compliance with the conditions established in accordance with Article 4 and 
specified on the labelling, and the application of the principles of good plant protection practice 
as well as, whenever possible, the principles of integrated control 
773 Remark by the author: 91/414/EEC Article 3 (3) says: “Member States shall 
prescribe that plant protection products must be used properly. Proper use shall include 
compliance with the conditions established in accordance with Article 4 and specified on the 
labelling, and the application of the principles of good plant protection practice as well as, 
whenever possible, the principles of integrated control” 
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products 
1.4.1. Content of the micro-organism 
1.4.2. Identity and content of impurities, additives, contaminating microorganisms 
1.4.3. Analytical profile of batches 
2. BIOLOGICAL PROPERTIES OF THE MICRO-ORGANISM 
2.1. History of the micro-organism and its uses. Natural occurrence 
and geographical distribution 
2.2. Information on target organism(s) 
2.2.1. Description of the target organism(s) 
2.2.2. Mode of action 
2.3. Host specificity range and effects on species other than the target 
harmful organism 
2.4. Development stages/life cycle of the micro-organism 
2.5. Infectiveness, dispersal and colonisation ability 
2.6. Relationships to known plant or animal or human pathogens 
2.7. Genetic stability and factors affecting it 
2.8. Information on the production of metabolites (especially toxins) 
2.9. Antibiotics and other anti-microbial agents 
3. FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE MICRO-ORGANISM 
3.1. Function 
3.2. Field of use envisaged 
3.3. Crops or products protected or treated 
3.4. Method of production and quality control 
3.5. Information on the occurrence or possible occurrence of the development 
of resistance of the target organism(s) 
3.6. Methods to prevent loss of virulence of seed stock of the microorganism 
3.7. Recommended methods and precautions concerning handling, 
storage, transport or fire 
3.8. Procedures for destruction or decontamination 
3.9. Measures in case of an accident 
4. ANALYTICAL METHODS 
4.1. Methods for the analysis of the micro-organism as manufactured 
4.2. Methods to determine and quantify residues (viable or non-viable) 
5. EFFECTS ON HUMAN HEALTH 
TIER I 
5.1. Basic information 
5.1.1. Medical data 
5.1.2. Medical surveillance on manufacturing plant personnel 
5.1.3. Sensitisation/allergenicity observations, if appropriate 
5.1.4. Direct observation, e.g. clinical cases 
5.2. Basic studies 
5.2.1. Sensitisation (1) 
5.2.2.1. Acute oral toxicity, pathogenicity and infectiveness 
5.2.2.2. Acute inhalation toxicity, pathogenicity and infectiveness 
5.2.2.3. Intraperitoneal/ subcutaneous single dose 
5.2.3. Genotoxicity testing 
5.2.3.1. In vitro studies 
5.2.4. Cell culture study 
5.2.5. Information on short-term toxicity and pathogenicity 
5.2.5.1. Health effects after repeated inhalatory exposure 
( E N D OF T I E R I ) 
TIER II 
5.3. Specific toxicity, pathogenicity and infectiveness studies 
5.4. In vivo studies in somatic cells 
5.5. Genotoxicity — In vivo studies in germ cells 
( E N D OF T I E R II ) 
5.6. Summary of mammalian toxicity, pathogenicity and infectiveness 
and overall evaluation 
6. RESIDUES IN OR ON TREATED PRODUCTS, FOOD AND FEED 
6.1. Persistance and likelihood of multiplication in or on crops, feedingstuffs 
or foodstuffs 
6.2. Further information required 
6.2.1. Non-viable residues 
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6.2.2. Viable residues 
6.3. Summary and evaluation of residue behaviour resulting from data 
submitted under points 6.1 and 6.2 
7. FATE AND BEHAVIOUR IN THE ENVIRONMENT 
7.1. Persistence and multiplication 
7.1.1. Soil 
7.1.2. Water 
7.1.3. Air 
7.2. Mobility 
8. EFFECTS ON NON-TARGET ORGANISMS 
8.1. Effects on birds 
8.2. Effects on aquatic organisms 
8.2.1. Effects on fish 
8.2.2. Effects on freshwater invertebrates 
8.2.3. Effects on algae growth 
8.2.4. Effects on plants other than algae 
8.3. Effects on bees 
8.4. Effects on arthropods other than bees 
8.5. Effects on earthworms 
8.6. Effects on non-target soil micro-organisms 
8.7. Additional studies 
9. SUMMARY AND EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
 
ANNEX III - REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DOSSIER TO BE SUBMITTED FOR THE 
AUTHORIZATION OF A PLANT PROTECTION PRODUCT - PART B 
1. IDENTITY OF THE PLANT PROTECTION PRODUCT 
1.1. Applicant 
1.2. Manufacturer of the preparation and the micro-organism(s) 
1.3. Trade name or proposed trade name, and manufacturer's development code number 
of the preparation if appropriate 
1.4. Detailed quantitative and qualitative information on the composition of the 
preparation 
1.5. Physical state and nature of the preparation 
1.6. Function 
2. PHYSICAL, CHEMICAL AND TECHNICAL PROPERTIES OF THE PLANT PROTECTION 
PRODUCT 
2.1. Appearance (colour and odour) 
2.2. Storage stability and shelf-life 
2.2.1. Effects of light, temperature and humidity on technical characteristics of the plant 
protection product 
2.2.2. Other factors affecting stability 
2.3. Explosivity and oxidising properties 
2.4. Flash point and other indications of flammability or spontaneous ignition 
2.5. Acidity, alkalinity and if necessary pH value 
2.6. Viscosity and surface tension 
2.7. Technical characteristics of the plant protection product 
2.7.1. Wettability 
2.7.2. Persistent foaming 
2.7.3. Suspensibility and suspension stability 
2.7.4. Dry sieve test and wet sieve test 
2.7.5. Particle size distribution (dustable and wettable powders, granules), content of 
dust/fines (granules), attrition and friability (granules) 
2.7.7. Flowability, pourability (rinsability) and dustability 
2.8. Physical, chemical and biological compatibility with other products including plant 
protection products with which its use is to be authorised 
2.8.1. Physical compatibility 
2.8.2. Chemical compatibility 
2.8.3. Biological compatibility 
2.9. Adherence and distribution to seeds 
2.10. Summary and evaluation of data presented under points 2.1 to 2.9 
3. DATA ON APPLICATION 
3.1. Field of use envisaged 
3.2. Mode of action 
285 
3.3. Details of intended use 
3.4. Application rate 
3.5. Content of micro-organism in material used (e.g. in the diluted 
spray, baits or treated seed) 
3.6. Method of application 
3.7. Number and timing of applications and duration of protection 
3.8. Necessary waiting periods or other precautions to avoid phytopathogenic 
effects on succeeding crops 
3.9. Proposed instructions for use 
4. FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE PLANT PROTECTION PRODUCT 
4.1. Packaging and compatibility of the preparation with proposed 
packaging materials 
4.2. Procedures for cleaning application equipment 
4.3. Re-entry periods, necessary waiting periods or other precautions 
to protect man, livestock and the environment 
4.4. Recommended methods and precautions concerning: handling, 
storage, transport or fire 
4.5. Measures in the case of an accident 
4.6. Procedures for destruction or decontamination of the plant 
protection product and its packaging 
4.6.1. Controlled incineration 
4.6.2. Others 
5. ANALYTICAL METHODS 
5.1. Methods for the analysis of the preparation 
5.2. Methods to determine and quantify residues 
6. EFFICACY DATA 
7. EFFECTS ON HUMAN HEALTH 
7.1. Basic acute toxicity studies 
7.1.1. Acute oral toxicity 
7.1.2. Acute inhalation toxicity 
7.1.3. Acute percutaneous toxicity 
7.2. Additional acute toxicity studies 
7.2.1. Skin irritation 
7.2.2. Eye irritation 
7.2.3. Skin sensitisation 
7.3. Data on exposure 
7.4. Available toxicological data relating to non-active substances 
7.5. Supplementary studies for combinations of plant protection products 
7.6. Summary and evaluation of health effects 
8. RESIDUES IN OR ON TREATED PRODUCTS, FOOD AND FEED 
9. FATE AND BEHAVIOUR IN THE ENVIRONMENT 
10. EFFECTS ON NON-TARGET ORGANISMS 
10.1. Effects on birds 
10.2. Effects on aquatic organisms 
10.3. Effects on bees 
10.4. Effects on arthropods other than bees 
10.5. Effects on earthworms 
10.6. Effects on soil micro-organisms 
10.7. Additional studies 
11. SUMMARY AND EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
 
ANNEX IV - STANDARD PHRASES FOR SPECIAL RISKS FOR HUMANS OR THE 
ENVIRONMENT AS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 16 
 
ANNEX VI - PART II - UNIFORM PRINCIPLES FOR EVALUATION AND AUTHORISATION OF 
PLANT PROTECTION PRODUCTS CONTAINING MICROORGANISMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
B. EVALUATION 
1. General principles 
2. Specific principles 
2.1. Identity 
2.1.1. Identity of the micro-organism in the plant protection product 
2.1.2. Identity of the plant protection product 
286 
2.2. Biological, physical, chemical and technical properties 
2.2.1. Biological properties of the micro-organism in the plant protection 
product 
2.2.2. Physical, chemical and technical properties of the plant protection 
product 
2.3. Further information 
2.3.1. Quality control of the production of the micro-organism in the plant 
protection product 
2.3.2. Quality control of the plant protection product 
2.4. Efficacy 
2.5. Identification/detection and quantification methods 
2.5.1. Analytical methods for the plant protection product 
2.5.2. Analytical methods for the determination of residues 
2.6. Impact on human and animal health 
2.6.1. Effects on human or animal health arising from the plant protection 
product 
2.6.2. Effects on human or animal health arising from residues 
2.7. Fate and behaviour in the environment 
2.8. Effects on and exposure of non-target organisms 
2.9. Conclusions and proposals 
C. DECISION-MAKING 
1. General principles 
2. Specific principles 
2.1. Identity 
2.2. Biological and technical properties 
2.3. Further information 
2.4. Efficacy 
2.5. Identification/detection and quantification methods 
2.6. Impact on human and animal health 
2.6.1. Effects on human or animal health arising from the plant protection 
product 
2.6.2. Effects on human or animal health arising from residues 
2.7. Fate and behaviour in the environment 
2.8. Effects on non-target organisms” 
 
d) [EXTOXNET] 
This information sheet taken from [EXTOXNET]774 regarding streptomycin shows how 
many inputs are still missing: 
ACUTE TOXICITY:  
The EPA has classified it as Toxicity class IV- relatively non- toxic.  
LD50 (dose which kills half of the test animals) is 9,000 mg/kg for rats and >10,000 
mg/kg for mice. 
CHRONIC TOXICITY:  
Reproductive Effects: n.a. (meaning “No information currently available”) 
Teratogenic Effects: Rabbits dosed with 5 or 10 mg/kg/day of streptomycin showed no 
teratogenic effects.  
Mutagenic Effects: n.a. 
Carcinogenic Effects: n.a. 
Organ Toxicity: Studies have shown that streptomycin can cause ear damage which is 
greatest in people exposed for four weeks or more. Can cause kidney damage. In rare 
cases, streptomycin can cause paralysis.  
Fate in Humans and Animals: Topical application or aerosol delivery results in minimal 
absorption. Streptomycin is not metabolized by the body.  
ECOLOGICAL EFFECTS 
Effects on Birds: Streptomycin is practically non-toxic to birds. 
                                          
774 = Extension Toxicology Network: A Pesticide Information Project of Cooperative 
Extension Offices of Cornell University, Michigan State University, Oregon State University, and 
University of California at Davis 
287 
Effects on Aquatic Organisms: Streptomycin is practically non-toxic to fresh water 
invertebrates. It is slightly toxic to warm and cold water species of fish. It is very toxic to 
algae. 
Effects on Other Animals (Nontarget species): used for cats. Dogs which consume 
streptomycin develop resistance to the compound in the intestinal microorganisms 
ENVIRONMENTAL FATE 
Breakdown of Chemical in Soil and Groundwater: n.a. 
Breakdown of Chemical in Water: n.a. 
Breakdown of Chemical in Vegetation: Residues of streptomycin are not detectable in or on 
crops when treated according to label use rates and directions. Streptomycin may cause 
chlorosis to corn, grapes, pears, peaches, and certain ornamentals.  
Exposure Guidelines: NOEL: 125 mg/kg/day (rats), ADI: 0.05 mg/kg 
 
e) [ÖPUL 2007] 
[ÖPUL 2007] p. 14: “1.6.10.9 Bei flächenverändernden Umständen, auf die der 
Förderungswerber keinen Einfluss hat und die nicht auf seinen Antrag oder seine Initiative 
eintreten (zB im Rahmen von Grundstückszusammenlegungsverfahren oder sonstigen 
öffentlichen Bodenordnungsverfahren, Enteignung, Vorliegen enteignungsfähiger 
Sachverhalte) und welche die Einhaltung der Verpflichtungen dauerhaft unmöglich 
machen, kann die AMA die Verpflichtung auf den betroffenen Flächen vorzeitig beenden 
und von einer Rückforderung bereits gewährter Mittel Abstand nehmen, wenn die 
verändernden Umstände dem Förderungswerber zum Zeitpunkt der Eingehung der 
Verpflichtung noch nicht bekannt sein konnten und die vorgesehene Meldung im Rahmen 
des Mehrfachantrags – Flächen oder spätestens mit der Sachverhaltserhebung zur 
Verpflichtungsüberprüfung erfolgt. 
1.6.10.10 Bei bewirtschaftungsverändernden Umständen, auf die der Förderungswerber 
keinen Einfluss hat und die nicht auf seinen Antrag oder seine Initiative eintreten (zB 
veterinärbehördliche Anordnungen, verpflichtende Rodung wegen Feuerbrand) und welche 
die Einhaltung der Verpflichtung dauerhaft unmöglich machen, kann die AMA die 
Verpflichtung vorzeitig beenden und von einer Rückforderung bereits gewährter Mittel 
Abstand nehmen, wenn die verändernden Umstände dem Förderungswerber zum 
Zeitpunkt der Eingehung der Verpflichtung noch nicht bekannt sein konnten und die 
diesbezügliche Meldung umgehend erfolgt.” 
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Executive Summary 
Generally public goods, of which environmental protection is an example, give 
rise to market failures because of free-rider- and open access resource problems. 
Furthermore externalities, asymmetric information, market power and the 
associated problems lead to insufficient provision of environmental protection. If 
the market cannot be relied upon to achieve the equilibrium between the 
competing goals “healthy environment” and (polluting) “economic activities”, 
governmental intervention is necessary. An historical review of the developments 
in trade regulation, the environmental movement and the European “greening” 
process is given. Governments need to develop efficient and effective 
environmental protection frameworks consisting of normative and non-normative 
instruments to steer the economy towards sustainability and a socially optimal 
level of environmental protection. A variety of governmental power-instruments is 
discussed. However, governments, just as the free market, do not necessarily 
produce the best results: the choice and correct application of strategies can be 
frequently flawed by government failures - decisions being subject to bias 
because of information failures, individualistic behaviour and bad management. 
Clearly, the higher the impacts of governmental interference and regulation on 
companies, the more resistance can be expected. Anticipated counter pressure 
opportunities of businesses are listed by their rising grade. The role of 
governments is to integrate the consideration of risks and impacts on the 
environment into the set of managerial decision-making-processes of the 
economy, without taking over responsibility and diminishing economic flexibility. 
Environmental policy has to balance conflicting demands efficiently and effectively 
through the appropriate use of instruments. Ideally governmental decision 
processes are guided by social cost benefit analyses, assigning values to tangible, 
but also intangible impacts (such as the quality of life). The full social costs of 
certain economic activities are highly interdependent and synergistic; the 
calculation is therefore very sophisticated and requires expert knowledge (that 
may not be wholly objective). National political activities as a whole include many 
unsustainable initiatives: partly because environmental protection is not the first 
priority of many governmental departments, and because those governmental 
departments, for which environmental protection should be a priority, fail to 
withstand counter-pressures of the regulated economic players. Therefore 
academia needs to assist with more research on the institutional setting of the 
policy-making process, in order to achieve that environmental concerns are taken 
seriously. Yet, the author experienced a severe gap in academic literature 
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regarding the use of economic power to oppose environmental policy and hopes 
that more attention will be paid to this topic in future.  
The case study reveals an incident of interaction of governmental and economic 
power: the intervention to achieve the authorisation of the antibiotic 
“streptomycin” for agricultural use against fire blight in Austria, although actually 
forbidden in the EU, by “danger-in-delay”-exemption. Fire blight is an highly 
infectious plant disease, caused by the bacteria “Erwinia amylovora”, affecting 
several pome fruit trees of high commercial interest such as apple, pear and 
quince. Consequently the occurrence of fire blight in orchards can cause severe 
economic damage. Since there are no cures the plant-pathogen has been found 
hard to control worldwide. In Austria controversies have arisen regarding the 
preventative use of streptomycin, because of possible consequences, which are 
e.g.: environmental deterioration (disturbances in soil equilibrium, water 
contamination, damaging small aquatic organisms), health hazards (rising 
resistance to antibiotics, allergies) and economic damage (possible contamination 
of honey, image losses). Other preventative measures, besides streptomycin, 
exist. In the study, the environmentally safe product “Blossom Protect” and the 
antibiotic are contrasted in a social cost benefit analysis. The case showed that 
market failures correlating to the issue have made governmental interference 
necessary. But also governmental failures have been identified by the author, 
which are information failures towards the public (“no health risks”, uncommon 
information policy, missing transparency and neglected “public’s right to know”), 
but also towards the pome-fruit orchardists (non-information on the negative 
effects of streptomycin, dismissing existing alternatives). Further governmental 
failures such as regulatory captures and deficient management (due to missing 
consolidated data, decisions in the absence of a cost benefit analysis), amongst 
others, are detected. Furthermore the seemingly unreasonable withdrawal of the 
AMA quality seal for acreages treated with the plant protection product Blossom 
Protect (allowed in organic farming), is judged to have been some kind of “act of 
reprisal” against the producers: they had been suspected to have caused the 
media hype drawing public attention towards the issue of the agricultural use of 
the antibiotic. To acquire the necessary expert knowledge, interviews with 
qualified representatives of stakeholders have been held. The author has tried to 
assess the bargaining process regarding the authorisation of the use of 
streptomycin and the stakeholders’ possibilities to wield power. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Kollektivgüter, wie zum Beispiel Umweltschutz, haben (u.a.) wegen der 
Trittbrettfahrer- und der Allmendeproblematik Marktversagen zur Folge. Auch die 
mit negativen externen Effekten, asymmetrischer Information und Marktmacht 
verbundenen Probleme führen zu unzureichendem Umweltschutz. Wenn der freie 
Markt kein zuverlässiges Gleichgewicht zwischen den konkurrierenden Zielen 
„gesunde Umwelt“ und (umweltverschmutzenden) „ökonomische Aktivitäten“ 
herstellen kann, ist staatliches Eingreifen notwendig. In einem geschichtlichen 
Rückblick werden Entwicklungen des Handelsrechts, das Entstehen der 
Umweltbewegung und des Europäischen Umweltprozesses dargestellt. 
Regierungen müssen mittels Rechtsgrundlagen und anderen Instrumenten 
effiziente und effektive Umweltschutzsysteme entwerfen, um die Wirtschaft auf 
nachhaltige Pfade zu lenken, damit das gesamtpolitisch optimale Umweltschutz-
Niveau erreicht werden kann. Eine Reihe von Möglichkeiten Staatsmacht 
einzusetzen wird beschrieben. Allerdings können Regierungen, so wie auch der 
freie Markt, zu sub-optimalen Resultaten führen: Mängel in der Festlegung und 
Umsetzung von Strategien führen oft zu Staatsversagen (Entscheidungen 
aufgrund von Informationsfehlern, Eigennutzenmaximierung und Misswirtschaft). 
Je größer die Auswirkungen von staatlichen Eingriffen und Regulierungen sind, 
desto mehr Widerstand wird von den (betroffenen) Firmen erwartet werden 
müssen. Voraussichtliche Gegendruck-Maßnahmen der Wirtschaft sind ihrem 
steigenden Grade nach angeführt. Rolle der Regierungen ist es, Überlegungen 
bezüglich Umwelt-Auswirkungen und Risiken in betriebliche 
Entscheidungsprozesse einfließen zu lassen, ohne dabei Verantwortung 
abzunehmen und die Flexibilität von Betrieben einzuschränken. Aufgabe der 
Umweltpolitik ist es, die Ausgewogenheit kollidierender Anforderungen durch den 
Einsatz geeigneter Instrumente effizient und effektiv herzustellen. Idealerweise 
orientiert sich der staatliche Entscheidungsprozess dabei an einer Social-Cost-
Benefit-Analyse, die sowohl materiellen, als auch immateriellen Auswirkungen 
(wie z.B. die Lebensqualität) Rechnung trägt. Die gesellschaftlichen Vollkosten 
gewisser ökonomischer Aktivitäten sind sehr verflochten und haben 
synergistischen Charakter; die Berechnung ist daher äußerst kompliziert und 
erfordert (eventuell nicht objektives) Fachwissen. Die Gesamtheit der politischen 
Betätigungen in einem Land besteht aus vielen nicht nachhaltigen Initiativen; 
teilweise aufgrund der mangelnden Priorität des Umweltschutzes in manchen 
Ressorts, aber auch weil Institutionen, die Umweltschutz sogar als Priorität 
hätten, dem Gegendruck der regulierten Wirtschaftssubjekte nicht standhalten. 
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Es obliegt daher der akademischen Welt durch Erforschung der institutionellen 
Rahmenbedingungen politischer Prozesse Unterstützungsarbeit zu leisten, damit 
Umweltfragen (besser) Gehör finden. Bezüglich des Einsatzes von 
Wirtschaftsmacht, um sich der Umweltpolitik zu widersetzen, bietet die 
wissenschaftliche Literatur, nach den Erfahrungen der Verfasserin, derzeit noch 
sehr wenig Anhaltspunkte und es wird auf mehr zukünftige Beachtung dieser 
Thematik gehofft. 
Die Fallstudie untersucht ein Begebnis der wechselseitigen Beeinflussung von 
staatlicher und ökonomischer Macht: die Erlangung einer „Gefahr im Verzug“-
Ausnahmegenehmigung des in der EU verbotenen Antibiotikums „Streptomycin“ 
für den landwirtschaftlichen Einsatz gegen den Feuerbrand in Österreich. 
Feuerbrand ist eine hochinfektiöse Pflanzenkrankheit, die von dem Bakterium 
„Erwinia amylovora“ hervorgerufen wird, und mehrere Kernobstbaumsorten von 
hohem gewerblichem Interesse befallen kann, wie z.B. Apfel, Birne und Quitte. 
Das Auftreten von Feuerbrand in Obstplantagen kann daher beachtlichen 
ökonomischen Schaden anrichten. Nachdem es keine Heilmittel gibt, fällt es 
weltweit schwierig den Krankheitserreger einzudämmen. In Österreich hat der 
präventive Einsatz von Streptomycin wegen u.a. folgender möglicher 
Konsequenzen zu Unstimmigkeiten geführt: Umweltschädigung (Störung des 
Gleichgewichts im Boden, Kontaminierung des Wassers, Schädigung von 
Fischnährtieren), Gesundheitsrisiken (zunehmende Antibiotikaresistenzen, 
Allergien) und ökonomische Schädigung (mögliche Belastung des Honigs, 
Imageverlust). Abgesehen von Streptomycin existieren aber auch noch andere 
präventive Maßnahmen. In der Studie werden das für die Umwelt harmlose 
Pflanzenschutzmittel „Blossom Protect“ und das Antibiotikum in einer Social-Cost-
Benefit-Analyse einander gegenübergestellt. Der Fall hat gezeigt, dass 
auftretende Marktfehler in diesem Fall das Eingreifen des Staates notwendig 
gemacht haben. Aber es wurden auch Staatsversagen in Form von 
Informationsfehlern in Richtung Öffentlichkeit („kein Gesundheitsrisiko“, 
eigenartige Informationspolitik, fehlende Transparenz und missachtetes Recht des 
Zugangs zu Informationen) und in Richtung der Erwerbsobstbauern (fehlende 
Aufklärung über die negativen Auswirkungen des Streptomycin-Einsatzes, Abtun 
existierender Alternativen) festgestellt. Weiters wurde „Regulatory Capture“, 
unzureichendes Management (aufgrund fehlender konsolidierter Daten und des 
Fällens von Entscheidungen in Ermangelung einer Cost-Benefit-Analyse) und auch 
andere Staatsversagen festgestellt. Zudem wurde das AMA-Gütesiegel für die mit 
dem Pflanzenschutzmittel Blossom Protect behandelten Flächen, aus völlig 
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unverständlichen Gründen, ausgesetzt. Dabei muss es sich wohl um einen 
„Vergeltungsschlag“ gegen die Produzenten des alternativen Produktes gehandelt 
haben, die mit dem, um die landwirtschaftliche Verwendung von Antibiotika 
herum entstandenen, Medienrummel in Zusammenhang gebracht wurden. Für die 
Aneignung des nötigen Expertenwissens wurden kompetente Vertreter 
verschiedener Stakeholder interviewt und der Versuch angestellt, die jeweiligen 
Möglichkeiten der Machtausübung im Hinblick auf die Zulassung von Streptomycin 
zu bewerten. 
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